Janus

I'm thinking of intentionality as planning, as having reasons for action, not simply as response to environments. Thinking and deliberate action: I be...

I see the naturalism of science as being methodologically necessary. I mean it just really cannot take metaphysics into account; it can only work with...

I can only aspire not to be stupid about it, and hope that I'm not being (too) stupid about it. :smile:

Right, we don't create the world, we construct it from pre-cognitive influences we cannot become conscious of. So, we are more like demiurges than cre...

I don't believe we are disagreeing at all. I also think things are just the way they appear (and can appear, with the augmentations of our senses affo...

That's interesting; when I visualize a circle it's just a space enclosed by a line and has no colour.

:up: I agree.

That's an interesting question regarding whether phenomenology should be counted as science. Husserl's 'back to the things' seems to echo the sciences...

I was thinking more along the lines of pre-critical ancient schools of philosophy with their (unquestioned) doctrines and spiritual exercises as descr...

I have no argument whatsoever with that. I think that certain kinds of beliefs are necessarily associated with action. Beliefs about what we are capab...

Right :up:

Was that driven more by philosophy or the discovery of fossil fuels?

:up: I think this is a good OP. I'm going out soon, (it's 5PM Saturday evening here and I'm off to a "vinyl revival" two turntable DJ-ed reggae dance ...

Cheers... I agree it is necessarily blurry; and as far as I am aware philosophy of science is yet to establish any perfectly clear and clean boundary ...

The idea of a disembodied subject seems to derive from a focus on the visual. We also touch and feel, taste, hear and smell things which to varying de...

Scientific practice ideally consists in unbiased and (as much as is humanly possible) presuppositionless inquiry. The abandonment of belief in what is...

I think we can be confident that people believe many things; beliefs which do not make themselves evident in their actions. For example do not many pe...

Philosophy as poetry or poesis... concept creation and self-making and self-transforming?

Reflecting on my own experience I find I can think in images or I can 'hear' my thoughts as 'spoken' in English. I can only think things which can be ...

Where is the boundary between intentional action and internally directed action? Single celled organisms demonstrate internally directed action; do yo...

Too intelligble for Finnegans Wake...more in the style of Ulysees in my view.

We can think in images, but that is not abstract thinking. We can imagine generic objects and associate them with particulars with which they share mo...

This is not true at all. What you call "shooting them down" I call "raising legitimate questions about them". From my perspective it seems you very of...

To me that seems to be a tendentious and poorly informed psychological explanation for a controversy which is understandable in a difficult area of ph...

I take this to be referring to the space and time we intuit, the subjective intuition of space and time. I think he's saying that we cannot rightly ex...

I think that is a misunderstanding of Kant. I don't understand Kant to say that time and space are only the perfect forms of intuition, but that we ca...

The passage above is not a quote from Husserl, but from you or someone else who claims to know what Husserl believed. In any case who cares what Husse...

Things don't exist from any particular point of view; they are perceived from points of view. They don't even exist for us from any particular point o...

Right, I don't deny the idea that we can think of mind as fundamental (in some sense we have no way of understanding) but that wouldn't change the sta...

QM does not undermine the mind-independent status of objects, although it might throw it into question. You seem to be jumping to unwarranted conclusi...

I'm not talking about seeing different light frequencies or seeing things in exactly the same ways or as having the same meanings, but simply about se...

That doesn't seem relevant: I don't even know what it is like to be you. I do, however know that we all, you me and the dogs see the same objects; thi...

This cannot explain how it is that other species see the same things we do. Also, we have individual intelligences, so my intelligence could not make ...

Object permanence is not strictly speaking a phenomenon. All we know, phenomenologically speaking (and of course trusting our memories) is that object...

If what I've read on this is accurate the human can distinguish about 10 million colours, although for simplicity we don't have many different names f...

How about a simple rating system? One to five stars like the rating of books on Amazon, or a scale of one to ten?

When I said "not so different" I wasn't suggesting there are no differences. The differences seem to rely on the (untestable) truth regarding purporte...

The name simply belongs to an imaginary character. It's not all that different to historical characters; they live on (for us at least) only in the im...

:ok:

:cool:

Something like this was pretty much my motivation for involvement with a Gurdjieff group, but the "more" I was looking for, I've come to realize is ri...

I tend to agree with you, although I acknowledge this is not a good fit for many others. It seems to me that questions that you or I may find merely i...

Which is precisely what I acknowledged above when I said you were rehearsing the ontological argument. The connection speaks only to Kant's concerns. ...

You are rehearsing Anselm's ontological argument, which I think Kant rightly disposed of. Such a being is an imaginary being (as far as we can know). ...

I actually agree with you in disliking OLP: they are like anally retentive thought police who reject the creativity involved in the idea that words ca...

What would be the logical structure of a meaningless judgement? It was pretty much my point, that making a proposition about a subject presupposes tha...

Surely imaginary predicates may be attributed to imaginary things, no? Also, is "imaginary" a predicate?

Do you mean can actual existence be denied of an actual thing? Would you affirm or deny existence of an imaginary thing?

Exactly, but it seems some minds are not satisfied with anything that is not black or white. The world must be either completely mind-dependent or com...

Yes, but logical positivism goes too far in ruling out metaphysical speculation as being totally useless. And it was precisely here that both Wittgens...