Presumably there is only one way for reality to be, so it is not imaginative possibilities for reality, but exploring ways we can imagine reality migh...
OK, I see what you mean now. It doesn't follow from the fact that there will be a definite future that we can, or could even in principle, know what t...
I like to think more in terms of insights than in terms of views. (Metaphysical) system building I see as a strange for of poetry, and exercise of the...
It depends on how you understand the practice of philosophy. @"Fooloso4" will correct me if I have misunderstood; I understand the dialectic to be, no...
If mental events just are physical events looked at from a different angle, then both would be causal. and mental events would not be illusory, but si...
Yes, perhaps it is an altered, yet 'ordinary', state of consciousness...like a 'flow' state or "being in the zone". That seems right to me...it is sim...
Perhaps, according to Kant, there could be no accessibility. I would take this to mean "no discursive accessibility", but I don't know what Kant thoug...
I tried to read Tse's book about fifteen years ago, but I have to admit I found it unconvincing (assuming that I understood it). Mental causation, for...
Not exactly: I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merel...
Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant in Schopenhauer, n...
It seems to me that this ignores the distinction between things-in-themselves and 'things-in-themselves' as thought. To be sure the thing in itself is...
It seems inescapable logically, that if everything In itself is basically Will and not material (as Schopenhauer asserted) then being must be equated/...
As do every chemical reaction or energy exchange and absolutely every change of any kind. The question really is 'what is that "you" apart from the to...
If there are actual alternative future possibilities, why would we not have been able to do otherwise than we did in the past? By alternative future p...
Again, you show your poor reading skills. I said: That is very far from saying "that everyone who lived before modern optics must have been a naive re...
Yes, I agree they could be realists who don't believe in the ultimate tangible quality of real existents. That was pretty much implicit when I wrote "...
:ok: I'll take that as a "no". If you take that passage to be explicitly equating thinking with being, then I would say your lack of reading comprehen...
I think it's arguable that material (whatever that material might have been thought to fundamentally be) was generally, and largely still is, understo...
If the things of the world are understood to be independent of the human mind, then that would be compatible with naive realism, regardless of what ki...
But if things are made of "stuff", that suggests materialism, and if not materialism, then realism at least. You can be a naive realist and hold that ...
It seems that, by and large, the ancient and medieval philosophers were naive realists even if they believed in the reality of a higher realm. This is...
It's a simple description of human behavior, and since morality has everything to do with human behavior it is of course relevant. If you can't see th...
I haven't purported to be presenting a moral theory, but rather just a description of how people are and what they do. People have moral feelings and ...
They are not tautologies; people don't have to be thus motivated. What I'm getting through to you is that I don't think moral decisions are a matter o...
I've already said that individual moral feeling is motivating, and that communally shared moral feeling is doubly so. The latter is, in that sense, no...
We know material being, we live it. So, I don't think it is necessary to witness it, in some way analogous to how one witnesses events, or material be...
I don't believe there are any truthmakers for moral thoughts or dispositions, in the kind of sense that there are truthmakers for empirical, mathemati...
You are speaking of physical pain, the sufferings of the flesh, no? How is that not the suffering that goes with material being? Of course there would...
True, but for all intents and purposes unimaginable is as good as impossible in my book. Of course the unimaginable may later become imaginable, but u...
I think 'general' is a better, less loaded, and less potentially misleading term than 'universal'. For example, a dog is considered to be an instance ...
There is no imaginable way in which an empirical existent could be a universal guarantor of objective moral goodness. For a start such a guarantor wou...
Not really. A real guarantor of objective moral good could not possibly be an empirical existent, so your argument fails from the start unless you pos...
Funny thing is it was I used to tease my sister (and my mother and brother) ...she was, and still is, somewhat of a "goodie two-shoes", and Mum and br...
I'd say we care because (or if) it is our nature to care. There is not some anterior reason that leads us to think we should care. We are instinctivel...
Your whole case against my arguments seems to rest on my use of the word "propositional" which I did put in inverted commas several times to indicate ...
Sure, we can entertain the idea that there might be some kind of existence we have no idea of, but it's no better than fiction, in fact it's worse, be...
The point is that if you had listened to me you would have realized that I agree with you that we can feel what can't be known. Calling that feeling "...
The only existence we know is our empirical existence and so the question, "should there be existence?" if it doesn't refer to that empirical existenc...
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