Janus

Why can't there be something which is neither A nor B, but something of both?

Peirce sees himself as belonging himself with the third group, with those who acknowledge the reality of all three categories of monadic affectivity, ...

It is the nominalist who does not accept the reality of universals. Realists of various kinds accept their reality, just not their transcendent realit...

The alternative to the idea that something indefinable has been lost in the process of the evolution of Western philosophy would seem to be that there...

I have some sympathy with the idea of eternal (meaning not perpetual, but atemporal) existence. But we cannot conceive how that would be, so we cannot...

I agree it is arguable that non-intuitive scientific models and theories may show us a "deeper" structure of reality (whatever we might think that mea...

No argument from me on that.

I was not referring to any "particular set of axioms" as being indispensable, although it is arguable that there are some axioms that seem to be funda...

If you don't believe that what philosophers write requires deciphering then that explains your tendency towards simplistic interpretations. I haven't ...

Peirce refers to himself as being something like a "scholastic realist", and this is not compatible with the idea that he was simply an idealist or a ...

So, how do you reconcile your simplistic interpretation with what is cited in the OP, where the following is quoted from Peirce: "I should call myself...

So, you've studied Peirce's works?

Then it would seem that you do not believe in nuanced, informed interpretations of philosophers writings; but prefer to remain tendentious, and cherry...

And please note that I am not denying that mystical or religious experience gives knowledge in some sense of the word, but just emphasizing the need t...

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind" but I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually under...

I can't see how any points where what you say here contradicts or constitutes a problem for what I have said there. Perhaps you could indicate those p...

Rationality does not claim there is no God; but self-reflexively comes to understand that there can be no purely rational (or empirical) way of knowin...

Constitutive rules just are what a culture, a way of life, takes to be inherently given in perception, in life. Obviously this is mediated, but not to...

We call 'reality' what makes sense to us, what else? Logic is the formalization of that 'making sense'. Beyond that, it's not clear to me what you are...

The sharing of a "public" world does not require linguistic ability. Look at the higher social animals for example.

Obviously I would believe something is there because I can see it. If I had reason to doubt one specific case it would only be on the unlikely basis t...

My real complaint, though, is that Hume paints our acceptance of induction as being merely a matter of habit, and not in any way rationally justified....

I agree with this. It sounds like you are a fellow admirer of Whitehead.

I don't believe that mind can be observed; it is the act of observing. Also Peirce does not say that mind came first as far I remember of what I have ...

Science attempts to model change; of course the model is not what is being modeled. Models are not perfect; they can be improved, probably endlessly, ...

Can you cite a statement by any rationalist that says it would be logically contradictory for things not to be as they are, or not to be in the future...

There are many discernible states of change within the "one BIG STATE" of change that we call the universe. That is what science studies states of cha...

Nature is in a state of change. All states are states of change; there are no truly static states, but there are patterns and regularities of change; ...

That's a nice elaboration of what is entailed by the Treatise of Humean Nature. In his ambition to do for human nature what he thought Newton had done...

Except it is the default position of the mind that has rid itself of superstitious reifications. That's why people are naturally naive realists. I lik...

I probably did not express that every well. What I meant to say is that Hume's mistake consists in imagining that it ever should have been thought tha...

You cannot genuinely (coherently and consistently) doubt that there are any 'thises' at all because to do so would undermine the coherence of all and ...

It means that all beliefs and doubts presuppose the background understanding. They only get their meaning in virtue of that general context.

Why are we not rationally warranted to base our expectations on what we have observed and continue to observe to work; namely inductive reasoning? Par...

The whole background against which beliefs and doubts make sense does not hinge merely on the understanding that I have hands; it hinges on countless ...

Why do I need to provide you with incentive? I really can't understand why you are so touchy about having your claims questioned. Surely that is why w...

Then you need to try harder, because I haven't seen any explanation from you beyond vague suggestions. "Qualitative judgements" which would seem to be...

I have studied religious traditions myself for more than forty five years; so I am well aware, as you already well know, that there is abundant eviden...

The problem is there is no way to explain how such "higher states" actually constitute anything that could rightly be termed 'knowledge'. If you want ...

That our hands are there (when they are) would seem to be, or more aptly, would seem to be an exemplification of, a "constitutive rule", in the sense ...

There is a sense in which I can agree with this, but I can't see what relevance it has to your questioning of rationality.

There is adhering to strict definitions, and then there is pointless pedantry.

No argument from me on that! I would agree that there is no absolute certainty (on analysis the very idea is revealed to be meaningless, I would say),...

There's a very simple answer to your dilemma: there exists both good and bad reasoning, and the fact that it is possible to reason badly does not prov...

Pedantry is not philosophy.

All we can say is that we imagine that a God that really existed, and thus was not nearly merely an imagined God, would be greater than a God that exi...

It's only a partial failure, which any erudite audience would recognize as such. Mistaking a hand for a flipper is not so bad; I could think of much w...

What possible criterion is there for judging whether something is really "there" or not other than that we can all see it?

The most prevalent contemporary viewpoint associated with the sciences would seem to be that (as they are defined here) firstness is reducible to seco...

Moore's hand is temporal, though, not timeless. As I've acknowledged before; I accept the commonsense truth expressed by Moore's gesture. It might be ...