It is not there when it is experienced
Consider a system in state of S which evolves to S' obeying laws of nature, S'=L(S). S and S' cannot exist together at the same time therefore S should be annihilated before S' created. This requires an instant that neither S nor S' exist. So we have the series S, "nothing" and S'. It is however impossible to create S' when there is no information about S. This requires a mind which is conscious of S when there is no S and S'. That is mind which creates S' and annihilates S.
Comments (111)
Of course there is the laws of nature. We experience it in any moment of our lives. Mind is however dominate to the laws of nature.
I have no idea what Laws you are experiencing. I am (my mind) is experiencing all kinds of things, but certainly not Laws. The Mind made up the Laws of Nature as it did God. It is a story. A myth. The Mind likes creating myths and stories. It's fun.
Mind does not change. What it experiences changes.
I think there is a reason, more than being fun, behind this, since this is not fun at all.
Yes, that is correct. I never said that S and its experience are same.
Quoting tim wood
The change in experience is the result of perceiving S and later S'.
Quoting tim wood
Not really. Here I am arguing that having S, one agent can be conscious of S and then he annihilates S and then create S'.
Quoting tim wood
My argument has nothing to do with Zeno argument. What I am arguing is that you need a mind with ability to annihilate and create in order to have motion.
There Mind is creating new forms by use of will and it is recognizing and conceiving forms by use of memory but it is not annihilating. The universe is more like a clay of energy that is constantly being manipulated and changing.
There is no series. The universe is a continuous and entangled. Using symbolics such as words, mathematics, or logic cannot be used to represent a continuous universe in flux. The only b way to understand it is via observation.
Memory of past is what is experienced, S and also those state before S.
Quoting Rich
Quoting Rich
Strange. You say that you experience no laws, yet every post you created in this thread is espousing some objective state-of-affairs (laws). In telling us how things really are and work, are you not espousing laws?
There is no objective state of affairs. Everything is in continuous flux. We are all involved and sharing experiences.
And when the heck did I ever use the concept of Laws? Everything is constantly changing. However, habits are formed which appear to be repetitive but are always different.
The fundamental error in all academic and scientific analysis of the universe is replacing symbols (which are static) for flow, which is what we are all experiencing. This is where philosophy can step in and say "what the heck"?. Instead philosophy plays along, even substituting some measurement which science calls time for the real thing.
You cannot deny that the stuff we experience has a form, meaning that it is in specific state.
Consider three movements:
1) S is hypothesized
2) S becomes destabilized as it it is negated (-S)
3) S' the synthesis of S & -S
Determinate negation.
or
It is not as experienced? Given the limitations of perception and the filtering and organization of the perceptual process.
Does mind create and destroy "Reality"? Does mind exist outside of "Reality"? Not as I understand the meaning of the terms but we likely have a language problem as well as a philosophical one.
Nature is in a state of change. All states are states of change; there are no truly static states, but there are patterns and regularities of change; that much seems obvious.
There are many discernible states of change within the "one BIG STATE" of change that we call the universe. That is what science studies states of change, rates of change and regularities of change. Do you find a problem with that?
Everything is continuously changing. Science just approximates. Problems arise when people start substituting approximations (for some practical application) for the actual experience. That's what creates paradoxes, Zeno's being the most famous.
The universe is one gigantic blob that constantly changing and we are changing with it and we (our minds) are causing change. This is real evolution. No need to fabricate some Laws of Nature that naturally loves Big Macs.
Science attempts to model change; of course the model is not what is being modeled. Models are not perfect; they can be improved, probably endlessly, but cannot ever become perfect. Zeno's paradox is easily solved by science; it is only seems to be a paradox to the untutored. What "laws of Nature" are has not been settled by science or by philosophy of science.
Are they given by God? Are they "nature taking habits" as Peirce contended? Are they something which we will never be able to discover the origin of? Are they merely descriptions with no provenance beyond the human mind? Take your pick; whatever you choose, you will find plenty of others that disagree.
I just observe my mind doing its thing. For some reason Descartes gets credit for this observation even though the ancient cultures pretty much observed the same. If someone wishes to make up stories of non-existent particles getting together and playing soccer or talking things over on a forum, that their deal not mine.
As for Pierce, he wrote that Mind came first which is not that much different from Daoism.
That is what objects are, repeating patterns of events. In some ways that is what nature is. The present consists of elements of the past and possibilities pulled from the future. The world is a continuous "becoming" not a static "being"
I don't believe that mind can be observed; it is the act of observing. Also Peirce does not say that mind came first as far I remember of what I have read of him. Perhaps you could cite a passage where he says this.
I agree with this. It sounds like you are a fellow admirer of Whitehead.
It's not that difficult. It's right there.
From Peirce's Law of the Mind (note the title of the article):
"I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolu-
tionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of
mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned
idealism which holds matter to be mere specialised and partially
deadened mind."
As far case Peirce is concerned, he proposes a Daoist-like Tychism which begats mind, which begats matter as deadened mind.
Bergson adopted some of this in his own view of the Creative Force and Matter.
"Everything is in continuous flux." and "We are all involved in sharing experiences." are both statements that you believe are true of ALL minds, which makes it a statement about some state-of-affairs that includes ALL minds, which makes it an objective statement about minds.
You don't necessarily need to use a word when you are using it's definition.
Law: a statement of fact, deduced from observation, to the effect that a particular natural or scientific phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions are present.
It is a simple observation. If you noticed any thing that is not changing it any person that is not creating let me know. (There actually is non-duration, but I'll leave that aside for now). All of this subject to change. Everything is evolving. There are no Laws, just some habits.
I don't understand what you are arguing against. Form is nothing than state.
States are a construct of the mind to solve practical problems. It is symbolic. If one substitutes states for the nature of nature, one will get paradoxes. States can be used when appropriate in technological development, not when it comes to a living nature. Philosophers shouldn't use states. The tool doesn't belong because there is nothing static in the universe.
Philosophy is not science. There are huge problems when the tools of one bleed into the other.
Ok.
Quoting Cavacava
What is -S? Could you give an example? In my case annihilation just destroys S and leaves us by noting whether S is the ironess of iron or thought for example.
Quoting Cavacava
What is &? Do you wanted to write "S' is the synthesis of S & -S"?
How could you embed the mind between?
That is what I am trying to say: What we experience is no longer there. Experience is always comes after existence. This means that there is nothing exist when we experience. The delay due to process (which turns input to mental state) is one obstacle.
Quoting prothero
Yes, we do it all the times. We can create and destroy thoughts. Thoughts are in motion and we have the ability to make them static.
Quoting prothero
Mind to me are ambiguous things. They don't have any location since they are not like stuff out there, physical, yet they could somehow interact with the stuff.
Quoting prothero
Yes, I am not a philosopher and English is not my first language. Thanks for your patience.
I am not talking about continuous movement. In fact my argument is about a discrete movement.
No such animal in this universe. Inapplicable to the study of nature. It is only a game to pass the time - which is perfectly fine as long as it is recognized as such.
Well actually there are lots of problems with the assumptions underlying that statement. One is the assumption that the precise state (location in space and time) of anything can be determined to the degree of precision required when talking about infinite divisions of space and time.
Mathematically one can solve Zeno's paradoxes with calculus and infinite series of decreasing numbers the sum of which turns out to be a finite number (Cantor etc.).
When talking about space-time divisions, the assumption that space-time is infinitely divisible is open to question as one approaches the planck length, planck time and considers the notion of space time quantum foam, quantum gravity and looks at the uncertainty principle regarding measurement of position and velocity.
So one must at least consider the discontinuity of space-time at infinitely small distances and thus the quantum collapses or transitions during the "motion" of particles and consider the measurement of macro objects as approximations.
I can't see how any points where what you say here contradicts or constitutes a problem for what I have said there. Perhaps you could indicate those points?
I'm not sure what you mean by "mind" but I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually understood.
Take a look at Peirce's categories of philosophy as cited here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2783/three-categories-and-seven-systems-of-metaphysics/p1
Just read what he wrote. I don't think it needs much deciphering.
Then it would seem that you do not believe in nuanced, informed interpretations of philosophers writings; but prefer to remain tendentious, and cherry-pick to serve your own agenda.
So, you've studied Peirce's works?
You wanted the reference, so you got it. Not my problem that you don't like it.
I have a suggestion. Why don't you just ignore it and pretend it doesn't exist.
So, how do you reconcile your simplistic interpretation with what is cited in the OP, where the following is quoted from Peirce:
"I should call myself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism."
Peirce refers to himself as being something like a "scholastic realist", and this is not compatible with the idea that he was simply an idealist or a panpsychist; or that he shared their ways of understanding the notion of mind or considering it to be fundamental. If you disagree with this then you are contradicting what Peirce himself wrote, as cited in that OP, which amounts to telling us that you know more about what Peirce thought than he did himself. :-}
For further amplification in his views about Mind and matter being deadened Mind, I would refer you to his article.
Exactly what do you believe should people do? Ignore Peirce's own succinct description and defer to your biased and goal oriented interpretation? Rather bizarre.
Maybe what you might consider is rethinking your own views?
BTW, I am very much a realist when it comes to the Mind. It is very, very, very real.
If you don't believe that what philosophers write requires deciphering then that explains your tendency towards simplistic interpretations.
Quoting Rich
I haven't said anything about my own views: I have just pointed out that your simplistic interpretation of Peirce is not compatible with what he himself has stated; and I have provided textual evidence for that by referring to what was cited in the other OP.
Anyone who understands human nature and agendas will always go to the source, and I don't care what discipline is being discussed?
[quote="Janus;148316"your simplistic interpretation]Peirce is not compatible with what he himself has stated;[/quote]
It keeps getting more bizarre. I didn't do any interpretation. It was a direct quote right out of his own article on MIND. You just don't like what he wrote. Sorry, can't help you. Maybe someone else can. Maybe someone who had a greater flare for distorting. As for me, I like it simple.
No argument from me on that.
For A to become B the following conditions must be true before B exists: (1) A must exist, (2) the possibilities for both B to exist and the transformation to take place must exist, and (3) A and what would be B after A’s transformation must necessarily be two different things; otherwise, A would still be A after such transformation, which, in strict terms, would really never take place if A and the result of its transformation are the same thing. Following this analogy, it is safe to conclude that in order for B to exist, it must have not existed before; to assume the contrary would be the same as to assume that B came to be out of B. Also, as soon as the possibility for B to exist becomes existent the possibility for the transformation from A to B becomes existent, as long as B is a valid outcome of A's transformation. Therefore, even though during the transformation from A to B, neither A or B exist, by B being the only outcome of A's transformation, the transformation will take place by passing through a series of events whose sum will result in the formation of B.
That makes him a 'medieval' realist, i.e. accepts the reality of universals - so not a 'realist' in the modern sense.
Review of Paul Forster, Peirce & the Threat of Nominalism.
I find the distinction of 'reality and existence' mentioned in that passage highly significant; it is practically the only recent source I have seen that understands this distinction.
Quoting Janus
He most certainly was a self-described idealist. From the SEP entry on C S Peirce
(my emphasis.)
There's a helpful essay on Peirce's idealism The Intelligibility of Peirce's Metaphysics of Objective Idealism, Nicholas Guardiano. My view is that the sense in which Peirce understands 'mind' is directly descended from the Platonic tradition via Augustine; which was preserved in German idealism, and is also found in Emerson (who was also influenced by Eastern monism, as described in the above essay.) There is an appendix to the SEP article on Peirce's relationship to German idealists. (Recall this was well before G E Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism'; at the time Peirce was active, idealism was still the reigning paradigm in American and English universities; Peirce's contemporaries, such as Joshia Royce and Borden Parker Bowne, were similarly idealistic philosophers.)
It is the nominalist who does not accept the reality of universals. Realists of various kinds accept their reality, just not their transcendent reality.
Quoting Wayfarer
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2783/three-categories-and-seven-systems-of-metaphysics/p1
Have a look at this OP where Peirce is directly cited and you will see that Peirce was no idealist in the ordinary sense of the term.
The problem is when neither B or A exist. This means that you have nothing so this question becomes relevant that how you could have B from nothing?
Peirce sees himself as belonging himself with the third group, with those who acknowledge the reality of all three categories of monadic affectivity, brute physicality and "triadic regulative habit". I think Peirce's conception of matter as "effete mind" indicates not that he believed anything such as "all is consciousness", but that the "habit-taking" of matter shows it to be best thought of as 'mind-like'. Just as brute matter is effete (meaning "no longer effective") mind, so mind would be considered by Peirce to be evolved matter. Remember, Peirce utterly rejected any notion of mind as substance or duality of substance.
Quoting Wayfarer
It seems to me that universality (or better, generality) is co-constitutive of particulars, just as particularity is. There cannot be particulars without generality. A thing cannot be anything without being some kind of thing. Equally it cannot be any kind of thing without being a particular thing. Generality is not transcendent because without particularity there can be no generality; it cannot be any more transcendent that particularity. The two are utterly co-arising and codependent, I would venture to say.
Why can't there be something which is neither A nor B, but something of both?
Agree up to this point. I don't think that second statement stacks up in the least against what Peirce thought. Mind being 'evolved matter' is what neo-Darwinists think, and although of course they didn't exist when he was around, it is not at all congruent with his thinking. (Have a look at his ideas on 'agapeism', which are distinctly antagonistic to many of the ideas that would become characteristic of later neo-Darwinism.) In Peirce, 'mind' was much more like Hegel's 'geist'.
Quoting Janus
I think the depiction of 'universals' as simply 'generalities' amounts to psychologism i.e. it equates them purely with habits of thought. The way that universals transcend particulars is more the fact that individual particulars are simply instances of a universal form. For instance, individuals are simply instances of a species, so the species in a sense 'transcends' the existence of this or that individual.
What I should have said is that consciousness is evolved matter. Matter is effete mind, ineffective mind, consciousness is thus evolved effete mind, the temporal; development of mind through the creative "taking of habits". The thing that is not in Peirce's ontology is the idea of a foundational pervasive consciousness (as opposed to ineffective mind). There is no doubt that Peirce believed in evolution. I think that his conception of matter as effete mind indicates that he thought that what we think of as mind is, in its basic brutely ineffective forms (forms that we would not normally think of as mind) inherent in nature; and that this explains its emergence in the forms that animals and humans manifest.
Take a look at this SEP entry in order to appreciate some of the subtleties of Peirce's view and its points of commonality and lack of commonality with the German Idealists: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/self-contextualization.html
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't see why. Generality is as inherent in nature as particularity is; and it is not confined merely to "habits of thought". The habit of thinking generalities could never have developed if there were no generalities in nature. It's true that a species in a sense "transcends" individuals of its class, but there is no reason that I can see to believe this is evidence of a transcendent realm of universal forms. It just shows the ways in which natures "takes habits" to reproduce established patterns.
The distortion, the twisting begins. Just drop some some words, rearrange some, and presto you have something you can live with. Now let's read what he really wrote instead of what you wish he wrote specifically about the mind (probably anticipating philosophers who would try to distort his views).
Peirce took several years to write his paper. It was written in English. Peirce knows how to use the language.
"I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind.
Rarely, have I read any philosophers so perfectly succinct about his views about mind. Bergson took the exact same view as did others, Emerson being one influence.
For all those who enjoy Tychism, I hope you equally enjoy Mind which provides the creative, non-deterministic impulse as well as deadened mind/matter.
But that is precisely what is in Peirce. Note that bolded phrase in the passage two posts up: 'mind pervades all nature'. It is pretty close to pan-psychism, really. And from that article you just linked to:
'This single substance of Peirce's metaphysical monism, Peirce seems to associate with with objective idealists, especially with the Geist of Hegel'. This is a point that I have taken up with Apokrisis at various times - I think the notion of 'mind' in Peirce ultimately goes back to the 'nous' of the Western tradition. That is what makes him an idealist - just as the SEP article says. And the addendum on his links with German idealism say that ultimately, he identified as more or less a Kantian - with some caveats. As I said, this is partially because of when he wrote - it was before the rebellion of analytical philosophy against Continental idealism.
Quoting Janus
I think the problem lies with the concept of a 'transcendent realm' because the concept 'objectifies' the idea - tries to depict it in a spatio-temporal sense. Of course, we can't imagine 'where' such a realm might be, and so, how it could actually be 'a realm'. But I think the expression is meant in the same sense as expressions such as 'the realm of natural numbers' or 'the domain of laws', which are in some sense a metaphorical use of the term 'domain' or 'realm'. However I still think that such realms and domains are perfectly real - but that they're not objectively existent, they're not 'out there somewhere'. The reality of numbers, for example, must already be assumed by thought, in order to arrive at an understanding at what is objectively the case. I mean, science does this at every instance, by calculating sameness, difference, distribution, frequency, and so on. It is only by quantification that it is able to derive such ideas as means, averages, patterns, and the like, by which an objective judgement is validated. But notice that the mathematical reasoning that science relies on to derive such facts, is not in itself part of the objective realm, mathematical truths being 'transcendent' in that sense. Scientists make quantified predictions based on hypotheses and then test them against nature, which tells them whether their hypotheses are correct. And they may get the maths wrong, but the general fact is that maths provides all the yardsticks against which such judgements are made. That is the sense in which mathematics is 'transcendent'; mathematical truths are 'always already the case'.
I think the problem is, that this notion of 'transcendental' sits uneasily with current philosophy. That is why such Platonistic intuitions are more than unfashionable, they're almost politically incorrect.
I think the problem is really that they are unintelligible. Hegel's notion of spirit is not a transcendental notion, but a notion of immanence; for Hegel spirit just is matter looked at from a different perspective; similar to Spinoza. I agree that this is in line with what Peirce wants to say, too. Nowhere that I can remember (and I have read quite a bit of Peirce over many years) does he identify himself as a Platonist. I'll try to respond in more detail to the rest of your post later.
It's not like the simplistic picture you are wanting to paint. Take a look at this SEP entry on this Schelling: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling/#2 paying particular attention to'2. Transcendental Philosophy and Naturphilosophie'.
In one short, succinct paragraph Peirce related what was on his on mind. A breath of fresh air.
‘Not understood’, more likely.
The problem is that apparently no coherent account of the reality of transcendent forms can be given; if an intelligible explanation had been propounded by anyone, no doubt we would all know about it.
Oh well, I remain unconvinced that you have any idea what was on Peirce's mind.
“The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category … suffices to make the world…?.” (CP, 5.436).
The "third category" is what you would call "mind".
https://screenshots.firefox.com/rxVQpiIITv13H3Vn/en.wikipedia.org
"Now it is certainly a productive activity that finds expression in willing; all free action is productive, albeit consciously productive. If we now suppose, since the two activities have only to be one in principle, that the same activity which is consciously productive in free action,is productive without consciousness in bringing about the world, then our predetermined harmony is real, and the contradiction resolved."
The rest of the text is here:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/schellin.htm
And you do? First you didn't even know about his own writings on the subject. Then, when presented, you completely ignore it. Then you simply rewrite it to your own taste. Then you start quotng some 5th removed text. Remarkable. It reminds me of the "academic scholars" who declare Bohmian Mechanics deterministic despite Bohm's own specific writings to the contrary.
Apparently an author's writings don't count much.
The point is that we have to know how to reach from A to B. That requires nothing between. It cannot be something, lets call it C, since we need to know how to reach from A to C.
So perhaps you argument should be interpreted as a modus-tollens that leads to a rejection this assumption, rather than an argument for a separate mental substance. I'm not even sure how introducing an overseer solves the problem without introducing it at another level.
I don't know whether the reality is discrete or continuous. Regardless you can develop a same model for continuous case.
Quoting sime
You are left with mere experience, if we accept that experience is by product of physical activity, which does not have any causal power. To be honest I believe on mind but I don't understand what is the use of brain when it comes to experience and act.
Quoting sime
What is another problem?
Your assumption that I was unaware of Peirce's The Law of Mind is incorrect. I asked you to cite passages and provide arguments for your particular interpretation of those passages; which you have failed to do. You interpret tendentiously and then protest that your interpretation must be correct because Peirce is so transparent that no interpretation is required. I am reasonably familiar with a good portion of Peirce's writings, the ones contained in two collections that I have owned for about fifteen years: Charles S Peirce: Selected Writings and Philosophical writings of Peirce edited by Philip P Wiener and Justus Buchler respectively. I know that Peirce is a complex and subtle thinker, and I also know that the philosophical questions concerning idealism and realism are nuanced and complicated in general.
So, when I see someone like you who reads superficially and interprets in order to satisfy their pet agenda, an agenda that they never cease to go on about, I can only laugh and shrug my shoulders. If you want to develop philosophically you need to learn that the writings of complex thinkers require considerable effort to understand and interpret and that the meaning of the content in individual essays always needs to be interpreted against their whole body of work.
Continuing your example, say there is a determinable state A followed by a determinable state B, and we call the transition from the first to the second states 'C'. You claim that C must be "nothing". I say that it must be an indeterminable state because "nothing" is impossible. C is something but it is not a determinable something.
There is no need to interpret. This is not ancient Greek. It is plain English and unusually succinct and pristine for philosophical writings which usually meander into total obfuscation and meaningless rambling. I'll leave the distortions, or what you call sophisticated intepretation, to you.
"Plain English! LOL, it seems you are a lost cause, then. You should be posting on some New Age forums instead of here if you think sophisticated interpretation of philosophical writing is not required.
Very, very straightforward.
The Law of the Mind.
What, in your own words, is "the growth of tychism"? What is mind? What is matter? Explain you interpretation of Peirce.
"I argued further in favor of that way of thinking, which it will be convenient to christen tychism (from ????, chance)."
" I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth,"
and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind..
It's straight forward. I don't agree entirely, but that is my view. I don't layer my views on Peirce.
If you're not prepared or able to say in your own words what you think Peirce means, and how you think that what you think he means entails that consciousness is fundamental to reality, then that surely signals the end of this discussion.
Actually he wrote Tychism and Mind are fundamental. That is why he titled his paper Law if the Mind.
C cannot be an indeterminate state. How could you get something determinate, B, from something indeterminate, C? You need nothing to allow changes and mind to know, and perform changes.
Yes, but that goes back to my original point that I believe that Peirce is not referring to consciousness or perception as being fundamental, but to the tendency of matter, as "effete mind", to take habits, which leads to the possibility of sign relations and evolved states such as consciousness.
Do you have an argument for why something determinate cannot proceed from something indeterminate?
Yes, an indeterminate state could lead into many determinate things since it is indifferent.
Outline your argument for the distinctions you claim he is making then. Of course my interpretation is biased; all interpretations, including yours, are biased. No one knows for sure what Peirce really had in mind; that's why there are scholars who spend lifetimes studying the great philosophers and disagreeing over how to interpret them.
Now you're contradicting yourself.
No. Why?
Quoting bahman
Quoting bahman
I should have written "No, an indeterminate state could not lead into many determinate things since it is indifferent.". I don't know why I made such a mistake. Sorry for that.
Do you have an argument for that?
An indeterminable (note that in our exchange you changed this to "indeterminate" so let's stick to the original term for the sake of clarity) state is a state that cannot be determined. What do you mean by "an indifferent state"?
Peirce is pretty clear:
https://archive.org/stream/C.S.Peirces5FamousTheMonistPapers/1.TheArchitectureOfTheories1891_djvu.txt
"The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense."
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws."
He is actually pretty close. Bergson some how was able to intuit it much better, having somehow been able to conceive of quantum behavior before it was actually discovered.
Did I say Peirce was a materialist? Apparently you see that as the only alternative which doesn't surprise me.
I've alteady agreed that Peirce thinks matter is effete mind. So that quote tells me nothing new. Just what he means by that is the issue in question.
"Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third."
"It would suppose that in the beginning, — infinitely
remote, — there was a chaos of unpersonalised feeling, which being
without connection or regularity would properly be without exist-
ence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness,
would have started the germ of a generalising tendency. Its other
sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue.
Thus, the tendency to habit would be started ; and from this with
the other principles of evolution all the regularities of the universe
would be evolved."
So close, but no cigar. Very Daoistic though.
Still nothing about consciousness being fundamental.
However, what he said about Materialism was precious. I must save that somewhere.
Yeah right! :-}
An indeterminable state could be anything and it could lead to anything. An indeterminable state could be X, Y, Z etc and in that sense is indifferent.
Moreover, even if we accept that there is no problem in defining the state of C then we face with the question that how could we reach from C to B, through another indeterminable state and this is problematic.
You seem to be missing the point. A determinable state is one which is restricted to some temporal duration. For example, say a prehistoric animal (a determinable state insofar as we define what that animal was like) is.trapped in silt, and millions of years later a fossil (a determinable state) is found. In between may be an indeterminable state the precise duration of which cannot even be determined.
The reason I used the term 'indeterminable' is to highlight that this is an epistemological, not an ontological, term. In actuality there may be no changeless states, the idea of a changeless state is an heuristic device, an epistemic facility.
The problem you are trying to assert is just a rehashing of Zeno's Paradox in different apparel.We don't know if nature is a continuum or truly quantum. If it is truly quantum then there would be, at the utmost micro level, changeless states of infinitesimal duration; but on the macro level there are no changeless states, but continual becoming.
Think of a film projector; is there anything in between the individual frames apart from blank film? Blank film is blank film, from the point of view of the film there is nothing determinable there, but it is nevertheless not nothing.
I've mentioned this before, but it's worth having a read of The Intelligibility of Peirce's Metaphysics of Objective Idealism. Lays it out pretty well.
Thanks, will read.
If you start with a determinate state (I would say concept not state but...) and negate it you get an indeterminable state (concept), and if you negate that you end up with another determinate state (concept) and all three are intimately related. (Hegel)