Janus

Well, what I am saying is that the subjective conviction should not be subjective in the bad sense, but should be resultant upon being "attentive, int...

You're arguing from objectrive, or at least intersubjective, empirical investigation whereas Wayfarer is really arguing (despite what he might like to...

Haven't you already relied on axiomatic assumptions in establishing your particular take on the way philosophical questioning should proceed?

The idea that we do not have free will or that the self is an illusion is a hypothesis that may count as a theory if it can produce predictions that c...

Either your comprehension is bad or you are disingenuously distorting what I've written and responding to straw instead of argument. Either way, this ...

This is nonsense. They see the sky and not an elephant, but they don't see that it is the sky and not an elephant because that would entail consciousl...

If you read carefully you will see that I have already made a distinction, and much earlier in previous exchanges with others in this thread as well, ...

So, you want to lose a perfectly valid distinction between believing and knowing? If you see something there is no doubt, and consequently no need for...

That's not right, I asked how we could know.

You're not really saying anything here. What you term "beliefs", and cite as "plausible counterexamples" would, in my view, be better termed 'believin...

I didn't say theories are not knowledge; I said they are knowledge-how. They give us knowledge of how to make predictions and construct experiments to...

Yes, why not define consciousness that way? It is modeling that brings about form. Formless matter is not substantive, but incoherent. Just as is inco...

I'm not sure we are really disagreeing so much as it being a matter of emphasis. We can objectify consciousness or the I in terms of its activities an...

I would say the "I-ness" is the fundamental fact upon which all other knowledge turns. It cannot be explained because it is the ground of all explanat...

To say "there are evidence-based theories which suggest..." doesn't seem right. Theories don't suggest, they posit. Perhaps you mean 'there is evidenc...

No, that is not what I was saying. I am just as absolutely certain that I am a linguistic being whose cognition is mediated by that fact, as I am that...

Yes, I wasn't suggesting that there is a simple one way relationship of dependence between memory and belief. It could be said that memory is dependen...

I'm not getting the connection between what you quote from me here and your question. To answer generally: I don't think beliefs can speak of absolute...

That raises an interesting question. If something happens most of the time, for example, let's say lions have never been at the waterhole first thing ...

Luckily it was not much work that I lost, so I am happy for you to laugh about it to your heart's content. :smile: I am not clear though on how you th...

How can you identify types of numbers if you don't know what a number is?

Yes, in fact I was in the process of editing that post to add that maybe it would be better not to say that animals and pre-linguistic humans believe ...

I agree with everything else you say in this post; I am really just arguing for the usefulness of distinctions between different kinds of believing in...

If someone sees the blue sky that does not entail that they see that the sky is blue; the latter would involve association with other experiences invo...

Provide some arguments to back up your assertions and aspersions and if it is good enough I might respond.

Are you suggesting that animals might imagine alternative scenarios?

I haven't denied that animals are capable of signaling in quite complex ways, but any assertion like the one underlined would need to be supported by ...

Thanks for the references, but I'm already well familiar with the arguments. I've read The Ego Tunnel and quite a bit of the Churchlands and some Blac...

I see what you're saying, but I think it's more than just that. 'Propositional' I would say means formulated as 'I believe that'; this way a belief is...

I don't think anyone was arguing that animals do not believe in the sense of expecting and being disposed to act; the point at issue seems to be wheth...

I'm not going to waste more time than necessary, so I'll address just one point at a time. It is obvious that language enables holding beliefs since t...

TBH, it seems to me you are more intent on trying to make it appear that you have already won the argument, than you are on actually arguing for your ...

So, just what, apart from linguistic ability, are those mysterious "intellectual capacities"? Explain how someone could be said to believe something i...

The consideration has been of believing in the context of pre-linguistic beings. Ants see, just as humans do; and we can coherently say that they see ...

Thank God for that!

Really, so, we never believe anything we cannot see?

So you are claiming that seeing the blue sky entails believing that the sky is blue? I think you're just playing with words, or perhaps with yourself,...

Seeing the blue sky is not believing that the sky is blue. Actually, there is a sense in which a pre-linguistic percipient could be said not to even s...

How could you believe the sky is blue if you had no concept of blue or of the sky? If you did have such concepts, which would necessarily be expressed...

You're still falling into dualist presuppositions here. In effect you're asking me to give an account that accords with presuppositions I don't accept...

OK, then give an account of such a theory and the evidence that purportedly supports it.

"Should Persons With Mental Disabilities Be Allowed to Vote" The implication being that no one should be allowed to vote?

'Objective' and 'subjective' are categories of human understanding; so nothing wrong with trying to clarify the differences ever more precisely. Nothi...

"What it means to be an object regardless of human understanding" seems to be hopelessly incoherent.

You're still falling into a conflation of domains. Of course acting for reasons is not random; but it is also not deterministic; I can choose which re...

You are conflating the science as practical knowledge with its interpretation as worldview.

But we are addressing human understanding and knowledge of these things, neither of which remain the same. What does remain the same is the fact that ...

What you refer to is not knowledge, but an attitude which rules out much more than it includes. It is better characterized as an ignorance than as a k...

The unpredictability follows if you don't assume (as Spinoza did assume, being entranced by the Newtonian paradigm) that prior elements lead inexorabl...

Thinking about extensa we might posit a chain or nexus of causes,thinking abut cogitans we might posit a chain or nexus of reasons. From the point of ...