Janus

So how do those regularities obtain across regions that are energetically separate from one another in your physicalist view? And who said anything ab...

Actually I didn't say that at all; I said that the idea of the physical is the idea of the radical separation of things. Of course I was talking about...

And what would that be, as explained in physicalist terms?

No, I'm saying the idea that there are "literal physical laws obtaining everywhere" is inexplicable on the position that energy or matter is the unive...

If all things are merely physical then what would be the universal principle that determines that physical laws obtain everywhere, even across regions...

It cannot be explained in the kind of physicalist terms you are asking for; else it would be...physical. So that demand begs the question.

Physicalists may or may not realize it, but it is the logical conclusion of the physicalist paradigm.

Because such a principle of universal entanglement cannot be modeled in the mechanical way the physical world is modeled. The mind is what does the mo...

From my mind where else? What's the problem?

To elaborate further; the idea of a universal physical substance makes no sense; what would it be? Energy? If it were then how would things further ap...

The idea of the physical is, among other things, the idea of radical, brute separation of all things from one another, whereas the idea of the mental ...

OK, I don't remember where he says that, but if it so then my criticisms have been misplaced.

LOL, did I say that? It's true though I do think they are all related, although being distinguishable from one another. To return to the thread topic,...

You are referring to Putnam. Do you take this to be Putnam's argument? This seems to speak more to reference than meaning. So, reference is not in the...

As I have said earlier as a work taken to present a positive theory of reference I think it is "much ado about nothing". Taken as a merely critical wo...

OK, I read the passage from P 91 as suggested, and I think this, which seems to express the substance of how Kripke thinks rigid designation is establ...

That's an unexpected take; I'd be interested to hear your reasons for saying that.

In an nutshell, my criticism of Kripke's exposition is that if he is saying that names are not definite descriptions that is trivially true, and if he...

No, I wouldn't be commenting if this was strictly a 'reading' thread. I'm just happy to wait for the purported rebuttal(s) of the problem I had with t...

Yes, but the identity is only established by definite descriptions which are in accordance with the actualities of this world; so there is really no I...

I agree. :up:

Fair enough, but if you think that he does adequately deal with this issue, why not enlighten us now, either by quoting the relevant section, or in yo...

But you haven't been able to explain how "such a thing" could be "removed" while still knowing who is being rigidly designated. Why not give it a go.....

Perhaps I have been using the term 'definite description' in an eccentric way, but even if my definition of the term has been incorrect, it doesn't af...

OK, but is it necessary that each and every individual predicate in the bunch that fits exactly one individual itself fits exactly one individual?

In what way is it at odds?

What do you mean? It's from me of course; where else?

But no single description picks out (in the sense of by itself informs someone previously ignorant of the identity of) a single individual to the excl...

But so what? That doesn't mean that the rigid designator is independent of definite descriptions.

To my eye these two statements are contradictory. Why would it not qualify as a definite description? I think it is a definite description, just as al...

Which is just what I have been saying all along, but which you, somewhat puzzlingly, seemed to be disagreeing with me about earlier

It seems to me that where you are confused is in thinking that either names are definite descriptions or that they are completely independent of them....

Agreed!

Sorry, that was a typo now corrected: it should have been "not wrong". But you don't know you are not wrong and you admit as much here:

I agree. I think that it doesn't not only not need any such explanation, but that any such explanation is impossible. I undertsnd that a descrition th...

You don't come right out and say that it is likely that when "people use phrases like "likelihood" in certain situations "all it really amounts to is ...

The likelihood I mean you can't know what people's psychological motivations are so you must be claiming that they are what you think they are based o...

I was supporting Harry's claim that not all memories are of the past. I wasn't, however, claiming that any memories are "trivially of the past", but r...

The same way you determine the likelihood that you believe exists that motivated your statement.

So, likewise the Russians are justified in Americaphobia? Everyone is justified in their phobias about anyone they even suspect might see them as the ...

A fine self-referential example of "making shit up based on your psychological biases" if ever I saw one!

The clue is here: You seem to be acknowledging that they must have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him, and yet you claim they refer to...

What else could mean that a woman or a golf ball in some alternate reality is the same entity as President Nixon in this one?

A non-physical thing, for example an individual soul, would not be everywhere; whereas as an infinitely great non-physical thing, for example God, wou...

What things are in a positive sense is always given in tangible terms; in terms of what the senses can grasp. So, it is no surprise that the idea of t...

Of course all present memories have been laid down in the past and future memories may be laid down in the present or in the future. The present very ...

I think this is the nub. The idea of a non-physical entity is not contradictory, and impossible to visualize as a square circle is impossible to visua...

All these examples only work if you posit some essence or soul- Nixon- such that it could have been incarnated as a woman or even a golf ball. But the...

This is empty word play being used to deny a perfectly valid distinction between memories which are of or about past events, and memories which are of...

If you want to say that everything we can visualize or imagine as "existent" is at the same time necessarily visualized as physical, you are going to ...