Janus

Right, they probably do mean "it is good' is true', but that does not entail that ''it is good' is true' is true.

That's simple, when people say "it is good'. they assume that what they think is good is good, absolutely speaking.

Yes, but only some things possess the ontological character of being (or at least of being thought of as) compositional elements.

If 'it is good' is understood to mean 'I think it is good' then the statement may be true or false depending on its honesty. Is it necessary, or even ...

I agree that the intentional may be understood to be a part of the empirical context, but not in the same way as perceptible events are. Also the fact...

The difference is that the former will be true only in some intentional or inter-subjective context, not in any purely objective existential or empiri...

Yes, an ought cannot be derived form any is, but only from an if. 'If I want X, then I ought to do Y'. There are no absolute goods, unless there be an...

Yes, if someone wants to claim that a philosophical problem is really a conceptually generated pseudo-problem, then they they should be able to give a...

There are two distinct alternative possibilities here: in some cases it may indeed be that someone suffers from a lack of understanding and hence cann...

No, its that a name or a definite description suitably indexed to the actual world just is a rigid designator. It will logically qulaify as such on ac...

That's a lame response!

The Earth has been observed to be spherical, hence that the Earth is spherical is not a theory, but an observation. Ah, I see that you have contested ...

Both are rigid if they are qualified as such and neither are rigid if not. They are logically equivalent.

No, you got it wrong again; it is about THE person named 'Nixon'. 'A person named "Nixon'" is about A person named 'Nixon'. Judicious use of the defin...

That there is no apparent logical difference between the two is shown by the fact that "Nixon might have had another name" is equivalent to 'The perso...

So, you're saying that empty names, such as Kripke's example 'unicorn', are only empty in the sense that thy have no referent but are not, and in fact...

If by that you mean that I think names are logically equivalent to the minimalist description 'the entity such and such' then yes, I do think that is ...

I am not sure what you are thinking here, Wallows, but I would certainly like to see a coherent and consistent resolution to that!

That's fine; I am confident that if they are fair and unbiased I will be allowed to continue to comment in this thread. If I am not, then I will no lo...

Would you mind pulling your head in? It is not for you to dictate where and what comments I can make in a free public forum, provided they are not obs...

Can you explain how you see that conflation; perhaps give an example to make it clearer? I'm not sure what you mean by "empty name". For me an empty n...

Wallows, what you want to say here is not clear, could you explain further. Specifically I don't know what you mean by "if you something assume someth...

He'll tell you to read it again, probably. Apparently you can't read it and understand it, without agreeing with it, even though no reasons for believ...

I am yet to see anyone provide a cogent logical distinction between 'X' and 'the entity referred to as 'X'' in everyday use. For modal logic you would...

Say something and I'll tell you if I disagree. What you say must be controversial though, otherwise it will simply be commonsense with which no one wi...

We can always hope, and that hope does seem to be fulfilled at least some of the time...otherwise why would we bother?

You could even say that there is just one entity in this world that satisfies the criteria you described without even naming the entity or by simply c...

Ha, your first post was far too full of wisdom; consequently (and unsurprisingly) no one responded to it.

I think this is right, that it is mostly a matter of personal intuition and/or stipulation when we talk about arcane matters such as what it could mea...

Interesting analysis! However if Nixon's parents had conceived a male child at a different time, or even at the same time but it had been a different ...

OK, if you want to be bothered I will. So we know which Nixon it is about because we both know which Nixon it is about! The sky is blue because the sk...

Of course in a completely empty formal sense a question about Nixon is about Nixon. What I meant is that the substance of the question is not dependen...

As I said before I am not going to read the book again. But since this is an open philosophy forum I consider I have the right to ask questions of tho...

I have said from the start that in my view descriptions are more or less definite. A description is adequately definite if it allows anyone with the r...

The question is not really about Nixon at all. It is really a general question: 'Could human beings have been golfballs?' So there is at least one des...

The quoted passage from Kripke is interesting, as it I think it shows that (at least on some counts) I have not been disagreeing with him at all, but ...

The individual is identified by some set of stipulated attributes. If you think there is a problem with that then why behave like a pompous smartarse ...

Yes it does or your counterfactual talk will be nonsense. I am saying that the individual must be stipulated, not discovered, (I didn't use the latter...

Finally you lay your argument out clearly! If an individual is to count as the same across possible worlds then the individual must have some attribut...

I would not say that A depends on B or the obverse, but that both A and B depend upon there being an actual world such that there is an Asda to go to ...

You have not shown that as far as i can see. Please provide a concise argument or quote exactly where you think you've shown it. LOL, who's confused n...

OK, I think I see where the confusion lies now: I think the precise formulation should be 'the entity called Trump in this world' (for me the 'in this...

I've read it and I can't see an argument for it that I believe I haven't refuted. Perhaps if you could restate your argument for why Trump is not logi...

Yes, the "ostensive/descriptive stuff" was in brackets. The point of what I said there was to show that 'Trump' and 'an entity called Trump' are logic...

Yes, but all you seem to be saying here is that once the particular entity called 'Trump' that is being referred to in this world is established (by o...

What do I have to be grateful for? Being misread, strawmanned and insulted?

I get and agree with the first part, but what you want to say with the above is obscure to me.

Again, this seems to be where we disagree. The former (without any further qualification or description) refers to anyone called 'Trump', just as 'the...

Yes, that's right. Of course we say that Trump would still be Trump even if he had not been called that, and we say that because he has been called th...

Well, I haven't said anything that contradicts that. I haven't said that a description which cannot infallibly pick out one particular entity could de...