The first says that to be true is to fit (presumably the facts). Why would you say that does not qualify as a definition of truth? Also, how would tha...
Sure, but that involves the happiness of others. I never said it was only your happiness that matters. It should be obvious. If the truths that philos...
The exactitude of ideal triangles is something which we stipulate against the realization of the inexactitude of actual triangular objects; it is just...
I think most of the philosophers you mentioned, bar perhaps Hobbes, would equate truth, or knowing truth with happiness or well-being in some sense. R...
The distinction between trivial and non-trivial ideas within conceptual schemas is a nice insight and a most salient point to make. The agreement abou...
I'm assuming you understand that I am not talking about the outcomes of Chinese medicine, but about its conceptual underpinnings. Negative outcomes, a...
Firstly there being a pill that makes you forget all about your partner (if you mean to literally have no memories of her or him) is not the same as a...
Sure, you can define philosophy as the analytic philosophers do; but that is just one small subsection of philosophy. I would say that there are no wi...
Philosophy is usually defined as "love of wisdom". If believing the truth is sometimes "awful" and not psychologically beneficial, then in those cases...
Sure there is, but if progress is measured in terms of science and technology then that begs the question, no? I don't find this response to be adequa...
Taking Chinese medicine as a whole, it is undoubtedly a conceptual scheme. It relies on notions of the five elements, chi, meridians, yin and yang and...
That's gibberish, and not what I was saying. The logical substance, not the grammatical structure, of both formulations is the same. If snow is white,...
I agree that no definite statement has been made about snow in "Iff snow is white", but on its own "snow is white" says that snow is white, so it refe...
I remain convinced that there is a reference there to snow being white. I agree that there is no reference to actual snow (in the sense of any particu...
Thanks for the offer, but this is not my primary area of interest, and there is never enough time to read even what I want to read. You can try to dis...
I read the rejection of the conceptual scheme/ empirical content duality to be a rejection of the idea that there are "two major categories of things"...
I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' ...
If a system of knowledge can be set out in any language, which my examples of Chinese and Western medicine perhaps can (could they, for example be set...
What leads you to say that? In it's familiar formulation 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.."'Snow is white'" refers to the sentence or propos...
From the linked SEP entry: Nevertheless, Davidson is not a coherentist, in any standard sense, about either truth or knowledge. Nor, for all that he a...
1."It is sometimes thought that translatability into a familiar lan- guage, say English, cannot be a criterion of languagehood on the grounds that the...
OK, well what I am questioning is relative to this from the paper: The key phrase is: for all I know. What is clear is that retention of some or all o...
I have read through the thread, but I don't remember the specific parts about the dolphins well enough to see how they might answer my question and I ...
It's a lot to read through. Can't you just answer my question according to your own understanding, or at least link a specific post or posts that you ...
Yes, whatever it is that appears as us experiences those processes, undergoes or is those processes; so it is not we as conscious subjects who experie...
No, I haven't said that the mountain's experience is subjective. But, on the other hand, there is a sense in which that could be said; we could say th...
All of those are items, in one way or another, of human experience; they are always already in conceptual form, so they are not what I have been talki...
I don't see how it does. That our capacities for conceptualization emerge out of a pre-conceptual 'matrix' or 'context' does not entail that we can ge...
I agree; we could say that experience is subjective insofar it is conscious, and it is objective insofar as it is not. But since what cannot be consci...
You simply assume that it does. It would have been more open-minded to have written: "Mt. Everest existed in it's entiretyor not regardless of whether...
True, but I think the two senses of 'experience' are related in ways which may be helpful to understanding the nature of the transcendental. I underst...
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