Stoicism: banal, false, or not philosophy.
I take philosophy to be inquiry into what's true and its method to be reasoned argument.
It is not, then, a form of therapy. There may be many worldviews which, if sincerely believed, will have therapeutic benefits. Believing, for example, that the future will be better than the past seems likely, in the main, to be beneficial psychologically. But that is not evidence it is true. And there seems nothing contradictory in the idea that the truth may be awful - that believing what is true may be psychologically harmful.
Nevertheless, it is what's true that philosophy is concerned with regardless of any therapeutic benefits believing it may or may not have.
So, if all that can be said about a stoic worldview is that it has therapeutic benefits, then it is not a worldview that should interest a true philosopher. A true philosophy wants to know what's true and hang the consequences.
What about banality? Well, let's say that Stoicism is the view that we ought to cultivate the virtues. Well, now it is banal, for virtues just are character traits that it is good and right to cultivate in oneself and in others. So now it is saying just "it is good to be good". Yes, it is. But we knew that already.
Even if it is more specific - that is, if it involves the cultivation of particular character traits - then these character traits will either be ones we have independent reason to think are character traits we ought to cultivate, or they will not be. If the former, then the view remains banal - for it is saying no more than that it is good to cultivate good character traits. If the latter, then it is most likely false. For if the character traits are ones that we seem to have moral reason not to cultivate - that is, if Stoicism makes prescriptions that seem to fly in the face of Reason's prescriptions - then it is most likely false, for it is what Reason says that is the philosopher's touchstone, not what some theory says.
So, I submit that Stoicism is either the label for a therapy and not a philoosphy, or it is the label for a banal view (the view that it is good to cultivate good character traits), or it is the view that we ought to cultivate very specific character traits that we do not appear to have reason to cultivate.
As an example of the latter, take the view - often associated with Stoicism - that it is irrational to feel grief for those who have died.
Now, on its face that claim seems false. Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. They have reason to feel grief. They are not a model of rationality, for they are either failing to recognise a reason to grieve, or failing to respond to a reason to grieve - a reason most of us recognise.
Perhaps that is not the Stoic view, and the Stoic view is in fact the view that it is irrational to feel grief when it is irrational to feel grief, and rational otherwise.
Okay, but now it is banal.
Perhaps that is not the Stoic view and the Stoic view is that it is beneficial to oneself not to feel grief and so beneficial to reflect on the (bad) arguments for thinking that death is not a harm to the one who dies (and to overlook their badness and try and be convinced by them).
Okay, maybe. But that is just a point about the therapeutic benefits of believing certain things and is not evidence of the truth of the beliefs in question.
In this way, then, it seems to me that Stoicism is going either to be banal, or false, or not really a philosophy at all.
It is not, then, a form of therapy. There may be many worldviews which, if sincerely believed, will have therapeutic benefits. Believing, for example, that the future will be better than the past seems likely, in the main, to be beneficial psychologically. But that is not evidence it is true. And there seems nothing contradictory in the idea that the truth may be awful - that believing what is true may be psychologically harmful.
Nevertheless, it is what's true that philosophy is concerned with regardless of any therapeutic benefits believing it may or may not have.
So, if all that can be said about a stoic worldview is that it has therapeutic benefits, then it is not a worldview that should interest a true philosopher. A true philosophy wants to know what's true and hang the consequences.
What about banality? Well, let's say that Stoicism is the view that we ought to cultivate the virtues. Well, now it is banal, for virtues just are character traits that it is good and right to cultivate in oneself and in others. So now it is saying just "it is good to be good". Yes, it is. But we knew that already.
Even if it is more specific - that is, if it involves the cultivation of particular character traits - then these character traits will either be ones we have independent reason to think are character traits we ought to cultivate, or they will not be. If the former, then the view remains banal - for it is saying no more than that it is good to cultivate good character traits. If the latter, then it is most likely false. For if the character traits are ones that we seem to have moral reason not to cultivate - that is, if Stoicism makes prescriptions that seem to fly in the face of Reason's prescriptions - then it is most likely false, for it is what Reason says that is the philosopher's touchstone, not what some theory says.
So, I submit that Stoicism is either the label for a therapy and not a philoosphy, or it is the label for a banal view (the view that it is good to cultivate good character traits), or it is the view that we ought to cultivate very specific character traits that we do not appear to have reason to cultivate.
As an example of the latter, take the view - often associated with Stoicism - that it is irrational to feel grief for those who have died.
Now, on its face that claim seems false. Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. They have reason to feel grief. They are not a model of rationality, for they are either failing to recognise a reason to grieve, or failing to respond to a reason to grieve - a reason most of us recognise.
Perhaps that is not the Stoic view, and the Stoic view is in fact the view that it is irrational to feel grief when it is irrational to feel grief, and rational otherwise.
Okay, but now it is banal.
Perhaps that is not the Stoic view and the Stoic view is that it is beneficial to oneself not to feel grief and so beneficial to reflect on the (bad) arguments for thinking that death is not a harm to the one who dies (and to overlook their badness and try and be convinced by them).
Okay, maybe. But that is just a point about the therapeutic benefits of believing certain things and is not evidence of the truth of the beliefs in question.
In this way, then, it seems to me that Stoicism is going either to be banal, or false, or not really a philosophy at all.
Comments (151)
A lot of bad things happen to most people, including their impending demise. For myself, I like the Manual quality of Epictetus: Do this when things go South.
But it appears often to be rational. If my partner dies, then I have reason to grieve her death. If there was a pill that would make me forget all about her, then I ought not to take it. And so on.
So, we often appear to have reason to feel grief. Other things being equal, that is evidence that we really do have reason to feel grief, despite the fact we would be happier not feeling it. And thus, it is evidence that Stoicism - or this particular Stoic belief - is false.
If a Stoic replies that I have misrepresented the view and that in fact the view is that grief is rational when it is rational and not when it is not, then the view is banal.
If the Stoic replies that we will be better off not feeling grief, then they have ceased doing philosophy and have become a therapist.
These are deeply personal things to consider. My interest in the teachings is not to make it other than that.
Someone who didn't - someone who managed to persuade themselves that death is nothing to the one who dies and so felt nothing upon learning of their death - is not a model of rationality.
So this is a case where the Stoic says something that flies in the face of Reason. A good Stoic, who feels no grief when his/her partner or friend or parent dies, is not a rational person.
We often have reason to be unhappy - reason to feel unpleasant things. That is, a rational person is not someone who has managed to find a way of being happy no matter what the world throws at them. No, it matters what's thrown at you. If some things are thrown at you, you ought - ought - to be unhappy and you are not fully rational if you are happy despite them.
If the Stoic is simply trying to teach us how to be happy whatever the world throws at us, then they are a therapist, not a philosopher and often what they teach will be profoundly immoral.
There are a whole range of negative emotions that we ought, under certain circumstances, feel. If you are the victim of a great injustice, then resentment and righteous indignation are fitting emotions to feel. You are not irrational in feeling them, though in feeling them you are not happy.
Another example: a good therapist may be able to make an atrocious individual feel good about themselves and feel happy. Now, has the therapist make the world a better place if they do that? Or worse?
Worse, obviously. The atrocious individual who has done many bad things ought to be unhappy, not happy.
Therapy is therapy, not philosophy.
And the view that we only ever have reason to do that which makes us happy is a false one (or at least, we seem to have abundant evidence that it is false).
I accept that others may read those texts differently, and that perhaps I am missing something essential, but I see the existence of grief, anger, and sorrow as a given in the responses. The appeal to be "rational" is not a negation but a negotiation. Sort of like the deal Apollo cut with the Furies.
I think we often have reason to feel emotions such as grief, anger, sorrow and so forth. Whether we do feel them or not is another matter. But the ideally rational person feels such emotions when and where they have reason to feel them and not otherwise.
If the Stoic thinks we never have reason to feel such things and that, ideally, we would not, then their view is implausible.
If the Stoic thinks that we sometimes have reason to feel such things, sometimes not, then their view is true but banal.
if the Stoic is simply offering us a way of gaining self-mastery, then they are not a philosopher anymore but a therapist.
This seems false to first appearances. Haven't we all sometimes believed that an act was wrong and done it anyway? Surely. I am sure I have, anyway.
Perhaps I am deceiving myself. But to insist that I am on the basis that my claim contradicts a Stoic claim is to have made Stoicism unfalsifiable.
Furthermore, as well as seeming false on its face, it seems false on further reflection too. For example, if all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance, then it surely does not merit deserved punishment. So, no wrongdoer ever deserves punishment for what they do - for in relevant respects what they did was just a mistake. They require treatment, not just deserts.
But it seems clear to the reason of most that people - including ourselves - often deserve punishment for what they have done.
Thus our reason seems quite clear on the matter: much wrongdoing is done knowingly.
Perhaps the Stoic will reply that it does not benefit us or others to acknowledge this. Well, they may be right about that, but now the Stoic has once more become a therapist.
Philosophy is usually defined as "love of wisdom". If believing the truth is sometimes "awful" and not psychologically beneficial, then in those cases believing the truth would not be wise. It follows therefore that wisdom is more important to philosophy than truth. The other point here is that, ultimately, we do not know what is true in the most general sense, and no amount of thinking will enable us to do so, we can only determine what seems most [plausible, and that is always based upon certain groundless assumptions. On the other hand, we can certainly come to understand what attitudes and beliefs are the most wise, at least for ourselves, if not for others.
As to choice - again, I gave an example. Imagine your partner dies and you know that if you take a certain pill all memory of her will be expunged, thus freeing you from grief. Should you take that pill? No, not unless this is a special case. Why should you not take that pill? Well, in part because you ought to feel grief and a good person does not try to escape those emotions under those kinds of circumstance.
The reason of most people represents this to be the case. Yours too, I'll wager. For just imagine that your friend's partner dies and he gleefully tells you that he feels no grief at all - well, you wouldn't think that was fine and dandy would you?!
There are many wise people who are not philosophers, and there are many philosophers who are not wise.
An accountant is wise with money, but they are not a philosopher of money, for instance.
Consider also that such feelings like grief naturally fade over time, and we consider that to be a kind of emotional healing from an emotional wound. If one were able to heal faster, or less vulnerable to wounds in the first place, why would that be bad? And to say that it would be good is not to fault those who do suffer such wounds and take long to heal; I’m not saying that people who get hurt and take time to recover are doing something wrong. You, in contrast, are saying that those who can heal faster or take more trauma without injury are somehow doing something wrong, and I’m calling for you to back that up instead of just calling it obvious to “Reason”. Reason without a reason is just an assertion of faith.
And if I had a friend who seemed eerily unperturbed by a trauma, my fear would be that he was only hiding his pain that I would expect he dis really feel — but if he convinced me that he had genuinely moved past it already, I would be proud of and happy for him.
I would say that there are no wise people in a general sense who are not philosophers (I'm not talking about their being professional philosophers, of course).
There are also, no doubt, many philosophers who are not wise; some because they have failed at their profession, and others because they belong to the unwise subsection of philosophy that thinks the search for truth, in the narrow sense as they conceive it, is more important than wisdom.
Also, not all accountants are wise with money, and those who are I would count as being philosophers of money; in the sense that they love the wisdom of money.
Firstly there being a pill that makes you forget all about your partner (if you mean to literally have no memories of her or him) is not the same as a pill that would relieve your grief and allow you to focus on the happy memories. Having said that, it is also not a given that all grief is necessarily psychologically detrimental or even totally unhappy. Have you heard of the expression "bittersweet"?
Quoting Bartricks
So, is it true that Stoics think grief is irrational ? Where is your evidence for this ?
Stoics look at natural facts. The philosophy is evidence-based. To reach awareness and understanding.
https://dailystoic.com/stoic-response-grief/
Quoting Bartricks
So, I don't think this is an either/or situation.
Practical wisdom relies on exploring and reflection, particularly of the self and how it relates to others in the world.
The centrality of self-knowledge is not something most modern and contemporary philosophers address. There are probably a few exceptions out there that you can think of.
As you say, the goal would rather seem to be about achieving certainty about certain topics via philosophical discourse.
And when has this ever resulted in agreement between 2 opposing parties, or views ?
For the Stoics, philosophy is a continuous act or art of living.
For Massimo Pigliucci it is ' a never-ending exercise of reflective equilibrium'.
It is an ongoing progress...
And this can also include study of analytical or continental philosophy. Whatever.
There is not just one way.
@Bartricks Have you considered offering up a question in the form of detailed OP, here ?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7089/discuss-philosophy-with-professor-massimo-pigliucci/p1
Well, Stoicism is a moral philosophy, which suggests principles upon which to base one's life and one's actions. So nothing could be more relevant to a moral philosophy than that it 'resonates' with a person.
This is what I find so humourous about these skeptical-stoical threads: If stoicism clearly does not resonate with you...why bother?
The entire point of the philosophy is its therapeutic benefits. That is the entire point of any moral philosophy. IF you do X, THEN result Y. The only way to prove or disprove Stoicism is to adopt it 'in good faith'. If you haven't actually applied any of the principles of Stoicism diligently in your life then you aren't in a position to comment on its validity. If the principles work, then Stoicism is valid in that it has been effective for you. If not, then it is not effective for you, but it could still be 'true' in that it may well be valid for someone else....
Unless it is the case that truth and reason are therapeutic. Which they surely must be, as delusion and unreason are the very definition of insanity.
I thought Stoicism had as a belief the distinction controllable vs uncontrollable. It so happens, quite unfortunately for most of us, that the former is usually internal and the latter is external. To add insult to injury it's usually the external that is painful. Isn't this truthful? If, yes, then its therapeutic quality would be one more feather in Zeno's cap. Right?
Quoting Bartricks
I think the nature of goodness is difficult to pin down. There's much controversy about what the definition of "good" is. "Virtue" seems an easier target, a safer bet so to speak, if one wanted to talk about ethics.
The short answer is yes. Stocism is indeed a Philosophy.
Unless you are thinking that Philosophy does not include cognitive science (Psychotherapy), then in your case it would not be a philosophy.
Quoting Pantagruel
Sure, a self-empowering therapy!
You are right, there will always be controversy in defining what 'good' is.
There is nothing banal about considering how to live as well as we can, cultivating certain virtues.
Given that the discussion is about Stoicism, here's an Introducion to the 4 cardinal virtues:
1. Wisdom
2. Courage
3. Justice
4. Temperance
https://dailystoic.com/4-stoic-virtues/
It doesn't complicate it, it just renders vivid the point - which is that sometimes we ought to hurt. If the pill eradiated grief, it would be wrong to take it after your partner has just died. Wrong, because you ought to grieve.
When you ask for 'a reason' what you actually mean is not a reason, but an explanation that you personally find satisfying.
Reason herself approves of us feeling grief under certain circumstances. My evidence that this is the case is that our reason - the reason of most of us, anyway - tells us that those who feel no grief under certain circumstances are faulty, not pictures of rational health.
Again, consider my example: if there was a pill that could eradicate grief, ought you take it after your partner dies? No. Some grief is appropriate - that is, some grief is grief one ought to feel. It is grief one has 'reason' to feel.
The project of using reason to figure out what's true with no regard to anything else is a distinctive project. And it has come to have a name: philosophy.
Now, others may use the term differently. That is true of all terms.
But if a Stoic 'philosopher' is not engaged in the above project but is instead just concerned to make people more able to be happy regardless of what the world throws at them, then that person is not a philosopher in my sense of the term, but a therapist (and an unqualified one at that!)
So? Just imagine there's a pill that eradicates grief directly then - the point remains that if your partner has just died you ought not take it, other things being equal.
We have a word for therapy. It is 'therapy'. We have a word for the single minded use of reason to pursue the truth: philosophy.
Now, I am not denying that some Stoics are philosophers, I am simply pointing out that to the extent that Stoics are doing no more than offering a half-baked view about how to be happy regardless of what the world throws at you they are not doing philosophy - for they have abandoned the pursuit of truth in favour of the pursuit of happiness.
There's a science devoted to that already.
I don't know what you're saying. Sounds wishy washy and makes Stoicism into a label for nothing very clear.
There's a science of psychology that investigates the causes of people's emotions and what mechanisms can be used to regulate them.
In one sense psychology- like any science - is a branch of philosophy insofar as it is using reason to find out what is true.
But it is distinct in that the questions it seeks to answer - the causes and mechanisms of our mental states - is one that empirical methods can resolve.
Whereas other questions - such as whether we ought to feel such emotions, whether it is good or bad to feel them, and so on - are ones that empirical methods cannot resolve. They are squarely philosophical in that you have to use reason alone to investigate them.
Now, if a Stoic is merely interested in the causes and control mechanisms of our emotions, then Stoicism is a psychological thesis or project.
But Stoics are not like this - they mix psychological claims in with claims (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) about how we ought to be, what we ought to be pursing, and so on.
Now those claims are philosophical - and it is on their basis that Stoicism can be considered a philosophical view and not just a therapy or branch of psychology.
But when it comes to those claims, they are either false or vacuously true.
When this is pointed out to a Stoic, they'll typically then change the subject to the supposed therapeutic benefits of their belief system.
Hence my claim that Stoicism is either banal, false or therapy (in truth, Stoics are guilty of a bit of all of these - they make some vacuously true claims, mix in some claims that are obviously false, and mix in some therapy).
Why bother what? I am interested in what's true. Whether a claim resonates with me (whatever that means) has no bearing on its truth. You, I think, are in serious danger of the fallacy of wishful thinking - of thinking that the fact you'd like a given proposition to be true, is therefore some kind of evidence that it actually is true. You're going to believe what you want, not what the evidence implies.
Quoting Pantagruel
That's questionable. But if it is true, then it is not a view that a true philosopher is interested in.
For example, it may well be the case that belief in God has therapeutic benefits. Now, that is no evidence that God exists.
A philosopher is interested in whether God actually exists, not in the therapeutic benefits that may (or may not) accrue from believing it.
So, again, if all Stoics are doing is offering a theory about how to improve your odds of being happy come what may, then it is just a therapy (and one radically underinformed by scientific data too).
I mean, if you really are interested in how best to be happy come what may, then consult a psychologist -- someone properly trained in this area - rather than a Stoic philosopher!
Quoting Pantagruel
Now you're just misusing terms like 'valid' and 'true'. No, a worldview is not true if it 'works' for you. Even a 7 year old realises this.
Ok, then you should in good faith make an effort to learn and adopt stoical principles in a way that makes sense to you, and then decide if they have the purported effect. That is the essential "truth" of the Stoic philosophy (or any moral/ethical philosophical system).
What worldview? Everyone's worldview is unique. All anyone has are the principles and strategies he lives by. People can (and often do) misrepresent what they claim to believe, when in practice they will do something entirely different. The gap between "espoused" and "enacted" beliefs is often very wide indeed.
Is it juvenile to expect to live by one's philosophy? Out of the mouth of babes I guess.
I have mentioned some of these.
For instance, a view associated with Stoicism is the view that all wrongdoing is the product of ignorance.
Do you think that's true? That is, do you think that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance? Do you think that claim is well supported by the evidence? Or is it a result of starting with a theory and then interpreting all the data in light of it?
This is a pretty common position among ancient philosophers. If the good is by definition desirable, why do men do evil? Socrates for sure.
I found the elements of Stoicism that inspire me, I get a thrill of inspiration reading the meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Maybe you will find something that you like. Maybe it isn't for you.
Obviously false. What prevents two or more people from having identical worldviews??
You need to start listening to reason rather than car adverts.
Reality isn't in your gift. You need to get your beliefs to match reality. Reality is where you live - forever. And reality doesn't care what you believe. Hence why you need to listen to reason, not yourself.
I didn't ask you who else believed it. I asked you if you thought it was true.
Stop being so self-involved. So it inspired you. Doesn't matter. That won't make it true.
Now, once more, is it true that all wrongdoing is a result of ignorance? It may be inspiring and comforting to think it is - but is it actually true?
If anyone is interested in Massimo Pigliucci's article on Hume:
https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/2016/04/22/david-hume-the-skeptical-stoic/
Quoting Massimo Pigliucci
It won't make it not-true.
True. It is irrelevant to its truth. To do philosophy well you have to get over yourself and follow reason instead.
Quoting Pantagruel
That isn't the view I asked you about. It is plausible that some wrongdoing is a product of ignorance. Is it plausible that it all is?
The answer is "no, it is not".
Look to yourself. Haven't you sometimes realized something was wrong and done it anyway?
Never mind, eh. So many isms, so little time...
What I mind about is up to me.
You are clearly not listening. Repeating your claims when I, and others, have addressed them is a waste of time and energy.
Your response?
A quote about living a philosopher's life. A quote from someone else.
How is that a response?
How about addressing a Stoic doctrine - again, the view that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance.
Is that a plausible claim?
No, not on its face.
Maybe it makes you feel warm and fuzzy. Maybe it inspires you.
Not evidence it is true.
Is it true?
No, it does not appear to be - virtually all of us have experience of believing something to be wrong, and doing it anyway.
Are we to think that if we believe an act is wrong then one way to test this thesis is to see if you do it? No, that's absurd.
So, our reason - and Stoics will tell you that they are all about reason and understanding the rational underpinnings to reality - does not represent wrongdoing to always and everywhere be the product of ignorance.
Again, normally ignorance operates as an excuse. That is, if you did something out of ignorance, then you are not blameworthy for what you did.
We would predict, then, that if it was manifest to reason that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance, then it would be equally manifest to reason that no wrongdoers are blameworthy for their conduct. But precisely the opposite is manifest to reason.
So, if we follow reason rather than fuzzy warmth we find that one Stoic thesis is false.
:up:
Thanks.
I don't think so, because even if doing philosophy does turn out to be therapeutic, that is not the reason a true philosopher does it. A true philosopher uses reason to discover the truth regardless of whether there are any therapeutic benefits to doing so.
Quoting unenlightened
Again, I don't think so. I agree that insanity involves some kind of systematic failure to track reason. But it is possible, I think, to be a true philosopher and insane.
This is because true philosophy is about using reason to pursue the truth, rather than following reason in every respect. For example, it seems entirely plausible that it is reasonable to pursue personal happiness, at least up to a point. And in pursuing that goal, it may be best to acquire some false beliefs - for not all true beliefs make us happier.
So Reason herself sometimes bids us acquire false beliefs - false worldviews - due to the therapeutic benefits of doing so.
But despite the fact that Reason herself bids us do this, a true philosopher will ignore her on this score, for a true philosopher is interested in what's true rather than making themselves as happy as can be.
As insanity involves some kind of systematic failure to listen to Reason in some or other regard, it is possible to be a true philosopher and insane. For a true philosopher commits themselves to tracking epistemic reasons, not other kinds. (Or at least, should epistemic reasons come into conflict with other ones, the true philosopher will follow the epistemic).
I think most of the philosophers you mentioned, bar perhaps Hobbes, would equate truth, or knowing truth with happiness or well-being in some sense. Remember you said that knowing the truth is sometimes awful; well it is only under the assumption that knowing the truth, even if it is awful, would ultimately serve well-being better than denying it that we could justify the thought that knowing of the truth is, tout court, wisdom.
What reason could we have for submitting ourselves, as slaves, to truths that would merely destroy our well-being (if there are such truths)? The further point is that the kinds of truths which must be sought, as opposed to those everyday truths which we can hardly deny, at least as they are in their everyday dimension, cannot be known with certainty but must be taken on faith.
Quoting Bartricks
:rofl:
I don't think they do.
But anyway, they're clearly different concepts. If you believe you are loved, that does not entail that you are loved. If you believe you are 7ft tall, that does not entail that you are 7ft tall. If the belief that your car is about to collide with a tree makes you unhappy, that does not entail that it is false. I think all of the philosophers I mentioned would agree with me about all of that.
Quoting Janus
I said it is entirely possible that the truth may be awful.
Quoting Janus
Well, the kind of reason in question is known as an epistemic reason.
You are just assuming that we only have reason to do something or believe something if it contributes to our well-being.
That's false, or at least it appears to be.
I have reason to honour my promises even if I'd be happier breaking them.
I have reason to feel sorrow and anger at some things - injustices, deaths of loved ones, and so on - even if I'd be happier without those feelings.
And sometimes I have reason to believe that X is true, due to it actually being true, even if believing X is false would make me happier.
Note, 'evidence' is just another word for epistemic reasons.
Philosophers - true ones - follow the evidence.
Really? You are sure about 'that' are you? How? Kindly defend your claim without contradicting yourself.
Sure, but that involves the happiness of others. I never said it was only your happiness that matters.
Quoting Bartricks
It should be obvious. If the truths that philosophy seeks could be known with certainty then why have they not long since been found?
Even the 'truths' of science are defeasible; you should know that. Of course knowing the truth (if it can be known) would be an epistemic matter. That's just a matter of definition. What you need to show is that there is an ethical imperative to know the truth, per se, an ethical imperative which is independent of all other considerations. How will you argue for such a thing?
Thank you, I do consider myself philosophically a buddhist. Thinking nothing is a great accomplishment.
It complicates it because, as someone else said after me, someone might want to eradicate grief but not eradicate memory. I know I would. Eradicating the grief doesn't mean changing your preferences about the situation, like thinking that your partner dying is just as good as her not dying. It just means not feeling the actual pain of it.
For example, for most of this year I have suffered with a horrible anxiety about death -- my own, that of my loved ones, of strangers around the world, of poor wild animals being eaten by other animals, of the world, of the whole universe in trillions of years. Nobody particularly close to me is particularly close to death in a way that most people would think would warrant this kind of crippling panic about it, so when I say to people that I wish I would stop feeling this way, everyone understands. Nobody thinks that I wish that I was indifferent about any of that. When I'm not suffering from that panic and anxiety, I still prefer to live as long as possible, and for everyone else to too. I'm just not crushed under emotional pain about the seeming inevitability of it; or I'm wishing I wasn't, when I am.
Right now as I typed this sentence, countless other people I've never met died. Right now, I'm not feeling cripplingly awful about that, but I still think it preferable that they hadn't. That's a reasonable thing, no? It's better that I'm not crushed under the emotional weight of all these deaths happening right now that I can't do anything about, isn't it? What is different about the case of a single loved one's death? Obviously, there are factual differences about how easy it would be to shrug off that pain, and so it's far more understandable that someone would be hurt by that more than by the death of millions of strangers they never saw. But that's like saying it's more understandable that someone would be hospitalized by a gunshot wound than by a stubbed toe; most people are tough enough to take a stubbed toe, but not a gunshot would. What we're talking about is the emotional equivalent of being bulletproof, and whether or not you ought to be. Nobody is saying that it is somehow wrong of someone to fail to be bulletproof, or "emotionally bulletproof", but if you can somehow manage to be, why ought you not?
Quoting Bartricks
That's what a reason is. You keep typing "Reason" with a capital R, and referring to it with personal pronouns, like you think it's some kind of deity. A reason is just a justification, a motive, a "because" given in answer to a "why" question. I ask why is it unhealthy to be able (if you are able) to shrug off emotional pain more easily or quickly. If you say "because reason", that's like saying "because because". It's not an answer.
Quoting Pantagruel
No, it really isn't.
Clearly you have not tried meditation.
Indeed. Why truth? Why not untruth? It seems natural enough to try and make sense of the pride we take in possessing the truth not just for ourselves but for others as well. It seems plausible that truth-for-all is related to adapting as a group to our environment. While I don't accept pragmatism's reduction of truth to what is useful to believe, I also can't accept some transcendent Truth as a vague god.
Quoting Bartricks
This is an interesting theme. It reminds me of a play.
[quote=wiki]
Therefore, An Enemy of the People tells the story of a man who dares to speak an unpalatable truth, and is punished for it. However, Ibsen took a somewhat skeptical view of his protagonist, suggesting that he may have gone too far in his zeal to tell the truth. Ibsen wrote to his publisher: "I am still uncertain as to whether I should call [An Enemy of the People] a comedy or a straight drama. It may [have] many traits of comedy, but it also is based on a serious idea."
[/quote]
We are familiar with the notion of the thinker ahead of his time or beyond his local community. From our loftly point of view, we see that the truth-teller was right and yet unrecognized. So, from our POV, sanity was misrecognized as madness. When you capitalize 'reason,' that suggest to me that you are trying make this principle 'infinite' and think from the absolute end of inquiry, from a God's point of view. Your 'Reason' looks to me like the deity of a monotheistic humanism. The philosopher ought to die if necessary in pursuit of the POV of this deity. Take up your cross (the capital T) and follow, says Reason. I am the way, the light, the truth. None come to the Father Truth except by me.
But there are problems with this. One has to assume that philosophy can be resolved without ambiguity. That human language isn't haunted by metaphoricity and ambiguity, that we aren't essentially mythological as opposed to metaphysical beings, that a metaphysics transcending myth and metaphoricity is possible. Cases have been made against these assumptions.
One problem I see with scientism is that its defense within philosophy to some degree violates its own principles. Scientism within philosophy is a kind of rhetoric that wants to understand itself as logical. Writing 'Reason' instead of 'reason' is a naked rhetorical and mythological device, and yet this device is used against feel-good framings of existence as bunk.
Quoting Bartricks
"[i]When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called-for example, the followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with reason
that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic.[/i]"
--Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 1 (Translated by Benson Mates, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996)
I believe some cynics would disagree with that one.
"Now the Stoics and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy, namely, the logical, the physical, and the ethical; and they begin their instruction with the logical part, even though there has been much dispute about the proper place to begin."
-Ibid. book 2, ch. 2
So. Apparently there's more to the stoic view besides "therapeutic benefits".
Ah, reason! OK.
"[i]Those who rate pleasure as the supreme ideal hold that the Good is a matter of the senses; but we Stoics maintain that it is a matter of the understanding, and we assign it to the mind. If the senses were to pass judgment on what is good, we should never reject any pleasure; for there is no pleasure that does not attract, no pleasure that does not please. Conversely, we should undergo no pain voluntarily; for there is no pain that does not clash with the senses. Besides, those who are too fond of pleasure and those who fear pain to the greatest degree would in that case not deserve reproof. But we condemn men who are slaves to their appetites and their lusts, and we scorn men who, through fear of pain, will dare no manly deed. But what wrong could such men be committing if they looked merely to the senses as arbiters of good and evil? For it is to the senses that you and yours have entrusted the test of things to be sought and things to be avoided!
Reason, however, is surely the governing element in such a matter as this; as reason has made the decision concerning the happy life, and concerning virtue and honour also, so she has made the decision with regard to good and evil. For with them the vilest part is allowed to give sentence about the better, so that the senses – dense as they are, and dull, and even more sluggish in man than in the other animals, – pass judgment on the Good.[/i]"
-Seneca the Younger, "Moral Letters to Lucilius", letter 124
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_124
"I am grieved to hear that your friend Flaccus is dead, but I would not have you sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to insist; and yet I know that it is the better way. But what man will ever be so blessed with that ideal steadfastness of soul, unless he has already risen far above the reach of Fortune? Even such a man will be stung by an event like this, but it will be only a sting. We, however, may be forgiven for bursting into tears, if only our tears have not flowed to excess, and if we have checked them by our own efforts. Let not the eyes be dry when we have lost a friend, nor let them overflow. We may weep, but we must not wail."
-Ibid. letter 63
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_63
(he also writes about the topic in his "Ad Marciam, De consolatione". He advises the same course of action there)
It seems to me you didn't do your homework on the stoics. I'll just stick with the attack on stoicism by Sextus Empiricus. Much more thorough even though he didn't claim that stoicism wasn't a philosophy... That's just weird. I mean, Zeno of Citium (founder of stoicism) was a student of Crates of Thebes, who was a student of Diogenes of Sinope. And its claimed that Diogenes was a student of Antisthenes who was a student of Socrates. As in, the guy featured as the main character in Plato's dialogues. Hard to deny that stoicism actually was a part of the tradition with such a pedigree.
But, as a philosophy, we can put all therapeutic claims to one side. That is, when we challenge the Stoic to defend their claims - that is, to show us the evidence in their support - we must be on guard, for almost invariably the Stoic will try and change the subject and tell us how beneficial it is for us to believe the things they believe. When that happens we must tell them in no uncertain terms to shut up and stick to philosophy.
Quoting Ying
Pyschology, not philosophy.
Quoting Ying
How? If they have a case, then they're appealing to Reason. If they don't, who cares - they're just asserting things.
Quoting Ying
Yes, I know - read the OP.
As to these three parts - what do you understand them to be or mean?
Anyway, stop quoting others and put some skin in the game: what do you think philosophy is, if not the use of reason to discover the truth?
I mean, would you accept that someone who just describes a world view - who just insists there's a choir of gods above us and that we all have overwhelming reason to give him 10% of our income - and insists it is true without providing any of his claims with reasoned support is not a philosopher?
I would.
And how does this person differ from a true philosopher?
Both sincerely believe in the truth of their claims. But why is one a philosopher and the other not?
Answer: because the philosopher appeals to Reason whereas the other just insists that things are so because they say so, or becusae there's a long tradition of believing these things in this neck of the woods.
So, again, a true philosopher is someone who undertakes to use reason to find out what's true.
If you think otherwise, tell me what a philosopher is, and tell me what you'd describe a rational truth-seeker as if not a philosopher.
Quoting Ying
Why a dismissive 'ok'? What do you use to find out what's true then, eh? Do you just guess? Do you just defer to your elders? Do you just blindly believe what the nearest whiffy unwashed wannabe guru tells you?
Quoting Ying
Take me to school then.
Yes, that's the gist. Although what we ought to do and what a philosopher does qua philosopher are not necessarily the same. That was my point about how it is possible to be insane and a philosopher. For a philosopher is interested in the truth - and as Reason is our only guide to what's true, the philosopher dedicates him/herself to listening to what Reason says about what's true. But Reason doesn't just talk about the truth, but also about how we ought to behave. And it is in this way that the possibility of an insane philosopher emerges. For someone may be tracking very well what Reason says about truth, but systematically failing to track in any coherent way what she says about other things, and in that way may qualify as insane. For example, a philosopher is very sensitive to epistemic reasons, but they may be very insensitive to instrumental reasons - and they may be insensitive to the latter in such a way as to qualify as mad.
Another example: take ethics. A philosopher is interested in what's true about both the content and nature of ethics. But - pace the Stoics and Socrates - knowing what is right does not entail that one will do what is right. Understanding that one has reason to behave in a certain way, does not guarantee that one will. Thus, an ethicist may be immoral.
Quoting Eee
I don't know what you mean. Let's just focus on one of those bizarre assumptions that you insist I must make, namely that we "aren't essentially mythological as opposed to metaphysical beings". Now, what do you mean? Do you mean that I have to assume I exist? Well, a) I don't have to make that assumption - all I have to assume is that there are truths and that our reason is our source of insight into them - and b) it is an extremely safe assumption, given that I clearly do exist.
Yes you did. :p
You do realize that Sextus Empiricus was a sceptic, right? Oh, let me guess. Scepticism also isn't a philosophy.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D6%3Achapter%3D2
You can read about those in the "Outlines of Pyrrhonism". Sextus Empiricus is rather thorough in his attacks on stoicism.
No. Actually checking what the stoics said might just be relevant to the discussion. Prevents the whole "straw man" nonsense.
-A tradition beginning with Thales of Milete in the west, "Vedas" in India and the "I Ching" in China.
-A "love of wisdom". Cliche definition, sure. I blame Pythagoras of Samos for that one.
-An umbrella term, like "science", which encompasses various sub disciplines like epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.
Depends. Are we talking about Scotsmen?
Oh, I don't know, maybe because the stoics also claim "reason" to be their main guiding tool? Didn't I post a quote about that earlier?
The internet. Obviously.
Done.
No I didn't. There are some people who claim to be philosophers, but are not. And some of them would claim to be Stoics. But I am not thereby claiming that there is no philosophy known as Stoicism or that there are not Stoic philosophers.
Quoting Ying
Relevance?
Quoting Ying
What do you understand by scepticism? Does a sceptic defend their scepticism using reason, or do they just assert it? If the former, then there are sceptical philosophers (and - for the record - I believe there most certainly are philosopher sceptics). Normally sceptics are sceptics about a particular domain, not about everything. But I accept that there can be philosophical sceptics about everything, I just believe their position is incoherent. Note, in claiming that their position is incoherent, I am not denying that it is a philosophy.
Quoting Ying
That's homework and you know already that I don't do my homework - I thought you were going to take me to school? Teach me - tell me what you understand that gnomic quote to mean.
Quoting Ying
When I attributed to the Stoics the view that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance, was I attacking a straw man?
When I attributed to the Stoics the view that grief is irrational, was I attacking a straw man?
I think you don't know what you're talking about and you're about to go off in a huff any. second. now.
Quoting Ying
No, not done at all. Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Then there's Ying - he does neither.
Gibberish and patently false. As self-directed individuals, humans use reason to discover and uncover truths about themselves in the world. Those motivations provide for goals and personal pleasure.
If realizing Truth was not personally pleasurable, why would one pursue it, for the agony of it?
Philosophy is not a mutually exclusive exercise for people....don't dichotomize.
"So, I submit that Stoicism is either the label for a therapy and not a philoosphy..."
Oh wait. No, you're right. You where implying it wasn't a "philoosphy". OK, my bad.
The relevance of me stating that Sextus Empiricus was a sceptic? Oh your accusation that his definition of philosophy is some sort of "psychology" as opposed to philosophy. I was guessing you missed the part where he wasn't a stoic.
Also, you got your definition of classical scepticism wrong.
"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able.""
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 4.
Are we reenacting this SNL skit but with philosophy instead of drugs?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeTCTARJZm8&feature=youtu.be&t=46
Basically, yeah.
Yeah, lots of straw there too.
Well, to be fair, I really don't know that much about "philoosphy"...
I'm about to go, yeah.
There are at least three parties in a public discussion. At least 2 interlocutors and the audience. I'll let them decide on this one.
Er, why did you quote the first bit and not the rest??? I said that Stoicism is either therapy, banal or false. Three possibilities. Three. Not one. Three.
Stoic number 1: "Believing X, Y and Z will make you psychologically robust in the face of reversals of fortune".
He/she is not a philosopher, but a therapist.
Stoic number 2: "It is good to be virtuous because being good involves possessing and exercising the virtues"
He/she is a philosopher, but his/her view is banal
Stoic number 3: "All wrongdoing is a product of ignorance because wrongdoing harms us and no-one would knowingly harm him/herself".
He/she is also a philosopher, but his/her view is false.
Quoting Ying
I didn't offer one - I asked you what you understood it to mean. I know how I use the term, but I haven't a clue how you do.
Why do you keep quoting Sextus at me? Just say what you mean.
Gibberish can't be false.
And it isn't gibberish. It is a coherent statement.
And it isn't false. It is true.
You have failed.
And you have passed the false-dichotomy test.
The ironic thing, is cognitive science/psychology 101 warns against dichotomization.
LOL
:smile:
Thanks. The cardinal virtues don't really address good in a moral sense do they? They seem more behavior-oriented. Someone who is wise, courageous, just and lives a life of moderation is observably "good". The theoretical basis of these behaviors are being sidestepped.
Why? Shouldn't the most informed person decide? And you've just said - and demonstrated - that you do not know much philosophy. For the claims I attributed to the Stoics are well known Stoic claims (which isn't to say that every Stoic would make them, but that they are associated with the view).
And how is the audience a party to the discussion? They're not involved, it's just being done in front of them.
Anyway, it is huff time for you - you're overdue.
Fine. Scepticism is the school of thought founded by Pyrrho of Elis. The generally accepted narrative claims that he was influenced by his encounters with the magi and gymnosophists whom he met during his travels with Alexander the Great. Most folks tend to forget that he also traveled with Anaxarchus of Abdera, a student of Diogenes of Smyrna. Diogenes was a student of Metrodorus of Chios, who studied under Democritus of Abdera (the atomism guy. He also was really happy, advocating "Euesto" and "Euthymia" as ways of life). Anyway, Metrodorus might have been a proto sceptic, and I find it hard to believe that Anaxarchus never talked to Pyrrho about his philosophical pedigree (I wasn't there though, so I don't actually know that. I'll just postpone judgement about that one then). Anyway, you know about Platos Academy right? Well, there was a period where the place was run by sceptics, the most prominent being Carneades and Arcesilaus. The main source on classical scepticism is Sextus Empiricus though, who wrote his works centuries later. Pyrrho's brand of scepticism is called "pyrrhonic scepticism", Carneades and Arcesilaus represent academic scepticism. Sextus Empiricus was a proponent of pyrrhonic scepticism. Both schools advocate the suspension of judgement, but the academics conceded that certain issues could be more (or less) plausible than others. Pyrrhonics just postpone judgement on "non evident matters" to attain "unperturbedness" or "ataraxia" and don't bother with the plausibility of non-evident claims.
OK fine. You're wrong. There. Happy?
No, I stated that I really don't know that much about "philoosphy". Never said that I don't know much about philosophy. Subtle difference.
I have said that philosophy involves using reason to discover what's true.
You've then started talking about Sextus and scepticism.
I am not sure of the relevance.
"I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason..."
-Marcus Aurelius
[quote=Ying]"When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search. So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people have claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called-for example, the followers of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with reason that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic."
--Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 1 (Translated by Benson Mates, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996)[/quote]
[quote=Bartricks]Pyschology, not philosophy.[/quote]
[quote=Ying]You do realize that Sextus Empiricus was a sceptic, right? Oh, let me guess. Scepticism also isn't a philosophy.[/quote]
[quote=Bartricks]What do you understand by scepticism? Does a sceptic defend their scepticism using reason, or do they just assert it? If the former, then there are sceptical philosophers (and - for the record - I believe there most certainly are philosopher sceptics). Normally sceptics are sceptics about a particular domain, not about everything. But I accept that there can be philosophical sceptics about everything, I just believe their position is incoherent. Note, in claiming that their position is incoherent, I am not denying that it is a philosophy.[/quote]
[quote=Ying]Also, you got your definition of classical scepticism wrong.
"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able.""
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 4. [/quote]
[quote=Bartricks]I didn't offer one - I asked you what you understood it to mean. I know how I use the term, but I haven't a clue how you do.
Why do you keep quoting Sextus at me? Just say what you mean.[/quote]
[quote=Ying]Fine. Scepticism is the school of thought founded by Pyrrho of Elis. The generally accepted narrative claims that he was influenced by his encounters with the magi and gymnosophists whom he met during his travels with Alexander the Great. Most folks tend to forget that he also traveled with Anaxarchus of Abdera, a student of Diogenes of Smyrna. Diogenes was a student of Metrodorus of Chios, who studied under Democritus of Abdera (the atomism guy. He also was really happy, advocating "Euesto" and "Euthymia" as ways of life). Anyway, Metrodorus might have been a proto sceptic, and I find it hard to believe that Anaxarchus never talked to Pyrrho about his philosophical pedigree (I wasn't there though, so I don't actually know that. I'll just postpone judgement about that one then). Anyway, you know about Platos Academy right? Well, there was a period where the place was run by sceptics, the most prominent being Carneades and Arcesilaus. The main source on classical scepticism is Sextus Empiricus though, who wrote his works centuries later. Pyrrho's brand of scepticism is called "pyrrhonic scepticism", Carneades and Arcesilaus represent academic scepticism. Sextus Empiricus was a proponent of pyrrhonic scepticism. Both schools advocate the suspension of judgement, but the academics conceded that certain issues could be more (or less) plausible than others. Pyrrhonics just postpone judgement on "non evident matters" to attain "unperturbedness" or "ataraxia" and don't bother with the plausibility of non-evident claims.[/quote]
The point? Well, you stated that you take philosophy to be an inquiry into what's true. I decided to offer a counter point with the quote I provided. We then went off on a tangent about scepticism in general. I'll concede that our little side discussion after the initial salvo wasn't particularly relevant to the main issue though. :)
Agreed again, and like others have advised, we failed to see your logic.
LOL
Be well
I would suggest that actual goodness is superior to theoretical goodness, in the sense that the purpose of goodness is exactly to be realized or enacted. So a practical ethic that realizes some good is superior to the practice of theoretical ethics. Exactly in this sense that Stoicism, yes it has many dimensions, but always the bottom line is that it guides personal development in a practical sense.
No we don't. Look up what Temperence actually means before you start mouthing off about things you know nothing about it would seem. Stoicism would be awful if it was anything like you described. Fortunately it isnt but that just means either you refuse to learn enough about it to effectively critique it or you do but are misrepresenting it in order to trick people into your perspective. Either way this is my last comment on such a churlish and incorrect response to stoicism.
I said that philosophy is the project of using reason to discover the truth.
You then provide a quote that makes a different point - a point about the attitudes of truth-seekers.
You then tell me that the author of the quote was a sceptic.
I do not understand the relevance of either the quote or scepticism, but as you also asked whether I considered scepticism a philosophy, I said something about it - namely that, as I understand 'scepticism', it is, or can be a philosophy if the sceptic believes their position is supported by reason.
You then tell me that I have not understood scepticism.
So I asked what you understood the term to mean.
Rather than answering, you give me a potted history of scepticism - without telling me what you actually understand the term to mean.
Anyway, this is pointless as you're not addressing anything I've actually said or the OP. This thread is about Stoicism, not scepticism.
Anyway, how is this about Stoicism? It's just you venting your frustration at me after ignorantly asserting that the belief that grief is irrational and something to be conquered is not a belief associated with Stoicism.
I did learn about stoicism and I learned about Antinatalism too and have probably read far more on both those subjects than yourself, else I wouldn't have gotten my degree. Get over yourself and give up your ridiculous fantasies about convincing the world to stop breeding. It is impossible to achieve without viciously and maliciously sterilising everyone against their will. Whatever reason you have for being jealous of children you should drop it. It's astounding to me how transparent antinatalists are on this topic. You don't like kids, you dont like that children steal attention away from your problems or you don't like that no one would want to have a child with you. Its most likely one of those. I have wrote more than a few pieces on the psychological motivations for negative affect ethics and all the motives come from a place of selfish, irrational egoism. So you've been traumatised before? Who hasn't? After all the shit my family did to me I can think of plenty of horrible shit that I could use to justify anger and revenge on the rest of the world but I don't because I promised myself I'd never blame those who arent responsible and I know that I can be better than all that shit and I refuse to become just as bad or worse than the people who made me suffer before. Then you have all the amazing individuals who have went through far worse than I that still don't turn into vicious, hateful, jealous and spiteful individuals like the people that hurt them. Get some therapy mate, seriously.
Sincerely hope you are banned from the site soon. I've nothing against Autodidacts when they actually demonstrate ability but from you I've seen none. You're just another dogmatic ideologue trapped by their own warped logic and I feel sorry for you.
Yes, but, it goes both ways. Many modern psychologists have actually claimed that Stoicism was an inspiration of sorts towards treating attitudes and mental states as subject to therapy. REBT, CBT, logotherapy...
In fact you should be wary of anyone trying to place themselves as the moderator of the content of your argument. Quite frankly ive noticed that individuals can get really angry when you bring up an empirical field of study to contradict them as if philosophy isn't allowed to use empirical evidence.
Also as someone who actually has a degree; if your argument needs to address psychology then you should address it while keeping your conclusion philosophical. You can have psychology as part of premises in an argument so long as the conclusion logically follows and you arent talking out the side of your neck.
I see no evidence of that. If you knew about Stoicism you'd know that the views I mentioned - such as that grief is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - are typical Stoic views.
Quoting Mark Dennis
Quoting Mark Dennis
Your inability to focus squarely on the arguments and your tendency to take robust arguments personally strongly implies you lack any proper academic training. And you clearly do not know much about either Stoicism or antinatalism or argumentation. You seem incapable of making valid inferences or in fairly characterising an opponent's position. Antinatalism, for instance, is not synonymous with the view that we ought to kill ourselves (as anyone who's read the literature on the subject - or, you know, just thought about it intelligently - would know).
Quoting Mark Dennis
Er, what? Are you literally insane?
This thread is about Stoicism and is not an appropriate venue for you to vent your irrational and unfocussed anger. I've argued here that Stoicism often ceases to be philosophy and becomes therapy. It is in that capacity that it may be both helpful and needed by you.
But whereas a psychologist will want to know the causes and mechanisms of our psychological states, the philosopher will want to know things such as what psychological states it is good to be in, what psychological states one ought to be in, and what a psychological state is, in and of itself.
those are not questions psychologists ask or set about answering.
Now, if you want, you can say that Stoicism is about what emotions we feel and how to get rid or them (or control them). And you can say that, as such, it is a psychological thesis, but as psychology is really a branch of philosophy, it is therefore a philosophical thesis.
And that's fine - I agree. But let's just be clear: it is a thesis not about what is good or bad, or what is right or wrong, or what the universe is fundamentally composed of. Rather, it is just a psychological thesis.
Well, the whole thread's premise is based on straw-manning psychology as if something separate from the ethos of neo-Stoical philosophy as self-help and personal development, no?
The reason I'm not engaging with you or discussing this with you is it would genuinely be a waste of my time because you won't get it. Because you lack the education. I'm sorry, that's just a fact. You aren't here to argue in good faith you're here to force us all to agree with your views.
I tried discussing antinatalism with you once before and I can see for myself the way you interact with others. I don't have the patience to teach you why you are wrong amd you'll just reject it all anyway and you'll be rude at every step of the way.
I'm sorry, but your personality is just too abrasive for me to have an adult conversation with. You don't get it and I'm over it.
OK, you added more content to that post, but, does it apply to modern-day Stoicism?
Why? Because a therapist is someone who's an expert on how to manage one's psychological states.
A philosopher, by contrast, is not an expert on those matters. For though a philosopher is interested in using reason to find out what's true, they focus on those questions that do not seem to be capable of being settled by empirical means.
So, if you want to know if you ought to be happy, then you would seek out a philosopher.
A psychologist can - or may be able to - tell you how to be happy.
A philosopher can - or may be able to - tell you whether you ought to be, and can tell you about whether happiness is purely subjective or has an objective aspect to it.
I have not said that Stoicism is definitely a psychological thesis. But many Stoics seem to make it into one - typically when their more philosophical claims are placed under scrutiny.
OK, well first, this isn't even what Stoicism is about. Second, do you only think in a pejorative (stereotypical) manner?
I'd say see both, as a pragmatic method or thing...
I am not sure what you mean. I think extremely aggressively. That is, if someone tells me their worldview, then I try my hardest to show that it is false.
Wow, this is quite obtuse, please elaborate on what you think is the difference between a Stoic and therapist, if you don't mind?
EDIT: And, I hope this isn't like, I want to be happy, therefore I see a therapist or how ought I be happy, being a question reserved for the philosopher.
A therapist is just trying to treat a person - that is, they are trying to make you into a certain sort of a person, be it a happier person, or a more controlled person, or whatever.
But a philosopher would be interested in what kind of a person one ought to be, and in what oughtness itself is, and in what a person is, and in what reality would need to be like in order for it to contain properties such as oughtness, and goodness.
So take Buddhism. If you engage a Buddhist in argument - that is, if you ask them to provide some kind of evidence that their worldview is true - they will typically change the subject and tell you how to be content.
Not saying all Buddhists do that - but in my limited experience, most do.
At that point they are not doing philosophy. They are not giving me epistemic reason to believe in their worldview. Rather, they are seeking to show me that I have instrumental reason to believe in their worldview.
Or take a Christian. A Christian might point out how much happier you'd be if you believed in God and an afterlife in which all wrongs are righted and so on. Well, they may be right - but that is not evidence that their worldview is true.
The philosopher - the true philosopher - is interested in whether gods and afterlives and souls and so on, actually exist. They are not interested in how beneficial or otherwise it may be to believe in such things.
So, if a Stoic starts saying "here's how to be happy..." and "believing this or reflecting on this will make you more able to deal with reversals of fortune etc." then they are offering instrumental - perhaps even moral - reasons to believe in their worldview, but they are not offering epistemic reasons (evidence) for their worldview. And it is evidence that true philosophers are interested in.
Of all the examples you took Buddhism as one to represent the astonishingly fine line between what one can call a philosophy or way of life that addresses in the extreme the suffering of an individual.
Go figure.
At this point I don't think you know what both of us are even talking about. I'm certainly lost hereabouts.
You asked me some questions - such as the difference between therapy and philosophy - and I answered them.
I do not know why you are lost or think that I am.
A therapist tries to change your psychological state.
That's not what a philosopher is trying to do.
A philosopher is seeking to answer questions that only careful reasoned reflection can illuminate. Such as 'what 'is' a psychological state? (are they physical states, or states of an immaterial thing?)', and 'what psychological state is it good for a person to be in?"
It is precisely because the philosopher's questions can only be answered by careful reasoned reflection, whereas the therapist's questions require detailed empirical investigation, that we have separate disciplines dedicated to answering them.
The post starts out OK; but, then we have this profound non sequitur:
Quoting Bartricks
Says who?
Me. Just then.
It is not a non-sequitur. It is just a fact.
Why do you think psychology and philosophy are distinct disciplines?
Well, there's WAY more overlap between the two rather than the superficial differences your trying to 'create'...
Asking a Buddhist for meaningful evidence that their fundamental views are correct is like trying to get water from a stone because the stone doesn't believe in MEANING. This guy is still arguing from a point that he feels any philosophy should be able to justify itself with evidence yet doesn't describe what he feels evidence should be. This guy will just move the goalposts every time so you really are wasting your time.
Quoting Wallows
Him of course. Weren't you reading? Bartricks is the judge of all and should be praised is what he is trying to really say. Anyone who disagrees with him gets labeled as uneducated or not doing philosophy right.
He literally told me to be "More like me" earlier. You are wasting your time with him. You are a philosopher, he is a subversive. Don't stoop my friend.
Just trying to burn down this straw man that he set out hereabouts.
Psychologists often make philosophical assumptions (often unnecessarily), and philosophers sometimes make psychological assumptions.
But they're distinct disciplines.
Can't you see the difference between these two questions:
"What will make me happy?"
"what is happiness?"
I completely understand that desire, however it is already ashes on the ground and he's staring longingly at a photo of it pretending and telling himself it isn't.
Oh and in case you are wondering why I have such a problem with him; He asked me a few months ago why we shouldn't sterilize our own population and all other animals too in a debate about antinatalism. I literally suggested that he wanted to do this because of his antinatal views, thinking it would turn out to be a straw man on my part but he actually likes that idea and asked me "Why not?".
It's always the people with skeletons..
Seriously you are far too intelligent Wallow, to let someone like Bartricks get under your skin. He will be banned soon, the moderators are discussing his behavior as we speak.
OK, but pragmatically I see no reason why a philosopher can't in principle answer a question purportedly exclusive to a therapist. And, I mean no disrespect to either or both professions.
Have you ever been to therapy, may I ask?
Yeah, I think I'm gonna fold my chair and go somewhere else now.
And there's also no reason why a philosopher can't bake a cake or lay a wall. Not sure what your point is.
Quoting Wallows
No, why on earth would I go to therapy?
It's possible to imagine the perfect car - inexpensive, fuel-efficient, low maintenance, etc - but until one can be constructed, thus felt, bought and driven, nobody will take you seriously. Practicality matters. This reminds me of Plato's world of forms. Supposedly these so-called forms are the perfect originals of which the physical world is just an imperfect image. If so then what we call theory, usually the perfect ideal original, becomes as valuable as original manuscripts to make practical copies of. The same applies to theoretical ethics and practical ethics. The latter is just a case of trying to fit the former within the limitations of the world as we know it which, because it is imperfect, renders practical ethics, not useless, but not completely satisfactory.
I'm glad that we both see this. It's a great theme.
Quoting Bartricks
Excellent. I thought so but wanted to check. If we understand the philosopher as the pursuer of truth through reason against his own comfort and community if necessary, then indeed he can be seen as insane.
Quoting Bartricks
What do you make of the is/ought problem? Various 'great' philosophers have taken the position that reason just tells us what is, not what ought to be. As I see it, the 'ought' is where bias tends to manifest. I remember my early concept of the scientist/philosopher. He or she just coldly looked for patterns in reality. He or she could see what others couldn't or wouldn't because he or she resisted the all too human urge to tell reality what it should be.
Quoting Bartricks
No, it's nothing so silly as having to assume you exist. What I am talking about is the nature of language. In short, language is not like math. It's full of metaphor and ambiguity. To me the linguistic turn in philosophy was reason in its pursuit of truth looking into its method. Certain philosophers have hoped to purify language, to find a version of language where exact reasoning toward truth would remain possible. But I don't think they did or even can succeed.
Basically we can do it in math because we can formalize everything. Everything result can be checked with a computer, even if that result also has intuitive meaning for the mathematician. But metaphysics that wants to talk about human things like ethics and reason itself is stuck in language. We can come to some consensus in the fog and metaphor. But this fog, along with ethical/political bias, helps explain, it seems to me, why philosophy tends to be many, many philosophies that try to swallow and negate one another.
To use language is mostly like riding a bike. The words pour out of us. We are intelligible to one another because we live in the same 'form of life,' which can't be made completely explicit to build the kind of foundation metaphysics needs.
[quote=link]
Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.).
First of all and most of the time (Heidegger's zunächst und zumeist, BT 370), humans live following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner.
[/quote]
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/from-conventionalism-to-social-authenticity-heideggers-anyone-and-contemporary-social-theory/
No one should take Heidegger on faith, but I think he makes a strong case on this issue. As does Wittgenstein.
[quote=link]
While engaged in hitch-free skilled activity, Dasein has no conscious experience of the items of equipment in use as independent objects (i.e., as the bearers of determinate properties that exist independently of the Dasein-centred context of action in which the equipmental entity is involved). Thus, while engaged in trouble-free hammering, the skilled carpenter has no conscious recognition of the hammer, the nails, or the work-bench, in the way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about them. Tools-in-use become phenomenologically transparent.
[/quote]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/
Here's Heidegger in his own (translated) words. When we are absorbed in using a tool, it becomes 'transparent ' in the sense that we don't focus on it but what we are trying to achieve.
[quote=H]
The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call ‘readiness-to-hand’. (Being and Time 15: 98)
[/quote]
I mentioned this because I think language is a like the hammer. The theoretical mode depends on the automatic ease we have with it most of the time. We can never define all of our terms. We can never get behind our tacit knowhow. We can of course do our best, but reason has a vanishing foundation, an abyss for a foundation. Language is received like the law. We can't question that 'law' without obeying it to do so, 'following the social rules that they apprehend in some kind of mindless, non-explicit, anonymous manner.'
This is why the philosopher as philosopher needs at least an ideal community, for which he is not insane, even if he is insane within his actual community. To speak a language is to be a 'we' on an automatic-unconscious level on only an 'I' at the high, conscious level.
Or what say you?
I think I see what you are getting at here. For you the philosopher is not operating empirically. This sounds like what's called armchair science. I googled and found a defense of it as 'traditional philosophy.' I just skimmed the intro, but here's a quote.
[quote=link]
The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most
part, on reason and reflection.
[/quote]
https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1525&context=etd
Thinkers like Rorty have made strong cases against 'armchair' science, but then Rorty thinks philosophy has died into cultural criticism (that the dream of reason is dead.)
On a different note, I can imagine the therapist as more of an engineer or person of tacit know-how who doesn't prioritize theory but rather results. A therapist might be understood as a kind of musician of the soul. All that matters is results, not the results-independent accumulation of explicit knowledge. But I don't have much experience with therapy. I'm doing armchair philosophy.
I think the one part where stoicism has it right, is specifically Marcus Aurelius when he talks about how you can't control people and things around you, but only yourself. You can influence people but you cannot control them and that's key in my opinion.
Stoicism surely can't be merely therapy. The stoic ideas were formulated with a metaphysical doctrine in mind. It is the relation between the therapy and the metaphysics that effectively makes stoicism a philosophy.
You asked me what I think scepticism to be. Well, I understand scepticism through the words of actual sceptics. As for stoicism? You don't understand that either apparently. I dealt with that one by actually quoting stoics since that's what we are talking about, not some halfwitted understanding someone cooked up during lunchbreak.
Exactly. Stoicism is not supposed to be an ongoing battle, but an acquiescence. You don't fight with your own expectations, you examine them and learn to let go the ones that aren't realistic, while making efforts at self-improvement. If that is a chore to you, then of course it isn't going to be pleasant, and it isn't going to work. As you have said, embrace it or fight it. :)
I get what you’re saying overall though. I just don’t think it sensible to take any perspective on life to an extreme view - this is why I remain suspicious of buddhist ideas.
I don’t think Stoicism is primarily about ignoring human emotions and being a lump ‘living in the moment’. My general take is that it’s about a rational means of keeping emotions in check, rather than bring numb, making choices based on what is possible, rather than fanciful, and understanding and accepting your own limitations. The later is something I’m not convinced about tbh as I think humanity is able to achieve so much because we believe beyond our own abilities and occasionally surpass ourselves.
Maximize Your Potential: The Stoic Life in Accordance with Nature
https://dailystoic.com/stoicism-nature/
I do not see a problem, just a dogma that - to those who cleave to it - generates a problem. Our reason gives us insight into the norms of Reason - that is, into what Reason prescribes.
It is by our reason that we learn about a prescription to seek out and beleve what is true. That is a norm. And I take it that the word 'ought', though ambiguous, in this context denotes some kind of prescription or bidding.
So, the judgement that we 'ought' to be generous is a judgement about what Reason prescribes - she prescribes generosity.
She tells us to seek out and believe what is true. She also tells us to be generous and kind and honest.
There is no is/ought problem, as such, for these are all oughts. It is just that they can sometimes conflict. Sometimes, for instance, it would not be moral to seek out and believe what is true.
Where Hume was right is that our reason - and so, by extension, Reason herself - seems ignorant about the extended world, the world of sense. Reason seems to know that the world of sensible things has a basic character, but nothing very specific. Hence why we cannot, by reason alone, figure out whether water will suffocate us, to use one of his examples. We have to observe the world to find that out - although again, not without assistance from our reason, for it is by reason (not sense) that we are told to do this (that is, to observe and to make inferences about future events on their basis).
But Hume was wrong and quite unjustified in taking this further and declaring Reason dumb about matters of substance and reality. indeed, I think his position is quite incoherent. Reason's prescriptions - about which true and false claims can be made - include both the prescription to seek out and believe what is true, and moral prescriptions, and the prescription to pursue our own desires, and no doubt some more besides. My point is that they are all kinds of prescription, and we cannot even begin to learn which descriptions are true until we start to attend to the prescriptions of Reason. So, prescriptions are, in a very real sense, prior to descriptions.
I will respond to the rest later.
Quoting Ying
Yes? So, as far as I'm concerned, that now makes you - you - a really rude person who can, with justice, be spoken to in a fashion that would be rude were it applied to anyone else. That's what I do. I talk to rude people - like you - in the manner you deserve.
Now, again, stop attacking me - stop suggesting I'm a halfwit - and actually address the OP.
Stop quoting and put things in your own words, otherwise a) it is not clear that you understand at all what is in the quote and b) it is not clear whether you endorse what is in the quote.
Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance? Was I wrong to say that a core Stoic belief is that grief is irrational?
My claim is not that Stoics are therapists, or that Stoicism is therapy, but that it is either therapy, or a collection of true, but banal ethical injunctions (such as 'be good'), or controversial but false claims, such as that guilt is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance.
In reality, Stoics flit between these - that is, they may defend a controversial ethical claim - such as that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - by appeal not to evidence (as a true philosopher would), but by appeal to the supposed therapeutic benefits that may come from believing it.
Yes, possibly, but then the Stoic makes their stand on grief banal. So, for instance, in reality it would appear that grief is sometimes rational, sometimes not - sometimes healthy, sometimes unhealthy. Grieving the death of people one has no close relationship to, for instance, seems unhealthy, especially if it is accompanied by a tendency to feel less, or no greater grief for the deaths of those with whom one does have a close relationship.
But if 'that' is what the Stoic is saying - that sometimes grief is rational, sometimes not - then their view is banal. And although individual Stoics may put more meat on the bone by supplying more detail about when and where grief is rational, at this point there would seem to be nothing distinctive about Stoicism.
If, on the other hand, Stoicism is to be a distinctive philosophical view, then it needs to say something substantial about these matters, and what they say would need to be supported.
For instance, let's say that a Stoic argues that grief is irrational because death is not a harm to the one who dies. Well, that's a substantial - non-banal - view. The problem, however, is that it appears to be false.
Stoics claim to be informed by Reaosn - indeed, to see reality as underpinned by Reason in some sense (and I agree with that). But our reason represents death to be a harm and grief to be appropriate - so in this respect anyway, the Stoics seem to say things that fly in the face of what Reason says.
That's the point at which the Stoics will typically appeal to well-being rather than truth.
Err, no. I called out your definition of stoicism as being less than 24 karat. Didn't say anything about you personally though. Besides, even smart folks miss the mark every once in a while. I'm pretty sure I said some stupid things in my time too.
Didn't you say: "Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Then there's Ying - he does neither", earlier? Not exactly the epitome of politeness either. :rofl:
Don't tell me what to do. Well, I mean, you could try, but it won't get you very far. :p
As for my understanding of stoicism, well, lets just say that I'm not wholly uninformed,. Copies of the works of Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Diogenes Laertius and the "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" by Sextus Empiricus (yeah the sceptic; books 2 and 3 deal with stoic epistemology, one of the few sources where you actually get to read about that since the texts dealing with the groundworks of stoicism by Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Soli have been lost to the mists of time.) grace my bookshelves. I also have a book which contains all the anecdotes and extant fragments of Crates of Thebes ("Die Weisheit Der Hunde" by Georg Luck. I also have a copy of "The Cynic Philosophers: from Diogenes to Julian" from the Penguin Classics series, but that one isn't nearly as complete as the book by Georg Luck. Anyway, Crates of Thebes was a teacher of Zeno of Citium, but you knew that already, right?). In any case, I certainly wouldn't call myself an expert on the school, but I'm more informed than your average run of the mill guy off the streets I guess.
And when it comes to endorsing the quotes, and stoicism by extension, no, I don't agree with stoicism in most cases. Scepticism and cyncism are more to my preference when it comes to hellenistic philosophy.
Yes. As in, you're wrong about that being a core belief of stoicism (they also pointed to other causes like greed and being ruled over by emotions; stating that the stoics boiled the entire issue down to just ignorance would be a gross oversimplification). Not making any claim on you being a halfwit or not. That's not for me to decide.
Yes. Like I said, Seneca has works explicitly dealing with the grief that comes from the loss of a loved one.
He literally states:
"I am grieved to hear that your friend Flaccus is dead, but I would not have you sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to insist; and yet I know that it is the better way. But what man will ever be so blessed with that ideal steadfastness of soul, unless he has already risen far above the reach of Fortune? Even such a man will be stung by an event like this, but it will be only a sting. We, however, may be forgiven for bursting into tears, if only our tears have not flowed to excess, and if we have checked them by our own efforts. Let not the eyes be dry when we have lost a friend, nor let them overflow. We may weep, but we must not wail."
--Seneca the Younger, "Moral Letters to Lucilius", letter 63
Didn't I post this one already?
It matters not just what someone says, but when they say it. You had already started to be rude at that point - started to talk about me, not the argument and had said I hadn't done my homework and then had the temerity to try and take me to school (though not by actually addressing anything I'd said, but by quoting others on irrelevant topics).
Quoting Ying
Quoting Ying
Why do you just assume that's not true of me too? Again, the rudeness. You just assume I'm ignorant. Yet I have made substantial claims - in my own words - about Stoicism and rather than provide evidence that they are false, you have asserted my ignorance.
Now, I actually have evidence that you're not very well informed, because I said some things about Stoicism that are true and you said that I needed to do my homework - which implies you think they're not true.
Quoting Ying
Potato, potarto. No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view.
And it is false, yes? I mean, obviously false.
You quote Seneca:
Quoting Ying
But you don't interpret the quote correctly (or at all, in fact). He does not dare to insist that you not mourn at all, but that's entirely consistent with believing that it is nevertheless irrational to do so. And indeed, in saying hat it is the better way he means that it is more rational - so ideally rational response to death is no grief at all, yes?
Seneca is confirming what I said, not refuting it.
Oh. and this is what you stated in the opening post:
"[i]As an example of the latter, take the view - often associated with Stoicism - that it is irrational to feel grief for those who have died.
Now, on its face that claim seems false. Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. They have reason to feel grief. They are not a model of rationality, for they are either failing to recognise a reason to grieve, or failing to respond to a reason to grieve - a reason most of us recognise.[/i]"
Seems like you claim that stoicism advocates that one shouldn't feel grief at all ("Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. ". The quote I provided says otherwise.
Now, to be fair, here's what Diogenes Laertius states in his "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" (Life of Zeno):
"And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others’ prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole."
So, yes, they hold grief to be an "irrational mental contraction". What the Seneca reference shows however is that their idea of how to deal with grief is much more nuanced than just never feeling any.
No, Stoics also make the first - Socrates famously maintained that all wrongdoing was a product of ignorance and Zeno followed him in that belief.
Plus, depending on what assumptions one makes about the connection between reasons and motivation, they're not even obviously distinct claims - there's a long tradition of believing that what one takes oneself to have reason to do, one is necessarily motivated to do (seems to have been Socartes' view, for instance, and it continues to be held in some form or other up to the present day).
If that's true then any desires that prevent one from doing as one ought are themselves symptomatic of ignorance.
Quoting Ying
No, read the quote again. Read what it actually says, not what you think it says.
From Diogenes Laertius' "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" (ch. on Zeno):
"[i]Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice. . .; magnanimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.
Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge.[/i]"
and:
"Now they say that the wise man is passionless, because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless."
So. According to Diogenes Laertius, the stoics "hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge". This isn't the same as claiming they held that "wrongdoing is a product of ignorance", or at least, I don't see it that way.
Your other claim, that stoics hold that "no one does wrong willingly", seems to be refuted by the notion that they hold the "bad man" to be "callous and relentless". Apparently they held that such folks actually do perform "bad" acts willingly. Seneca had first hand experience of such "bad men", since he knew Nero personally (cost him his life in the end).
Seneca seems to state that grief is a natural (another stoic tenet was that one should live in accordance with nature... Just sayin'...) response but that we shouldn't prolong our grief unnecessarily.
Prudent. I'm going to do the same. :)
To be honest, though, the thoughts Bartricks is professing is not that different than the caricature of Stoicism that any newbie might encounter, through reading about "stoicism" from Jordan Peterson and his sage Stoic being a bloke on an SSRI's eating tons of lobsters.
I hope the visit organized by Baden and other mods, of Massimo Pigliucci, will benefit his understanding on the matter.
Yeah I guess. This thread did provide me with an excuse to read some stoic texts again, so there's that. A bit selfish (shellfish? Ok, never mind) but hey, I got something out of it at least.
So the mods are doing the whole guest speaker thing again? I remember sending out emails to several big names back on the old forum. Simon Blackburn was willing to feature, Martha Nussbaum wanted someone to come to Chicago and Noam Chomsky actually took the time to send a reply, stating he was busy (not particularly surprising... Worth a try though, right?). I also emailed Peter Singer but I got an automated response, lol.
Read all about it:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7089/discuss-philosophy-with-professor-massimo-pigliucci/p1
The category of ‘ethics’/‘morality’ is something very much part of ‘philosophy’. Stoicism is certainly about ‘ethics’/‘morality’. You may as well be saying ‘ethics’ isn’t philosophy or have I missed something?
If I’m wrong can you express why Stoicism isn’t related to ethics? You seem to be trying to parcel stoicism off as part of psychology rather than as part of ethics?
Note: I’m not trying to put words into your mouth just trying to understand where you place these items in relation to each other and why.
Thanks
I am saying that much of what Stoics say is not philosophical, but psychological. However, I am not saying that 'all' of what they say is. Far from it. I am saying that they often make philosophical claims.
But what one needs to be on guard for, is the tendency - when under argumentative pressure - to subtly change the topic from philosophy to psychology. That is, to stop doing philosophy and start doing therapy.
You're essentially appealing to a dog-whistle. I'm willing to entertain that stoicism is heuristical in nature but I don't think that's inherently bad. After all, stoicism has done much to help the development of cognitive-behavioral therapy, and that would not have been possible if stoicism was completely devoid of profound ideas. Also, a therapeutical motivation doesn't necessarily have any bearing on the quality of the philosophy.
thx my guy