Being a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells and so on are modes of activity. All modes of activity would seem to be relational. So, if there is ...
I accept all the same facts you do (except that you deny that I can't feel, as opposed to merely empathize with, your pain). If that single point is n...
Likewise cheers. We can both believe whatever we want in accordance with how things seem to us: the subjectivity of experience at work and play. :smil...
It might make sense to you. If I experienced pain in one area, and then pain in another area I would not say the same pain has moved, but that I now h...
Well, if the pain is no longer in the same location as it was in the one person then it's no longer the same pain. The intensity of the pain can only ...
What you quote me as saying there is not at all inconsistent with "pains move around and change in intensity", so I have no idea what you think the "c...
No, I'm taking issue with your usage of "same". Even if the pains were in exactly the same locations in the various bodies, and of exactly the same in...
No you made the unjustifiable claim that the pain experienced by appendicitis sufferers is the "same". It's not even in precisely the same locations o...
No it's reliant on the fact that people with an inflamed appendix characteristically have pain in the lower right abdomen or pain near the navel. Less...
No, it's not because that neurological process would not occur if I didn't want to rake the leaves. Human experience is "above science"; the latter is...
I hadn't realized you didn't understand the notion of efficient or mechanical causation. Put simply it is understood to consist in a transfer of energ...
In normal parlance causes for actual events are generally thought in efficient, mechanical terms. There is a clear distinction between this conception...
So, we must know something of the territory in order to be able to say that some maps (or models) are more accurate than others? I guess it depends on...
I wasn't suggesting that this is explicitly the way the PLA is laid out. But, think about it: it being impossible that there be rules only you know ab...
What do you mean? My point was, to give an example, you make up novel words (sounds and a script to represent them) for objects, and be able to determ...
As I understand it the crux of the idea of the impossibility of a private language is that, if you decided to create one, you would not be able to und...
I think you mean "scientific theory". Science is not the best way to understand human behavior in my view. If you want to understand why people do thi...
The proximate and efficient cause would be the tines of the rake dragging the leaves. I wouldn't talk in terms of "sufficient" cause but rather suffic...
But it is. If I decide to take leaves, and no person or condition stops me then I will rake leaves. Leaves simply being there are a necessary conditio...
In the first case it's in accordance with ordinary usage. In the second case we are talking about a statistical phenomenon, not an individual decision...
The language of necessary and sufficient causes has been yours, not mine. I would rather refer to necessary and sufficient conditions, which for me is...
No, not the leaves. I am not compelled to rake leaves everywhere I see them, or even most places. What causes me to rake particular leaves is the thou...
No, talking about X in various ways just is exploring the different ways we are able to think about X. As I see it that is exactly what has constitute...
. To talk about "the nature of the mind, the world, language, and so on" would be to talk about the different ways in which we can think about those t...
Are you sure you were pretending? I didn't say philosophy doesn't teach anything, I said it teaches how to think about things in different ways. If ph...
I notice you like to attempt to dismiss your interlocutor's arguments by trying to frame them as some cliched, unargued response. The distinction betw...
What good philosophy shows and continues to show is the various ways in which things can be thought about. It's more art than science. I don't believe...
OK I think I pretty much already said what your first paragraph says, and I don't actually understand the second, it feels like looking through an ext...
This seems like a mere projection of your own disaffection with philosophy. Perhaps some of the pre-Kantian metaphysicians might have imagined that ph...
So, the issue you seem to be stumbling over is the distinction between what about our experience of sense objects can be determinably or definitively ...
Right, I think I agree. You seem to be saying that if we didn't have any aesthetic response, then there would be nothing about the objects of sense th...
Isn't it obvious? Leaves do not cause us to rake them; our desire to rake them does. Unless you understand causation in some kind of weird Aristotelia...
I missed this earlier. Perhaps it's now redundant to respond, but I think it's an important point. The world that we experience via the senses just is...
Sure you can refer with an umbrella term to that which can only be indeterminably shared, to that which is private. It's the fact that we all have our...
A glimpse is rich enough; and may be rich indeed. What can be determinably shared is the prosaic; and that is what diminishes art, and subjective expe...
I'm not playing a game, much less anyone else's. I had thought you were saying that claims are not fallible; if you were not saying that then I was co...
Nonsense! There is private subjectivity and there are various kinds and degrees of inter-subjective sharing. There will always be things which cannot ...
As I said private responses may only be alluded to, evoked, there is nothing determinable shared by the artist with the viewer or audience. The artwor...
There's a difference between the allusive, indeterminate kind of sharing of the arts, which speaks to the reality that we do not all see the same way,...
I'm not saying the ineffable has philosophical primacy; how could it? The point is though that any philosophy which tries (per impossibile) to leave i...
Comments