The False Argument of Faith
Being very straightfoward, everytime I enter in a religious debate with someone who "follows" some religion (catholic, protestant, orthodox, muslim, etc...) eventually, as a religious debate tends to end, the "faithful" one, ends appealing to the "Faith Argument", that i find stupid and misleading, because this argument is supported by no base. "I believe in God because i have Faith" they say, and how can you discourse about that. So to explain to them, i created this arrangement:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/185405289@N06/49026515372/in/dateposted-public/
Any thoughts on it?
https://www.flickr.com/photos/185405289@N06/49026515372/in/dateposted-public/
Any thoughts on it?
Comments (108)
Anyway yeah, that's pretty straightforward. Appeal to faith is a pretty well-known fallacy, and there's not much you can do in response. "Opinions not founded in reason cannot be swayed by it" or something to that effect is a popular aphorism. (Apparently of uncertain origin and phrasing).
Yes, matters of faith provide no matter. If they speak as if 'God' exists, then you can call them on intellectual dishonesty. If they base 'God' on the Bible, you can show the Bible to be wrong, especially in Genesis. If they want the Old Testament 'God', you can show Him not to be followable because His actions cannot be approved. If they still wish to believe, then that's fine.
Then the point of difference is what, or rather whom, you have faith in. Religion requires faith in religious authorities. For secular faith, I suppose you could say that you need to have faith in your own abilities to correctly read and understand these words.
That’s not what I said. You can’t put your faith in God. You can only put your faith in those who educate you about God. Of course if you were to meet God then your faith would be in yourself, just like it is in reading these words. Perhaps you are experiencing a delusion right now. If you met God, how would you know it wasn’t a delusion? You would need to have faith in your experience or faith in yourself.
I understand faith to be a method of acquiring belief rather than justification as your diagram seems to suggest. Perhaps people use the word "faith" in that manner and I'm not aware of it.
By definition, faith as a method of acquiring belief short-circuits the "normal" or preferred use of well-crafted logical arguments. This logical failing stands out like a sore thumb for all to see and pick apart at will.
Nevertheless I feel that faith and evidence-based reasoning differ not in type but in degrees. As @Keenan said "All knowledge is based on faith" I believe that justification doesn't always guarantee the truth because although our arguments may be valid we lack absolute certainty in the truth of our premises (faith???). Ergo the existence of a inference gap between any and all justification and the truth. In logical discourse this inference gap is minimized to the best of our abilities and is "small" but in faith-based belief it's a gigantic chasm relatively speaking.
In short the difference between logic and faith is the difference in the size of the bridge you construct to cross the inference gap. A pond is not an ocean but the difference is only in size.
If someone told you this then you would be having faith in that person. If you read it somewhere then you’d be having faith in whoever wrote it. If you discovered this yourself...
If all knowledge is based on faith then faith essentially becomes meaningless, and so does God.
I don't believe in God because of what other men told me. I believe in God because He confirmed what other men said about Him.
One is a guess, the other is a conviction.
Guesses that are admitted to be guesses are fine, and yes all knowledge is based on them, because nothing can be conclusively proven from the ground up. Unquestionable convictions are the problem. And refusing to allow people to run with their best guesses just is asserting an unquestionable conviction to the contrary of whatever those guesses would be, so to be against faith-as-in-convictions just is to be accepting of "faith"-as-in-guesses.
You’re the one who claims that all knowledge is based on faith, if you recall. This means that you cannot know that your experience was real. You can only have faith that it was real. You have to trust yourself that the experience wasn’t a delusion based on the suggestions of others.
If the practice of adopting system-wide premises is that stupid, then what exactly supports the fourteen axioms of propositional logic or the nine axioms of standard number theory?
Can you show me one example of an axiomatic system that is not based on unsupported, speculative, and essentially arbitrary beliefs?
It is not possible to do mathematics without axiomatic sytems, and without mathematics, you have no instrument to maintain consistency in scientific theories either. Hence, in your view, science also goes out of the window.
In other words, your views are suitable only for aboriginal hunter-gatherer tribes who live off collecting elephant dung in a tropical rain forest.
MONEY. :clap: :clap:
[quote=Gus Lamarch]"I believe in God because i have Faith" they say, and how can you discourse about that. [/quote]
You can't because rational discourse takes at least two and the believer in question cops-out with an appeal to faith fallacy (@praxis) - just as g/G stops-up gaps in knowledge or comprehension, dropping the "faith"-card stops the give-n-take of reasons. It's like debating with someone about their hallucinations or pet conspiracy theory. Or, as Daniel Dennett quips, faith-talk is like playing tennis without a net. As far as I can tell, just like swearing, "faith" is an emotional - anti-anxiety - crutch that's, by its perennial persistence, clearly quite effective for many, if not most, of our fellow primates.
[quote=Freddy Zarathustra][i]A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not prove anything.
*
Faith is what people believe in when they do not want to know the truth.
*
If a man has a strong faith he can indulge in the luxury of skepticism.[/i][/quote]
I can't say it better than Freddy [my emphases added] or add much more to what's already been said here.
I think a good response there was never any base in the first place, the arbitrary is nothing more than a ghost of imagination.
There are no "arbitrary" things because each thing we are describing is necessarily unique to itself. If we take a mathematical relationship, like 2+2=4, the question of the arbitrariness makes no sense because there would never be 2+2=4 (what is known here) which would be anything other than a 2+2=4.
We need to have knowledge of things in order to have faith in them, sure. I know what unicorns are, for instance, but I have no faith that they exist other than in mythology. I could offer a valid explanation for why they exist mythologically, and I may have faith in that explanation.
So do I lack faith that unicorns are real or do I have faith in a rational explanation of their mythological existence?
At the core of every system, you will find unexplained starting points. If you do not "see" that, then you do not understand what a system is.
That is not without consequences.
Logic itself is a belief system based on fourteen unexplained starting points. Either you reason within a system, or else about a system, or else you are doing system-less bullshit.
So, why does religion have a core of unexplained starting points?
Well, because every system is like that. Expecting something else, is simply wrong, unsound, and even obviously impossible.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Wrong. Unique up to isomorphism only.
We are long past Skolem's 1934 publication from which became clear that the natural numbers cannot possibly be the only model that fits Peano arithmetic theory. There must be, and there are, nonstandard models of arithmetic. In fact, we already knew that from Gödel's 1931 publication concerning the incompleteness of Peano arithmetic theory. You are almost a century behind with your views.
All these nonstandard models of arithmetic theory are somehow carbon copies of the natural numbers, and are somehow isomorphic, but not perfectly so, depending on what "perfect" means in this context.
Essentially unique is never really unique, because it is necessary to allow for the existence of isomorphisms.
My point is we were never talking about an all encompassing system in the first place. Rather, we were describing particular thing, in this case, the mathematical relationships of 2+2=4.
Nothing about this claims there to be a singular model or thing, but merely says we are talking about a particular one. Non-standrad models or relationships are perfectly fine, we just aren't talking about them or knowing them in this identification of this 2+2=4.
Other non-standard uses are fine, even a different concept of 2+2=4, and just constitute a different relationship we might know about.
There is no essentially unique. The relationship is the reverse: no matter how similar things might be (natural numbers, different instances of atoms, different instances of human, etc.), they are each a unique difference. Even those who are the same in a representation are entirely different.
There is no isomorphism between any of them, even as the might take on similar forms, symbols or meanings.
The real, physical universe is not an abstract, Platonic world which can verbatim serve as a model for a mathematical theory. In mathematics, objects are unique up to isomorphism. In the physical universe, they are (assumed to be) always really unique. This is one of the (many) difficulties and mismatches between mathematics and the physical universe. It is probably also one of the (many) reasons why science is only a poor Platonic-cave shadow of the real Theory of Everything (ToE).
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Well, yeah, in an empirical environment, while looking at the real, physical world, I certainly agree. In abstract, Platonic worlds, no. These Platonic abstractions are not the physical world.
For example, the natural numbers are not part of the physical universe. They are just a Platonic abstraction, i.e. a sequence of language expressions. That is why the language expression "2+2=4" is such a bad example about the physical universe. It is unrelated to the physical universe.
However, if you carefully apply a correspondence-seeking bureaucracy of scientific formalisms, heavily backed by experimental testing, then you can possibly (and safely) use that kind of language expressions in science.
Mathematics is not science, and neither of both are a complete theory of the physical universe. Given the unpredictability of human behaviour, giving us the impression of free will, there can undoubtedly not even be a complete theory of the physical universe.
I would have thought that the whole basis of mathematical physics and indeed much of science in general, is that in finding the kinds of things, and the orderly relations between things, we are perceiving the elements of a Platonic order in the apparent disorder of sensory perception, so as to be amenable to mathematical representation. It's not as if the two realms of mathematics and physical objects are entirely divorced, otherwise nothing of the kind would be possible, and presumably we'd still be living like other creatures, as there would be no rational order of things to be perceived.
That is science.
Science is simply another activity, and absolutely not the same activity as mathematics.
Scientists spend an inordinate amount of effort establishing correspondence between their theories and the real, physical world. The number one tool for that is: experimental testing. The epistemological keyword for scientists is: correspondence.
Mathematical physics is still physics. It will ultimately still seek to experimentally test and in that way ensure correspondence between their theories and the physical universe. It is actually quite stricter than that. Mathematical physics is not allowed to talk about anything that does not concern the physical universe.
Physics consists of language expressions about real-world facts in the physical universe.
(Pure) mathematicians don't do that at all. Mathematical theories are not about the real, physical world. There is no correspondence. Any claim to correspondence is more likely than not a constructivist heresy.
The model for a mathematical theory is a set of language expressions that fits the rules -- i.e. other language expressions -- of the theory at hand. Example: Provable Peano-arithmetic theorems are true in the abstract, Platonic world of the natural numbers (=model). The epistemological keyword in mathematics is: provability.
Mathematics consists of language expressions about other language expressions (that live in abstract, Platonic worlds).
Quoting Wayfarer
They have an interface in language alone. Physics uses the language and regulations produced by mathematics to maintain consistency in its own use of language. Mathematics never says what physics should be talking about. The semantics are entirely produced by physics itself. Mathematics only helps keeping the language of physics consistent.
And if the physical world were not, in the main, consistent, a 'consistent language of physics' would be as useless for modeling the physical world as trying to nail jello to a tree. But it is consistent (enough). So what accounts for the consistency of the physical world - the regularities (i.e. transformational symmetries) of which are computable (vide David Deutsch re: UTM) - if it is not, as (e.g.) Tegmark suggests, intrinsically mathematical?
Again, I am sure some humans might throw faith as a step into an intended to be logical argument to convince others, but in general it seems to me faith is presented as precisely not logical. And also not something to convince others, but part of what one can do (and it is recommended by some, generally Christians) to do in relation to God adn the idea of God.
Someone who follows is going somewhere, or possibly nowhere special, but going. Perhaps one can be going somewhere without following, or perhaps everyone who thinks they are going somewhere is going nowhere. Perhaps philosophers are going somewhere, or perhaps they are going nowhere.
Justify where you are going, or justify your going nowhere before mocking those of us afflicted with faith. Justify loving my neighbour? Piffle!
Consider starting from the simple meaning of words, in a secular way.
Faith: complete trust or confidence in someone or something.
What does that mean to human's... ?
Of course it's not 'the same as mathematics', but the point I'm making is that the mathematical order of the cosmos is what makes science possible, aside from being intrinsic to the fabric of the cosmos. (Although it's almost reassuring that there is such widespread refusal to acknowledge such an obvious point.)
There is a Platonic intuition that senses that there is somewhere a connection between mathematics and the physical universe, but we (should) never make use of it in mathematics.
Doing so, would trivially degenerate in dangerous constructivism, i.e. assuming correspondence with the physical universe, while bypassing the scientific requirements and formalisms such as experimental testing.
Therefore, it is necessary to strictly enforce the rules: If you intend to assert anything about the physical universe, you will have to experimentally test. Merely calculating is not allowed.
Well, this is a philosophy forum, and I think the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences' says something important.
Quoting alcontali
And? Scientists do 'experimentally test' incessantly, and they realise spectacular results.
Mathematical objects do not have isomorphism either, for each is it own particular concept. 2+2=4 is not the same as another, different concept of 2+2=4. One mathematical rule is not another.
There is no such thing as a ToE because it violates what an account or theory of something does. Each description we give of something, whether it a state which exists or an eternal concept, is singular are and unique. A ToE if formed on the false premise we can give an account of something be an entirely different thing. The very point of a description, theory or definition is it accounts for one specific thing. None of these things are everything, so a ToE will always fail.
Completeness, if there is anything approaching it, is only defined in a given a specific account. We can have always have a "complete" account in we may fully describe something as we are aware of it, but this will not be exhaustive of everything because there is always another thing; a different rule, another state, a different concept, not given in this description of a thing we know.
For example, "2+2=4" is not identical to "two plus two is four" but these expressions are still isomorphic under translation. That is why the equality operator needs to be defined explicitly as to clarify when we will still acknowledge these expressions as being equal. The idea in math is that expressions can only be unique up to isomorphism. In the physical world, however, we assume that objects can be really unique.
By the way, in the formalist view, "2+2=4" is a string, i.e. symbolic language only. it is just a string of symbols. It does not represent anything else than that. Seeking correspondence with the physical universe is not the job of mathematics. It is the prerogative of downstream disciplines, such as science, that will institute empirical formalisms, such as experimental testing, to establish such correspondence.
In mathematics, the symbol "2" and "4" are exclusively Platonic abstractions, i.e. language expressions, that live in their own abstract, Platonic world. The world of natural numbers are a model for arithmetic theory, in a sense that all theorems provable in arithmetic theory are true in the world of natural numbers. Furthermore, the physical universe is not even isomorphic with the Platonic world of natural numbers. From the point of view of mathematics, these two worlds are unrelated.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
The ToE is a completely hypothetical theory to which we do not have access, and of which the physical universe is a model. An existing model, i.e. collection of true sentences, always has a theory, if only the model itself. In terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the ToE is the shortest possible summary of the physical universe as model:
In algorithmic information theory (a subfield of computer science and mathematics), the Kolmogorov complexity of an object, such as a piece of text, is the length of the shortest computer program (in a predetermined programming language) that produces the object as output.
Asserting that the physical universe has no theory of which the representation is shorter than the full details of the physical universe itself, pretty much amounts to claiming that the universe is completely random. This amounts to asserting that any digital representation of the physical universe is an incompressible string.
Because of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem, there is no proof possible for this view:
We know that, in the set of all possible strings, most strings are complex in the sense that they cannot be described in any significantly "compressed" way. However, it turns out that the fact that a specific string is complex cannot be formally proven, if the complexity of the string is above a certain threshold. The precise formalization is as follows [...]
Hence, the situation is rather as following.
It is not possible to prove that there exists a ToE, because then you would need to produce a copy of it, which is clearly not available. It is, however, also not possible to prove that there does not exist a ToE, because that assertion would be in violation of Chaitin's incompleteness theorem.
There is no isomorphism within the Platonic realm either, each concept is unique.
The formalisation of 2+2=4 as just symbols is different to the concept of two plus equals four, which is turn different from another concept using the symbols 2+2=4, which is in turn different to a translation of two equals two equals four form one language to another.
I'm not speaking about a correspondence to the physical realm, but rather the distinction and identity of different concepts or meanings within the Platonic realm. One concept is never another, is not doing the same thing as another. I'm talking about the necessary distinctions of the platonic realm, which render isomorphism incoherent.
To assign isomorphism in Platonic realm is to tell a falsehood about the distinctions of the Platonic realm. A ToE is impossible because it cannot cross distinction. Whether in the physical or Platonic realm, any proposed ToE is but one distinction of reality. In being the ToE, as opposed to everything else, it necessarily leaves something out. It always fails to cover of something the distinction which are not it.
Put simply, it does not matter how complex or not a string might be, for in being itself, it is distinct from everything else. The problem isn't given in the particular length or cycles a representation might have or not, it is that the representation is never thing it describes. Full detail is the only description to give, whether we speak of a physical state or something in the Platonic realm. There can be no "shorter strings" of description, derivation form outside concept or formalisms. Any thing, physical or Platonic, can only be given by itself. Our descriptions only give an account of this thing when it describes it.
This does no imply randomness. It is not, for example, make 2+2=4 random. Since it is given by the concept itself, it is the nature of that instance of 2+2=4 to have this particular meaning. The same is true of every instance of two plus two equals four. The same is true of every concept of translation between two symbolic languages.
Whether the definitions of the Platonic realm or instances of measurement of the physical universe, there is a reason are present as such: that what each of them are/do. One was never gong to have a world in which an instance of 2+2=4 meant something else than it does. Same for 2x2m pavers one is using in their backyard. If you've got a 2x2 meter paver, it's was never going to be anything else.
You reject a very fundamental notion of the Platonic realm:
The interest of isomorphisms lies in the fact that two isomorphic objects cannot be distinguished by using only the properties used to define morphisms; thus isomorphic objects may be considered the same as long as one considers only these properties and their consequences.
It is probably also a rejection of the very concept of abstraction.
Platonic objects are beliefs expressed in language that arise in an abstract world constructed from basic beliefs. It is a core belief in mathematics that such belief objects can be isomorphic. But then again, there cannot be compulsion in matters of belief. Therefore, you do not need to believe it.
The mathematical way of thinking ultimately always rests on arbitrary, speculative beliefs with no justification possible, as its epistemic domain is staunchly axiomatic. It invariably seeks to strip away (real-world) meaning. In that sense, it is not meaningful either. It does not seek to be necessarily useful either, and it is often probably not. It only seeks to ensure that derived beliefs are provable from basic beliefs. Hence, at best, it is consistent.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
If we limit the ToE to a compressed digital version of the physical universe, then Chaitin's incompleteness theorem insists that you cannot exclude that it may exist. Such digital file may not leave out anything that would be considered relevant.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Even though I agree that a map is not the territory, depending on what you use it for, the map may not need to be the territory.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Yes, but according to the formalist philosophy, a Platonic object is its representation. The number 12 is just the string "12". It is equal to itself up to isomorphism. Platonic objects are language expressions only. In that sense, they are different from physical objects, which can consist of matter, energy, and so on.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Yes, but what is the description of a description if not the description itself?
(essentially unique up to isomorphism ...)
I thought of this exchange when I read about this disovery - a mathematical discovery, by physicists, for which approval was sought from Terence Tao, the world-leading mathematician.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/185405289@N06/49026515372/in/dateposted-public/
Based on the illustration you provided above and your opening comments, it sounds like your concern with adherents of religion (at least, those who seem to base their convictions on "faith"), is that their religious faith is ungrounded or irrational; i.e., not based on reason or evidence.
Certainly, an argument as you've demonstrated in the illustration above is circular and unfounded.
However, I would like to submit that this is not the sort of reasoning imbibed by all religious people, and in fact, the dichotomy between the sort of circular reasoning you've outlined above and evidential inference is not primarily between theists and non-theists, spiritualists and naturalists - however you want to delineate the line between those with religious "faith" and those without.
Circular reasoning is not exclusive to people who claim religious faith. Indeed, to illustrate a Christian perspective, the Bible itself lends itself to reasonable and evidential assessment. In other words, a strong case can be made that the Bible does not promote the kind of "leap" of faith that it is commonly stereotyped with.
Before I offer some examples, I will briefly touch on the notion implied by your illustration - that basic belief in God is predicated on "nothing." This stance is questionable, and there are strong philosophical arguments for the epistemological soundness of "warranted belief in God" (see, Alvin Plantinga's, Warranted Christian Belief). However, I will leave this debate aside for the purposes of this post and simply focus on delineating an evidential appeal to the particular faith of Christianity.
Consider the following passages:
1 Peter 3:15: "But in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect"
Luke 24:38-39: "And He said to them, 'Why are you troubled, and why do doubts arise in your hearts?
See My hands and My feet, that it is I Myself; touch Me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have.'"
Acts 2:32: "God has raised this Jesus to life, and we are all witnesses of it."
Just on the basis of these two passages, you can see an appeal to reason and historical fact.
In the passage I listed from 1 Peter, the phrase, "make a defense" comes from the Greek, ????????? (apologian), which basically means "a verbal defense (particularly in a law court); from the same as apologeomai; a plea."
In courts of law, appeals to reason and evidence are essential. Thus, according to this passage, it seems clear that the apostle Peter is urging followers of Jesus (or people of that particular "faith") to be prepared with a reasonable explanation for their faith.
Similarly, I list the passages from Luke and Acts to demonstrate the Biblical claim of a historical, falsifiable event. The claim is this: Jesus resurrected bodily from the dead, and there were many eye-witnesses to the account. If the New Testament Biblical writers would have asserted that Jesus rose spiritually from the dead, it seems there would have been no way to scrutinize the claim on the basis of evidence.
However, this is not the case, according to the Biblical testimony. Thus, the significant claims of Jesus and his followers are up for debate, but they are steeped in evidential appeals.
If, after considering the many sources of evidence, including the eye-witness scriptural accounts, I am convinced of there reliability, I can espouse a "reasonable faith."
In this way, it can also be suggested that most things we accept as fact are similarly based on a combination of evidence and "faith." I cannot say that I know for certain that George Washington existed and presided over the United States as its first president. But, I do take that to be a true, because I think the evidence is reasonable.
This view of the relationship between faith and reason encapsulates many paradigms commonly stereotyped as factual, including non-theistic propositions such as evolution and naturalism.
With these ideas in mind, I will attempt to demonstrate how your initial statement about faith can be reasonably countered. Within your argument, you include several denominations of Christianity; this is where I will focus my formulations. I think a charitable version of your argument would look something like this:
1. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
2. faith in the Christian understanding of God has no evidential basis.
3. Therefore, it is irrational and misleading. (1,2 MP)
As I've demonstrated above, faith in God can have a strong basis in evidential reasoning. Thus, my counter to your argument is the following:
4. If faith in the Christian understanding of God ultimately has no evidential basis, then it is irrational and misleading.
5. faith in the Christian understanding of God has a strong evidential basis.
6. Therefore, faith in the Christian understanding of God is rational and evidentially sound. (4,5 MT).
The False Argument of Faith
I do not agree with you. Faith can have a very strong beneficial quality. As we stumble about blind and confused, faith can provide a great deal of support in life.
A lot of good points everyone's making; I hope I can add a couple more.
In the spirit of arguing against old worn-out paradigm's I submit the following.
1. This business about a belief in unicorns is a red herring. Unicorns may in fact exist in another world. The absurdity of unicorns is no less absurd than our own conscious existence that cannot be logically explained. Cognitive science says consciousness operates together in an illogical manner (conscious and subconscious cognitive abilities). How do we square that circle?
2. In Christianity, Jesus had a consciousness. His consciousness is assumed to be irrational, just like our consciousness. Dying for someone else, is irrational. Love can be irrational. Any metaphysical phenomenon is considered outside of the domains of logical existence. This is one reason why Christianity is so relatable. It's not solely an a priori logical concept. It's also partly an a posteriori irrational experience. A phenomenon.
My point is that rather than fear the irrational, one should embrace the irrational as evidence in support of their personal relationship in the Christian faith.
If the non- believer or skeptic wants to argue that all of life is rational, that their own conscious existence is rational, and that the world ex-nihilo can be completely explained rationally with no mystery or paradox, ironically, it will only serve to diminish their case in support of any alternative rational belief system. As if irrationality could or does not exist. Ask the skeptic if he/she can rationally explain their own existence. If they can't (which we know they can't) then where's their argument?
In the end, the concept of Faith has, of course, other secular or rational/irrational implications. Faith in one's abilities, faith in one's employees, faith in one's creativity, faith in one's loved ones...
But what is the concept of rationality and pure reason? What is it's sole purpose? Does it explain everything? Why did Kant conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason? What is abstract metaphysical phenomena? And finally, someone explain consciousness!
I've heard this point a lot in 'faith' arguments. I see where you are coming from. However, what I find most interesting is how do we know that our lives aren't just a delusion? How do we know we are not dreaming? What if death is the passage of 'waking up' from this state of delirium called life?
People use this point to counter arguments for God or faith in God, but I think taking this position calls forth questioning faith in life at all. There have been moments in my life where I have stopped in my tracks and have pondered about how insane life is. People wake up, go to work, work tirelessly for this thing called 'money,' use this money to buy things, then go home to sleep. People also wonder about arguing people on concepts and associations of things in life. Sometimes people go to war over resources. Sometimes people bomb things to prove a point. It is absurd, to say the least--referencing Albert Camus here. What I am trying to get at is the fact that life to an outsider would seem just like a dream. Dreams are bizarre, but so is life, and just about every part of it if you really ponder about how odd it really is.
To get to the point, it appears taking this position as a counter to people that defend their faith in God, religion, or something higher than just human mammals walking around till we die, in my opinion, this counter is not the most effective method in arguing against people of faith in religion/God. I think a better question is to ask: what leads people to believe or have faith in the existence of God? What leads people to be so ardently obedient to God? (referencing the Abraham example here). Are we programmed to believe or reject faith in God? Is there a possibility that certain events can trigger one into this state, and is it designed this way on purpose from a supernatural force or not? I find these questions very interesting when it comes to faith.
Anyhow, thanks for this awesome post. I love thinking about the delusion premise/argument about faith and life in general. Cheers!
I see now I have said something like this before, here.
Your problem is you are trying to use rationality in which is an emotional argument. It will fail every time. Its not that they don't understand, they don't care.
People desire the emotions that a God brings them. So they justify whatever supports this. If you wish to persuade people against religion, you need to provide them an alternative argument that supports most of what they emotionally want.
These emotions are generally:
1. A desire and reason to do good
2. A clarity that there is good and evil
2. That there is greater purpose then oneself in life
3. A desire to feel worthwhile
A lot of atheists completely misunderstand the situation, and either disdainfully dismiss these emotions, or outright ignore them. If you don't fully understand the person you're chatting with, you will have an incredibly difficult time persuading them. Lose the mentality that the person before you is stupid, because that picture entails that's what you think of them. Gain the mentality that emotions are a large part of our processing, and that we are inherently beings that rationalize our desires, and rarely use rationality to create our desires.
What on earth is an "emotional argument"? :chin:
Quoting Philosophim
Does this have something to do with Hume or someone else, I forget? Reason is slave to the passions kinda belief?
First of all: no one really believes in Pyrrhonism. Pyrrho is a character of philosophical joke or a way of putting sticks in the wheel of absolute rationalism. It should not affect anyone with common sense (even if they are rationalists).
That said, even if we admit that the basis of all knowledge is in some kind of belief, not all beliefs have the same kind or degree of justification. Belief in the flat Earth is less justified than belief in the law of gravity. This is due to a unanimously accepted criterion: that empirical evidence carries weight in justifying a belief.
The problem with justifying a belief lies in the ability to rely on beliefs that meet certain requirements. We call these beliefs 'knowledge'. I do not believe that belief in God is counted among them. In any case, not if it is based on "faith" .
I do but, sure, I'm a no one.
Quoting David Mo
Are you absolutely certain? Between 0% and 100%, what is the level of your certainty in the statement you just made?
Quoting David Mo
Agreed but is there a kind of justification that guarantees with absolute certainty the truth of anything, anything at all?
Quoting David Mo
You lost me there. My fault, not yours. Anyway, the problem is no justificatory scheme is rigorous enough to ensure complete certainty. That's Pyrrhonism for me.
It seems to me that the problem with the idea of faith is when it is used by others as an argument. As a psychologist construct, along with will it is a driving force for any motivation in life whatever system of belief we adhere to.
The problem is when people use the notion of faith to try and impose their system of beliefs on others. This can be done by religious and political believers, who wish to impose ideas on others. It comes down to wishing to coerce others into believing without questioning and this is very dangerous as it suggests that people should not question for themselves but have faith.
It can be a basis for indoctrination, especially in the young because it involves manipulating of emotions with the dismissal of appeals to reason.
In particular, one can be made to feel guilty for questioning.
I am inclined to think the use or misuse of the idea of faith in its intention of overriding rational questioning may stem from a subconscious certainty of belief in the person who introduces faith as a basis for argument.
Yeah, I need to clarify that. What I should have typed was, "An argument motivated for an emotional outcome". Such things only need rationalizations to support. Certain feelings, like social ties, may cause us to do "irrational" things. Take family for instance. Lets imagine an adult person you know has a severely abusive mother that utterly devastates them emotionally whenever this person visits their parent.
Telling a person in such a situation that they should never speak to them again, might be "rational" from an outside perspective. After all, you would do the same with a stranger. But most people will not respond positively to this if they are looking to justify their emotional bond with their mother. You could give every reason in the world why the person is wrong in seeking to have a relationship with their mother, if you do not address this emotional bond that is the true motivation of a person's actions.
For many people, religion is not a rational belief, but an emotional belief that is built by the bonds of family, friends, ideals, and "God". These are strong motivators that a person will continually seek to rationalize, while ignoring "rational" arguments that destroy them.
Saying to a person, "Faith is not a rational argument" misses the point. Its not the faith in the technical aspects of a God that people often hold. Its faith in the emotional bonds, that are expressed through particular statements and rules. Saying, "Ha, there's a contradiction on page 5 and 10 on the bible!" is worthless. The bible is simply a rationalization tool to support the emotional framework. It doesn't need to be air tight. People didn't start believing in God because of page 5 or 10. They believed due to the emotional feelings and social bonds it gave them.
This applies in more than just religion. Sports, politics, and even beliefs in "ideologies and frameworks". Many people hold to their philosophical beliefs to satisfy emotional needs rather than rational needs. Its just the way people work. The adage of "People being rationalizing beings first, rational beings second" has been said in many forms and many ways over the centuries. Its a well worn hat. =)
I see. A plausible theory you have there. It makes me wonder though whether there are any categories of people who are exceptions to this pattern of behavior? Philosophers, for instance, would immediately cease to be philosophers with such an attitude, no? I was tempted to cite the ever present phenomenon of back and forth between philosophers as a counterexample to your claims but then debates involve two people at a minimum; individual philosophers stick to a certain worldview that may suffer from the malady you described as rationalization.
Nonetheless, there's an attempt to reason, no matter how contrived or affected, even in rationalization, right? Commendable in spirit then, if not in letter.
By the way, was Socrates committing the cardinal sin of rationalization?
A priori knowledge is not based on believing your senses. So there is some knowledge that is not based on faith.
"Many know, manier don't, that to beleive is stronger than to know."
Belief and faith are somewhat different. Belief does not necessarily involve a supernatural element. Faith in a god does.
God may or may not exist. It is not proven or disproven, and therefore individuals are at liberty to beleive either way, and nobody can ask them to do the opposite.
However, any claim about the NATURE of god is pure fantasy. And insisting on the believability of the fantastic claims abou the nature of god is stating nothing more than mere superstitons.
Your argument fails because you have to balance the claims of the NT with all the other miraculous claims of the ancient world. The NT was written by Christian believers. The NT is generally reliable except the virgin birth, the giving of authority to the apostles, and the resurrection. It makes perfect sense to say these were made up after Jesus's death by his followers
Quoting TheMadFool
There is no absolute certainty outside the formal sciences.
In any case, my certainty about almost everything is not quantifiable. I am not speaking in mathematical terms.
:ok: But then why did you refer to Pyrrho as a "joke"? To my knowledge, Pyrrho is all about uncertainty, expressible mathematically as confidence levels regarding the conclusions of arguments with values less than 100%.
My point with this discussion was to prove that even if you construct a rational argument against the "argument of faith" people will not care, because the "loop" of "faith because of god, because of faith" is an answer to its own question. It's dogmatic, and with everything dogmatic, the best is to avoid.
Faith is not an valid argument.
Ultimately, I agree with you. Many of us have been driven around the bend with people who have imposed their systems the so called name of truth.
Here I am ,trying to disentangle myself from the many layers of thinking and emotions,especially guilt, arising from oppression of those who claim authority on the basis of the faiths which they proclaim as ultimate and beyond questioning.
I hope that the scope of this website is forward
Perhaps we need to awaken more, with a real spirit of questioning rather than rest in the comforts of conventional thinking and logic with a view to moving into a future unknown, but different from the known certainties of the past.
Don't buy into that. It's an ad hoc fallacy used to defend religious fervour. Your belief in the device on which you are reading this and their belief in an invisible friend are not of the same order.
What is known about Pyrrhon is basically through Diogenes Laertius, who doesn't mention mathematics at all, much less the mathematical probabilities of truth - this is a concept that comes much later than Pyrrhon. If you read what Laertius says (the ninth book of the Lives of Illustrious Philosophers) you will realise that he is full of "striking" anecdotes that present him as a character of integrity, but rather as an extravagant one. That is why I said that it is like a "joke" among philosophers.
As Theodosius (quoted by Laercio) says in his time, nothing is known about Pyrrhon's "disposition", so Pyrrhonians should be called "pyrrhonist-like".
Thanks for the advice. Very kind of you.
[quote=Wikipedia]Although Pyrrhonism's objective is eudaimonia, it is best known for its epistemological arguments, particularly the problem of the criterion, and for being the first Western school of philosophy to identify the problem of induction and the Münchhausen trilemma.[/quote]
Gave me a fright when I found out Pyrrhonism was first to mention in enough detail the trio underlined above. Do I really not know anything?
:up: Your explanation was to the point and helpful. I find it more interesting to know how the philosophy of given philosophers affected their lives. Practice what you preach, something I haven't got the hang off till date. :up:
Of course its not. Its not an argument they are giving you Gus. Pointing that out to them misses the entire point. Appealing to faith means, "I don't care about your rationality, this is what I believe".
Your picture will not do anything but make them roll their eyes at you. They get the argument. You can never change what a person believes by appealing to rationality, when a person abandons rationality as a reason for their belief. What you've been missing is people of faith are presenting you with rationalizations for their faith. You can dismantle rationalizations, but that does not dismantle faith.
If you want to get people to not believe in God anymore, you need to address the emotional and societal ties that bind that faith.
Atheists don't commit the appeal to faith fallacy...
Because they typically don't know that they too are using faith.
There's not much one can do in response here either.
Not necessarily. People are varied in their level of rationalizing, versus being rational. Rationalizing is an attempt to support one's emotional belief. If one rationalization fails, another will be invented depending on how much a person clings to that belief.
But I do believe that if you can rationalize, you have the potential to be rational. There are plenty of philosophers who rationalize. They may talk a good game, or create a system that fits within narrow confines, but in the end is not really rational.
Being rational requires a self-awareness of your emotional bias and desires. We need those biases and desires to care, but we need to measure ourselves that to times when we must let those biases and desires go in the face of contrary evidence.
Anyone can come up with reasons that confirm what they desire to be. Only the truly rational can conclude their desires were wrong. It is something we all have to be vigilant against, and can easily stumble on.
That's what I was going for.
Quoting Philosophim
If you ask me, people rationalize about personal matters. I suppose philosophers are deeply attached to their ideas, theories, etc., this making them prone to rationalization - you know comforting themselves that what they're doing is for a reason other than their real motives which may range from fear of being proved wrong to a desire for fame and glory.
Quoting Philosophim
Easier said than done, don't you think? It's a huge step going from theory to practice, from reading stuff in books and actually doing them.Quoting Philosophim
Confirmation bias - a known cognitive issue.
All in all, my take on this issue is simple: No one, including philosophers and other breeds of thinkers from the world of science and other fields, will ever undertake anything worthwhile if fae doesn't have a stake in it whatever that may be. It would be superfluous to mention the man on the Clapham omnibus at this point. Given this is so, rationalization seems inevitable and is likely to be universal - happening everywhere, anywhere, to anybody.
You don't "believe" in the device you are writing on; you see, hear and feel it.
I agree!
What does "fae" mean? Fairy?
If I can translate this in my own way - with or without fairies - I would say that men would do nothing - knowledge included - without emotional motivation. Faith is a kind of emotional motivation. But motivation is not knowledge. You can believe in many things, but none of them is knowledge if you cannot justify it sufficiently.
I'm trying to avoid having to write he/she, him/her, using gender-neutral words that I picked up from a website.
Fae = he/she
Faer = him/her
Faers = his/hers
Faerself = himself/herself
It's got to do with the LGBT movement and so I see it as a win win.
Quoting David Mo
Isn't that a tautology?
Quoting David Mo
I'm more inclined to think faith is a mode of belief acquisition but it's no secret that it has emotional underpinnings. That said, is the whole enterprise of seeking proof of god more rationalizing then ratiocinating? @Philosophim Perhaps both. It doesn't hurt to discover one was right all along.
... and you believe that sense experience constitutes reality, no? Perhaps not much different than believing our ideas about a G/god are representative of any reality.
Every position, whether it is "religious, political, philosophical" or otherwise, begins and relies on some founding axiom or inherent principle, whether or not one wishes to use the word "faith" or otherwise".
For example, most would reject the idea of solipsism on "faith", they couldn't "prove" it true or false, but would consider it absurd and reject it on that basis.
Kind of trying to find an entry point here.
It seems you were suggesting a difference between believing and feeling/sensing etc., but actually it seems that the faith/belief we have in a God, religious doctrine, or our experience aren't totally distinct or far off from one another, save from the fact that we "believe" in our devices because we sense them, and we "believe" in our ideas without necessarily sensing what it is they refer to. What seems to place them on the same terms is that both are bases for our own attention, thinking, and action. If we didn't have some sort of faith in our ability to affect anything, for example, I doubt we would even act. By this token even so-called determinists could be said to have faith in their action by way of (edit: their) assuming that their input will or will not have some sort of impact, meaning, or influence.
Any way, the idea in which we believe in may be modified or altered by new sense experiences or understandings of how religion and life come together. And our sense experience may be shaped by what it is we have faith in, because our faith shapes the ways in which we attend to things (i.e. the senses).
So basically, we all believe in something, and although we may think religious faith is baseless, it seems that during the course of holding to faith it actually acquires a number of bases, but ones which are not necessarily easily communicable; it's not exactly verifiable to others by way of concrete evidence or even rational argument. Thus some find it difficult to talk to others without being encountered with a claim that the faith ought to be proven, or that its baseless because there is no clear evidence, and not much more to say than "I can't prove it to you. You need to have faith to see it yourself." And so it seems that faith would actually (edit: purportedly) lead to an experience which is un-measurable. And in this sense one who makes an "argument of faith" may be headed in the direction of an argument by anecdote.
I think a little humility is appropriate when dealing with other people's faith or intuition or beliefs arrived at through non-scientific processes, because we all have these.
In science, up into the early 70s it was considered utterly unjusitifed to consider animals as having emotions, motivations, desires, and as experiencers. In fact to assert they did have these qualities could damage your career. It could not be demonstrated, it was thought, in the scientific community, so skepticism was considered the rational default. And yet quite rationally animal owners and trainers, farmers and all sorts of other lay people know damn well animals were, like us, conscious, goal oriented, experiencers with preferences.
Futher we all makes choices to believe in certain experts and in cases of non-consensus these experts as opposed to those. Those who focus on empirical science, still follow their intuition in making decisions because we cannot do the reserach ourselves. Those who followed the consensus of experts in the 40s and 50s about animals would have believed in a position about animals that seems ridiculous today. Thus an intuitively arrived at positions based on the conclusions of scientific experts and models would have been wrong.
None of what I am saying here means that I consider all positions correct or equally likely to be or that science doesn't have an incredibly effective epistemology and set of methodologies for arriving at great models. Nor that sitting alone in a room mulling would have produced quantum physics or neuroscience. I am not a Rationalist, certainly not in any pure form.
But there are always paradigmatic issues and interpretations based on current models and other potential areas of bias. And we all draw important conclusions based on epistemologies we may not want to acknowledge is ok when others base their conclusions on them.
The question of the existence of God is of an entirely different order. Actually it is arguably an incoherent question in the some similiar kind of way as the independent or absolute existence of everyday objects is. Although at least in the latter case we can say that logic tells us that there must be "something" that exists independently of human perception.
But what can we say of the absolute existence of, say, a chair other than that it is a chair, or a collection of atoms, or a wooden structure or something that it is as it is perceived and understood by us. So we cannot say of anything that it is anything other than what it is for us, except in principle; Kant's "unknowable X" perhaps. But of what use is it to attempt to say anything more than that, anything that purports to go beyond the initial realization that dispels naive realism?
I don't think so. Psychologists also talk about rational or biological motivation.
Quoting TheMadFool
Faith is the motive for believing in a god. They believe that a god exists because of their faith. Since it is not a rational or biological motivation, I believe it is an emotional motivation to believe.
What are these?
Quoting David Mo
I would refrain from saying faith is "...not a rational...motivation". It might be totally reasonable to assume, on faith, certain truths and, theories. :chin:
Common humans in common situations do not use axiomatic belief systems. Therefore, I assume that your mention of "axioms" is merely metaphorical. I suppose every human believes in some things without strict evidence of them. If this is what you mean, I would agree with you.
But not all beliefs ("axioms") have the same degree of evidence. If we abandon the criterion of black or white evidence, we can recognize some strong and justified beliefs against others that are not justified.
For example, I cannot personally present any evidence for the curvature of the Erth (my mathematical and physical knowledge are limited) but I believe that my belief in what physicists say is justified in front of the defenders of the flat Earth. Is it not?
Faith (I mean believing by faith) is a typical unjustified belief. It is not sustained by any rational indication but only by emotional desire. It is not the same as any other belief.
Rational: you decide to buy in a shop because it sells the same products at a better price than another.
Biological: You drink water because you are thirsty.
I guess it's things like that. It is not that emotions do not play a role in all (or almost all) motives, but sometimes we choose against them because we have other kinds of motives that weigh more. Like the one I just put above.
Quoting TheMadFool
If one belief is more reasonable than another, it ceases to be faith by definition. Faith consists in believing for the sake of it, even in what is absurd, as Paul of Tarsus said --he should know what he was talking about.
You mean that there are rational arguments for believing in God. For example, when Pascal uses the argument of the bet, his belief in God is no longer due to his faith and becomes an attempt at proof. Badly founded, in my opinion, but I don't want to discuss this now, because it would take us off topic.
Why is it "because" in both cases? I'm asking because you've spoken as if they're different in the sense that biological motivation is somehow not rational but since it looks like the word "because" or its equivalents can't be avoided in both kinds of motivations and too, their meanings don't seem to be different on both occasions, what gives?
Quoting David Mo
A very good observation on your part but I'm not talking about that kinda reasonableness. To clarify, there seems to be, insofar as reasonableness matters, two kinds of reasons:
1. Reason that justifies a given proposition P (this is
where what you said is relevant)
2. Reason that suggests/recommends a choice between two equally unjustified propositions. This, it seems, requires more explanation. An example might help. There is neither proof that god exists nor proof that god doesn't exist. In other words, the scales of truth, and thus our options for belief, are equally balanced. In this case, it's "reasonable" to believe something despite both god's existence and nonexistence being equally unjustified. Agnosticism is irrelevant for the simple reason that there are believers and nonbelievers i.e. some people think that it's "reasonable" to take a stance, choose a side, without any solid justification at all. (this is where what you said is irrelevant)
:chin:
And I'd be willing to have a talk with you.
The word 'reason' means two different things:
a) The cause or motive for something to have happened.
b) The ability to reach valid conclusions according to the facts and logic.
That is why I can say without redundancy that the reason for having done something (in the first sense) is reason (in the second sense). In the same way I can say without contradiction that the reason for doing something is not reasonable. It would be clearer if we talk about motives and rational arguments.
There is a difference. In your example: a biological impulse (thirst) can lead me to drink water that reason advises me not to drink because it is contaminated. This is not an unusual example. Men often do things under biological or emotional impulses that reason advises against.
I am not discussing logic or epistemology, but the psychological impact of reason as motivation versus other reasons. That is, not about whether someone is right or wrong in his or her thinking, but about the 'cause' of what he or she thinks.
You seem to mix both aspects of the issue (reasons and arguments) in your last paragraph. If a certain question is undecidable for logical reasons, the logical position is to refrain from all judgement, i.e. scepticism. Preference would be a subjective matter in the same way that someone may prefer red to blue. But the subjective choice to believe or not to believe in gods has objective consequences. And these consequences must be discussed rationally.
By the way, I don't believe that there is no rational evidence about gods’ existence. I think there are rational arguments against the existence of gods that justify disbelief.
Nice! :100:
Quoting David Mo
This induces bafflement. I presume the distinction was necessary. So, why not stick to your guns instead of trying to have a foot in both camps?
Quoting David Mo
:ok:
I suppose I have a fairly good grasp of what it is that you want to convey. I concur with you on all points you've made so far except those that've I stated seem a bit off to me.
It's true that the word "reason" is more nuanced than I realized. I'm especially indebted to you for pointing out how it can mean both a cause in re biological motivation and a premise as in rational motivation.
You mentioned something else in our conversation:
Quoting David Mo
What's "emotional motivation"?
Staying on topic, how does all that you've said and faith hang together?
For my money, I'm going to run with the conventional reading of what faith is - it's the practice of believing something sans evidence/proof. We know, from experience, that people are, generally, reluctant to believe on faith alone. If this were not true, entire nations should be in the grips of con artists, right? So, it's settled, faith isn't all that popular.
Having said that, we shouldn't forget to factor in the many times when con artists did succeed in defrauding people. These, if nothing else, suggests that faith is alive and kicking in the general population even if in the wrong places.
In line with your thoughts then, it's patently clear, people are actually investing belief on faith. This means there are certain, to borrow your word, "motivations", for practising this mode of belief acquisition (faith). What these are in actuality is anyone's guess.
To not get distracted from the main issue - faith and religion - I suggest we focus our attention on the motivations for faith alone unless a you feel a detour is germane to the OP.
Too, in my humble opinion, you should take a look at @Philosophim's take on the issue - your theory of motivations sounds very much like his theory that if people offer a "reason" when their faith is challenged it turns out to be a case of rationalization. Perhaps it's just a superficial resemblance, I'm not sure.
As for what I've said, about the reasonableness of making a choice between two equally unjustified claims, I suppose it boils down to rationalization or your theory of motivations.
Nonetheless, to offer something in my defense, I would like to cite so-called axiomatic systems - a very small aspect of ratiocination of course - wherein you simply assume the truth of certain propositions and see what it leads to. Such systems don't seem to fit into your theory of motivations, neither does Philosophim's theory of rationalization explain it very well for the simple reason that there are no reasons that determine one's choice of axioms. Axioms, by definition, lack reasons for belief.
Except among Episcopalians, Papists, Muslims, Hindus, Shintoists, animists, Scientologists and a long etcetera that adds up to a few billion human beings. If we add those who have faith in Hitler, Trump, Bolsonaro, Putin and other lesser fools, we are a handful of 'foolish' rationalists (be worth the paradox).
I think that the Age of Enlightenment is still to come... if climate change lets it. Which I doubt, to my regret.
Quoting TheMadFool
Of course. That is why axioms are only valid in formal sciences. In our knowledge of facts, scientific or vulgar, rationalism demands us to question our principles. This is one reason why there are only a handful of people who try to be a coherent rationalist. It is more comforting to have a a digestive wisdom that promises us eternal happiness than to be a materialist who claims that after death there is nothing but death. As Dostoevsky said, if someone shows me that God does not exist I will continue to believe that Christ was God.
This is the faith of the submissive and Paul of Tarsus. The only ones who will go to heaven along with the jihadists and other religious serial killers.
This is one of the reasons/motives.
This, to my reckoning, is what we call cognitive dissonance or so it seems. It looks like it's not true that the various categories you mentioned above actually believe in the thing they're supposed to - it's got more to do with habit than conviction of any kind. Too, beliefs (if not habits) of such kind don't translate into monetary or other kinds of losses and so are, let's just say, tolerated by the rational side of the human psyche.
Quoting David Mo
What prevents them from spilling over into other domains like life and living it?
Quoting David Mo
Last I heard there's no end insofar as "to question our principles" is concerned. Munchhausen trilemma?
I have no reason to think that, generally speaking, those who believe in a violent or compassionate god have other different reasons than their belief in that god. Another thing is that you think their beliefs are confusing or that they are at odds with the idea of a god that you believe in. But that is another matter. We are now discussing what is the base of those beliefs that you can think are confusing or wrong. Or not.
Quoting TheMadFool
I don't know if I understood the question correctly. 'Spill over` puzzles me a little (damn phrasal verbs!). Can you change the verb? Do you mean 'apply to'? My answer follows this idea:
Natural sciences are not governed by 'axioms' because these are immovable principles, apart from the use of mathematics as an axiomatic-deductive system that applies to experience, which has the last word. That is why the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics has superseded or modified the principles of Newtonian physics. An axiom, on the contrary, is never touched. If in physics it happens like this, in our daily life, that we have principles less supported by evidence than in natural science, it is not and should not be an untouchable principle either. That is what a true believer is not willing to touch: the commandments of his god, faith in his god or the image of his god. If he does so, all his beliefs will collapse and that is not easy to bear.
Quoting TheMadFool
The Munchausen trilemma disappears if we stop looking for absolute principles and look for reasonable principles.
I'm only drawing your attention to the possible fact that what you see as faith-based beliefs may not actually be that - they could simply be habits learned through repetition in settings like family, work, friends, community, culture, country, etc. In other words, your counterexamples to my claim that people, generally, aren't inclined toward faith are not so.
Quoting David Mo
Well, let me rephrase it as best as I can. What prevents you or me or anyone from assuming things, anything at all - propositions, theories, whatnot? For instance, as we speak, I can, for no reason whatsoever, assume that god exists or even that fae doesn't.
Of course, you might say that doing so has consequences in that certain other propositions are entailed and then the issue of consistency/inconsistency arises. Is this what you want to say? If yes, then what about propositions that are consistent with relevant other propositions? Does consistency in itself justify, is it a measure of, truth?
I don't think so.
You seem to be in the know about how science works. A scientist constructs, not one but many, hypotheses that explains a given set of observations and more than one may fit the data. What then? I'm familiar with one method that allows a choice to be made between competing hypotheses - Ockham's razor (seek simplicity) - but that has nothing to do with truth at all. Too, what if two candidate hypotheses are equally simple? What then? Can I not choose i.e. assume one of them to be true even though I have absolutely no rationale to do so? :chin:
Quoting David Mo
Interesting thought! What exactly is your point?
In your example faith (belief without justification) is caused (motivation) by habit. In this example habit is the cause, faith is the effect.
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting TheMadFool
Nothing prevents you from having a hypothesis if you do not take it as a certainty. Hypotheses must be tested, assumptions must be justified. Meanwhile, a hypothesis only delimits the field of possibilities. Only experience can turn a hypothesis into law, an assumption into knowledge. A hypothesis can be evaluated when experience has not yet come to its aid or when experience gives the same support to the opposite hypothesis. Here coherence plays a fundamental role. An inconsistent hypothesis is immediately discarded. Empirical confirmation is not necessary under these conditions. Ockham's razor is one criterion among others in the contrast phase of the opposite hypothesis. It is not a criterion of truth in itself. I agree with you. In reality there is no single criterion of truth. Scientists play with different supports for one or another hypothesis. Hypotheses are rarely definitive. This introduces some degree of intuition into science and this is what makes science interesting for many of them.
What I say about the hypothesis is also valid for common assumptions at a lower level of exigency. In my opinion, common knowledge is an imperfect variant of scientific knowledge. Therefore, an assumption may obtain some rational or non-rational justification. In the first case it is knowledge. In the second case it is faith or something similar.
Science and common knowledge do not produce any absolute certainty, although some legal propositions are so obvious that they can be considered absolutely certain for practical purposes. Faith is not knowledge. No certainty can be drawn from faith.
This is what I mean when I speak of reasonable principles.
You're proposing a causal link between habit and faith here. How does that work? Do you have a causal argument to support this?
Quoting David Mo
That's reassuring. So, how certain can we be?
Quoting David Mo
What do you mean by "experience"?
Quoting David Mo
Yes, but as I informed you and that might not have been necessary, there are/could be times when multiple hypotheses may be consistent with observation, all of them equally appealing in every known measure of appeal. What then? Am I not free, in the sense there are no justifications to force a choice, to choose any one of these hypotheses?
You repeat so much the experience of seeing the sun rise every morning that you end up believing that it will always be like that. The believer who repeats a prayer with a lot of force ends up accepting it as an untouchable mantra. This is how superstitions work, as Skynner demonstrated with a dove.
Whether there is freedom or not I don't know. I can give an opinion on this, but I don't know.
Quoting TheMadFool
Knowledge extracted and/or justified from the senses.
Quoting TheMadFool
In that case you refrain from giving your opinion. Only in very special circumstances do you take an option without any support. But it is very rare to find a circumstance in which there is no slight support for an option. Most often you find some reason to believe in something. It all depends on you being able to find the best one.
In the case of religious options what you do is choose one or the other after hearing from those who defend or attack your belief. And you choose from those options. If you are honest you will recognize that you are not very sure. This happened even to Teresa of Calcutta, as she herself acknowledged. If you are not sincere with yourself you will say that your faith is unshakable (Paul) or that you have irrefutable proof that your god exists (Thomas Aquinas).
I can accept that but I'm interested in the causal claim that habit leads to faith. How? By tue way your sun example is an inductive inference - it has nothing to do with habit.
As for your view on praying and superstition, you're spot on. Many cases of superstition are examples of false cause fallacies: non causa pro causa or post hoc ergo propter hoc.
It appears you're right. Habit can cause faith in some kind of a feedback loop - faith induces the development of ritualistic behavior, these become habits, and habits reinforce [cause] faith...round and round we go in the carousel of faith and habit.
Quoting David Mo
If I have the opportunity of marrying two equally attractive women, your advice is to not marry at all? :chin:
The belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on the belief that the past will repeat itself in the future. This is the basic principle of induction. Obviously induction cannot be justified by induction. Only habit justifies it. It is a natural habit, but a habit.
Quoting TheMadFool
Have you considered bigamy?
A habit, as I said, perhaps in words that were poorly chosen and thus what appears to be a misconception on your part, is simply the act of repeating a certain kind of behavior, that behavior being associated with some meaning - here faith - and thus habits go towards reinforcing that meaning - faith - but in no way do habits justify anything unless one personifies the universe and construes its laws to be habits. Interesting.
Quoting David Mo
You didn't offer that option.
I agree. The principle of uniformity of the past is justified because of is universal. Everybody believes it. Other practical reasons can be discussed. But the main reason is this.
Hi Gus,
Thanks for your post. I think this is a definitely a common reality within religious discussions, that I, who identify as a Christian, also find to be quite frustrating, and I recognize that I have used this circular reasoning before.
As a Christian, faith is definitely a significant aspect of my religious adherence, and in the Bible, it is often upheld as a virtue. I am not necessarily providing any sort of argument, but rather I would like to provide a better definition of faith, what it is and what it is not and hopefully this will add some value to the conversation.
Take the phrase, "a blind leap of faith". Unfortunately, I think that many Western Christians adhere to this sort of faith when the argument boils down to your mentioned point of frustration, however I do not believe this is what faith actually is, nor do I think that the Bible and Jesus depict it as such. First, I'll offer one example (there are plenty of others), in which we don't see faith as a lack of evidence.
1. Doubting Thomas (John 24:24-29)
I am not sure how familiar you are with the Christian gospels, but one relatively well known story is that of one of Jesus' disciples, Thomas, who got the unfortunate label of "doubting Thomas" because he does not believe that Jesus was raised from the dead, solely on the basis of the other disciples telling him. It is not until he sees the wounds in Jesus' hands, feet, and side that he believes (don't ask me why Jesus wasn't just raised back perfectly healed, I have never really thought this through), and Jesus responds by saying, "blessed are those who have not seen, yet believe". Although some people seem to draw the conclusion that Jesus is saying it is better not have evidence and believe (blind faith), this is not at all within the text. Additionally, it isn't at all the case that Thomas doesn't have evidence before he believes (he does: the testimony of the other disciples), however he receives additional evidence which leads to his belief.
Faith is not the belief based on no evidence, in fact there are plenty examples we come across that we would still say require faith, but there is plenty of evidence. I'll provide a personally applicable one.
I just recently got into rock climbing (quarantine things am I right?), and there is a ton of evidence that it is perfectly safe. The rope I am using is rated to 8 kilo-newtons, the bolts in the rock can hold 6000lbs of force, the carabiner can handle 22KN, and... you get the idea. All the evidence points to the fact that I am perfectly safe, however I think it's still applicable to say, "I have faith that I will be safe" or "I have faith in the equipment".
Hopefully this understanding of faith helps. Additionally, I would just input that I think that there is good evidence for theism and the Christian tradition that I have chosen to be a part of. (To name a few in regards to theism in general: the Fine tuning argument, the necessity of God in our principle of causation, the phenomena of morality. In regard to Christianity, the nature of the message, its survival as unappealing as it would be for the earliest Christians). I also won't deny that there is evidence against Christianity and theism as whole (biggest one for me is the problem of evil), but all in all the evidence seems to lean towards the reality of the Christian God, and that is what I put my faith in. Hope this helps!
Hi Gus, thanks for the chart you provided. I find fault with argument that its advancing. I think you are arguing something along these lines:
1. Beliefs or noetic attitudes need adequate epistemic justification.
2. If beliefs or noetic attitudes need adequate epistemic justification, then faith in the belief ‘God exists’ needs adequate epistemic justification.
3. If faith in the belief ‘God exists’ needs adequate epistemic justification, then the only means in which faith could be epistemically justified is if it appeals to the belief that God exists.
4. If the only means in which faith could be epistemically justified is if it appeals to the belief that God exists, then appeals to faith ultimately lead to circular arguments.
5. If appeals to faith ultimately lead to circular arguments, then appeals to faith should be rejected.
6. Therefore, appeals to faith should be rejected.
My contention with this argument is premise three. As a theist, I agree that faith should be buttressed by some justification and that blind faith is something to be avoided. However, why should one believe that the consequent is the case for faith? The mature theist, I would suppose, does have other means in which to justify her faith. She could appeal to the intuition that God exists, the arguments for God’s existence, testimony from other intelligent/reflective believers and the failure of naturalism to adequately explain the totality of existence as means of justification. The above items are far from simple appeals to some prior and seemingly unjustified belief as premise four suggests. However, even if one grants premise three, the argument still does not seem to succeed, for premise five is contentious as well. Perhaps appeals to faith are circular, yet this might not give one reason to reject them since could not one argue, as the coherentist would, that any justification is eventually circular? Of course, I would qualify this response by saying that a person who appeals to faith should at least lay down all their cards that give reason, aside from faith, for why he or she believes in God. Still, if justification is circular when all is said and done, then circular arguments are inevitable. So, from the coherentist perspective, appeals to faith should not really be rejected on the grounds of circularity since this is a pernicious effect that could happen in any instance where one has to give an account of justification for one’s beliefs. The above reasons motivate my doubt for the success of your argument.
I'm sorry if I'm interfering in this discussion.
John drastically asserts that there are two things: seeing (evidence) and believing. He attributes to Jesus the saying that one is better than the other: belief. I don't see your reason for interpreting this any other way.
Before touching the wound, Thomas had no evidence. Only second hand testimonies. Obviously a second hand is not evidence. Thomas applies here the rational principle that extraordinary statements require extraordinary evidence. Therefore, he only believes in the resurrection when he has extraordinary evidence. And he is admonished for preferring rational knowledge to faith.
I do not believe that any other reading is possible. Moreover, this reading is perfectly consistent with the Pauline distinction between faith and wisdom of men (1 Corinthians 1:21).
Your justification of faith is not a justification at all.
Intuition is the same as faith if it is not supported by another instance. You simply change one word for another that means the same thing.
Authority is not an argument at all. You choose men with authority and discard others on the basis of the object to be demonstrated, namely, your faith. They will always tell you what you want to hear.
Nor do you explain the whole universe by saying that God made it. You only introduce a mysterious concept (god) and claim that with that everything is understood. Understanding means explaining the unknown by the known, not the other way around. The absurd does not explain anything. And faith is absurd. Paul says so and I agree.
Therefore, your justifications are valid only in the assumption of your faith. That is, a circular argument where the conclusion is used as a premise.
You justify the circularity of your reasoning by suggesting that every rational argument is circular. I do not think so. Please show it.
But it _is_ _their_ argument.
Most religious people have come to believe their religious doctrine before they were even old enough for their capacities for critical thinking to develop. This is the norm in religions, not just monotheistic ones. These religious people simply don't know any other way. Epistemically, they are in a situation that is impossible to deliberately replicate for an adult person. They cannot empathize with non-believers, and non-believers cannot empathize with them. This is why any attempt to discuss the justification for a person's religious belief is bound to be fruitless.
Religion, and all its structure - based on a empty concept - God - - seems to me to represent a human need to justify its instinctive actions and feelings. It is built by rationality to justify irrationality.
The dogmatic view of certain religions kills the individual and transforms the herd's view in such a way that their actions, reactions, and emotions are almost made unconscious.
And yet they rule the world.
Indeed, they do...
"That modern secular individuals are prone to cling on to beliefs about science, in the same way that their ancestors turned to the gods, carries no judgment on the value of science as a method but simply highlights the human motivation to believe."
In the short term? Yes.
In the long term? Maybe.
I don't know you but I'll pick "Maybe".
Quoting Pantagruel
:100:
So you're optimistic like that? Tell me more!
On the grounds of what do you think that our philosophical resistance is not futile in the long run?
Faith is ultimately belief in belief itself - that is right to believe.
I have faith.
Why do I believe in myself? Empirically, maybe I'm not sufficient. But I don't believe that. I believe I have a purpose. I have faith in myself. That's my take.
It's not that I see myself as my own God or that I believe my chosen God will redeem me.
But both at their core stem from your own self belief. Faith.
I missed this earlier. Perhaps it's now redundant to respond, but I think it's an important point. The world that we experience via the senses just is reality for us; It is what the notion of reality derives from. We experience objects of the senses and we can talk about them; pointing out aspects of them that we will all (well most anyway) see, hear, smell, feel, taste and so on.
It's only a certain kind of skepticism, based on mere logical possibilities that we can imagine, that leads us to question the absolute reality of the world revealed to us by the senses. God is one of those mere logical possibilities, although it is also true that people often associate certain kinds of numinous experiences with the notion, even though the association is by no means a necessary one.
That said, I'm not condemning any individual faiths that may be based on the kinds of profound numinous experiences that certainly happen to people, if you can trust the reports. I also have personal experiences to draw upon in that regard. Such experiences cannot constitute any inter-subjectively testable evidence for anything, though.
The world that we experience via the senses just is reality for us
''Reality for us'' I would like if you elaborate on that. Do you try to say by that that we create abstracts (Aka things from our perception) to understand reality?
We experience objects of the senses and we can talk about them; pointing out aspects of them that we will all (well most anyway) see, hear, smell, feel, taste and so on.
Ok, now this is interersting, because this actually resemble abstract concepts. In this case, it would depend whetever you are a relast of these things or not and the essentiality of empericism. We can say that these notions derive from reality/aka the concrete world.
It's only a certain kind of skepticism, based on mere logical possibilities that we can imagine, that leads us to question the absolute reality of the world revealed to us by the senses
I would also like to investigate what ''absolute reality'' means. Do you think that it also relates back to epistemology, in the sense what absolute reality is even like and how we can access that? And what is the best method we can go about to access that.
Btw, sorry if I did some things wrong, I am new. (I mean as in relation to quotes, etc.)
The substance of history, that is, the cyclical conclusion of the expression of Egoism through Being, proves that those who live for the future, eternalize themselves in the existence of those who live for the present, and therefore, they become the essence of existence.
"The same ones who are stoned today, will be worshiped as saints in the future by their own murderers"