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"Not as separate as you thought" is a far cry from "killing relativism."

So those conceptual schemes deemed unworthy of the title will be those that fail to fit "the totality of sensory evidence" or those that contain some ...

The deflation makes sense if it can be established that conceptual schemes share translatable content to a large (almost total) extent. Which raises t...

Next: "all the sensory evidence qua facts" is what makes a scheme true. Here Davidson assumes the sensory evidence qua facts can be accessed directly ...

@banno The above is why I can agree the T-sentence makes no reference to a fact, but have to insist that without a fact the T-sentence can't be put to...

Davidson presents a compelling argument that if a scheme fits the totality of sensory evidence it can be said to be true. So this is one way to arrive...

A contradiction here vis-a-vis truth in connection to fit. Can you parse this or connect it to some quotes?

Rereading Davidson and the thread. Can you connect this statement to a quote in Davidson? Where does Davidson measure the titular "worthiness" of conc...

Within the conceptual scheme of a few Christians (very few, the fantast zealots) there is no question the goblet is filled with blood. A nontrivial ca...

re the yawl and the ketch Davidson says: Such examples emphasize the interpretation of anomalous details against a background of common beliefs and a ...

I'll read through the paper and thread again and get back to you.

Just to be precise: What Banno said to me was: Philosophy amounts to nothing.

Yeah, that's an interesting one. 1)? 2)? 3) Therefore, philosophy is bunk. Using philosophy to prove philosophy is bunk proves philosophy isn't bunk.

I don't expect big answers from philosophy. (I used to.) Just interesting tidbits and brain-aerobics. The word "a-telical" comes to mind. Not to dimin...

It takes a lot of philosophical discourse to dissolve philosophical discourse. Reminds me of Samuel Beckett's wordy obsession with going silent.

I get the deflation thing. It's almost a kind of anti-philosophy.

If your response to my objection is something like: All that business deflates to T-sentences and T-sentences are all we have and all we should want.....

You suggested it could be a play on "basis" but you didn't expand. Interested to hear a direct response to my objection.

The exegesis was interesting and I understand the translatability and T-sentence bit. But the question of the possibility of a single, or no, scheme i...

I'm curious about this because the quote is taken directly from the closing paragraph: "reestablished unmediated touch with... objects.."

My own objections - that without a some way to verify access to the "content" portion of the scheme-content dyad there's no basis for claiming the abs...

I don't think he does away with them either. But I'm new to Davidson so I'm willing to listen.

It might be useful to compare the phrases 1) snow is white and 2) if snow is white. 1) is a statement about snow. 2) isn't.

I'm not arguing there's no reference to snow. Just trying to locate Janus philosophically.

Do you agree that none of these expressions says anything about snow?

Is there a reference to snow in the following? 1) snow 2) if snow 3) if and only if snow 4) if and only if snow is white

Yeah. I deleted that comment. I misread you. No problem.

As a newbie to this kind of deflationism, and with a pinch of charity, here's how I see it: Take the T-sentence: "Snow is white" is true iff snow is w...

nm

All that makes sense.

115-1? 113+1?

I'm interested in the primo reading list too.

Sweet.

I might have to go to an actual library and make actual photocopies, like last century.

I was looking for it online but couldn't find a freebie. Any ideas?

Do you agree that Banno's interpretation of Davidson is more deflationary than your own?

By "so" do you mean "true"?

Okay, good, that's clear, thanks.

It's not much trouble to pull that word out: Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these make...

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these things make sentences true?

That would make truth relative to language and experience et al. But still deflationary in Banno's sense - when Banno says we already understand what ...

Davidson from the final paragraph: "Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language..."

But if truth is only relative to language and we've established unmediated touch with objects haven't we eliminated schemes and thereby truth relative...

Hmmm... I wonder if Banno would agree with that.

I'm hesitant to take a stab at it until I've processed tonight's exchange so far and have taken another glance at the essay. This is Banno's and creat...

Take these two paragraphs: Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can ...

Good. Thanks.

I agree it amounts to nothing. But, like we have to do our bench-presses, we have to do our brain-presses, if we want to stay fit.

Will do. Do you see all of this as a kind of skepticism?

Why do we need them? Folk seem to just get on with using language without the help of epistemologists. Why shouldn't it just be that we use words to t...