More precisely, the thirder view could be expressed as the claim that whenever Sleeping Beauty awakens, from her epistemic perspective, P(today is Tue...
I agree. I view the states at issue to be irreducibly epistemic states of agents. They are, in other words, relational states defined pragmatically. S...
Thanks to you! I'll likely revisit some of your most recent objection just for the sake of clarifying my position (and refine it if needs be). Of cour...
From Sleeping Beauty's perspective, the conditional probability of the coin flip being tails upon her awakening isn't conditioned on 'today' being eit...
I love your variation! However, your conclusion may be a bit premature as halfers can counter it using the same argument with which they counter the t...
I'm going to respond tomorrow since I'm now nearing the end of my current period of awakening. Meanwhile, I want to post this answer GPT-4 gave—on beh...
This assignment is an expression of pairwise indifference between the three possible awakening circumstances. But rather than relying on the Principle...
Taking ratios over possible worlds is a vivid way to illustrate the issue at hand when it comes to Bayesian updating of credences in light of new info...
I think there are good grounds for Sleeping Beauty upon awakening to ascribe strictly equal probabilities P = 1/3 to the three cases: (1) Today is Mon...
I think this observation is very astute. As I am developing a pragmatist conception of credence, I am trying to move away from the idea that one's cre...
That's correct since events that happen in the world don't come flagged with sign posts that say: "the current event begins here" and "the current eve...
The state "the coin landed heads" is ambiguous with respect to the span of the centered possible world that it might be referring to. I think you woul...
Since on my approach probabilities track frequencies, even if there is just one kidnapping event, the hostage's chances of survival are 5 in 11 whenev...
She can't condition her credence on H by winning a prize if she only learns about her victory after the experiment ends. The same applies to her oppor...
In your prize scenario, knowing that you've won a prize indeed gives you new information, and this can rightly affect your credences. However, in the ...
In your scenario, the nature of the prize is conditioned on the coin toss results. In the film example, the number of features (and the coin toss resu...
The main point is that seeing Rex Harrison being featured (while knowing that 1% of the movies randomly being shown in this theater feature him) doesn...
Yes, me too. But that's just because two out of three showings are parts of double features. Seeing Rex Harrison being featured doesn't change my cred...
I believe you meant 0.0199. That represents the probability of the tulip being red at least once across the two days of awakening in the event that th...
I don't understand your argument at all. Finding an escape opportunity with probability P is a constant feature of the prisoner's environment. Sleepin...
Suppose there is a 0.01% chance to find an opportunity to escape on any given day held captive regardless of that day being the only one or one among ...
Which is why I had included the proviso that the (rare) opportunities be proportional to the number of days the hostage is held captive. Under those c...
The opportunity to escape just enables the prisoner to put their credence to good use, and to chose how to most appropriately define the states that t...
My safehouse and escape example – before I introduce the idea of escape possibilities – is designed in such a way that the prisoner's epistemic situat...
There are two possible conclusions depending on the way you chose to define the temporal span of your centered possible worlds (the states in the prob...
Under the narrow centered worlds parameterization of the problem space, the possibility (indeed, certainty) of Sleeping Beauty being dismissed on the ...
That's cute but rather point missing. Sleeping beauty also is dismissed on the third day no matter what. But if we ignore the narrow centered case whe...
Here is a excerpt of a discussion I've had with GPT-4. I don't think its last suggestion about the error Lewis might be making regarding Beauty's upda...
Your revised scenario seems to neglect the existence of a state where the player is being dismissed. This isn't quite equivalent to Milano's 'blind st...
If by "reasoning as if one's interview is randomly selected from the set of possible interviews" you're referring to Sleeping Beauty's avowal of her i...
Your assertion that I'm reasoning "as if" someone selected an interview from all possible interviews isn't quite accurate. Sleeping Beauty is fully aw...
What I mean is that whenever the coin landed heads during a particular awakening, then it also landed heads during the particular experimental run thi...
Indeed, it's true that if you play the game once, it's not most likely that you'll win during that particular experimental run. However, when I sugges...
Consider this scenario in the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem where a ten-sided dice is thrown. In this situation, it would be rational for me ...
Perhaps a rational individual might not believe in the plausibility of being woken up and put back to sleep 2^101 times. But even if this extreme scen...
Thanks! I'm going to read this paper. I like the conclusion: "Thus, we suggest that although it is true that Beauty is in a heads-awakening if and onl...
I introduced the prisoner variant to satisfy Michael's insistence that Sleeping Beauty's credence only be evaluated within a single-run experimental c...
GPT-4 wasn't endorsing your conclusion. Rather, it pointed out that your calculation of P(Heads | Monday or Tuesday) = 1/2 simply restates the uncondi...
Just for fun, I asked GPT-4 to comment on your Bayesian analysis. What do you make of Michael's purported solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem: "In...
It appears that you are suggesting a false dichotomy. Logically, both (1) two-thirds of all interviews being Tails interviews, and (2) half of all exp...
Lewis's treatment yields an incredible result. Elga's treatment yields an unsurprising result by means of a controversial method. This is why I prefer...
I apologize. I misunderstood this part of Elga's argument. Although P(T1) and P(H1) are the credences Sleeping Beauty should have upon being first awa...
It looks like you may have misinterpreted Elga's paper. He doesn't define P as an unconditional probability. In fact, he expressly defines P as "the c...
This scenario doesn't accurately reflect the Sleeping Beauty experiment. Instead, imagine that one bag is chosen at random. You are then given one bal...
The betting examples serve to illustrate that the credences held by thirders, unlike those held by halfers, align with the frequencies of outcomes in ...
I've also been working under the assumption that the experiment is conducted only once. Sleeping Beauty's calculation that P(H) = 1/3 doesn't hinge on...
Sleeping Beauty isn't asked to place a bet on the outcome on day zero, before she's put to sleep for the first time, with payouts occurring on each su...
It is fundamentally the same scenario, except we're adding external threats like crocodiles or lions to the test environment. In the hostage situation...
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