Pierre-Normand

Your proposed scenario certainly provides an interesting variation, but it doesn't quite correspond to the structure of the situation typically discus...

Indeed, in my examples (labelled "First step" through "Fourth step"), there's only a single source of randomness, which consists in the random assignm...

If Ned only reads a part of the printout that doesn't mention him reading it, his actions wouldn't contradict the thesis of determinism. For instance,...

I concur that we must accept, in principle, that this information can be acquired by Ned in order for his contrarian behavior to make any sense. Would...

And the Montreal Protocol that has been ratified by all member states of the United Nations.

A Halfer might argue that Sleeping Beauty being posed such a question, along with the provided context of the question's delivery (i.e., through a ran...

Of course not. Just saying it isn't sufficient. He also has to think it!

If I understand correctly, you seem to be asking how the Thirders might be able to infer the probabilities of the three fine-grained types of awakenin...

In the OP variation, the coin is flipped on Sunday before Sleeping Beauty's first awakening. Elga is right, though, that nothing substantially changes...

This is indeed a flaw inherent to the statement of the problem. What is a rational person supposed to believe about a probabilistic outcome that is am...

One argument that Halfers make is that being given many occasions to verify the exact same thing, rather than verifying it once, doesn't change the pr...

The concept of Sleeping Beauty's credence P(H) indeed goes beyond stating the coin's inherent likelihood to land heads or tails. In the context of thi...

Actually, I've stopped being a committed Thirder a few days ago, since I began developing a pragmatist conception of the dispute between Thirders and ...

Here is another interesting aspect of the Sleeping Beauty problem. What is the nature of the information that Sleeping Beauty receives on each occasio...

Where can we buy those new NFTs?

In the Sleeping Beauty problem, both main parties to the debates agree that it's Sleeping Beauty's credence while she is being awakened ("now") that i...

Here is another discussion with GPT-4 that rehearses my pragmatist conception of the dispute between halfers and thirders. PN: Let's explore a variati...

Mike Pence in his recent CNN town hall makes a compelling argument against Trump's indictment. It sends a terrible message to the world. Since Pence a...

That may be a topic for another thread but George Packer's piece How America Fractured into Four Parts in The Atlantic suggest to me an interesting wa...

In that case, in the secret mission scenario, it looks like Sergeant Sue and G. I. Jane are poised to having a fight—or at least a heated argument—reg...

But we are agreed on the validity of Sue's credences in both scenarios, right?

Structurally, DZ#1 is similar to awake and DZ#2 is similar to asleep. In this way, the Jane&Helen scenario perfectly maps on the secret mission scenar...

In the secret mission example, Sergeant Sue is tasked with locating Jane on one of her three scheduled missions selected at random. Neither Sue nor Ja...

Although you linked my most recent post, I assume you intended to respond to this one. In my scenario, there was only one room for awakenings. Without...

Let's consider another scenario. Suppose Jane is an amnesiac paratrooper set to be dropped behind enemy lines for three separate missions on different...

Indeed, Jane reasons as if she was randomly selected from the set of all participants, as this forms the basis of her prior probabilities. What you se...

Your calculation seems correct, but it doesn't adequately account for the new capacity Jane gains to refer to her own temporal location using an index...

I'd be happy to revisit this objection but I'm going to stand back and watch a little how @"PhilosophyRunner" grapples with it. If I see that they are...

:up:

P(R|R or B1) is the probability of the ball being red, given that the ball isn't labelled B2. That's because the outcome 'R or B1' is equivalent to th...

You challenged the validity of Elga's inference by presenting what you consider a counterexample: "If I have one red ball in one bag and two numbered ...

Here is a follow-up to my previous clarificatory remark to @sime regarding the statistical distribution of the participants in the waking rooms of the...

What you mean, of course, it that you are picking a bag at random, and in a second stage picking a ball from that bag at random. I assume Elga would h...

This inference is only invalid inasmuch as it may lead to an equivocation. When you say "tails is more probable," what exactly do you mean? If you're ...

In the scenario I had envisioned, where new participants had the duration of their stay premised on the throw of a six-sided die, there was a 6/11 pro...

Yes, and no. Its ability to grasp 'at first glance' the conceptual structure of intricate arguments in a contextually sensitive manner far exceeds tha...

Indeed, not only would their expected value (EV) be positive, but it would be positive because the majority of their individual bets would be winning ...

@"PhilosophyRunner"'s comment is on point. You awakening once while the coin landed tails is akin to a showing of the Mona Lisa on a particular day. T...

In the Sleeping Beauty case, betting on tails at each awakening isn't merely profitable over the long run. It's also more likely to be a winning bet a...

Why should it be either one or the other? One of them expresses a credence that an awakening (the current one) is occurring as a result of a coin havi...

If that were the case, the problem would transform into a different version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. This altered version would have Sleeping B...

Have you had a look at the setup I had described here to provide a pragmatist account of the thirder/halfer dispute? On a particular day, when Sue is ...

This is actually straightforward. Imagine a spatial analogy. The 'B series of space' might be represented by Cartesian coordinates on a surface or by ...

While Bayesians and frequentists might disagree about the meaning of probability assignments to potential outcomes of experiments, with the former ass...

Because her credence wasn't meant to reflect the proportion of winning bets but rather the proportion of awakening episodes that occur during an exper...

Your suggestion that a thirder expects to gain from choosing amnesia would depend on her misconstruing the nature of her predictions. A thirder, upon ...

Yes, your attempt turned out to be interactive but not very exploratory. I did an experiment with GPT-4 where I achieved the opposite result. I had in...

Follow-up to my discussion with GPT-4 about the pragmatist interpretation of the Sleeping Beauty problem: PN: As I reflected about this thought experi...

I've refined further @"Michael"'s 'less-extreme' variation of the Sleeping Beauty problem in a way that highlights a pragmatist interpretation of the ...