Marchesk

Yes, but then does this mean the problem arose because philosophers took universal concepts out of context?

At the very least, we have learned to use red for a range of color shades. And these shades can be given numbers based on a three-value primary color ...

What does this mean exactly? Because it sounds like our use of red and green are arbitrary, and we could have divided up color space differently, and ...

Sure we can wonder, but if there is nothing in common among reds, how are we able to discriminate them from greens?

I guess we can just focus on a color property, and notice that we use the universal term "red" for all the particular instances of reds.

I would say we use the word red the way we do because lots of things have reddish hue.

The problem is working out how universals are useful. They may or not point to a particular thing (a universal object) in the world, but it would be f...

Let's take another example. Do ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist? This is a bit different from external world skepticism. The problem aris...

Or like Zen Buddhism. It's interesting that Witty said concerning consciousness and the beetle in a box not that it's nothing, only that we can't spea...

I did, and you responded by saying you didn't understand the well known positions in the example used, so I posted links for you to familiarize yourse...

That's a good point. I could have used free will or skepticism, it's just they seemed harder to express simply in this conversation. We could say that...

I like that. Turns out that a lot of everyday notions are problematic, and don't stand up that well under inquiry. Science backs philosophy on this.

I don't care about the theological application of universals, only the philosophical problem, which goes back to Plato, and still exists today. It's j...

That's a good way of putting it. Yeah, long before I read about p-zombies or even solipsism, I remember sitting in a busy dinner with a friend, and I ...

Descartes seems to be the big bad of philosophy, but I think he's just rephrasing what arose in ancient philosophy. And I don't think it's unique to W...

The NY Times had a good article on this a few years ago: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/

The problem of universals. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/ I used it as an example, because it's easy to say how it might be s...

Yes, just like indirect realism leads to a veil of perception and potentially radical skepticism. But maybe that's just our epistemic position as anim...

Do we really? It's not like I can read people's thoughts or have their experiences. What I think's happening is that inferring other people's minds is...

Right, but we experience a mental life for ourselves, and infer that in others based on behavior and similar biology. That's what's laid out with the ...

Assuming two things: 1. We can differentiate sentient from non-sentient creatures. 2. Sentience captures everything qualia or phenomenal does. If we c...

I don't know what the answer is to the hard problem. But I would be very hesitant to support substance dualism. I mention property dualism as a more r...

Yeah, there's something that has properties. It could be a field, particle swarm, ordinary object, process, brain state, whatever. I mention property ...

We don't see things exactly as they are, or science wouldn't surprise us all the time. Clearly, our senses are limited. The big question is whether th...

I guess if "something" is defined sufficiently broadly to include more than objects.

You have an idiosyncratic definition of physical where it becomes almost impossible to discuss non-physical options. I don't believe in winning argume...

That doesn't sound right. We see the game via the TV. Otherwise, how would you be able to see what goes on? The tv is a means by which we can remotely...

Sure. But you've made indirect realism difficult by locating all the properties with the perceiver. There's quite a bit more options. Minds do perceiv...

I'm sympathetic to that, but it gets you called a "New Mysterian" and a defeatist. I always liked McGinn's arguments for cognitive closure, regardless...

If you can't tell what properties exist in perception and what exist in objects, then why be a realist? But anyway, science is able to do it, that's h...

This is all assuming physicalism is everything else that we have to fit consciousness into. Like Schop, I don't know anymore than anyone else does. Bu...

We want to know to what extent the world is like our experiences and to what extent it's different. So for example, we've determined that an object's ...

I'm not sure I understand why people don't understand the basics of these discussions. But okay, I'll continue to play along. If there is a difference...

Right, dualism is just one possible answer to the hard problem. So let's say that you're right and there is no hard problem. So how would you decide w...

Of course it's all part of reality. Dreams, imagination, lies, madness, hallucinations, appearances, colors are all real in that sense. But that's not...

This can be gotten around by defining solipsism a certain way. First of all, the self is just another experience. For the solipsist, all that exists i...

What about for patterns, functions, and processes? If we consider an object to be a certain patten of molecular arrangement, where pattern can allow f...

Things are identical to themselves. Is that semantic identity also?

I don't know what determines consciousness and I would be fine with saying Data is conscious. It's the epistemological problem that Block explains whi...

Probably not. It's just interesting that she's describing a set and when I think of a roof, it's a universal concept.

Hmmm, so then it becomes a matter of explaining physical property P, which is a matter left up to neuroscience, I take it. I like it better than sayin...

Agreed, so what is the correct account?

Alright, yes, nature isn't conceptual. So I'll rephrase: Some of our concepts are about the structure, function and properties of the world. Others re...

Okay, but the hard problem is showing how a brain state of seeing red is a red experience, or results in a red experience. Saying they're identical is...

Right, but this presents an ontological problem. For physicalists, anyway. It's not a problem if you're down with dualism, or you're an idealist. It's...

The hard and harder problems exist if we take our ontology from science, because it leaves the phenomenal out. Reconciling would mean figuring out a w...

Phenomenal are creature dependent. We see red not because the world is colored in, but because our visual system evolved to discriminate photons that ...

Obviously it's not a problem for nature. It's a problem for humans because we can't figure out what the proper account of consciousness is. And depend...

Phenomenal: color, sound, smell, taste, pain, pleasure, hot, cold, thoughts, beliefs, desires, dreams, feelings. Non: shape, space, time, composition,...

It's been the human experience since at least philosophical inquiry began and the distinction between appearance and reality was a thing. Thus the wor...