The Great Whatever

I think Michael makes an interesting sociological point here, which is that direct realism is often associated with a family of philosophical views, a...

I actually did, which, again, you would know if you bothered to read before replying. Now go back, look, find it, and I don't know, feel embarrassed, ...

Not even Jesus can make some read before answering.

Thread officially dead. Christ.

Yes, there is. That's the whole point of this conversation: that in any case, the direct realist by his own position can be mistaken about whether som...

I've already explained in previous posts, I don't see the point in explaining again unless you say something besides 'nuh uh.' Because after all, you'...

No, because then the question just repeats for this second experience.

Recognizing a tension in your thought is not fallacious. There is in fact such a tension; the modus operandi for the direct realist is to cover his ea...

Notice that 1) is impossible if the two are phenomenologically indistinguishable. If for any particular case I cannot tell, then it cannot be that I c...

Sure. I might go through it more thoroughly piece by piece later, but the basic idea is: -A theory of meaning is essential to the philosophy of langua...

Inference to the best explanation is only a coherent option when there is evidence that could possibly bear on the matter, which the direct realist's ...

1) I can tell the difference between veridical and non-veridical experience. 2) I cannot tell the difference between veridical and non-veridical exper...

Again, it's not some external position, 'the skeptic,' that threatens you -- it's that your own position is internally incoherent. Your position does ...

So, is it possible on your view that all of your experiences could be hallucinations? If not, why not?

But...this is precisely not what you've been saying? Did you even read the post you quoted?

If the distinction is senseless, then this is a problem for the realist, who is the one who wants to secure the distinction. An idealist, for example,...

I really don't see how you think this isn't a problem, jamalrob, nor can I believe that after the posts I've made you don't know what I'm talking abou...

Yes, there would be a meaningful distinction on the position jamalrob is advocating: this is what he posits. The result is that he draws a distinction...

The position that demands it is the position that (1) there are two metaphysically distinct kinds of experience, ostensible perception and actual perc...

Yes, but it's your problem. That is, your own positions requires you to say not only that everything could be a hallucination, but also that you have ...

There may be a contradiction, depending on what your other epistemological commitments are.

Okay, so does that mean there are cases where you can tell whether you're hallucinating or not? If so, what differentiates the cases where you can fro...

It's on JSTOR, but I don't know where a legal copy is. I actually can't tell from JSTOR's TOS whether it's legal to post it here.

You don't see the problem between claiming that you can't make the distinction between two things, and then making that very distinction?

You don't have to tell a story. Your theory entails that there exists a distinction that you have to make in order for the theory to make sense, while...

I guess I pretty much agree with everything he says, but on the other hand I think this discussion, and Tarski-style theories of truth, were obviated ...

You haven't answered my question, though. Put it this way. You have claimed there are two metaphysically distinct, but phenomenologically identical, t...

The problem is not that you can't tell the difference between the two when you're hallucinating. The problem is that according to your own account, yo...

No, let's give you the fact that there's a difference. Now, how did you figure this out? That is, how can you, the realist tell the difference between...

I guess there's a sense in which I'm not really that interested in the first two points. I think I want to bypass the second one entirely, because the...

But if your 'real' body was generally invincible in daily life, but damaging your 'virtual' body had terrible, painful consequences, you'd take libert...

I don't think philosophy offers relief just in the sense of relieving boredom. If boredom was the only problem life wouldn't be so bad.

If you were from the non-Matrix world, you might say so. But then, they would tell you you're in error about not being in a 1990's metropolis.

Well, the world is such that you end up a wage slave no matter what you do, probably. Professional philosophy is dehumanizing in its own way, and so i...

I never said it was better. I said it was more edifying. Special sciences are, if you like, more useful. Or, in other words, there is a difference bet...

My point is that the people living in the Matrix are no more in error about anything than people living outside of it. We already live in a Matrix, if...

I still say there is a sense in which philosophy demands and rewards thought in a way the special sciences don't. In the special sciences, first and f...

Except, as I said, in both cases the causal story is already the same. Remember, you are still in the 'real world' and subject to its causal influence...

In my opinion philosophy is edifying in a way that other avenues of inquiry are not. The special sciences are by comparison 'workmanlike' and approxim...

But it would be just the opposite: unplugging would be going into the 'fake' world. You see?

So, for example, Kant thought that (Aristotelian) logic was complete, and so derived a table of categories that were necessary to all thought on the b...

Realists.

I spent a long time reading Kant, and ultimately I think I have no major sympathies with him. If you want an extremely reductive dismissal of his work...

But if you were born 'plugged in,' and saw 'unplugging' as the exception, the roller coaster we deem 'real' would be the 'virtual' one, and vice-versa...

But they're not causally mediated in a different way. In both cases, you hit your 'skin' with certain stimuli, and the result is that a spatial 'envir...

I think the way the point is characterized isn't so important as long as the point is understood that there is no metaphysical difference between the ...

To say that natural space 'surrounds' virtual space is to treat virtual space as if it were a little piece of natural space. But when you control your...

Well, for one thing, the simulation breaks down in systematic ways when you poke holes in the hardware, in either case.

Our natural waking perception is in a way 'designed,' too. Of course there's no person or group of people who purposefully made it some way, but nonet...

I don't understand what you mean in the second paragraph. What does knowing it is a simulation have to do with anything? You still interact with it in...