Reading for November: Davidson, Reality Without Reference

Right, gonna reel some thoughts off in order to work them out in the process of writing. It seems to me that the thrust of Davidson's paper is something like this: "Look, a theory of truth can do without a concept of truth, so why not a theory of meaning without a concept of reference?". He begins by acknowledging that a theory of meaning without a concept of reference does in fact sound a bit odd - after all, "explaining the truth conditions of a sentence like 'Socrates flies' must amount to saying it is true if and only if the object referred to by 'Socrates' is one of the objects referred to by the predicate 'flies'." To work himself up to the challenge of meaning-without-reference, he begins instead by looking at truth - specifically Tarski's Convention T.

Without going into the specifics of the theory (Davidson summerises it quickly in the third paragraph of the paper, and discusses it more fully in his paper, "In Defense of Convention T"), the upshot of the theory is that while it doesn't tell us what truth is, it allows us to specify what does and does not count as a truthful sentence in a particular language. He notes that objections have been made to the effect that if this is so, this theory of truth is in fact only something like a partial theory, one that does not 'give a complete account of the truth of sentences'. It is at this point that Davidson essentially grasps the nettle and says something like 'so what? - the theory does it's job, and we use notions like "reference" and "satisfaction" merely as 'posits' or 'theoretical constructs' that allow us to employ the theory of truth'. In Davidson's own words, "their role is theoretical, and so we know all there is to know about them when we know how they operate to characterize truth. We don't need a general concept of reference in the construction of an adequate theory."

The reason that Davidson can get away with this is that he sets up his theory of truth to abide by a particular set of criteria: whether or not someone who speaks a language L would have enough information to interpret what a speaker of that language says, based purely on the theory so provided. On this count, says Davidson, the Convention T would allow a speaker to have exactly this information. It is important, says Davidson, that by appealing to this criteria, we allow ourselves to interpret references in terms of "non-linguistic concepts". In other words, the criteria that Davidson sets up here are 'empirical': if, on the basis of the theory of truth, one can understand how it is a sentence can be true, then we don't need to explain what truth is. Similarly, if, on the basis of a theory of meaning, we can understand how words refer, then we don't need to explain what reference is.

The key for Davidson of course is that his whole project is concerned with explaining meaning by recourse to a theory of truth. In so doing, Davidson hopes to get rid of any appeal to 'intentional' elements in a theory of language (where meanings are dictated by intentions, desires, beliefs and so on), situating meaning wholly on an 'extensional' level. In effect, Davidson wants to give a theory of meaning that does not at all appeal to any concept of 'meaning'. In the paper under discussion here, Davidson's attempt to do without reference is of a piece with precisely this project to shed language of any intentional elements.

Anyway, at this point I'm just trying to make sense of the paper, so I don't have any concrete critical comments either way. Given the number of threads that run through the paper - which is anything but self-contained - it's actually pretty hard to assess without at the same time addressing Davidson's entire philosophical project. I will say that's it's an awfully clever paper, even if, at a purely intuitive level, the whole thing strikes me as a bit cold and austere. I'm not caught up with the analytic literature on Davidson, but I think the open question is whether or not Davidson's theory meets the criteria he sets out for it. Davidson says that a theory of truth will allow a speaker to understand how truth functions - and similarly with reference - but is it in fact the case? Can counter-examples be provided? Have they?

PS. What happened to the link in the OP?
PPS. This is such a bitch to read. Would rather read a division of Being and Time any day!

I guess I pretty much agree with everything he says, but on the other hand I think this discussion, and Tarski-style theories of truth, were obviated several years earlier than this paper was published by the advent of Montague Grammar. Montague showed formally precisely how the divide between the 'building block' and 'complete sentence' starting points could be navigated, by demonstrating that meaning could be built in tandem with syntactic structure according to a few simple syntactic and semantic operations.

The result is that on the one hand the 'meaning' of each word can only be given in the context of the whole sentence (so for instance, if a predicate is a functional mapping form individuals to truth values, it in some sense only 'has meaning' or is of interest insofar as it takes an individual as an argument to get a truth value), but on the other hand, each sentence only has its 'meaning' as a result of syntactically and so semantically composing the parts together (you can't get to the truth value without putting the individuals and predicates and so on together). And it's not some wishy-washy thing either, how that works is spelled out in almost annoying formal detail.

That of course allows notions like 'reference' to be given precisely the treatment that Davidson wants them to be given, and in a way, shows for a small fragment of English how this is actually done. By looking at Montague's work we can see how a proper name contributes to the truth of a sentence without a prior notion of reference, and then we look back on it and say 'what that does, that's basically what it turns out we meant by 'reference'.'

Quoting StreetlightX

PPS. This is such a bitch to read. Would rather read a division of Being and Time any day!

I agree, I really don't like the writing style of analytic philosophers during this period. It's bizarrely elliptical, and makes casual reference to a whole web of formal and technical literature while at the same time never bothering to give examples or spell anything out formally in the paper itself. It's sometimes difficult even to locate the main points they say they're going to make in the abstract, in the paper itself.

Reply to jamalrob

Does anyone have a link to a copy of this?

Just asking...

... considering my dyslexia I need to start as soon as possible.

Thanks!

Meow!

GREG

Reply to Mayor of Simpleton It's on JSTOR, but I don't know where a legal copy is. I actually can't tell from JSTOR's TOS whether it's legal to post it here.

Reply to The Great Whatever

Thanks, but since I don't want to pay $39 for this I'll have to pass.

Maybe next month?

Meow!

GREG

btw... I just love abbreviations, as in my world TOS means Thoracic Outlet Syndrome. ;)

Reply to Mayor of Simpleton If you type "Reality Without Reference PDF" into google you'll find a link to a PDF copy the book "Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation" which contains "Reality Without Reference" as a chapter (see attached image). I encountered success, but as always, please proceed at your own risk.

If this is not an appropriate thing to post here, please accept my apologies and feel free to delete.

For those it might benefit this essay, or rather the book in which it appears, Inquiries into Truth and Representation, is in Scribd. Perhaps if the entire book is read it would be easier to understand, but I've read only this essay, and am uncertain if my problem with it arises from a lack of understanding or a lack of interest. Probably both to varying degrees. I have trouble understanding, at the least, the significance of the issue, and will take my leave by noting for what it's worth that I think treating language as something distinct from the world (or us), and thereby requiring a relation to the world, may be unwise, and that language includes more than words (gestures, sounds).

Reply to Aaron R

Thanks!

I was able to download the whole book... something that will probably take me a year to get through, but hey... it gives me something to (maybe) do.

Cheers!

Meow!

GREG

Quoting The Great Whatever

I really don't like the writing style of analytic philosophers during this period. It's bizarrely elliptical, and makes casual reference to a whole web of formal and technical literature while at the same time never bothering to give examples or spell anything out formally in the paper itself. It's sometimes difficult even to locate the main points they say they're going to make in the abstract, in the paper itself.

Thanks for saying this, TGW. I've never studied Davidson nor been taught about him. So I find essays like this a near-hopeless struggle. And yet other essays I've found by him like 'A nice derangement of epitaphs' flow and are highly readable.

Could you or someone who feels they understand what he's saying summarise his argument here? I confess I'm baffled. Elsewhere, as in 'Derangement' for instance, he seems to argue for a near-Wittgensteinian position, that generalised rule-making about the way people use language is a hopeless and foolhardy task, that largely what people have to do is theorise on the fly, based on mutual understanding. What work, then, is all this intricate business about truth doing in this essay?

Davidson:Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth—a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true

I've been a creative writer most of my life, thinking a lot about the meaning of language, and I don't understand this truth-oriented notion of a 'theory of meaning' (which in itself, as he acknowledges, is a very vague notion). If someone says 'Hello you!' or 'I wish I hadn't gone out in the rain' or 'How many times do I have to ask you not to smoke in here?' or 'Socrates flies' (a bizarre example of a sentence, but one favoured by Davidson) - I can't see what 'truth' has to do with it. Communication is about many things, of which truth-telling, or at least plausibility-while-communicating, is one element. How is truth all-embracing? In what way?

I'd be glad of advice and exchange of views :)

Don't have much to add, just read the paper and checking in. I found it quite difficult.

In brief I gathered his argument was that if we have a theory of truth then we don't need any of the other back-end stuff that we normally assume is necessary. Take for example "Socrates flies". Traditionally we would break that up into "Socrates" refers to Socrates and the predicate "x flies" is true if x flies. Davidson is arguing that this whole story is irrelevant. Whether we adopt the causal theory of reference or the descriptive theory of reference or don't use a theory at all, it doesn't matter as long as all the same sentences come out true.

Quoting mcdoodle

Could you or someone who feels they understand what he's saying summarise his argument here? I confess I'm baffled. Elsewhere, as in 'Derangement' for instance, he seems to argue for a near-Wittgensteinian position, that generalised rule-making about the way people use language is a hopeless and foolhardy task, that largely what people have to do is theorise on the fly, based on mutual understanding. What work, then, is all this intricate business about truth doing in this essay?

Sure. I might go through it more thoroughly piece by piece later, but the basic idea is:

-A theory of meaning is essential to the philosophy of language
-A theory of truth is essential to the theory of meaning
-A notion of reference is essential to a theory of truth, to explain at least the function of referential expressions like proper names, demonstratives, pronouns, and 'complex singular terms' (by which I take it he means things like 'the cat we bought last week'), and the denotation of predicates (things like nouns, adjectives, prepositional phrases, and verbs), in terms of which individuals fall under their extensions (which individuals they're applicable to)

-Traditionally philosophers have tried to give an account of reference independently of linguistic function, or give an account of how reference arises in non-linguistic terms, in order to explain how this notion plays a role in language
-Others have tried to downplay the role that reference plays by just starting off by giving the truth conditions of simple sentences and building up the truth of more complex ones from those
-But neither of these options is tenable. The first doesn't work because reference only plays a role in the context of sentences as a whole, and so has no non-linguisitc characterization that can be abstracted from our whole theory of language. The second doesn't work because the smaller elements that make up simple sentences clearly have meanings of their own, and we can't just stipulate simple sentences as atomistic wholes. This is seen from the fact that we can use those elements recurseively to create simple sentences ('the cat we bought last week ate the tuna' expresses a relation between two individuals, but 'the cat we bought last week' clearly is compositionally derived from simpler expressions like 'cat' and 'week,' and if we want to understand these phrases systematically we should be able to explain how they arise from the smaller bits)
-So, we need to have a notion of reference, some way to explain the meaning of these individual bits, but at the same time there seems to be no way to do so outside of the linguistic theory as a whole

-The solution: give up on a non-linguistic characterization of reference. Insofar as there is reference, we explain it with reference to an entire linguistic theory about the role it plays in determining truth conditions. Since there are multiple ways of doing this, there are multiple ways of defining reference, according to which theory you use, and so the function of reference on your particular theory can't be described independently, but can only be seen in retrospect given how it function in that theory.

Quoting mcdoodle

I've been a creative writer most of my life, thinking a lot about the meaning of language, and I don't understand this truth-oriented notion of a 'theory of meaning' (which in itself, as he acknowledges, is a very vague notion). If someone says 'Hello you!' or 'I wish I hadn't gone out in the rain' or 'How many times do I have to ask you not to smoke in here?' or 'Socrates flies' (a bizarre example of a sentence, but one favoured by Davidson) - I can't see what 'truth' has to do with it. Communication is about many things, of which truth-telling, or at least plausibility-while-communicating, is one element. How is truth all-embracing? In what way?

That's why he says 'whatever else it embraces.' There is more to a theory of meaning than a theory of truth, but clearly the latter is an essential part of it. In the 70's philosophers were generally sensitive to the fact that more than this was needed. But the traditional focus has always been on truth conditions.

Thanks TGW

I recommend reading the SEP entry on Davidson in conjunction with this paper, otherwise it can be a bit tricky to understand what's going on.

Well. I struggled with this, just disagreeing with everything from go to whoa. I've got my own ideas on a theory of meaning (don't stress I'll try not to push that barrow too much here) and this was hard for me.

I disagreed/disliked:

- His characterisation of reference (for me reference is mental)
- What seemed a circular theory (Tarski says truth is what is meant by this, Davidson says meaning is what is true by that)
- His writing style, assuming specialised knowledge
- That for Davidson meaning appears not to be an entity (echoing Wittgenstein, Chomsky et al.) seemingly flying in the face of the way we speak
- Apparent lack of explanation for meaning of expressions such as 'hello!' or for fiction and lies.
- Apparent lack of explanation for a link between meaning and natural meaning i.e. a low pressure system in the east means three days rain at least.

Simply put this just didn't seem to have much explanatory power. Dislike. 1 star.

Quoting The Great Whatever

That's why he says 'whatever else it embraces.' There is more to a theory of meaning than a theory of truth, but clearly the latter is an essential part of it. In the 70's philosophers were generally sensitive to the fact that more than this was needed. But the traditional focus has always been on truth conditions.

To me 'Truth and meaning' is a better-written essay. Certainly I got to grips with it more easily. There are pdfs scattered all over the Web, I found mine here: http://www.oswego.edu/~delancey/313_DIR/TM.pdf. That essay ends:

Davidson:Since I think there is no alternative, I have taken an optimistic and programmatic view of the possibilities for a formal characterization of a truth predicate for a natural language. But it must be allowed that a staggering list of difficulties and conundrums remains.To name a few: we do not know the logical form of counterfactual or subjunctive sentences, nor of sentences about probabilities and about causal relations; we have no good idea what the logical role of adverbs is, nor the role of attributive adjectives; we have no theory for mass terms like "fire," "water," and"snow," nor for sentences about belief, perception, and intention, nor for verbs of action that imply purpose. And finally, there are all the sentences that seem not to have truth values at all: the imperatives, optatives, interrogatives, and a host more. A comprehensive theory of meaning for a natural language must cope successfully with each of these problems.

This is indeed a staggering list. For me it means the exceptions are greater in number than the matters covered by the theory. I hope this isn't too much of a diversion from the problem of reference to say, doesn't this list of exceptions imply there's something wanting in the overall theory?

Yeah you're right @mcdoodle the theory is VERY wanting. Minimal explanatory power. Does it have many adherents? Seems hugely problematic.

Reply to mcdoodle I think it highlights the fundamental problem in trying to find a formal theory to comprehensively explain a natural language.

I have been slowly working my way through this rather dense paper. This is not the style of philosophy I am used to reading, and I agree with Streetlight's comment about Being and Time being easier (and more fun) to read, but I think it is a somewhat interesting exercise, anyway. These are the main points I have found so far:
• a theory of meaning cannot succeed without elucidating reference and making it central
• there are good reasons to believe that reference cannot be explained or analysed in more primitive terms
• A Tarskian style theory of truth can help to resolve this apparent dilemma
• Central among the problems involved in a theory of meaning is the task of explaining language and communication by appeal to simpler, or at least different concepts
• It is natural to believe this is possible because linguistic phenomena are obviously supervenient on non-linguistic phenomena
• It is accepted that a theory of truth need not fully analyse the “pre-analytic” understanding of truth
• But it seems to be a catastrophic failure that it cannot explain or analyse the concept of reference

The questions that arise for me so far are:

• What could be the non-linguistic "simpler, or at least different" concepts?

• Referring to the second last point above: How could the pre-analytic be analysed, anyway?

• If it is OK for truth not to be fully analyzed then why not the same for reference?

Davidson will apparently go on to say why, contrary to the idea that we cannot live without reference, we should live without it. When I find the time I will continue with this to find out.

Reply to mcdoodle In short, no. Most of the things he mentions are areas for future research using the same sort of theory, which have been studied extensively by truth-conditional semanticists. It's work to be done in the program, not things that fall outside the scope of the program (and that work has been more or less underway for decades with significant progress).

As for the things that aren't truth-conditional, he's not offering a full account of meaning, but of the truth predicate. There's nothing stopping this account from being embedded in a larger one.

Reply to The Great Whatever
But that's the goal, isn't? A full account of meaning. I can't conceive of how how a theory of meaning for truth-conditionals can fit into such an account either. Indeed I'm certain it can't.
A theory of meaning that seems applicable for all meaningful expressions is much more desirable, and I think accounts of small portions of meaningful expressions do a disservice, and further most likely wrong. We're looking for necessary connections between all meaning and expressions not just some.

Guys, if someone decides to upload it somewhere I swear I won't tell. I've been out of school for a while and don't have access to the dungeon of papers under the ivory tower of knowledge anymore.

Honestly, as far as philosophy goes, I think the hope of being able to sell your papers for cash should have been quashed since philosophy began as an art practiced by humans. No one has made money selling philosophy papers like people sell music on iTunes. And also, I am personally against intellectual property as a concept beyond acknowledgement of the author. So, can we please have a policy on this, and hopefully it is this: all philosophy should be widely shared and accessible, except for Ayn Rand's books, which should be priced at $85,000 a page with 5% of the US military budget used to crackdown on anyone pirating Ayn Rand books.

Proposition: Davidson is not the same person as Ayn Rand.
Conclusion: Davidson should be widely shared and accessible.

Quoting invizzy

But that's the goal, isn't? A full account of meaning.

Yes, but that's not the point of the paper. It's to work on one specific aspect of a theory of meaning.

Quoting invizzy

I think accounts of small portions of meaningful expressions do a disservice, and further most likely wrong. We're looking for necessary connections between all meaning and expressions not just some.

Some pieces of language are truth-conditional, and some aren't. Clearly they aren't going to be subject to the same sort of analysis. Though at a higher level, in speech act theory, they can come together in seeing truth-conditionality being associated with certain sorts of speech acts, like assertion.

A word on what I like about the whole Davidsonian approach to language, although it's not specific to this paper as such (hopefully it might throw some light on it for others!): I think Davidson is on to something important in terms of his attempt to impart a certain immanence to language. I don't imagine that 'immanence' is a term Davidson himself would use, but I think it gets at what's (partially) at stake in his work: the idea of shedding the representational function of language so that language no longer simply 'represents' things 'out there' in the world, but rather - as far as meaning and reference goes - works according to its own terms. Language, as seen through the Davidsonian lens, 'works' (that is, is able to be understood by language users) without the need for "direct contact" with the world, as Davidson puts it. I think this is generally the right way to go about thinking things.

Elsewhere and in a different context, he actually makes this goal quite explicit: "Beliefs are true or false but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking that there are representations that engenders intimations of relativism" ('On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme').

I still feel uneasy about the manner by which he goes about achieving this aim - via a truth-centric semantics - but I'm not well versed enough at this point to give that unease articulation.

Quoting The Great Whatever

Clearly they aren't going to be subject to the same sort of analysis.

Why not though? That's my point. A theory of gravity attempts to explain gravity for all things, for example. Partial theories are dubious theories if not outright bad ones.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with 'partial theories', and the onus is on you to show that language functions univocally if you want to make the rather far-fetched claim that 'partial theories are dubious if not outright bad ones'.

Reply to invizzy All complete theories have partial theories embedded in them. It has to be that way if you think the phenomena are at all diverse.

Reply to StreetlightX Semanticists don't spend quite so much time on these issues as philosophers of language do, but to the extent that they do, they're generally interested in 'bridging theories' about how theories of meaning ultimately 'cash out' in the vocabulary of other disciplines. Unsurprisingly, there is a broad 'externalist' and 'internalist' camp, one of which thinks that propositions expressed in language literally have external objects as their constituents (so if you make a semantic model, your 'domain of individuals' will literally be real things), and the latter of which thinks that meanings have to be cashed out in representational or psychological terms. I think that formal semantics of this sort offers the hope of a radically deflationary view on the matter, by which language is concerned with its own internal logic without needing to 'hook up' with anything else, whether they be representations or real-world objects. Maybe that's a kind of 'immanence.' But I think there's also hope that a better understanding of semantics can show 'metaphysical' theories of meaning to be internally incoherent (and so much of metaphysics incoherent with it -- not by stipulation as with the old positivists, but as a matter of empirical discovery).

Quoting StreetlightX

I don't imagine that 'immanence' is a term Davidson himself would use, but I think it gets at what's (partially) at stake in his work: the idea of shedding the representational function of language so that language no longer simply 'represents' things 'out there' in the world, but rather - as far as meaning and reference goes - works according to its own terms. Language, as seen through the Davidsonian lens, 'works' (that is, is able to be understood by language users) without the need for "direct contact" with the world, as Davidson puts it. I think this is generally the right way to go about thinking things.

Elsewhere and in a different context, he actually makes this goal quite explicit: "Beliefs are true or false but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking that there are representations that engenders intimations of relativism" ('On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme').

For me, language, taken as a whole does not represent anything; rather it presents a domain of things out there in the world. Sayings represent things not all of which are themselves merely other sayings. Within the world presented to us by language, only a very small part of what is presented consists of linguistic objects.

I think the whole notion of "direct contact" between the world and language is metaphysical and fallacious, based on a kind of mystical reification of linguistic function. Words refer to things and reference is a logical function, like truth, that is just obvious to us, but which cannot be analyzed in terms of any more primitive function.

I agree that "it is good to be rid of representations" if 'representation' is taken in the sense of a representative theory of perception; that we see representations and not things themselves and that our sayings represent those representations ( perceptions) of the things and are thus representations of representations.

The problem with this kind of theory is that in its terms what is represented and so what is referred to are forever out of our reach, making the very idea of representation and reference incoherent or mystical/magical. So, for me the T-schema is a formulation of merely logical reference, correspondence and thus truth, and the logic of reference, correspondence and truth is entirely immanent to language and ineluctably primordial and thus unanalyzable.

Quoting StreetlightX

I still feel uneasy about the manner by which he goes about achieving this aim - via a truth-centric semantics - but I'm not well versed enough at this point to give that unease articulation.

I think truth is one part of a primordial quadruple: actuality, reference, correspondence, truth. We perceive actuality, our sayings refer to our interpretations of it, logically they may either correspond or not correspond to it, and thus be either true or false. I don't believe any part of the primordial puzzle can be discarded, without bringing about a devolution into incoherence.

So, I agree with Heidegger that we can give a correspondence account of everyday truth ( as distinct from aletheia) , and that that is the only account that makes any sense, but that account must simply be pragmatically accepted, since no correspondence theory is possible.

Quoting The Great Whatever

In short, no. Most of the things he mentions are areas for future research using the same sort of theory, which have been studied extensively by truth-conditional semanticists. It's work to be done in the program, not things that fall outside the scope of the program (and that work has been more or less underway for decades with significant progress).

As for the things that aren't truth-conditional, he's not offering a full account of meaning, but of the truth predicate. There's nothing stopping this account from being embedded in a larger one.

I don't understand. The Davidsonian theory is about assertions/propositions, right?

Are truth-conditional propositions a significant part of the everyday use of language? I don't think they are but I'm game to be dissuaded.

I don't understand how 'the same sort of theory' extends beyond assertions to language that is not assertion-like. If a speaker is not making truth-conditional remarks, in what way have truth-conditions anything to do with it?

If we were to listen in to tapes of people talking to each other on buses, in bars and on park benches, would we mostly be able to analyse their talk in a Davidsonian way?

Pardon me if my questions are naive: I find this whole area of thought a stumbling block. I'm busy learning logic as we speak, but the relation between logic and natural language is a different question altogether.

Quoting mcdoodle

Are truth-conditional propositions a significant part of the everyday use of language? I don't think they are but I'm game to be dissuaded.

???

Yes, of course they are, they're a huge part. I'm not sure why you would think otherwise?

Quoting mcdoodle

I don't understand how 'the same sort of theory' extends beyond assertions to language that is not assertion-like. If a speaker is not making truth-conditional remarks, in what way have truth-conditions anything to do with it?

Because even things without truth conditions share a compositional semantics with things that do, like commands and questions. And even things that don't even share that much are embraced by a common speech act theory, of which assertion is only one part.

Me:Are truth-conditional propositions a significant part of the everyday use of language? I don't think they are but I'm game to be dissuaded.

Quoting The Great Whatever

???

Yes, of course they are, they're a huge part. I'm not sure why you would think otherwise?

Well, as I said, I've been a fiction writer most of my life, listening to then constructing dialogue. I feel speakers and hearers agree on the need for plausibility, much of the time, but truth-conditions rarely obtain. Truth-to-the-world-around-us is often in the background of talk, in my understanding, but is rarely a foreground matter. The sorts of condescending sentences that philosophers often quote are usually what one would say to a child, or to a foreigner learning the language. In life the redness of the door or the greenness of the grass are just assumed, while my wife tells me about her journey, with the little exaggerations that I know to disregard, because the essence of our talk is emotional and active. How shall I react? How shall I speak in reply? What does she want of me? How shall we move on? Whose wants will be satisfied, who will compromise?

Drama is what language is a part of. In my experience truth-telling or speaking with truth conditions has little role in drama. We make moves, tell each other stories, play games with each other, follow rituals then subvert them. I don't mean that we don't tell the truth sometimes, but that truth-telling isn't important. Is there empirical evidence that it is? Or is it just what people of a philosophical bent assume?

In institutional settings like work or study or the dole office or friendship settings like the bar or the bus, in all of them I don't see that people are bothered about truth-conditions except very occasionally. We're all dealing with accepted/received wisdom, the conventions of friends/work, the boundaries of the acceptable, what we want and what they want.

Well, that's how I see it. perhaps I seem very jaundiced or something! Anyway, I must to bed. I found this interesting Scott Soames anti-Davidson paper if anyone's interested, legit as it's on Soames's own institutional website: http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/678/docs/Selected_Publication/Truth_and_Meaning.pdf

Quoting mcdoodle

but that truth-telling isn't important. Is there empirical evidence that it is?

Why not go a day without it, or assuming anyone does, and see how far you get?

Also, it does no good to claim that truth conditional things are often prone to exaggeration, lie, custom, and so on. Insofar as these deviate from truth-telling, their effect only makes sense against the assumption that one isn't lying (in fact, it seems a convention where lying is the default doesn't make sense, since it would become the new truth). Everything you talk about is truth-conditional in the relevant sense, and that includes fictional statements as well, though of course they have a funny sort of internal logic.

One also wonders what to make of everything you just said to me...or whether in your daily routines, you're never struck by the desire or need to tell anybody anything, or ask anybody to tell you anything. Very odd perspective.

Quoting The Great Whatever

All complete theories have partial theories embedded in them. It has to be that way if you think the phenomena are at all diverse.

I'm not sure this is true. To be honest I'm not sure we can even make sense of a 'partial theory'. Theories that don't explain things (and obviously 'partial' ones don't) are plainly dreadful theories. Can you give me an example of a successful partial theory?

Reply to invizzy Evolution is a successful partial theory. It explains the development of biological organisms but not astronomical bodies.

Reply to Michael Mmm, I don't think it is ABOUT astronomical bodies though.

Reply to invizzy And Davidson theory on truth isn't about other elements of language.

Reply to Michael It is about meaning isn't it?

So a theory of evolutionary biology is actually pretty complete when it comes to astronomical bodies. I assume that a necessary condition for biological evolution would be that the entity is biological, that is part of the theory. Planets are not and the theory thus explains why they don't biologically evolve. A theory of meaning then needs to explain meaning fully, but it is no problem if some things don't HAVE meaning, just like it is no problem if some things don't evolve. But we need a rule for why.
A partial theory of why tigers evolve would also need to explain why the theory was specific to tigers or else it would be just rubbish.

Reply to invizzy Davidson's paper is about a theory of truth, which forms part of a theory of meaning. He accepts that there is more to a theory of meaning than a theory of truth, but also claims rightly that a theory of truth must form a large part of it.

Reply to The Great Whatever

What is the reasoning that you take to support a claim that a theory of truth must form part of a theory of meaning, rather than that a theory of meaning must form part of a theory of truth?

Reply to mcdoodle

For me, it depends on what you mean by 'truth'. Taking it in the strictly propositional sense I agree with you. Mostly, speakers are not so much concerned with asserting propositions, in the kind of formulated truth-functional sense. But on the other hand I think there is always a background understanding that what is said should be true, in the sense that of revealing and dealing with the actual, or at least the speaker's interpretation of what she takes to be actual.

It is always simply taken for granted that the things we say refer to commonly agreed upon things, and this is true as much of speech acts such as commanding, soliciting, imploring, reassuring, intimidating, deceiving, and so on.

Truth is revealing, and falsity is concealing. Truth and falsity are of one logical piece that constitutes meaning. I don't think it makes sense to say that a theory of truth is part of a theory of meaning or vice versa; to say this would be to assume that truth and meaning can be atomistically disconnected, or treated in a kind of mereological way as whole and part.

Reply to John Because meaning is a broader phenomenon than truth. Even linguistic meaning is. Thus 'hello' is not truth-conditional, but it is linguistically meaningful. There may be notions of truth that transcend language, like having true beliefs, but it seems like the truth predicate these theorists are after are usually explicitly about linguistic truth. And clearly linguistic truth is only a part, though a major part, of linguistic meaning.

Reply to The Great Whatever

This sounds reasonable at first glance; but I am not convinced 'hello' has a linguistic meaning.

In any case any statement of linguistic meaning is a truth conditional statement.

Also. I would contend that any wider context of meaning, beyond the merely propositional, is also a wider context of truth, beyond the propositional.

This sounds reasonable at first glance; but I am not convinced 'hello' has a linguistic meaning.

Well, if you consider things like programming languages to be modeled based on human language (which they are), then there is the equivalent of "hello" in programming languages, which are things like code for signals waiting to receive data. This is similar to humans when they say "hello", which is to signify that they would like to exchange data of some sort, be it actual conversation, or even acknowledgement of the other person as being a part of a societal context.

Quoting John

This sounds reasonable at first glance; but I am not convinced 'hello' has a linguistic meaning.

That doesn't strike me as a plausible position.

That you think that is nice to know; to know [i]why[/I] you think that would be even nicer.

In any case, whether it does or does not have a linguistic (which I take to mean 'concrete') meaning is not critical to my response anyway.

Reply to John I don't understand why I'm obligated to provide a reason when you haven't, especially since your view is clearly at first blush the more ridiculous one.

Quoting John

linguistic (which I take to mean 'concrete')

I don't know why you would take 'linguistic' to mean 'concrete.' Those words don't even mean close to the same thing.

If to be linguistically meaningful is not necessarily to refer to something concrete, then what does it consist in?

Are you merely saying that any mark or sound should be counted as linguistically meaningful provided it produces a more or less predictable response?

Reply to John The answer to what linguistic meaning is can only be provided in the context of an entire theory of semantics. But I would say that clearly, 'linguistic' means 'having to do with language,' not 'concrete.'

Quoting The Great Whatever

But I would say that clearly, 'linguistic' means 'having to do with language,' not 'concrete.'

Then it must be a mere tautology that any example of language has a linguistic meaning.

For me, if a sentence counts as having a linguistic meaning then the meaning can be given in concrete terms, which means it can be translated.

If a sentence is linguistically meaningless, then its meaning cannot be given in concrete terms; that is it is non-sense, and cannot be translated. This seems obvious because to translate a sentence is to render it in different words without changing the sense. If a sentence is non-sense, however....you get the point, no?

Now, you said that 'hello' has a linguistic meaning. I actually don't think words have meanings at all; but they do have linguistic references if they refer to concrete things. Words like 'and' 'the' and so on do not have linguistic reference but do have a logical sense, and a linguistic function. 'Hello' has a kind of logical sense and a linguistic function, insofar as it is a greeting, but I would not count that as having a linguistic meaning.

The problem is, all these terms 'linguistic', 'meaning' 'concrete' 'sense' and so on can obviously themselves be interpreted in different ways, so we can simply be talking past one another.

Quoting John

For me, if a sentence counts as having a linguistic meaning then the meaning can be given in concrete terms, which means it can be translated.

But 'hello' obviously can be translated, and is in almost any pedagogical language text.

Quoting John

I actually don't think words have meanings at all

That doesn't seem plausible, especially given your contention about translation: we can perfectly well translate many single words, not just sentences.

My initial excitement soon dissipated as I began reading the essay. I've read it twice and I still haven't been able to wrap my head around it. At least I'm not the only one.

Thanks to those of you who tried to explicate it in this discussion. Breaking it down into key points was helpful.

Reply to The Great Whatever Ok, 'hello' can be translated, or at least has it's equivalent functors in other languages or in English. But it does not refer to anything specific.

I don't think words can be considered to be the units of linguistic meaning, because a word by itself has no particular context.

For me 'translation' best refers to finding equivalent contexts and not merely words. I think a sentence is a minimal context.

Quoting John

Ok, 'hello' can be translated, or at least has it's equivalent functors in other languages or in English. But it does not refer to anything specific.

That seems to support the thesis that meaning does not require reference, but only function.

On the other hand, my old buggy buddy here can only be understood, it seems to me, as referring to a leaf. A one word language of camouflage? Or perhaps one could better say that reference does not require language either?

I certainly agree that meaning as such does not require reference, but I have been contending that linguistic meaning can only be understood in terms of reference, and also that both meaning and truth are broader than language, language that is considered as mere linguistics.

I don't know whether it is right to say that your little green buddy refers to a leaf; resembles a leaf certainly.

But again, all these terms we are trying to analyze and understand are themselves subject to different interpretations.

Quoting unenlightened

That seems to support the thesis that meaning does not require reference, but only function.

It seems to [i]only[/I] support the thesis that meaning does not require reference, but only function [I]in some cases[/I].

Quoting unenlightened

On the other hand, my old buggy buddy here can only be understood, it seems to me, as referring to a leaf. A one word language of camouflage? Or perhaps one could better say that reference does not require language either?

Can you explain why? I don't know the name of that species, but I'm guessing it's common name includes the word "leaf". But even if so, it still wouldn't refer to a leaf; it'd refer to a species of insect. Though it would relate to a leaf, and it's common name would be properly understood in relation to a leaf.

Quoting John

I don't think words can be considered to be the units of linguistic meaning, because a word by itself has no particular context.

But the meaning of the individual word can equally be seen as a template for what it contributes given some context: clearly speakers have this sort of knowledge of the meanings of individual words, or else dictionaries would be literally incomprehensible, let alone writeable.

Quick question: wouldn't "Hello!" be treated as a sentence in linguistics?

Reply to jamalrob Yes. It's a minor (word) sentence and sentence word.

Reply to jamalrob
Reply to Michael
Yes, sentences are just strings of words starting with capital letters and ending in some form of punctuation, usually a full stop. Clauses are more easily identifiable and much more effective units for studying meaning than sentences I would say. But it depends on the level, type and subject of analysis.

Quoting John

I don't think words can be considered to be the units of linguistic meaning, because a word by itself has no particular context.

Linguistic meaning often can't be analysed in terms of words, but that's not to say a word like "Hello!" doesn't have linguistic meaning. It does. A case where you can't analyse linguistic meaning at the level of a word would be, for example, a phrasal verb. You can't analyze the meaning of "I gave in" by analyzing the meaning of each word in turn for obvious reasons. The appropriate semantic units are "I" + "gave in". In the case of a morpheme, the semantic unit can be less than a word, and in the case of a proverb it can be a whole sentence, and so on. Anyhow, this is all semantics. Context of utterance comes into play later when you consider pragmatics. They're two different levels of analysis.

Or maybe I'm being too linguisticky. Well, that's the way I look at it anyhow.

Quoting Baden

Linguistic meaning often can't be analysed in terms of words, but that's not to say a word like "Hello!" doesn't have linguistic meaning. It does. A case where you can't analyse linguistic meaning at the level of a word would be, for example, a phrasal verb. You can't analyze the meaning of "I gave in" by analyzing the meaning of each word in turn for obvious reasons. The appropriate semantic units are "I" + "gave in". In the case of a morpheme, the semantic unit can be less than a word, and in the case of a proverb it can be a whole sentence, and so on. Anyhow, this is all semantics. Context of utterance comes into play later when you consider pragmatics. They're two different levels of analysis.

Thanks, Baden, I was going to respond with something like, "Yes, but isn't what you say here just standard linguistics?", but then I turned the page and read your next comment.

The problem I have is that the definition of 'linguistic meaning' is not clear to me, and no one has provided a clear definition. And I haven't studied linguistics.

The way I was trying to think it through was that if a sentence has a linguistic meaning then it can be analyzed precisely in the way you suggest with "I gave in". .We all know "gave in" means 'surrendered' or 'submitted' or 'stopped trying' and so on. So there is no suggestion that linguistically meaningful (in the way I have been trying to consider it) sentences necessarily have precise meanings, but they seem to partake in a range of 'family meanings'.

Reply to Michael has provided an example of the standard understanding where "Hello" is a sentence. It may be fair to consider it a sentence but I would dispute that it has anything like a range of such meanings.

It seems that 'Hello' can be anything from a more or less meaningless sound we routinely utter just to begin a conversation on the phone, to "I greet you", " How are you", "I am pleased to see you" "I am not pleased to see you", "Are you there?" , " Is anybody there", "I didn't foresee that", " I am pleased to see that", "Look at that!", and so on. All these different meanings of "hello" are not linguistically determined, that is they are not merely matters of language, but are determined by varying contexts and dispositions. (Of course, I am not saying that all those uses are not linguistically conventional).

The same may be said to be true of most sentences, at least to some degree, but a sentence like "I fell out of the boat" which could be an expression of fun or deadly danger depending on the context still has a fairly narrowly determinate linguistic meaning, even in the 'abstract', so to speak.

I'm not trying to be argumentative about this, 'digging my heels in'; I'm just trying to make sense of the notion of linguistic meaning. I mean, if all sentences, or whatever are considered to be the 'units' of meaning in a language are counted as having their meaning sufficiently determined linguistically, then I would seem to be pointlessly arguing against a trivial true tautology.

Quoting The Great Whatever

But the meaning of the individual word can equally be seen as a template for what it contributes given some context: clearly speakers have this sort of knowledge of the meanings of individual words, or else dictionaries would be literally incomprehensible, let alone writeable.

I still think individual words are better thought of as having definitions, references or functions than they are thought of as having meanings, A word does not have a meaning in the way that a sentence does. I acknowledge that 'meaning' can itself be defined in more than one way, but i think it is helpful to make a distinction between 'definition' and 'meaning'.

Maybe it could be said that definitions are sufficiently determined linguistically, whereas meanings are determined by wider extra-linguistic contexts.

Quoting John

A word does not have a meaning in the way that a sentence does.

And how does this work with polysynthetic languages?

Reply to Michael

Why could the example 'word' "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq " not equally be called a 'sentence without any gaps', and the 'morphemes' that make it up 'words'?

Quoting John

Why could the example 'word' "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq " not equally be called a 'sentence without any gaps', and the 'morphemes' that make it up 'words'?

They can be called whatever you like. But why depart from established linguistic terminology? It seems to me that if you want to call that word "a sentence without any gaps" and its morphemes "words" then you're inventing a new linguistic terminology to fit your theory that words don't have meanings (on their own), which makes your theory rather vacuous (as you're (re-)defining a word as something which doesn't have meaning (on its own)).

And furthermore, such "sentences without any gaps" are present in English, too. They're the word-sentences/sentence-words I've already referenced.

Quoting The Great Whatever

Why not go a day without it [truth-telling], or assuming anyone does, and see how far you get?

Also, it does no good to claim that truth conditional things are often prone to exaggeration, lie, custom, and so on. Insofar as these deviate from truth-telling, their effect only makes sense against the assumption that one isn't lying (in fact, it seems a convention where lying is the default doesn't make sense, since it would become the new truth). Everything you talk about is truth-conditional in the relevant sense, and that includes fictional statements as well, though of course they have a funny sort of internal logic.

One also wonders what to make of everything you just said to me...or whether in your daily routines, you're never struck by the desire or need to tell anybody anything, or ask anybody to tell you anything. Very odd perspective.

Sorry for slow response, I'm really busy on a course.

This is not a sphere I'm well-read in, but there certainly is a big thread of modern-day semantics on my personal to-read list - Sellars, Horwich and Brandom - who are arguing, as I understand it, against a truth-theoretic semantics, and for one form or another of what's known as 'inferential' or 'conceptual role semantics'.

Your reply moves very quickly to speaking about 'everything' and 'never'. I'm perfectly clear that we're often trying to exchange honestly something-or-other (it might be knowledge, ways of understanding), and I didn't mean to claim otherwise. That's quite different from claiming it's a general rule and that it's about 'truth'.

Part of what I'm busy studying is the implications of truth-theoretic work - the various forms of logic - so it's not that I'm dismissive of that side of things, I'm keen to learn it, but I'm also keen to understand what if anything underpins it. There is some sort of rule-following in making and then in interpreting assertions or propositions, and it minimally requires plausibility. But what is there beyond that, and a lot of philosophers insisting that well, it just is so? 'Truth matters'?

Quoting Michael

They can be called whatever you like. But why depart from established linguistic terminology? It seems to me that if you want to call that word "a sentence without any gaps" and its morphemes "words" then you're inventing a new terminology to fit your theory that words don't have meanings (on their own), which makes your theory rather vacuous.

And furthermore, such "sentences without any gaps" are present in English, too. They're the word-sentences/sentence-words I've already referenced.

Yes, but the point was: what is the salient distinguishing characteristic between that 'sentence-without-any-gaps-word' and a so-called 'normal' sentence apart from the former's lack of gaps?

And what are the salient differences between the so-called 'morphemes' that make up that 'word' and the so-called normal words that we understand to make up our so-called sentences?

Unless you can say what the salient points of distinction are, then I think your example carries no weight.

Reply to John

I don't understand this. You said that words don't have meanings on their own. I provided an example of a word that has meaning on its own. Your response is to redefine linguistic terminology such that the example I provided isn't a word. Your redefined linguistic terminology is both unjustified and strips any significance from your claim.

The fact remains that words can, and do, have meanings on their own, as the example shows.

Reply to Michael

All I am asking you to do is tell me on the basis of what criteria such 'words' as the exampled 'word-sentences' qualify as words rather than as sentences. Is it merely because there are no gaps between the letters or is there some other criterion?

In that article you cited, it says that the individual morphemes which make up the 'word-sentence' have "independent meaning" by which I understand that they have definitions, just as what we call 'words' do.

I have already acknowledged that it can be said that words have meaning "on their own", but that they do not (in general at least) have meanings in the way that sentences do. That is why I think it is better to say that words have definitions, references or functions rather than meanings. The exampled 'word-sentence' has meaning in the kind of way English sentences usually do, and its constituent morphemes have 'meaning' in the kind of way our words usually do, i.e. they have definitions, references and/or functions. So I cannot really see the point of your objection at all. If I am missing something you need to point out what it is; I would be glad of that.

If you are just 'arguing from convention' and objecting to what you see as my contravention of it, then I don't think we will have a very fruitful discussion. I am more interested in questioning conventions in order to understand the underlying logics.

[quote=John]All I am asking you to do is tell me on the basis of what criteria such 'words' as the exampled 'word-sentences' qualify as words rather than as sentences. Is it merely because there are no gaps between the letters or is there some other criterion?[/quote]

You could ask the same thing about the word "unbreakable". Why is it a word and not a gap-free sentence? The sort of things that make "unbreakable" a word are the same sort of things that make "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" a word.

In that article you cited, it says that the individual morphemes which make up the 'word-sentence' have "independent meaning" by which I understand that they have definitions, just as what we call 'words' do.

And the same is true of the morphemes "un", "break", and "able". But that doesn't mean that they're not morphemes or that unbreakable is not a word.

I have already acknowledged that it can be said that words have meaning "on their own", but that they do not (in general at least) have meanings in the way that sentences do.

But they do. The Yupik word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" has meaning in the same way that the English sentence "He had not yet said again that he was going to hunt reindeer" has.

Quoting Michael

You could ask the same thing about the word "unbreakable". Why is it a word and not a gap-free sentence? The sort of things that make "unbreakable" a word are the same sort of things that make tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq a word

Firstly, "unbreakable" does not convey anything other than a definition, so it could not count as a sentence. On the other hand, according to your argument, 'Hehadnotyetsaidagainthathewasgoingtohuntreindeer' could count as a word. But what kind of word is it? Is it a noun, adjective, proposition, pronoun or what? What is its definition?

Quoting Michael

And the same is true of the morphemes "un", "break", and "able". But that doesn't mean that they're not morphemes or that unbreakable is not a word

'Un' is a morpheme, but 'break' and 'able' are not; they are words. Of course 'unbreakable' is a word: it is a composite word and an adjective.

Quoting Michael

But they do. The Yupik word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" has meaning in the same way that the English sentence "He had not yet said again that he was going to hunt reindeer" has.

You still haven't given any good reason why it should be considered to be a word; you have merely stipulated it as such.

[quote=John]'Un' is a morpheme, but 'break' and 'able' are not; they are words.[/quote]

They're morphemes as well as words. And in Yupik, "ssur", "qatar", "ni", "ksaite", "ngqiggte", and "uq" are morphemes with "tuntu" both morpheme and word.

You still haven't given any good reason why it should be considered to be a word; you have merely stipulated it as such.

I don't need to give a good reason. It's simply a fact about linguistic terminology. You can take it up with the people who employ such terminology (i.e. linguists) if you like. So it seems to me that the burden is on you to provide reasons why it shouldn't be considered a word.

Of course 'unbreakable' is a word

And of course "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a word.

On your argument, 'Hehadnotyetsaidagainthathewasgoingtohuntreindeer' could count as a word. But what kind of word is it? Is it a noun, adjective, proposition, pronoun or what?

Anything could be a word, so I don't understand the significance of the question.

Quoting Michael

They're morphemes as well as words. And in Yupik, "ssur", "qatar", "ni", "ksaite", "ngqiggte", and "uq" are morphemes with "tuntu" both morpheme and word.

This is from Wikipedia: "A morpheme is not identical to a word, and the principal difference between the two is that a morpheme may or may not stand alone, whereas a word, by definition, is freestanding."

On that definition 'break' could be considered a morpheme, as well as a word, but then , so what? Why not for simplicity's sake just say it is a non-complex word. And what bearing does all this have on the question of whether it makes sense to count any string of words as a word anyway. You still haven't said why we should grant 'wordhood' to anything that is not identifiable as a conventional word-type.

Quoting Michael

I don't need to give a good reason. It's simply a fact about linguistic terminology. You can take it up with the people who employ such terminology (i,e. linguists) if you like. So it seems to me that the burden is on you to provide reasons why it shouldn't be considered a word.

So, you are merely arguing from conventional authority then? If the linguists say that it should count as a word, then it counts as a word? You think it makes perfect sense to say that any string of words can also be counted as a word? Even if it cannot be identified as any type of word: as a noun, verb, adjective, etc.? Or given any definition? Do you believe that all linguists would say that? That there is not, or could not be, any controversy about such claims within the linguistic community?

[quote=John]This is from Wikipedia: "A morpheme is not identical to a word, and the principal difference between the two is that a morpheme may or may not stand alone, whereas a word, by definition, is freestanding."[/quote]

Also from Wikipedia: "To illustrate the relationship between words and morphemes, the English term "rice" is a single word consisting of only one morpheme (rice). This word has a 1:1 morpheme per word ratio. In contrast, "handshakes", is a single word consisting of three morphemes (hand, shake, -s). This word has a 3:1 morpheme per word ratio."

Furthermore, that a word is free-standing refutes your claim that "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a string of words without any spaces as "except for the morpheme tuntu "reindeer", none of the other morphemes can appear in isolation".

So, you are merely arguing from conventional authority then? If the linguists say that it should count as a word, then it counts as a word?

In lieu of any convincing counter-claims, yes. Just as I would argue from conventional scientific authority on scientific matters in lieu of any convincing counter-claims. So are you going to offer one?

You think it makes perfect sense to say that any string of words can also be counted as a word?

Not any string of words, but some. For example, the word "handshake" is a combination of the words (and morphemes) "hand" and "shake". And the word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a combination of the morphemes "tuntu" (also a word), "ssur", "qatar", "ni", "ksaite", "ngqiggte", and "uq", What's so hard to understand about this?

Even if it cannot be identified as any type of word: noun, verb, adjective, etc.? Or given any definition?

I never said this. The word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" can be given a definition, and probably can be identified as a noun or verb or adjective (or, perhaps, such distinctions aren't made or aren't as clear-cut in the Yupik language).

Quoting Michael

Also from Wikipedia: "To illustrate the relationship between words and morphemes, the English term "rice" is a single word consisting of only one morpheme (rice). This word has a 1:1 morpheme per word ratio. In contrast, "handshakes", is a single word consisting of three morphemes (hand, shake, -s). This word has a 3:1 morpheme per word ratio."

Furthermore, that a word is free-standing refutes your claim that "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a string of words without any spaces as "except for the morpheme tuntu "reindeer", none of the other morphemes can appear in isolation".

The English translations of these morphemes: "reindeer-hunt-future-say-negation-again-third.person.singular.indicative" can stand alone and thus be counted as words.

In any case, you are not clarifying the issue by introducing other languages as examples, since the original argument is about what kinds of English words and sentences can be said to have linguistic meaning and whether the meaning of sentences can be determined purely linguistically, that is, in terms of linguistic definitions of their components (whether words or morphemes) or is also driven by extra-liinguistic contexts.

Quoting Michael

In lieu of any convincing counter-claims, yes. Just as I would argue from conventional scientific authority on scientific matters in lieu of any convincing counter-claims. So are you going to offer one?

From the same article you cited:
"There is no generally agreed upon definition of polysynthesis. Some authors apply it to languages with high morpheme-to-word ratios, whilst others use it for languages that are highly head-marking, or those that frequently use noun incorporation. At the same time, the question of whether to call a particular language polysynthetic is complicated by the fact that morpheme and word boundaries are not always clear cut, and languages may be highly synthetic in one area but less synthetic in other areas (e.g., verbs and nouns in Southern Athabaskan languages or Inuit languages)."

Quoting Michael

Not any string of words, but some. For example, the word "handshake" is a combination of the words (and morphemes) "hand" and "shake". And the word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a combination of the morphemes "tuntu" (also a word), "ssur", "qatar", "ni", "ksaite", "ngqiggte", and "uq", What's so hard to understand about this?

It is not hard to understand, but hard to agree with. I could just as well have asked if you believed any string of words and/or morphemes could count as a word, and if not then why not?
The point for me is that many of what you are saying count only as morphemes and not as words in Yupik count as both in their English translations.

Quoting Michael

I never said this. The word "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" can be given a definition, and probably can be identified as a noun or verb or adjective (or, perhaps, such distinctions aren't made or aren't as clear-cut in the Yupik language).

OK, I ask you again if you count 'Hehadnotyetsaidagainthathewasgoingtohuntreindeer' as a valid potential English word.

What is the definition of this word/sentence (in its English translation)? And is it a noun, verb, preposition or what?

The reason I ask for these qualifications relative to the English translation is that for your argument to hold the logic must be the same in each language.

Quoting John

The English translations of these morphemes: "reindeer-hunt-future-say-negation-again-third.person.singular.indicative" can stand alone and thus be counted as words.

So? They can't in Yupik. In Yupik, "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is the word and its morphemes (excepting "tuntu") are bound.

From the same article you cited:
"There is no generally agreed upon definition of polysynthesis. Some authors apply it to languages with high morpheme-to-word ratios, whilst others use it for languages that are highly head-marking, or those that frequently use noun incorporation. At the same time, the question of whether to call a particular language polysynthetic is complicated by the fact that morpheme and word boundaries are not always clear cut, and languages may be highly synthetic in one area but less synthetic in other areas (e.g., verbs and nouns in Southern Athabaskan languages or Inuit languages)."

So? That doesn't change the fact that "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a word.

It is not hard to understand, but hard to agree with. I could just as well have asked if you believed any string of words and/or morphemes could count as a word, and if not then why not?

You might as well ask why "handshake" is a word but "footshake" isn't. It's just the way the language has developed.

The point for me is that many of what you are saying count only as morphemes and not as words in Yupik count as both in their English translations.

So? That doesn't change the fact that "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a word. You're privileging English as if it provides the "correct" distinction between morphemes and words and sentences.

OK, I ask you again if you count 'Hehadnotyetsaidagainthathewasgoingtohuntreindeer' as a valid potential English word.

Anything is a potential English word, so yes. Are you saying that there are limits to how a language can develop?

What is the definition of this word/sentence (in its English translation)? And is it a noun, verb, preposition or what?

How can I give an account of a would-be word? If and when it's ever a word it could mean anything and be a noun or a verb or a preposition or whatever. You might as well ask a man from hundreds of years ago to give an account of the word "computer".

The reason I ask for these qualifications relative to the English translation is that for your argument to hold the logic must be the same in each language.

The logic is the same. A word is a free-standing unit of language composed of one or more morphemes (which may be either free or bound). "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" is a free-standing unit of language composed of a free morpheme and 6 bound morphemes. It's a word.

And you are still yet to explain why it isn't a word.

Quoting Michael

How can I give an account of a would-be word? If and when it's ever a word it could mean anything and be a noun or a verb or a preposition or whatever. You might as well ask a man from hundreds of years ago to give an account of the word "computer".

The argument turns on the point about what constitutes a word. The usual definition is that a word must be one of a number of types, because a word must have a defined semantic or logical function.

For me if "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" counts logically and semantically as a word then it follows that its English translation must also, since they share the same logical and semantic form. If you cannot tell me what kind of word 'Hehadnotyetsaidagainthathewasgoingtohuntreindeer' is then I will continue to find your arguments to be merely pedantic and utterly unconvincing, and we will find no common ground.

In that case, rather than wasting more time talking past each other, it would be better to just agree to disagree and leave it.

Quoting John

For me if "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" counts logically and semantically as a word then it follows that its English translation must also

No it doesn't.

Reply to The Great Whatever

Why not, pray tell?

Reply to John Because languages are different.

They are not so different that translation is not possible.

Reply to John I didn't say they were.

If translation is possible then the sense must be retained, which means that the logic of the semantic units is more or less equivalent. From this it follows that if "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" semantically counts as a word then its English equivalent must also.

Obviously I am not claiming it would be a conventional word, but just that it could count as a neologism which satisfies the semantic requirements of wordhood. In other words, it would have to be a noun, verb, preposition, pronoun or whatever. To claim that it is a word and yet that it is not any type of what we would count as a word is spurious, unless you provide an argument for why such a conclusion should be accepted.

If you are not interested in engaging this argument then stop the Monty Pythonesque retorts and simply don't respond at all. In any case I won't waste any more time responding to more 'Pythonisms' :-} .

Quoting John

If translation is possible then the sense must be retained, which means that the logic of the semantic units is more or less equivalent. From this it follows that if "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" semantically counts as a word then its English equivalent must also.

Doesn't follow.

I think it's you that doesn't follow ;) .

Quoting John

For me if "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" counts logically and semantically as a word then it follows that its English translation must also, since they share the same logical and semantic form

You can translate even within English among synonyms from those of one word to those of more than one and vice versa. I "give in", mentioned before, means I "surrender". You go from (verb + preposition) to (verb). There is no requirement either within or between languages that semantic units retain the form of a word and its associated word class(es). Words are strings of letters that happen to have come together over time and in translation they can be broken up and combined in sometimes unpredictable ways. They don't have a guaranteed structural integrity. A polysynthetic language like Yupik demonstrates that. So, from a linguistic point of view, "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" does count as a word and its translation in English does count as several words. That shouldn't be a matter of dispute.

Quoting John

If translation is possible then the sense must be retained, which means that the logic of the semantic units is more or less equivalent. From this it follows that if "tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" semantically counts as a word then its English equivalent must also.

This argument would lead by reductio ad absurdum to the conclusion that if the Irish "dúinn" is counted as a word then the English "for us" must also be counted as a word because they mean the same thing.

That's a fair point, Baden, well taken, and I stand corrected. Now I am wondering what it could be that distinguishes a sentence from a word. It seems that it might be just linguistic convention after all.

But the irony is that your correction of my argument would seem to even more strongly highlight and support my original point about the different ways in which words and sentences derive their meanings; which was that the meaning of words is determined by linguistic convention; i.e. the definitions that are based on long-term linguistic practice, whereas the meaning of sentences is much more open to novelty, to the influences that come from extra-linguistic contexts.

It would seem that is why "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" counts as a word (even though it is not identifiable as any of our conventional word types): because it is always used in a linguistically defined context in that culture, whereas the English equivalent sentence is not.

Consider, for example, how we would determine the meaning of the following sentence: 'I wouldn't mind if the lights were turned off for good'. There is no way to know what that sentence means absent an extra-linguistic context.

Quoting John

the meaning of words is determined by linguistic convention; i.e. the definitions that are based on long-term linguistic practice, whereas the meaning of sentences is much more open to novelty, to the influences that come from extra-linguistic contexts.

I don't really object to that as you put it here, John.

Quoting John

It would seem that is why "Tuntussuqatarniksaitengqiggtuq" counts as a word (even though it is not identifiable as any of our conventional word types): because it is always used in a linguistically defined context in that culture, whereas the English equivalent sentence is not.

Consider, for example, how we would determine the meaning of the following sentence: 'I wouldn't mind if the lights were turned off for good'. There is no way to know what that sentence means absent an extra-linguistic context.

I think it's counted as a word just for grammatical reasons. I imagine the same type of contextual cues would be needed to fully interpret its meaning as are required in English. Ambiguous syntactical structures would seem to be a better candidate for differences in interpretative difficulty across languages. So, for example, in English a sentence like "I like her cooking" regardless of extralinguistic context has built in semantic ambiguity (which I'm sure a little imagination quickly reveals) attributable to its syntax alone. It's quite probable that this disappears in translation to many other languages.

Anyway, if I haven't addressed your point here, feel free to reiterate.