I agree, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. While it is interesting to consider the argument in the light of JTB, I don't think that the argument dep...
I think that what you are suggesting is correct, but also that it is taken into account in the structure of the argument. SO, to give an example of wh...
OK, so perhaps inadvertently you had hit on one of the possible responses. Not much point in complaining about he use of specialised language in a thr...
It's taken as true by various philosophical notions, explicitly or more often implicitly. Those notions that do so must explain how they deal with Fit...
I'm not following your line of thinking. We know that from nonO we can derive (1), and from that we reach the absurdity of knowing p while knowing we ...
@"Michael" just left some of the proof out. From p??Kp it does follow* that p?Kp; that is, if it is possible to know anything that is true, then every...
It wasn't intended as a criticism. I was simply looking to see where you were going. Here: You suggest three truth-values - "true", "false" or "cannot...
Challenges to Metaphysical Realism At the risk of taking this thread back on topic, there is an article on SEP directly addressing the titular issue. ...
In truth, I had failed to notice that the Wiki argument uses the wrong assumption. Too much faith in Wiki, I guess. SO you accept the assumption ?p (p...
Line 3. It's a conclusion, not an assumption. Hence the paradox. Yes, I had misunderstood the way the sentence was being used, because I was looking a...
Yeah, and that is why the proof is problematic. Wiki's is a poor rendering. Fitch's paradox is that if all truths are knowable then all truths are kno...
rather, I don't see where you think this fits into the Fitch argument. The premiss is ?p (p ? Kp) That's not "it's possible to know an unknown sentenc...
So what is it you think he is getting at in §126? Philosophy sets things out but doesn't explain them...? (An interesting point to begin a discussion,...
I encourage folk to read the surrounding pages. Philosophy sets out explicitly the rules, logic, grammar of the issue before us - so that it "lies ope...
The equation of philosophy with phenomenology here would be an error. It is clear from the context that he is talking about rules, meaning and logic, ...
You agree, I assume, that there is a difference between knowing the sentence "There is a teapot in orbit around Jupiter" and knowing that there is a t...
So you are going with the rejection of classical logic - you are happy to introduce statements which are neither true nor false? Are you accepting int...
I agree. @"Luke" seems to have the parsing wrong. The argument shows that if every statement is knowable, then every statement is known. The obvious c...
There are paradoxes that are not self-referential. Further, paradoxes show problems with the grammar of our expressions. If the grammar is inconsisten...
There might be a teapot in orbit around Jupiter. You know the sentence "there might be a teapot in orbit around Jupiter" You do not know if there is a...
Positing a world, independent of our perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, explains a fair bit that is otherwise concealed. Like how it is that you and ...
Might be so. But @"Wayfarer" has presented converse arguments such that those who espouse materialism are afraid less they be obliged to face the real...
But that is exactly what I have been criticising. You say that the fundamental constituents of reality are experiential, then that our experiences are...
I'm still puzzled by your idealism that is apparently the same as realism. Sure, mind constructs what we see round us. But you have agreed that it is ...
Sure. He contemplates such stuff while sitting on the chair. The chair is still a chair. These categories are not as exclusive as you seem to suppose....
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