Banno

, , I might set replying to as the assignment for this unit...

You, too. It's a good read, if you can get a hold of it.

And I am happy to oblige.

Well, as I said, we might best save that discussion for Doneallan's party - see Proper Names And Identifying Descriptions, Keith S. Donnellan, Synthes...

And you. See . You might be interested. Cheers.

But I'm just going to ask what the pre-predicative is, and of course it can't be said, so that goes nowhere. At least in part it's the doing; but it s...

, , if there is interest, we might move on to Donellan's article after this.

Well, that should add to the post count. Thing is, reducing the discussion to a personal disagreement doesn't do much to resolve it. I plan a thread o...

Goodness, so now our discussion is generating a secondary literature...

That was my Honours thesis. It's wrong. Trouble is, as I think Donellan pointed out, we can use proper names correctly even when we do not have a suit...

Would it help you if I preceded every post with "I might be wrong, but..."? For me, the all are.

What happened to @"Shawn"?

A note on the use of "individual". Individuals are those things to which you might give a proper name. In particular, "individual" is not limited to p...

And then This, very much contra Russell, Searle, and many, many others. A description may be used to pick out some individual in order to give it a na...

Well, that made me laugh.

It's just a way of talking. Thou shalt have no other gods before me?

@"Tom Storm", looks like you are being misquoted: ...

Ill formed is anther way of saying it's the wrong question. But here your fallacy is black-or-white.

And that's not something we might consider? :wink:

As am I, but then I think Kripke showed his view to be misguided. Seems to me that counterfactual sentences make sense. After all, you might not have ...

SO to the bottom of p. 181, where Kripke asks why folk suppose that we can't have a posteriori necessities, and offers two pictures that folk may be h...

Perhaps. I've no clear idea what "giveness" might be.

That's a different point, and I agree, and I note that the lectern example is I think not repeated in Naming and Necessity. We have the contingent "Th...

Good for you. Kripke argues otherwise, and his argument is widely accepted, and this is a thread about his argument. That is, the thread is about what...

Because implication is transitive: If A? and B is a theorem, or true, then A?C. In (3)\,(x)(y) (x=y) \supset (x)(y) (x=y) is A, ?(x=x) is B, and ?(x=y...

Seems to me that much of this is addressed in the next part of the article. Leet's muddle on, but make sure we come back to this.

Then so much the worse for those arguments. Yes.

You are in danger of treating possible worlds as if they are discovered, rather than posited. As if they were actual. A possible world is just a suppo...

...allows contradictions. Possible worlds do not allow contradictions. They are what we in the trade call impossible, In one sense you've simply hidde...

(1)\,(x)(y) Seems it would be worthwhile going over some of the "oddball symbology". (x) is just "for all x". (x=y) says that x and y are the same thi...

P \supset \Box P is not an instance of the law of identify. I'll leave you to it, Meta. Not interested in playing your game.

Not even x=x? Hu? Ah. That's a different "is". I found myself pointing this out the other day... Dogs are mammals is an example of F(S)-type "is". The...

It wasn't that that caused me to lose track, it was the bit were you appear to claim that, that water boils at 100? is known a priori. I gather that y...

Yeah it is. You claimed: (my bolding) It isn't. It is invalid, so it can't be a priori. If it is true, it is true a posteriori, as Kripke uses it.

Well, no, since as you will have noted, he gives examples where this is not the case.

Thanks.

That's just what they want you to think.

Yes, I take him here to be saying that the argument (1-4) applies when a and b are proper names and F a property.

Ah. So can we agree, @"RussellA" that the argument (1-4) uses identity but not Leibniz's law? Kripke calls (1) the law of the substitutivity of identi...

How would this case differ from the "ice" example? He chose "it is not made of ice" for it's dramatic effect and yet to minimise other commitments:

A=A is the Principle of Identity.

Thanks to the mods for keeping the thread on topic.

So back to Identity, bottom of p. 180. It's clear from the examples given that statements of the form x=y can be discovered empirically, and hence at ...

A quick note that we need to keep clear when Kripke is talking about an identity that is established by a proper name and one that is established by a...

, (x)(y) is not Leibniz's Law. That'd be something like UF(Fx \equiv Fy) \supset (x=y) Not the same. I don't see that the argument (1-4) uses Leibniz'...

From those first few paragraphs, do we now agree that, that Hesperus is Phosphorus is an a posteriori observation? I know water boils at 100? at norma...

I don't think so. It's more as if logic were embedded in a conditional... 'if you would talk in a coherent way, then you must follow these rules..." C...

P \supset \Box P is invalid. It is certainly not as it stands a priori. The whole point of the argument is that ?P in the case of the lectern is known...

Well, one consequence is that, that x=y may be discovered empirically - examples are give - but has necessary implications. While this may seem obviou...

Why would anyone consider these analytic? They look to be synthetic. Hesperus is the evening star; phosphorus, the morning star. It is not clear from ...