Where were we? You'd kindly listed some of the argument so far. To be sure, (1) was that we understand vastly more of what lies behind our perceptions...
No. I read certain philosophy, and found it was wrong. There's a tad too much presumption in your prognosis. And very little of any substance to your ...
Nor do I, nor is that sentence strictly analytic - It's not true at the moment, for instance. The point being that there is considerable variation in ...
Ah, is that so? Is it true? Drop truth and statements cease to be of any use. ...none of which implies that facts are not true. Quite the contrary. Ag...
Well, yes. If it's not a fact, then by that very fact you do not know it. This is no more than the way that these words are used. And of course some o...
As I said earlier, metaphysics is inevitable. Analytic philosophy is particularly helpful in showing inconsistencies and lack of clarity in metaphysic...
True. But beliefs can sometimes be mistaken, not so, facts. That's an important difference. ( already pointed this out.) And you know more than you th...
Sure. I think it also all too easy to grab a passing answer and take it as verity. Indeed, this is far and away the most common approach - making shit...
We might be in agreement here, I'm not sure. Some folk would read the above as diminishing the import of verbal disputes. But I suspect that what we a...
Wittgenstein's philosophy as remediation, or Midgley's plumbing. You do philosophy when you pick at folk's thinking, trying to get at what is going on...
Use orange juice instead of maple syrup, or just skip this - the pumpkin will usually be sweet enough for those outside north America. And dice and bo...
Yep. It's a question of preference, of what "parlance" one chooses, but I'll go with there being one table, described in two ways, participating in tw...
Call me credulous, but when I have the tea in my hand, that's what I mean by talk of 'physically existent". Well, it's atomic structure is not somethi...
The difference in parlance is a deeper issue. Sure, there are things about the cup that are unperceived, and things about the cup that we don't know. ...
Sure. Bob wants to use Kant's ideas to build two ontologies - the thing perceived and the thing unperceived. It's not as if one's ontology can be utte...
Going back to the two cups, That you have to make such sophisticated an argument, sundering ontology from epistemics, what is from what we know, does ...
It doesn't. But when we talk about the cup, the pot, the cupboard, we are not talking about our private perception-of-cupboard, or the pot in itself, ...
Hmm. Who is in the tomb? I say it is Elizabeth Windsor. What say you? But moreover, I say that, that we say "Elizabeth Windsor" is a question of conve...
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