Your observer is reduced to a point. That is all that is needed. How could this discussion go on without you and I? If your purpose is to prove that t...
Quadruped? That's my problem then. Not enough feet. You reached it as a conclusion to some argument? This? It's wrong. If the glove has a palm and a b...
Yeah, to some extent the hinge is just the stuff we agree on, but there is an extra step such that the hinge is the stuff about which we cannot sensib...
You can however tell that one glove is the chiral opposite of the other. If the gloves have palm and back, then you can certainly tell which is left a...
Tones listed some of your errors for your benefit. Address yourself to him: Have a look at the Russell article. Let us know what you think. It takes a...
Nuh. The river bed is silt, sand and rocks. It stays relatively fixed while the river flows past. If it didn't, we wouldn't have a river - we'd have a...
It's not a good idea to consider hinges to be "outside our epistemological framework", anymore than it would be a good idea for a hydrologist not to c...
Again, what you have written shows multiple errors in your understanding of formal logic. And misunderstandings of my post. Experience shows that list...
I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. Hence J apparently can see how it addresses the OP Existence, at least as q...
Ok, so is there any evidence that Austin explicitly accepted the Contrast Theory of Meaning? Especially as both he and Wittgenstein advocated looking ...
Seems to me that there is a difference between holding that every use of a word is dependent on a contrast and holding that this use of a word is depe...
I am not aware of either Austin or Wittgenstein explicitly advocating anything close to the Contrast Theory of Meaning - They each advocated close and...
Cheers. I don't have Kimhi's book, so I can't answer any issues raised there directly. In any case it seems what is needed is a thesis, or a series of...
Formalism just obliges good grammar. It shows us how to set things out more clearly. And of course there is the further issue of whether we can indeed...
Looks like this has to be personal. Well, as one of those who participated, I'd characterise the interaction differently. You were unable to set out c...
Indeed, and I think that making use of the grammar of first order logic helps here, in obliging us to take care as to what we mean by "exists". So "?(...
ALL of meaning? If Gellner is suggesting that both Wittgenstein and Austin agree here with the most extreme version of Frank's suggestion, what are we...
I'm happy to acknowledge that. Then by all means, set out what Gellner is saying. What is his argument? What is the problem with "the contrast theory ...
Well, can we explicated the "Contrast Theory of Meaning"? As I understand it, he would have it that the meaning of a word is seen in contrasting it wi...
A coffee machine is not a toast machine. Except when it is. https://www.cnet.com/a/img/resize/5f98cb795caf184678cb2a0a45f777ba3b76e6bc/hub/2010/04/26/...
Then is there a way in which @"Michael" is right, that without the creature capable of seeing colour, there are no colours? Well, yes, but it's quite ...
There's that vicious circularity again. Sure, all that. Have a look at How To Speak Of The Colors, by yet another expat from downunder, with a leaning...
"putatively existing"? "?(x)f(x)" says something in the domain of discourse is f. Does that thing exist? Well, "Frodo has hairy feet" predicates hairy...
The difference is brought out nicely in predicate logic. Three differing uses of "is" are used. 1. The "is" of predication - "The ball is red" - f(a) ...
Yet the ball does not change colour... It might change colour if someone painted it, or if the surface faded in the sun. So we have an superficially e...
Michael might claim here that the colour does change - it becomes darker as the shadow crosses the ball. But this is to see only one use for "colour":...
It's odd that @"Michael" sees Searle as a friend, when Searle has spent so much effort in showing the intentional character of perception. Searle evis...
This is a rather neat summation of the mistake of thinking that either colour is a mind-independent property of objects, or colour is a mental phenome...
It's you who are claiming that the tomato is red but not really red; these are your words, your word game. All I'm doing is pointing out how silly tha...
So you have claimed. I rather think you are equivocating on the notion of "really", wanting to say that red tomatoes are not really red - the implicat...
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