Bartricks

Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments ...

Well, if you're denying that there are rational intuitions in support of claims such as "if something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable...

Oh blimey.

Oh good grief.

No. Don't tell me about it. Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything....

You know I like you much more now you've dropped the wise old logician act and become just another vulgar little insulter like all the rest. Anyway, w...

Replied to the wrong insult.

Anyway, lovely as all this is, how about we go back to the actual argument and this apparent refutation of the position it entails: 1. If moral values...

Haha, my tongue was in my cheek just an itsy witsy bit.

Aw, is you serious angry? Nice to meet the real you. You're exactly as anticipated.

Yes, all excellent points. Have you considered joining the army?

Are you actually going to address anything - anything - I have argued? There is no way on earth that any responsible educational establishment would l...

Well that made me laugh, I must admit. You don't say!!

the 12 year olds must have been very frightened. How long before security evicted you from the premises? Thank you for the offer, but in my mind you h...

Bartricks: Janet was either killed by someone or she died of natural causes Hugh: No, Janet also could have been killed by Mark. Bartricks: That would...

No, they have the same intent. Again: imagine two acts that are identical in every way apart from spatially and or temporally. Not hard. I mean, if I ...

You don't know a valid argument from an invalid one. Demonstrably. You have asked painfully pompous and disingenuous questions You are not remotely op...

Those are just statements - in each csae it is just you blankly stating something that contradicts the conclujsion - the conclusion - of my argument. ...

another possibility is that moral values are nonsense. But stop being tedious. Stop it. Stop. It.

I am using subjective in a way that covers intwrsubjectivist views. Stop being tedious.

It's not bad faith - I am going to reject that premise, and I am going to do so on non-question begging grounds. You're the one who's convinced I'm no...

Ah, well done for changing what you're saying and then thinking I won't notice! That argument makes no mention of objective value in its premises (hen...

No, I am not going patiently to explain again why the 'intrinsic/extrinsic' distinction is quite different from the 'objective/subjective' distinction...

Well that's precisely why you shouldn't sniff glue. Things that are false - indeed, incoherent - will appear obviously true to you and other things (s...

If someone did that - that is, actually did lay waste every metaethical theory bar one with five simple, self-evident premises - how would you tell? I...

That is a question begging definition of intrinsic value. (Although I agree that we have the intuition that those things that are intrinsically morall...

potato, potarto. The argument is valid, yes? Or do we have to go through this again. I don't know what a truth table is, but I do know not to trust wh...

Premise 2 is self-evidently true. Consider this premise: if I say something is true, it is not necessarily true. Does that need justifying, in your vi...

You are going to say that about any argument that has any premises - so, you know, all arguments. Any argument for anything whatsoever - no matter how...

It isn't trivial. I have established that moral values must be the values of a subject. That is, to be morally valuable is to be being valued by someo...

No, any and all subsets. It works for them all. Try it.

Identify a subset then - a subset of your values - and let's see if it works. I can't fight fog.

Does.

So this argument: Is valid. Right. And that is my argument. That. Is. My. Argument. Note, to be loved is to be the object of an attitude. To be morall...

I'm not 'reifying' Reason. To reify something is to 'mistakenly' think of it as an object. Reason is an object - a subject, a mind. If you think not, ...

I imagine you know a lot about bins.

They differ either temporally or spatially or both, that is true. So you are saying that two acts that differ in no non-moral way at all apart from te...

It is not clear to me on what basis you reject that premise, though. I have a lot of time for Berkeley, but I don't think he subscribed to that princi...

Well, I mean they are not one and the same world. So, they differ either in terms of their spatial or temporal properties (or both). Doesn't your reas...

They're numerically distinct. So, just imagine two numerically distinct acts that are, in every other physical, mental and historical way, identical. ...

Well, why do you think the criticism is considered so damning? Moral norms appear to be immutable. I agree that they're not, but they do appear to be,...

I have read the Euthyphro, but I think you haven't read the OP - not carefully anyway. This thread is not about Plato's Euthyphro dialogue, but about ...

Yes, there is a distinct argument for that. Here: 1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. (That is, being morally valuab...

Respect the appearances. Not my advice; Aristotle's. It is what it appears to be. Like most things. And it appears to be a thread in which someone is ...

Zinger!! Look, the insults are not coming out of nowhere. You. Just. Insulted. Me. I politely, efficiently, answered your questions. You then told me ...

You know that's an insult, right?

Why think it is not what it appears to be? Do you often think psychologists are experimenting on you?

I said all those things in my reply to you above, it's just that now I've numbered them so that you can recognise them as an argument.

As Rufoid doesn't know an argument from his armpit, here are the arguments that establish that the subject is reason. 1. Moral values and prescription...

Again so soon? You'll get a blister.