Why the Euthyphro fails
In another thread I have argued that moral values are the values of a subject, Reason.
To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro, the question most philosophers are going to want to ask is "is something morally valuable because Reason values it, or does she value it because it is morally valuable?
But when you think about it, the question is redundant, because the theory just is that something is morally valuable because Reason values it. So what's the problem supposed to be, exactly?
Well, the problem is that it appears self-evident to the reason of most that if something is morally valuable it is not just morally valuable here and now, but always and everywhere. That is, moral value does not vary over time and space alone. If it is bad today to be a sadist, then it is morally bad tomorrow to be one, other things being equal.
Yet if moral value was constitutively determined by a subject's valuing attitudes, then in principle nothing would prevent something from being morally valuable one day and not the next.
In other words then, our reason tells us that moral values and prescriptions are fixed across space and time. But if moral value is made of a subject's values, then it would not be fixed across space and time. Therefore, moral value is not made of a subject's values.
I think this argument is bad. Thoroughly bad. I have numerous problems with it.
The first point I want to make is that, so far as I can tell, no-one can escape it.
For example, if you identify moral value with your own values - so, if you are an individual subjectivist - then what's valuable one day might not be tomorrow. It depends on what you value at the time.
If you identify moral value with the values of some collective, the same applies.
So if you're an individual or collectivist subjectivist about moral values and you use the Euthyphro to try and dispatch my kind of view then you have taken a shot at me through your own head.
And if you think that moral value is emanating from some kind of weird 'form of the good' or something, then as well as being bonkers, you too cannot stop what is valuable one day from not being the next - for what's to stop this Platonic obelisk from emanating value towards something one day and not the next?
Even if you are a nihilist and think that nothing is morally valuable in reality, you face it too. Or at least, you do if you accept that it is 'possible' for something to be morally valuable. For what's to stop moral value suddenly coming into existence, on your view? And if that happened, then what had no value at all one day, would have moral value the next.
So the first thing I would say about the Euthyphro is that it seems to apply to everyone - even nihilists. Yet it is impossible for all views about moral value to be false. So something must be wrong with the objection.
To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro, the question most philosophers are going to want to ask is "is something morally valuable because Reason values it, or does she value it because it is morally valuable?
But when you think about it, the question is redundant, because the theory just is that something is morally valuable because Reason values it. So what's the problem supposed to be, exactly?
Well, the problem is that it appears self-evident to the reason of most that if something is morally valuable it is not just morally valuable here and now, but always and everywhere. That is, moral value does not vary over time and space alone. If it is bad today to be a sadist, then it is morally bad tomorrow to be one, other things being equal.
Yet if moral value was constitutively determined by a subject's valuing attitudes, then in principle nothing would prevent something from being morally valuable one day and not the next.
In other words then, our reason tells us that moral values and prescriptions are fixed across space and time. But if moral value is made of a subject's values, then it would not be fixed across space and time. Therefore, moral value is not made of a subject's values.
I think this argument is bad. Thoroughly bad. I have numerous problems with it.
The first point I want to make is that, so far as I can tell, no-one can escape it.
For example, if you identify moral value with your own values - so, if you are an individual subjectivist - then what's valuable one day might not be tomorrow. It depends on what you value at the time.
If you identify moral value with the values of some collective, the same applies.
So if you're an individual or collectivist subjectivist about moral values and you use the Euthyphro to try and dispatch my kind of view then you have taken a shot at me through your own head.
And if you think that moral value is emanating from some kind of weird 'form of the good' or something, then as well as being bonkers, you too cannot stop what is valuable one day from not being the next - for what's to stop this Platonic obelisk from emanating value towards something one day and not the next?
Even if you are a nihilist and think that nothing is morally valuable in reality, you face it too. Or at least, you do if you accept that it is 'possible' for something to be morally valuable. For what's to stop moral value suddenly coming into existence, on your view? And if that happened, then what had no value at all one day, would have moral value the next.
So the first thing I would say about the Euthyphro is that it seems to apply to everyone - even nihilists. Yet it is impossible for all views about moral value to be false. So something must be wrong with the objection.
Comments (180)
Quoting Bartricks
I'm not altogether clear where you are taking your stand, aside from making Apollo your god.But I would say that a question cannot be 'wrong' in the way that a statement can be false. So the way I would put it, that you might find congenial, is that value is the relation between subject and world. The fault with the question is that it is like asking if the Stockton to Darlington railway is in Stockton or Darlington. The answer is both and neither, and all stations between.
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject, Reason
And I meant by wrong that the argument is unsound, because an argument that would refute all theories - including nihilism - must be unsound, for not all theories about moral value can be false.
So, those who wield the Euthyphro objection against my kind of view, should first note that it works against theirs too.
That, I am hoping, will wipe the smile off their smug faces.
I haven't mentioned Apollo.
Who is she?
Where did you get the idea that Reason is female? Because you keep fucking it? (Sorry about the pun, :-) I could not resist it.)
But I think all views are subject to it. So, let's assume - crazily - that moral values are objective. Well, how would holding that view give one any grounds for denying a premise of the argument I presented?
So, here's the Euthyphro again, adjusted for moral objectivism.
1. If moral values are objective, then moral values with be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. therefore, moral values are not objective
For instance, take an objective property like shape. The vodka and lemonade in front of me has a certain shape. It is the shape of the glass it is in. But it doesn't have that shape of necessity, but contingently. I just tilted the glass, and the shape of the vodka and lemonade changed.
Now, shape is objective, yet no object has its shape of necessity. So if moral value is objective one cannot, on those grounds alone, conclude that therefore moral values are necessary.
Thus, the argument applies to moral objectivism as much as it does to moral subjectivism.
Regardless of whether moral properties are conceived of subjectively or objectively, they are going to be contingent, not necessary.
Upon realizing this the moral objectivists should, of course, shit their pants.
So everyone must admit either that they cannot explain why moral norms and values are fixed, or else admit that contrary to rational appearances they are not fixed. Everyone.
This is not a paraphrase, it is a misunderstanding of Plato's dialogue.
The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. In any case, Socrates question is about justice not reason. The dialogue, like many of his others, ends in aporia. Reason does not provide an answer.
The dialogue and what came to be known as the Euthyphro problem are two different things.
Do you know what 'paraphrase' means? And have you read the actual dialogue? (No and no).
Quoting Fooloso4
Er, yes. And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. Like I said!! Can you read?
The first definition that pops up when you Google it:
You are not expressing Plato's meaning. As I said, the issue is justice not reason.
Quoting Bartricks
I certainly have.That is how I knew it was about justice not reason. In fact, I used it when teaching intro to philosophy many times. Which leads me to wonder whether you have read it.
Quoting Bartricks
Er, well you continually refer to "the Euthyphro".
The dialogue is not called 'the Euthyphro'. It is called 'Euthyphro'. And the problem that I am addressing is the one I outlined in the OP. That one.
This thread is about the problem outlined in the OP. It is not - not, not, not - about Plato's dialogue. Start one up about that dialogue if you want (tip: read it first though). But this thread - this one, started by me - is about the Euthyphro problem or criticism or argument. The one I outlined in the OP. The one you've got nothing whatsoever to say about.
Tell me, when you go to an art gallery do you just spend your time looking at the frames?
The Euthyphro is usually posed as a question: Is something good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? The first option makes goodness an arbitrary choice by God, while the second subordinates God to an external principle of goodness. Like many philosophical dilemmas, it sets up a false dichotomy; something is good because it is consistent with the eternal and unchanging nature of God, and everything that God wills is consistent with His eternal and unchanging nature.
Now, which premise are you denying?
Believe what you want. It is not something I usually bring up on the forum since I would rather be judged by what I say rather than by my credentials. There are, however, a few here who know enough about me to know the truth.
I don't see any value in continuing this. If you were not blinded by your assumptions you would find that there are other points that I brought up that you either ignored or more likely did not understand.
I am not addressing your argument at all, just describing the actual Euthyphro dilemma as it is commonly set forth by contemporary philosophers. It is about the relation between goodness and God, not the relation between "moral values" and "Reason."
Once more then, here is the problem:
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject
I think it is a bad argument. One of the reasons it is bad - just one - is that you can replace 'a subject' with something objective, and the argument works just as well.
Anyway, as you seemed obsessed with God - because no doubt 'God' is the one mentioned in all the versions you're reading online - make that subject God and tell me which premise you're denying.
What makes you think I'm not judging you based on what you say? I am. That's precisely what I am doing.
Where - where - did you say anything at all that addressed the argument I outlined (the Euthyphro)?
So, say something clever - start by addressing the actual argument rather than telling me what you've read about on Wikipedia. You know, like an actual teacher would.
Right, I was instead addressing the problem named in the thread title. And the original was about "the pious" and "the gods," so the common version that I presented simply updates the terminology for a monotheistic context.
Quoting Bartricks
The first one, obviously. If moral values are the values of God, then they are necessary, not contingent, since they must be consistent with His eternal and unchanging nature.
So, by 'God' you mean a mind who, if he is valuing X, is incapable of valuing Y? A mind whose attitudes are fixed - whose attitudes the mind itself is incapable of changing?
As well as appearing to be inconsistent with possessing omnipotence, the whole point of the objection is to draw attention to the fact that you cannot 'explain' why this would be the case. If we're talking about a subject - a mind - then clearly any mind can value something other than what he/she is actually valuing.
Just stipulating that this one can't doesn't address the problem.
That's why most contemporary moral philosophers think the argument refutes 'God' command theory, for in place of an explanation we simply find a stipulation.
Indeed, immutability is one of the standard attributes of God in classical theism. Of course, treating God as a "subject" and a "mind" is rather anthropomorphic.
Quoting Bartricks
That God always wills and acts in accordance with His eternal and immutable nature is perfectly consistent with what omnipotence means in classical theism.
If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander?
If your reason or intuition is suggesting this to you, your reason or intuition are mistaken. It's clearly the case that moral values can and do vary from person to person, and even over time for the same persons.
They're contingent, not necessary.
It is you who has decided that because everything you've read on the internet says 'God' that the OP must say God too. It doesn't. The argument is addressed to any and all attempts to identify moral values and prescriptions with those of a subject, an agent of some kind.
Now, my point, for the umpteenth time, is that the argument actually applies to everyone. Which implies it is faulty. It is faulty.
Anyway, why do most contemporary moral philosophers think it refutes the 'God' version of subjectivism? Because if you just stipulate that the subject in question cannot, of necessity, change, then you haven't explained why. And, on the face of it, the stipulation seems false. If God is an agent, why can't he change his mind? No good just saying "oh, well I've defined him as unchanging". Again, get over the childish megalomania and realize that saying things doesn't make them so (well, there are exceptions, but meh).
It isn't consistent with omnipotence. I do things in accordance with my nature. So do you. For whatever I do, it was my nature to do it - my nature being partly constituted by the things I do.
But I'm not omnipotent. Nor are you. So, 'doing things in accordance with your nature' is not sufficient for omnipotence.
An omnipotent being can do anything he god damned wants. Including prescribing today what he proscribed yesterday. I mean, even I can do that - you saying being all powerful involves being able to do 'less' than I can do? Wow, good definition of omnipotence!!
So, you just have to insist - apropos nothing - that God's values and prescriptions are necessary and not contingent - which anyone can do about anything.
It is intuitively obvious that no mind values anything or prescribes anything of necessity. If you think otherwise, explain. Don't just give me a definition, give me a representation of reason that implies what you say. Note, a representation of reason, not a representation by a priest.
The word "reason" makes no sense to me in that sentence by the way.
Argue. It appears self-evident to the reason of most that moral truths are necessary, not contingent. How else do you explain why the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be such a damning criticism of subjectivist views???
Good, I consider that a compliment.
It might seem self-evident to you, but it doesn't at all seem to be the case to me or to many other people. So simply claiming that it seems self-evident does no good.
Quoting Bartricks
Aside from the fact that that would be both an argument from authority and an argumentum ad populum, what's the source for the claim?
I have tried having polite discussions with you in this and other threads today, but you have promptly and persistently resorted to baseless assumptions and corresponding insults, rather than sticking to the substance of each matter at hand. Why is that?
Quoting Bartricks
Right back at you.
If you're going to make a claim, it's up to you to provide citations. There's no way I'm doing your work for you. I couldn't care less if you do the work. But if you want anyone to accept the claim, it's up to you.
"But there is a problem with this commitment. The widespread view that moral truths such as pain is intrinsically bad or torturing innocent children for fun is impermissible are necessary seems to undermine it"
Widespread. Virtually all contemporary moral philosophers think moral truths are necessary truths. That's why they think the Euthyphro is a good criticism. Why do you think they think it is a good criticism? Because they like saying "Euthyphro"?
First off, the claim was about interpretations of the Euthyphro.
Aside from that, where is Danahar's citation?
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
Quoting Bartricks
No what isn't?
I explained this to you already. You want anyone to accept something, it's up to you to do the work. You're trying to sell me something. I'm not wanting to sell myself something.
What claim are you referring to?
Quoting Bartricks
It's a statement of how I approach people making empirical claims. I'm the source. I'm telling you something about myself.
Citation please.
Again, it's a claim about me. I'm the source. It's not a claim about all or most philosophers or anything like that.
Citation in support of that please. It's a claim. Support it.
Were you only making claims about yourself? If so, then we don't need a citation other than you.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's another claim. Citation please.
Why would we need a citation for something someone is saying about their view, how they feel or approach things?
What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything.
That's a claim. Citation please.
So you're not going by my rules, and you think that someone telling you their own views needs a citation. Why?
Now, provide citations in support of all of your claims please. All. Of. Them.
I'm not trying to convince you of anything.
Citation please.
If you ask me a question, you want something from me - an answer. Well, if you want something from me, you do the work - you're the wanter.
Still living by your rules.
If I leave the windows open in the car when I go through the car wash I get the inside cleaned too.
So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon.
Citation please.
I get places much faster by never stopping at red lights. It works until you have a major accident.
I really hope you're not much older than fifteen.
I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP.
The argument I am considering is this:
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject
That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions.
I think it is a bad argument. I think it will apply to all views, not just subjectivist ones. So it must be unsound because not all views can be false. And I think it is unsound.
But I don't really understand your question or how it bears on the above .Which is not to say it doesn't, just that I don't see it yet.
Quoting Bartricks
I don't know why I am still bothering. Oh well, here goes...
The argument you are considering to be a bad argument claims that moral values are not the values of a subject.
You say that moral values cannot be the values of just any old subject, such as you and I, because we might disagree, and that would make moral values subjective or contingent in a bad way.
Still, you say it is a bad argument because moral values are the values of a subject, namely Reason. But then instead of saying that this makes the moral values necessary, because the values of reason are necessary, instead you claim that they are still contingent because Reason might change her mind at any time.
If Reason can change her mind and her values are subjective and contingent, then how is that any better than our own moral valuing, which are subjective and contingent? In other words if what you say about the contingency of Reason's values is accepted, then why should we accept her as a Divine Commander?
I have allowed for Reason changing her mind when circumstances demand, but if she were able to simply change her mind even though circumstances have not changed, then she could not be a reliable guide to moral values, unless you allow that they are merely subjective and contingent in a bad way. If that were so, then we might as well trust our own diverse individual moral judgements, which are not delivered by Divine Reason, but simply by humans reasoning.
I have presented this in good faith; it's what I really think about what you have been claiming, but I'm open to being corrected if I have misunderstood you in some way. If you don't answer in good faith then I'm done with you Barty.
Fifteen year-olds usually are.
Ah, he was saying that reason is a subject? I'm not sure how that would make sense to him/wouldn't just be equivocating the word "subject," but I don't suppose I'd get an honest, straightforward answer from him.
The historical "objectivity" of reason that he's referring to was a symptom of psychological projection. That's been remedied to some extent (though certainly not wholesale) by a greater realization of and improved empathy towards other people in the world, who can be, who can look at things, who can reason, quite different from ourselves.
2 seems clearly false to me
You’re referring to ‘value’ as a property of the subject. This is inaccurate, and the main reason why the argument fails.
Value is a relation between an experiencing subject and the events/objects of their experience. It is neither an inherent property of the subject nor of the event/object.
Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. It is a property of the subject only in relation to behaviour, and a property of behaviour only in relation to the subject. This means that moral values are contingent upon both subject and behaviour.
But as a subject we are aware of the self as an event/object of experience, too - and a small and temporary one at that. And yet we are aware of the value of certain behaviours irrespective of the lifetime of the subject. So we posit the existence of an ‘eternal subject’ that is not a limited or temporary event/object of experience - to which all events/objects must necessarily relate, because value is not contingent in our experience upon limited, temporary events/objects.
Enter ‘good’ as an abstract subject - a value. Suddenly a value is no longer seen as a relation contingent upon an experiencing subject and the objects of their experience, but becomes the subject itself. An eternal subject, no less. Something necessary. And it’s no surprise that we find ourselves to be ‘created’ in its image...
Moral values are not the values of a subject, they are relations between a subject/observer (singular or collective) and their experience of behaviour. As such they are contingent, not necessary.
If something is valuable, it is always valuable only in relation to a subject/observer, and is therefore contingent upon the subject/observer. The question is: who or what is the subject/observer?
Yeah, me too. His support of it is a combo of the old "it's self-evident" trope and an appeal to authority/supposed popularity (among authority).
Say what?
It's okay to say that it's a relation between the subject and what they're valuing, I suppose, but the valuing part of that equation only occurs in the subject's brain.
Because they are contingent on a subject's will, whether that will is a human, animal, rock, Reason or God.
Quoting Bartricks
I don't recognise this at all. Mind you I am out of touch. Does anyone else recognise this picture of the prevailing moral philosophy? I got the impression that most moral philosophers were relativists.
EDIT: Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. That seems very strange to me. We should take a leaf out of AI thinking on this I reckon. EDIT2: that's not to say that they all agree with the argument Bartricks says they agree with. Bartricks argument was not a subject of the philpapers survey.
Don't forget that moral realism includes all forms of ethical naturalism as well as some of the 'true to archetype' forms of virtue ethics, so the moral realism required for the premise to be acceptable (arguments from authority issues aside) is not specified by the survey. Ethical naturalism particularly would class as realist, but be in opposition to the premise that moral values are not our values.
Then there's realists about morality who don't see morals as values at all but laws, or those who think moral statements are not normative at all but descriptive, those who think morality is a virtue, not a value (but still a non-subjective one). All of whom would still describe themselves as moral realists.
In all, I think the number of philosophers who believe in a non-subjective external source of moral valuing (which is what the premise here demands) is very slim. Certainly a minority.
What I was skeptical about wasn't this, but a specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro.
The ‘valuing part’ you refer to is a set of measurable/observable events in the brain that can be related to the experience of valuing. That doesn’t amount to a value relation, and it doesn’t prove that a value relation is only in the subject’s brain, any more than a quantity is.
This is an important point. One that I raised earlier:
Quoting Fooloso4
The irony here is that while appealing to reason Bartricks has demonstrated that he is incapable of reasoned thought and argument, relying instead on insults and personal attacks.
Then I wouldn't say that it's a relation. Valuing only occurs in the subject's brain. What is valued is not only in the subject's brain (usually; the exception is if the subject values their thoughts, ideas, etc.). If you don't want to say that the relation is between the subject valuing something and what it is that they value, then it's not a relation, because there's nothing else to be had.
Mind taking a little side trip with me?
What is the Quoting Terrapin Station you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it?
Is your problem with this statement I made?
Quoting Possibility
Or is it with something else?
The claim was "the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be . . . a damning criticism of subjectivist views"
Aside from simply being a naturally skeptical person, I'm skeptical of that claim because for one, I can't recall even one philosopher interpreting Euthyphro as being about a subjectivist account of ethics. Aside from that, usually one of the primary critical focuses is the philosophy of religion issue re whether particular properties of God are the case in a way that could at least potentially be arbitrary, or whether there's something more primary than God that non-arbitrarily determines what those properties (like piety) of God would be.
I figured. Perhaps the word to be used there is 'intrinsic' - and then point one also falls apart, as it permits both.
I have little idea what you're saying in most of the initial post you made about this. (That's why I responded with a "Say what?"--a lot of your post came across like gobbledygook to me.)
So I said that I could see saying that valuations are a relation between the individual valuing something and what they're valuing. But the valuation is strictly something mental the individual is doing.
The particulars of the dialogue itself, probably not the foundation of subjectivist condemnation. The dialectical form of the conversation may very well be, however, insofar as, no matter what somebody says, somebody else can find something wrong with it if he puts enough effort into it.
I don’t do religion or its philosophies, so I’ll let the aside be.
Thanks.
I don't know what you're saying really. Again, I'm skeptical about a claim about how "virtually all contemporary moral philosophers" interpret something. The evidence that would counter my skepticism is evidence of what virtually all (or at least a great many) contemporary moral philosophers say about it.
So we'd need to look at how Kwame Anthony Appiah and Johann Frick and Christine Korsgaard and Alex Guerrero and on and on and on interpret the Euthyphro.
I’m more or less agreeing with you with respect to the claim as stated. Even if I hadn’t read a substantial catalog of moral philosophy, in which there is barely a mention of that Socratic dialectic itself, I’d say it’s pretty unlikely a group of folks like moral philosophers would band together enough to agree that dialectic formed part of their respective philosophies.
The form of the dialectic, however, with substitute conditionals, has been tossed around ever since: is it this because of that or is it that because of this.
God favours the big battalions.
What God favours is necessarily good.
The big battalions are good.
Might is right.
Euthyphro claims to be acting not on his own authority but on the authority of the gods. But in doing so he is appealing to his own authority on divine matters. What he is doing is right because it is what the gods demand of men.
What is at issue is whether Euthyphro has knowledge of divine matters, that is, whether he is an authority on the divine. If Euthyphro is not an authority on such matters, and no one else is either, then the question of the gods' authority is called into question. For how can man appeal to the gods authority if he lacks knowledge of the gods?
Socrates eventually turns from the question of piety to that of justice, for the pious is part of justice (12d). Socrates asks what part it is. Euthyphro's response is revealing. He says:
The part of justice that is concerned with the care of men is left unaddressed. If piety is part of justice than what he is doing cannot be pious if it is not just. Appeal to piety is insufficient grounds for establishing the justice of his actions.
Justice stands above piety. Socrates' words and actions might be seen as impious or atheistic, but if it can be shown that what he says and does is guided by his care for men, then either piety and justice are at odds or what is truly pious must be determined by what is just. Although the question of justice is not addressed, it looms over the dialogue.
That's the point. The dialogue is remembered for it's attack on god when it should be remembered for its support for equity.
That is absolutely not the argument I made! I think moral values ARE contingent.
Yes, moral values are not the values of just anyone, but just one person - the person whose values they are. A person we can call Reason.
But my basis for that claim is that it is manifest to reason that if you or I value something it is not of necessity thereby morally valuable. Thus, our reason - our faculties of reason - tell us that we ourselves are not the ones whose moral values our reason gives us insight into. That is, our faculty of reason is not another faculty of introspection.
It has nothing to do with the contingency moral values would have if they are the values of a subject. My evidence that my values are not moral values is that my reason tells me that they are not. I may be quite sure I value something, yet that does not settle the matter of whether it is morally valuable. I accept that though I may value xing, that does not entail that it is morally valuable. Again, I accept this because it is manifest to reason. both mine and yours and virtually everyone else who isn't crazy or in the grips of a theory.
I think this is an ongoing problem - rather than looking at the argument I have actually given, you project quite different ones onto me and then, when what I say does not seem consistent with the view you've projected onto me, you insist I am not being clear or making sense!
Anyway, Quoting Janus
Again, I think moral values ARE contingent. Most contemporary moral philosophers - indeed, most moral philosophers full stop - think they're necessary. Hence why they reject ALL subjectivist views on the basis of Euthyphro-based concerns.
I am a subjectivist. I think moral values and norms are contingent. I reject other kinds of subjectivist view - those that identify moral values with our own - not on the grounds that this would make moral values and norms contingent. No, I reject those views because they are self-evidently false upon reflection. I reject them because if I value something, it is manifestly not thereby made morally valuable - not of necessity, anyway.
You seem fundamentally not to understand the view my arguments have entailed. For you say that Reason would not be a reliable guide to moral value. Er, but moral values ARE her values. So how on earth - how on earth - could she be anything other than the most reliable guide to them?
Who is the most reliable guide to what Bartricks Potter values? Why, Bartricks Potter!
Who is the most reliable guide to what Hugh values? Why Hugh of course!
Who is the most reliable guide to what Reason values? Why Reason of course.
How has reason attempted to tell us about what she values - why she's given us a faculty of reason. So, if you want to find out what Reason values, consult your reason and the reason of others.
Now nothing I have said there engages with the Euthyphro. Hence why I don't see how what you're saying engages with it.
Those who think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one - so, you know, the vast bulk of moral theorists - think it is a good one because they think moral truths are necessary truths.
I think they're wrong about that. But my first point is that unless you agree that moral truths are necessary truths, then you can't use the Euthyphro to try and challenge my view - for you'd be committing theoretical suicide. And I am also pointing out that this is actually true whether you're a subjectivist or an objectivist about morality.
So my first point - my first step - is to wipe the smile off everyone who thinks the Euthyphro is a damning criticism by pointing out that it applies to objectivists and subjectivists alike.
Again, I stress, I reject 2. But I accept that it appears to be true.
Imagine someone committing an obviously immoral deed. Now imagine another possible world, that mirrors this one. And in this other possible world, someone commits an identical deed. Mustn't that one be wrong too? Someone who thought the first was wrong, but the second not, is surely confused?
We'd want them to explain why the first is wrong and the second not. Perhaps they merely appear the same, but the agent of one had a quite different intention to the other. But no, by stipulation, everything is the same in terms of the respective agent's intentions, and in terms of the consequences of the acts, and so on.
Someone who, despite recognising this, insisted that one was right and the other wrong, is, surely, confused? Two acts cannot differ in their morality alone, it would seem.
Do you agree?
Again, this is not about the dialogue 'Euthyphro'. It is about 'the Euthyphro', the name given to an objection a form of which was first made in that dialogue.
Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue. Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue.
Don't make me go all Mr McGregor on you.
So, throw away your cheap off the peg come-backs and get tailoring.
I acknowledged you made the argument that moral values are contingent. Read again, more carefully.
Quoting Bartricks
You seem to be both saying that what the faculties of reason of individual subjects consider to be moral values do not constitute moral value on account of the fact of their differences, and that they do constitute moral values on account of the fact that they are faculties of reason.
If all we had to do was consult our faculties of reason about what is morally valuable then there could be no disagreement amongst those who did so and no need to posit Divine Reason. But this is patently untrue; there is, and it seems can be, no such agreement.
I do agree that there is general agreement about the most significant moral values such as prohibition of murder, rape, torture and so on, but I think this is simply on account of the fact that virtually no one, understandably, would want to live in a society that would promote or even condone such acts, and society that did son would not last long. So, no need for Divine Reason, then.
Perhaps you want to draw a distinction between what individual subjects simply value and what they rationally value; but I don't see how you could make that work. The notion of a Divine Reason is too attentuated and remote from the visceral exigencies of human lives as they are lived.
And you haven't addressed the problem with your claim that Reason could simply change her mind (presumably by Divine Fiat) about what she values even though no circumstances had changed, and that we should follow her nonetheless (whatever following her could even mean given the problem of how we could know what Divine Reason values or dis-values).
I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good.
Quoting Janus
What? How does any of that follow?
You wouldn't know coherence if it built a house in your bottom. My view is coherent. To show it to be incoherent you'd need to show it to contain a contradiction. Where is that contradiction?
Erm, this thread is about that problem. So, I'm addressing it here! That problem - or supposed problem - is the Euthyphro. A problem that is addressed to all subjectivist views. A problem I have outlined in the OP. A problem that I think is not really a problem. The first step to seeing that it is not a problem is seeing that it applies to everyone, objectivists too.
There's really no way I could be confronting the problem more squarely!!!
As I read it, Socrates' concern is with justice, but that what justice is leads to aporia. It is an example of Socratic or zetetic skepticism. I have never interpreted it as an attack on god but an attack on Euthyphro's assumption of wisdom regarding divine things.
Although Socrates does raise the question of the justice of the gods according to the stories of the poets, such questions are not unique to him, as Euthyphro's responses make clear.
I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". Have you? In any case, it is evident that neither the dialogue nor the dilemma have been understood by someone who relies on bar tricks instead of careful reading, scholarship, and reasoned argument.
Er, yes, I said that. Me. My argument is that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. That's my view. Being valuable means featuring as the object of a valuing relation. See the moral subjectivism thread.
My argument is that only a subject - a subject of experiences, a mind - can be the one who is doing the valuing.
Therefore, for something to be morally valuable, it needs to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude.
I then argued that as if I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable, moral values are not my values. That is, though what it takes for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude, something is not made morally valuable by me valuing it.
Thus, I am not the subject whose values constitute moral values. There is such a subject. But it is demonstrably not me, not you, not one of us.
That's the argument.
You say it fails and then say some things that are entirely consistent with my view. You are presumptuous. You think you already know the argument fails - don't you? Without understanding either my position or understanding that the argument is logically valid, you insist it fails.
It doesn't fail. But if it does fail, it is going to be the Euthyphro that refutes it. Hence this thread.
Well then, I appreciate the attempt to connect.
So I don’t assume where you’re coming from, do you regard subjective experience to be informative, or do you draw the line at what can be measured or objectively verified?
What information do you have regarding this ‘something mental’ that the individual is doing?
That's because you don't hang out with people competent in these matters. They don't tend to mill about in the park. Anyway, if you prefer to talk about the dialogue Euthyphro - you know, the one whose title you got wrong - then start up a threat to do so. Here the topic is 'the Euthyphro', a problem to do with moral contingency. Read something written by an academic philosopher about it. Note that it is to do with the supposed 'arbitrariness' that identifying moral norms and values with those of a subject (be it me, you, God, a god, anyone) would confer on them. Which is just another way of saying that it is to do with the supposedly troublesome variability that moral norms and values would have if they were the values and prescriptions of a person. That's the problem. The problem I am trying to address here. It is a biggee. Huge.
Then, duly humbled, return with your head hanging in shame and resume trying to best me.
I was replying to @Fooloso4, not you.
Your comments have not been interesting enough to warrant a reply.
Is that right?
The less they know, the less they know it. No, not "certainly a minority', but "the majority".
You really don't know what you're talking about, yet you're alarmingly confident. it's quite disturbing. For instance, you've run together metaethical and normative theories. Virtue ethics is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. I'm not a virtue ethicists, but nothing stops me from being. That is, one can be a subjectivist and a virtue ethicist. One can be a subjectivist and a utilitarian. One can be a subjectivist and a deontologist. One can be a subjectivist and a pluralist. And so on.
That's because subjectivism is a metaethical theory, not a normative one.
Moral realism denotes a family of metaethical theories. A great big unruly family whose members do not get on.
What unites them? Well, they believe the following: that normative moral propositions - such as "X is right" or "Y is morally bad" - are truth-apt (that is, capable of being true or false) and that some of them are true.
The anti-realists take two forms, because realism combines two claims and one might deny either one.
For example, some anti-realists deny that normative moral utterances are truth-apt. They're the expressivists. The others accept that they're truth apt, but deny that any of them are true. They're the error theorists.
Now, my point is that whichever one of those views you hold, the Euthyphro objection can be raised against you.
They can't all be false though, can they? So, if the Euthyphro criticism would be just as effective against any view as it is against mine, then something must be wrong with the Euthyphro criticism.
Everyone must agree to that.
Those who haven't read Plato's dialogue Euthyphro are mistakenly thinking that this thread is about his dialogue, despite the OP making clear that it is about a particular criticism that has its origins in his dialogue. A distinction that is too subtle, it would seem, for you and certain others. You prefer to discuss a label than the view or criticism the label is being applied to. And when someone points out that the use of the label is perfectly legitimate and that it is the position that is important not the label that is put on it, you prefer to take issue with 'that' rather than anything philosophically interesting. Why? Becusae you don't know what is or is not philosophically interesting or significant. That's my analysis anyway.
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then moral values are contingent not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject
That argument is valid and it appears to be sound. And note, it doesn't seem to matter who the subject is. You could insist otherwise by insisting that if you identify the subject as 'God' then because God's nature is fixed, 1 is false. But that is not evidence that 1 is false, it is just an expression of a religious dogma. To defeat the argument you have to show - not stipulate - that either 1 or 2 is false.
No good just stipulating that the subject's nature is fixed. For on the face of it a subject's values are contingent, not necessary. And thus if you think this particular subject is the exception, you need to make a case for the reasonableness of that belief, rather than just express it with confidence (which I know many of you think can do the work of an argument, but can't).
And no good just insisting that premise 2 is false because it contradicts your theory, for that is question begging.
I think the argument is not sound. I think premise 2 is false. But I think it is first worth noting that the argument 'must' be unsound, because it can be addressed to all views, and not all views can be false.
To see this just substitute for 'a subject' some objective thing and see what happens.
Yes, it is.
We are agreed on the measure of Bartrinks as well.
On both counts.
Just the place for a Snark.
"What I say three times is true!"
What's nonsense - to think a) that values require valuers or that b) values do not require valuers?
It's b that's nonsense, isn't it? And what do I believe? a or b? a. I believe a.
What's nonsense - to think that a) only a subject, a mind, can value something or b) that something other than a mind - a chair say, or a stone - can value things?
It's b that's nonsense, isn't it? And what do I believe? a or b? a. I believe a.
What does putting those two together get us? It gets us to the conclusion that moral value, being a kind of value, requires at least one valuer, and that the valuer has to be a subject, a mind.
Now, if you think that's nonsense, then either you can't reason at all - you just don't see how the conclusion follows (in which case I think you're probably entitled to some kind of government benefit to shield you from the worst ravages of the oh so confusing and hazardous world) - or you think one of those bs is true.
So which is it?
Or perhaps you think the objection - the Euthyphro - that this thread is about is nonsense. But in that case you either think the argument is invalid or you think it has a nonsense premise or a nonsense conclusion. Which?
This objection is not the Euthyphro, but answering it will show how to answer the Euthyphro.
I have argued that moral values are the values of a god. That is, to be morally valuable is to be the object of a god's valuing attitude.
But isn't it a self-evident truth of reason that whatever is morally valuable, it will be so irrespective of whether any god exists? Surely it is morally bad to torture a kitten regardless of whether there are any gods around? If it is morally bad to torture a kitten, it is bad irrespective of the presence of any gods, not because of one.
Yet if moral values are the values of a god, then that would be impossible. Conclusion: moral values are therefore 'not' the values of a god. That is:
1. If moral values are the values of a god, then if no gods exist, nothing is morally valuable
2. If no gods exist, some things are still morally valuable
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a god.
The argument is valid and both premises appear to be true.
The number of things you didn't mention would make a long list. Fortunately, I am not confined to rearranging your words. Unfortunately, your topic though interesting is deprived of most of its virtue by your unpleasant manners.
:lol:
You are not reading "necessary" in the right way. Necessary here means "for the purpose of". And since there is something which makes them necessary, in this way, they are contingent on that thing.
Quoting Bartricks
When you read "necessary" in the right way, it makes perfect sense to say that moral values are necessary. You've misinterpreted the word, then claimed the statement makes no sense.
From the Platonic perspective, the thing which necessitates moral values, "the good", is an object, a goal, (which because it does not exist as it is what is wanted, or lacking by the subject), is separate from the subject. This is what objectifies moral values.
"If p, then q. Oh what to do? The argument doesn't lead where I want it to. No matter. No worry. I know what to do: I'll pretend I know stuff when I haven't a clue, and offer condescending guidance and invalid arguments and just generally be annoying and pompous and silly and ignorant and wrong and bad and a git."
Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this—an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient—that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied.
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion—a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever....”
All that to say this.....it is possible for worthy logic to give nothing worthy, it is possible for good logic to give nothing better than.....yeah, so?
And buried in there is a resolution for understanding the Euthyphro problem: for Socrates, in opposing, the analytic, insofar as there is no apodeitic correctness for the base of the charge against him, and for Euthyphro himself, in maintaining, the dialectic, insofar as he just stomps his foot and vacates the field, for the very same lack of apodeitic correctness. As such, the Euthyphro problem doesn’t fail at all, but rather demonstrates a failure.
Exit, stage right.
I think they are wrong to think that, but I think that they are quite right in thinking that this does appear - rationally appear - to be the case.
You mention the Platonic form of the good - okay, so if this strange obelisk values things (a notion I can make no sense of whatsoever), why is it the case that it could not disvalue the things it values?
Consider those who might make the subject 'God'. They might try and address the Euthyphro criticism by pointing out that God has an immutable nature. But this, I think we can agree, does nothing whatsoever to address it. For the whole point is that if the source of moral values and norms is a person, then independent argument aside, there is no reason to think the person in question could not change their attitudes. All the 'God' person is doing is stipulating, not showing.
Well, that's true of you too if you just stipulate that this Platonic form of the good has an immutable nature and always values the same things across time and space.
For an analogy: take any physical object. It has a shape. But it can have a different one, can't it? Any physical object can have a different shape. No physical object has its shape of necessity. Anything spherical can be square, and so on.
Simply saying "ah, but the Platonic form of the good is not like that - it has the property of disvaluing X, and it can never do anything other than disvalue X" is like saying "ah, but there are some cuboid objects that cannot be anything other than cuboids".
Well, that seems prima facie false.
The point though, is that this is not how "necessary" is used in morality. It is used to indicate what is needed, what ought to be done for some purpose. If something is "necessary", there is a reason why it is necessary, it is deemed as needed for some purpose. So you are taking the wrong sense of "necessary", one not applicable to morality, and trying to make a moral argument out of it. That's nothing but equivocation.
Quoting Bartricks
That's not what I said about 'the good", nor is it what Plato said about 'the good".
Most moral philosophers think that if an act - let's pick an obviously bad one, such as setting fire to an innocent person -is bad in this world, then it is wrong in all non-morally identical possible worlds.
That's a thesis that my kind of view has problems explaining - or appears to, I should say.
Okay, what do you say about it, then? If moral truths are invariable across time and space, how does identifying them with the emanations of a Form explain why that is so? Explain without stipulating.
if so, what do you do with all those widely corroborated rational intuitions that represent them to be? Just reject them?
It seems you haven't read any moral philosophy. Do you recognize a difference between "is" and "ought". "Necessary" in the sense of "cannot not be the case" is based in what "is". "Necessary" in the sense of what is needed for some purpose is based in what ought to be done.
Quoting Bartricks
How could moral values be invariable across time and space when "ought" refers exclusively to future acts?
What is the name of this thesis:
If two worlds are identical in all non-moral respects, then necessarily they are identical in all moral respects?
Consider yourself owned.
How does that make any sense?
It is the basis of the Euthyphro criticism.
Judging by the op, I'd say you haven't read The Euthyphro. In it, Plato relates morality to the gods, not to Reason, or to worlds which are identical in some aspects (whatever that means).
This thread is not about Plato's Euthyphro dialogue, but about the famous criticism it inspired.
That criticism is that if moral norms and values are the prescriptions and values of a subject (be they a god, gods or us) then they would not be immutable. They could vary over time.
Yet, in Plato's day as today, moral norms and values appear to be fixed. They are represented to be by our reason. Hence a problem.
Now, if you're not interested in that problem - the problem to do with the supposed arbitrariness that identifying moral norms and values with those of person would confer on them - then simply go to another thread. For this thread is about that problem - the problem contemporary philosophers call 'the Euthyphro'.
Don't dispute that it is called that. It is. But don't dispute it - this isn't a thread about label use and so it will just derail it.
Don't dispute that the criticism is in the original dialogue or tell me what the original dialogue is about. I have read it, I assure you. I have a copy of it - over there, in the bookshelf. But it wouldn't matter if I hadn't.
Just engage with the actual criticism.
I don't agree that moral values appear to be fixed, not today, nor in Plato's day. The criticism appears to be way off base.
Quoting Bartricks
I did engage with the actual criticism. I pointed out that you were using "necessary" in a way which is inconsistent with the way that it is used in moral philosophy. You insisted that "necessary" means "cannot not be the case", which is some sort of logical principle that has nothing to do with morality, which deals with how people ought to behave. Then you went off on some tangent talking about different worlds with identical features.
Quoting Bartricks
You know that if they are two worlds, then they must differ in some way, or else they would be one and the same world. If they do not differ in non-moral respects, then they necessarily differ in moral respects.
"Consider yourself owned."
Imagine that Tim smacks Susan in the face for a laugh. That act is wrong, right? Now imagine there is another planet exactly like this one - I mean, exactly like it in every physical respect. It contains twins of us, for instance. And in that world Tim's twin - Tim2 smacks Susan2 in the face for a laugh. Now, is that act wrong too? Don't change the scenario in the twin world - don't imagine Tim2 having different motivations to Tim1. No, it is the same act performed with the same intentions, it is just performed by Tim2 not Tim1, a person who is in every way identical to Tim1 except that he is not numerically identical.
Doesn't it have to be wrong too? If Tim1's act of hitting Susan1 was wrong, isn't Tim2's act of hitting Susan2 wrong as well?
If the planets were exactly the same, then by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, they would be one and the same planet, and everything which is the case on one would also be the case on the supposed "other", because it wouldn't be "other", it would actually be the very same planet. So your question doesn't make any sense because you are talking about one and the same planet as if it were two distinct planets.
What do you mean by "numerically distinct"? If there are differences, what are the difference between them? These differences could amount to the act being morally unacceptable on one and morally acceptable on the other.
Doesn't your reason tell you that the two acts must be morally identical?
No, because the acts are carried out on different planets with differences between them so reason tells me that they are not identical. If they are not identical acts, then why say that they are morally identical?
And/or that two acts that differ in no non-moral way at all apart from spatially - so, one happens to your left, the other to your right - can differ morally?
A similar act in different circumstances cannot be called the same act. They may have different intent. Therefore it is possible that they could differ morally.
I mean, if I ask you to imagine a car identical to yours in every way apart from it is in another location, would you find that difficult? Would you say "er, but then it is not the same car" - yes, I know. Not the same car. But similar in every way - apart from it is over there.
Am I in a primary school? Are you 5? Imagine two acts - two, not one, two - that are identical in every non-moral way apart from spatially or temporally. Will they be morally identical as well? So, if act A is wrong, does act B have to be too.
Yes it is hard. I find it to be impossible. This is like saying imagine two people who are exactly alike except they are different. It's nonsense.
Quoting Bartricks
Cars don't have intention. Anyway, I'd say that the two cars were not exactly alike, they have a different serial number to begin with, and they've both been used in different ways with different wear and tear.
Quoting Bartricks
Sorry, but I find that you are asking me to imagine the impossible, like a square circle. It's nonsense, it can be said, but not imagined.
Aren't you familiar with nominalism?
It depends on who you ask, of course.
In my personal view, it actually depends on just how the one person smacks (or whatever they do to) the other. If it's not something that would leave macro-observable effects past, say, 72 hours, then no, I wouldn't say that's wrong.
I think people overreact and tend to have ridiculously draconian policies about this sort of stuff. Not every nonconsensual act, no matter how minor, is morally wrong or should be legally prohibited.
Two acts - A and B. They are the same in every non-moral respect. So, same intentions, same consequences, same everything. Twin acts, as it were. If one is wrong, mustn't the other one be too?
Just answer that question and resist the temptation to try and educate me.
On my view--I'm a nominalist--numerically distinct things can not be identical in any respect.
Re the ethical question, things are only wrong or not wrong to a particular individual. There's nothing to say that a given individual couldn't judge act 1 morally wrong while judging numerically distinct but similar (what we could loosely call "the same") act 2 not morally wrong. If we can't figure out why that individual might judge them differently, we can ask them.
Problem is, these are not two acts. You are referring to one and the same act, and calling it "two acts". That's why your premise is self-contradicting.
This presupposes that intentions and consequences are "non-moral respects." Does anyone actually believe that?
So two acts must be spatially and/or temporally identical in order to be morally identical?
Quoting Bartricks
In order to claim that two acts are not morally identical, even though they are the same in terms of their intentions and consequences, one must presuppose that intentions and consequences are non-moral respects--as I said before.
Quoting Bartricks
Because you say so? According to your own rules, you need to provide a valid syllogism with this as its conclusion and premisses that are confirmed by rational intuitions.
First, a wholly non-moral example. Imagine two physical objects. Two, note, not one. But imagine that these objects occupy the same amount of space and have the same composition and the same colour.
Do they have to have the same shape? That is, if two objects occupy the same amount of space, do they have to have the same shape?
Well, no. Obviously not. Two physical objects can be identical in every way apart from having different shapes, yes?
Now, imagine two actions. These two actions have the same consequences (they both result in an innocent person's death, say). They are both performed with the same intentions. Now, do they both have to have the same morality? That is, if one is wrong, must the other be wrong too?
Don't - don't - say "oh, but one might have an extra consequence that the other didn't" or 'oh, but one was performed with a different intention". No, I have stipulated that this is not so, just as I stipulated that the two physical objects occupy the same amount of space.
Now, given that they are identical in terms of their intentions and consequences, must they have the same morality?
Virtually everyone - I mean, virtually everyone - gets the rational intuition that they do. And this is expressed in the following way: two acts that are identical in all of their non-moral features will be morally identical as well.
What does this tell us - or seem to tell us? Well, it seems to tell us that actions have their morality of necessity, not contingently.
Return to shape - two objects can be identical in every way apart from shape. That is, there can be brute shape differences. We can say of A and B - well, they are identical in every way, apart from shape.
But we can't do that in terms of moral properties. We do not seem able coherently to say that two acts can be identical in every way apart from that one was right and the other wrong.
One act can be wrong and the other right, but there must be some non-moral difference between them to account for that difference.
So, if act A is right and act B is wrong, then either act A was performed with a different intention or it had different consequences - and that explains why it is right whereas B is wrong.
But someone who said "no, A and B are exactly the same apart from morally" seems to be confused.
Also, try and follow the dialectic here. The thesis above - the thesis that two acts cannot differ in their moral properties alone - is a thesis that poses a serious problem for MY view.
it is the thesis whose truth undergirds the Euthyphro problem.
For if moral properties are necessary properties, then my view is in trouble, as if my view is true then moral properties are contingent properties.
If you are already convinced that moral properties are contingent properties, then you cannot consistently think that the Euthyphro criticism works. And in that case I simply refer you to the arguments I used to establish the truth of my view - a view you now have no basis for rejecting.
On the other hand, if you think that moral properties are indeed necessary properties, then you will think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one.
To the extent that you've actually done a survey on this--posting your present comments in this thread, it seems like no one other than you thinks they must have the same morality.
Good and bad are measured by degree, that's why there are differing punishment sentences for "the same" criminal act. It is the fact that each of these acts in your example, results in an innocent person's death which makes them both wrong. But the degree of wrongness may vary such that one is worse than the other.
Quoting Bartricks
No, there could still be other factors specific to the circumstances which makes one worse than the other, therefore they would not have the same morality.
Quoting Bartricks
So this is false, by the argument above. I think virtually everyone would get the idea that one act would be worse than the other, depending on the circumstances.
Quoting Bartricks
Just as you did before, you are misrepresenting morality. Morality is based in judgements of degree, so it is not the case that every good act is morally equivalent to every other good act, nor is it the case that every morally bad act is morally equivalent to every other morally bad act. So the fact that two similar acts are both morally bad doesn't imply that they are morally identical.
In conclusion, just because two acts are bad doesn't mean that they are morally identical.
Quoting Bartricks
But act A may differ morally from act B even if they are both bad. So you start from a false premise, that if two acts are bad, they are morally identical.
Now that, to most people, is impossible. Two acts cannot be identical in every way apart from morally.
If two acts differ morally, then they must differ in some other respect as well - they must have been performed with different intentions, have slightly different conseequences and so forth.
You are confirming this without realizing that you are.
How can you not see that you're talking nonsense? If they are identical then they are not two acts but one and the same act. You are starting with an impossible premise.
Imagine two acts that are identical in terms of the intentions with which - nope, not bothering. I've written it umpteen times and your comprehension skills are just below the level needed to grasp this kind of thing.
Again, have you considered the army? Pick up a crayon, put it in your fist and fill out an application form. It's all yes/no questions, or you can just put in a smiley face for yes, and a sad face for no.
If we're talking about qualitative identity, then only one quality need be the same in order that we call it "the same", the same colour, the same weight, the same length, etc. Or even if two things appear similar we might say that they are the same. But you said that everything describable about the supposed "two" acts are the same, so you clearly weren't talking about qualitative identity.
Face the facts Bartricks, you're trying to put forward an argument which fails, as unsound, because it begins in an impossible premise.
You've got a keyboard. Be able to support claims that you forward.
You're saying you don't have a keyboard? Or maybe you don't know if you do?