Why is this at all un-obvious? I suppose, because why would we need a sentence to point "white" at snow and not need another sentence to point "snow" ...
For whole sentences, yes, a bit. Yes, a bit, as soon as we notice that parts of the sentence taken separately are about or describe the cat on the mat...
What would have been wrong with calling such an attitude a sentential attitude? And making it a mental state held by an agent toward a sentence? A pro...
True is what we call sentences which prevail: those whose tokens replicate successfully as free-standing (e.g. un-negated) assertions within the langu...
And so was I, but deliberately. As per Goodman: https://fdocuments.in/document/goodman-likeness.html Not necessarily as per Putnam, but I think it's a...
And that Mary agrees. And you have at least two speakers to deal with if you don't. So reduces further to a property of utterances. E.g. /uploads/resi...
S1: The water is cold. General reference/meaning is indicated, specific not. S2: ????????????? General not, specific not. S3: The water in Lake Michig...
Yes, or as I put it: that you mean a specific bit of water, and we don't know which. But, as you say, we all still know, as English speakers, what it ...
I suggest they're interchangeable. We all know that your sentence S refers to water in general, and cold things in general. We just don't know which b...
So reference is to some particular item (e.g. glass of liquid), whereas meaning is reference to a wider class or extension (e.g. of water)? We can ref...
Yes if we agree to clarify that the string without quotes is what we're calling a sentence, while the string with quotes is a name facilitating talk a...
Sure. Just not the fact which, as a sentence, it represents. Except of course in cases of self-reference: "this sentence has thirty one letters" etc. ...
Wherever we pretend it to be located. In a diagram we might draw an arrow between our depiction of a symbol and our depiction of the corresponding obj...
I don't think so. @"Michael" grudgingly accepted the very same clarification you continue to reject. I don't know if this is because you also reject t...
Agreed. It is invented, or pretended, by people using their heads, but that doesn't locate it in the head. See the link above. The second is our prete...
Some of them are sentences, and some of those are true, yes. Meaning, some them are what we choose to point the word "sentence" at, and some of those ...
I think the heap puzzle is a clear enough counterexample to that general assertion. Meaning rests on, or is, usage: some of it agreed, some controvers...
Yes, although the circularity perhaps only reflects the fact that definitions are unnecessary. The game asks for judgements, but not reasons. Fair eno...
I disagree. Never mind. Well sure, but a consequent is a sentence (or proposition). So you now reject as tiresome pedantry? Ok. Since you don't claim ...
Well I would recommend it, in any discussion of semantics, as "subject" is notoriously ambiguous between word and object, and often clarified for exam...
Do you mean that some alleged (truth-making) non-word-string corresponding to or referred to by the word-string "snow being white", or indeed by the w...
Oh gawd, now you're doing it. Which one, then? Please choose, and not equivocate. E.g. p the truth-bearing sentence/proposition/consequent, or p some ...
That would be basic correspondence theory, yes. My picture 1. Something I thought that neither of us agreed with but only one of us was capable of dis...
That's a related issue, sure. I'm less unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts that are physical events (objects in the larger sense of reg...
Hence my quoting Goodman, earlier. And note that my second picture is consistent with the T-schema. Even though it doesn't have whole sentences referr...
(My emphasis.) Exactly. According to correspondence theory in this kind of context. (My emphasis again.) Of course perhaps it isn't at all right. Henc...
Absolutely not. Wittgenstein is scrupulous. Pointing. The (alleged) thing that's not also a string of words. Sure. Two words for one thing. No problem...
If I say then I'm pointing "piece of metal" and "knife" at a metal knife. If I say then I'm pointing "string of words" and "fact" at the true sentence...
And stop doing it, please. The equivocation. You don't have to accept the alleged corresponding entities. But stop having it both ways, and basking in...
Only for the mystic, addicted to systematic equivocation. "Snow is white" is a sentence, and we point the word "true" at it iff we point the word "whi...
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