aletheist

No, simply recognizing our fallibility--i.e., the fact that certitude can never truly be justified, since the mere possibility of mistake cannot be lo...

This is obviously false. People rationally do good things and irrationally do bad things all the time.

The problem is not so much with rationality itself as with the set of presuppositions--i.e., the worldview--that serves as the starting point for any ...

Would you likewise go as far as acknowledging that they could be the intentional product of a creative intelligence? How should we determine what coun...

As I said before, how we answer the question depends entirely on our presuppositions. Treating the laws of nature as brute facts is no more "scientifi...

The question is how the initial state of order came about, from which the universe has been tending toward disorder ever since, at least according to ...

Apologies if I seem evasive, but I am not in the right frame of mind to delve into this any deeper at the moment. Perhaps another time.

It depends on how you define "ideas." I will stick with my answer as written for now.

Presumably reasonable inferences from perceptual judgments prompted by past sensations and corroborated by subsequent experiences.

I am still not sure where you are going with this. Something other than visual content is the sole basis of a blind person's belief in anything.

There seem to be some missing premisses here. How do we know that 2 is true? How does C1 follow from 1 and 2? How does 3 follow from C1? What exactly ...

I recommend not wasting your time. MU clearly has no clue about how mathematical modeling works as diagrammatic abstraction, primarily embodying relat...

No, it means that it is irrelevant within mathematics whether its strictly hypothetical models represent anything that really exists. In other words, ...

If you had actually said this in the first place, I would not have commented at all. What you actually said was: I took you to be claiming that a non-...

I said nothing at all about quarks, leptons, bosons, or the Standard Model. My claim is strictly about mathematics.

The fact that you think I am just blabbering makes my point for me. If we are utilizing mathematics, we are dealing with strictly hypothetical objects...

You have no idea how mathematical modeling works, do you? Or representation in general, since obviously a representation does not have all the same pr...

You are conflating the actual particles with the hypothetical (i.e., mathematical) representations.

No, we utilize non-dimensional points (and other mathematical constructions) as strictly hypothetical objects, and recognize that they do not have rea...

I agree, and your acknowledgment of this presupposition is what I was seeking all along. Of course, you are also presupposing that our current underst...

As I have already tried to make clear, my comments have nothing to do with the conclusions of modern science, or whether I like them. I am pointing ou...

No, we hypothesize laws of nature to explain causation; or rather, what we presuppose to be causation, rather than just random events. How long have w...

No, not causation in general; rather, the specific laws of nature as we observe them operating today. We also have no good reason to presume that they...

You are not even trying to understand the point that I am actually making. Technology is built using the laws of nature that we observe now, and have ...

It seems to me that we have to make a distinction of some kind between justification that warrants belief and justification that warrants knowledge. O...

I am not questioning whether causation is a presupposition of beliefs about past behavior that are based on present observations; I am questioning whe...

How does causation, all by itself, warrant beliefs about past behavior on the basis of present observations? How can we "prove" any theories about the...

I asked you first. :) It was a sincere question. No doubt every person has some beliefs that are justified yet false, which therefore do not qualify a...

I did not ask what presuppositions you reject, I asked what presuppositions you have (perhaps uncritically) adopted in claiming to know the age of the...

But each of us has certain presuppositions that dictate what we count as evidence and how we evaluate it, and different people can have different pres...

How do we distinguish justified belief from genuine knowledge? For example, I do not see how anyone can possibly know that the universe is 13.75 billi...

The justification warrants the belief, but not (by itself) the claim to knowledge.

I said that "if X then Y" is true if the laws of nature are such that if X were to happen then Y would happen. I was not trying to offer a solution fo...

Because we construct different models of real generals, for different purposes. "Artifical" vs. "natural" has nothing to do with it. If an earthquake ...

This misses the whole point of the example. In context, Peirce was illustrating for his audience that laws of nature are real generals; it had absolut...

Just curious, what is your warrant for claiming that we know this? It is obviously a belief; and given certain presuppositions, it is justified; but w...

Again, that is the wrong kind of subjunctive conditional. You verify "if X were to happen then Y would happen" by making X happen (e.g., conducting an...

In what sense do you think that we are justifying induction via induction? Again, Peirce's argument was that induction is justified by virtue of its s...

Peirce was intimately familiar with Hume and rejected the notion that induction depends on presupposing the uniformity of nature. Instead, his justifi...

This seems like an alternative version of modal collapse, which today is widely (though not universally) considered to be a fallacy in modal logic. Us...

Perhaps under quantum theory, it does not have one. The proper subjunctive conditional for my approach would presumably be a probabilistic one, like m...

The various theories of truth--correspondence, coherence, consensus, instrumental--only arise within the context of nominalism regarding generals. Pra...

I guess something more like, "If the bottle of poison were to be broken, then the cat would be dead." Not sure this gets at your point, though. It has...

But if you were to flip a coin such that it landed on its side, then it would be neither heads nor tails. :D

I used to call them "counterfactuals," until someone on this forum insisted that by definition, this means that they must be "counter to fact." I swit...

What would be an example of a "counterfactual quantum event"? Peirce was ahead of his time in recognizing the reality of absolute chance; he held that...

Deduction is not the only kind of inference. We infer causation as a retroduction - i.e., a hypothesis. We then use deduction to infer predictions tha...

No, what makes the first statement true is not some "power" that Peirce has. Rather, it is the fact that there is a real tendency in the universe for ...

From a pragmatic realist (i.e., pragmaticist) standpoint, subjunctive conditionals are true when the laws of nature that they express are real general...

How can you be certain that nothing at all is certain? But you evidently hold to the belief that beliefs in no way can be used as tools to reach truth...