The "ridgid" future is the actual outcome. You are currently thinking of the ridgid future as if it mutually exclusive with possibility. It's not. As ...
Indeed, but you are ignoring that it is states of existence which are the causes and effects. You keep proposing (pre)determinism on the ground a past...
Missing the point, John. I wasn't saying the "causal relation" was observable. The point was that it is a logical expression of existing states. We mi...
For sure. "Causation" is a logical expression of correlated empirical states. Doesn't change the fact that causal relationships are the presence of va...
Well, that's the problem with your approach. Causation is a matter of the action empirical states. It is existing states which cause other ones, not s...
Your problem is you are treating free will like its a state of existence. It's actually a logical expression of our states of decision. We can't point...
Determinism is not about metaphysical actors. It cannot be. One state causing other involves states of existence. It’s an empirical question. Causalit...
Indeed, I mean (pre)determinism suggests that prior states necessitate future ones. That's it's error. Prior states cannot perform such an action beca...
They are the same with respect to the idea of future outcomes being necessary by an initial state. I used "(pre)determinism" for exactly that reason. ...
For sure it influences our ethical positions. Persons get protection from harmful actions. Whether that be an unborn foetus/baby from a mother who wan...
It's really about the ethics of killing foetuses/babies and the ethics of whether women can decide to remove foetuses/babies from their own respective...
I avoided that suggestion deliberately. Yes, it is true that many of these arguing "Universal (pre)determinism envision the are talking about the abse...
I’m afraid to say this rather missies my point. Under my argument, there is only one sort of determining force: existing things causing other existing...
How exactly are you planning on executing free will in this situation? This argument suggests free will must executed by one's present belief, such th...
Ah, but that is the metaphysical error which is at stake here. We cannot be of substance. Substance is constant. No matter what happens in the world, ...
This is nonsensical. Your beliefs can't be a predetermined result because it takes your belief's existence to result in the relationship. Not only can...
The problem is that holds a misunderstanding of causality. It is always deterministic. Any casual relationship, by definition, has one state relating ...
Even more critically, it is required for free will. The point of free will is that , in our consciousness of the world and actions, a state of ourselv...
If you believe the nonsense that human action is somehow defined without any reference to our circumstances, sure. The compatibilist rejects this. For...
I'd take my description a bit further. Free will is not even at stake here. These legal categories are measuring specific coercive factors on an agent...
That's a misstep. We know the behaviour was determined (the causal chain leading up to that point) and we know it was freely defined (nothing prior to...
You are still using the nonsensical libertarian version free will here. The compatibilist rejects this notion of free will. For the compatibilist, fre...
Awareness does not dependent on being thought about or recalled in memory. Life does not need to think about how it had an experience to have one. And...
I more or less agree with TGW here. The temporally ordered sequence is a new experience which happens after the event. So, I think, is spacial signifi...
You're leaving out a fifth option: the it-in-itself is nothing. A feature which has no element to describe or phenomenological manifestation to talk a...
That issue is avoided by the condition of omniscience. If I know everything, then I would know I was omniscient. Assuming I'm interested in being trut...
You are missing that, in that instance, the statue is named. You began by pointing at a statue. The object you were thinking of has been there all alo...
The problem is naive and direct realism doesn't realism advocate this. The peeling is only present when it has been presumed that reality (things-in-t...
I'd say you are good: intimate relationships don't exist. A relationship is not any state of the world. It's a logical expression expressed across man...
In the simplest terms, religious claims about the world are the metaphysical (the necessary) and contingent (the finite, states of the world) confused...
That's a misplaced question. Conceptual expression doesn't exist. It is a question of logic, not of states existence. Existing objects express concept...
This is a strawman because Brassier is not attacking the conceptual nature of anything that we know. Indeed, he makes exactly the same criticism: that...
He's describing difference between concepts expressed in expereince and objects there. Objects are never the means by which we know them (our experien...
This the problem Brassier is addressing. Such a world is meaningless. Brassier brings this-up precisely because the "independent world," separate to t...
It really depends on you mean by "perfectly correspond." We tend to get fooled and confused when we approach this topic because while all instances of...
Indeed. It runs all together deeper. Objects which are, later named and categorised by us, ARE something which we later identify (tall, short, soft, r...
That's the dead end/error which drives much of the nonsense about theory of truth. There isn't a "how." At some point we are simply found with awarene...
I should clarify I'm talking about how most people use actually "correspondence" more so than its status as a theory of truth, at least going off by w...
But that's wrong. It's exactly the opposite: we know the nature of (your) consciousness. We know its a particular state which has emerged from other p...
Exactly. More or less. "Logic" says nothing. The difference in question is given entirely by "not about language" or "about language." If we want to d...
You are, again, asking for criteria when it doesn't make sense. Some logical distinctions are merely not about language. There is a difference in what...
Logical distinctions don't need to be about language. Some distinctions are not about language. Semantics is a type of logical distinction, that which...
Nope. It's not semantics. Logically (i.e. metaphysically), language is not the object it talks about. I'm not just arguing for a semantic distinction....
But's that's your strawman. There is no criteria. "Correspondence" is merely when there is one thing (language/experience, "cat" ) which talks/is awar...
That's what your account is missing. It's not just a question of language. Things are not the language used to speak of them. When the cat is sleeping...
I know that. The (realist) argument here is going beyond merely whether or not we say there are things we can talk about. It is asserting something ab...
That's a different question. Now you aren't asking how your consciousness came about, but rather whether there are any other conscious states emerging...
Missing the point, Michael. My argument was pointing out that criticisms of correspondence mean in the language (and so the claim) they are attacking....
I'd say it all about (perceived) Correspondence Theory of Truth and realism. In the OP, they are defending correspondence as instances where language ...
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