I think so. At least, he spends alot of the paper comparing Cavell with other readers and seems to 'side' with Cavell against them. It's more exposito...
No, you mentioned him because you saw another generic opportunity to wheel out your pet concerns which are tangental and irrelavent to the thrust of t...
§120 §120 largely trades on the distinction between the ideal (what language 'ought' to be) and the actual (what language 'is') that Witty has previou...
This is a great paper that deals with Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, and just so happens to also comment on §117 in a way that might help w/r/t the...
Oh my God are you at all capable of arguing about ideas rather than names? Rid yourself of this continental disease, it's philosophically asphyxiating...
Of course it's 'possible'; Derrida and co. have never left the plane of the 'possible' - that's the only thing they are acquainted with. The question ...
Perhaps one response to this is to transform the question from 'what transformations can't we think?' to: 'what transformations can't we live?'. This,...
Just going to try and respond to bits and pieces to catch up a little bit: Don't you find this kind of approach just absolutely suffocating? I mean, H...
This might be my last post for a day or so as it's ANZAC day tomorrow and I'll be out gambl... celebrating the war effort all of tomorrow, and I need ...
I don't think most people who use the term 'identity politics' know what they're referring to. I think they just see words like 'race' and 'gender' an...
I've been trying - and failing - to articulate to myself why this approach doesn't sit right with me, but I think I've hit upon why. I think for the e...
But feminism and anti-racist movements do not largely conform to the description I gave above. I think - though I could be wrong - we might agree on t...
This, by the political scientist Corey Robin, might be helpful: "One last word on identity politics: Every form of politics can take its identitarian ...
There's been some good discussion here with those who've had no such issues. Considering that I've had to correct some basic grammatical comprehension...
What failure? Was there something I wrote that implied that such temporal 'glue' ought to have no place in any analysis of language and normativity? O...
Can I ask that you look at the conversation between me and Csal a bit earlier on in the thread? Particularly these exchanges: these four posts here wh...
But I think what I want to say that local conditions of sense are already this 'deeper' sense of transcendentality; or that the deep manifests itself ...
Like Michael, you're simply mapping your concept of a house (and a flower) to the physical: you're just begging the question (yes, I'm ignoring what t...
No, that would be silly. As would any reading along those lines. It's There would be a concept of ; Not: There would be that one could imagine turning...
The last and only thing I'll say about Derrida in this thread from here because it is off-topic, as are most invocations of Derrida in anything whatso...
They are undeconstructible because they count, for Derrida, as among the conditions of their deconstruction. Deconstruction would be 'impossible', wou...
§118, §119 As per what I said about §116, §118 and §119 are best understood in light of the distinction between the understanding on the one hand, and...
Right, which is why I didn't say we can't. I said if we did, we'd be talking about something else. Or if you like - we can't if we want to talk about ...
Cool, so you've gone ahead and mapped the concept of flowers and houses to the physics, and then, on the basis of that, told me that concepts have not...
The idea is that there would be a concept of a house that one could imagine turning into a flower, but not our concept of a house. But tbh I'm not rea...
But the point being made is not about things: it is about concepts (or language). It's not about physical possibility. It's about conceptual possibili...
Is it presented in a dialectically oppositional way? Or are you simply engaging in the standard Derridian one-upping that leads, over and over again, ...
Your point is well taken, but I think what's missed is the context of the example, which, to be entirely fair, I did not provide. Actually, I mentione...
Hah, not you. Still, I'd say something like: a language game is conditioned by a form of life. So, in the 'context' of building something, 'slab' and ...
Also, a quick note on something I was thinking about in the car today: I've always disliked calling language-games 'contexts', and on reflection I thi...
I don't think the second bit of §117 can be properly discussed without referring to the discussion of ostension that took place earlier in the book. A...
More Cavell! - On Morality: "I take it that most moral philosophers have assumed that the validity of morality depended upon its competence to assess ...
I'd forgotten you'd mentioned physics. In any case you weren't who I had in mind. All I'll say is that I what I'm arguing for can accommodate this (as...
So a few people now have mentioned 'physics' - as though 'physics' could tell us what we call houses and what we call flowers; but this of course is a...
§117: This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician i...
A relevant quote relating to issues around §116: "In the work of Wittgenstein ... appeals to "what we ordinarily say" take on a different emphasis . I...
Just to be clear, the context of Cavell's discussion - which I see you've found - is in relation to the problem of scepticism: do we need philosophy t...
Your post brings to mind alot of the debate that occasionally crops up, in Lacanian circles, between those who bank on the 'Real' as provding some kin...
Was thinking about this a bit more: I think I'm avoiding magical examples because if McGonagall could just wave her wand and transfigure a bungalow in...
Comments