You’re asking, “How can meaning be use if I can’t use a sentence I don’t understand?” But that just shows that understanding is a skill, not that mean...
Tool 11: Hinges, what stands fast. Witt’s point is that doubt only works against a background (the background is layered) of things you don’t doubt. I...
What I meant by “the problem” is the temptation Wittgenstein keeps referring to, the urge to treat understanding as a hidden inner process, that which...
I agree with much of what he's saying, but with a Wittgensteinian twist, viz., consciousness is the bedrock hinge of reality. It's as fundamental as w...
A lot of what you wrote is strong, especially the way you deal with the misreading of PI 133. When Wittgenstein talks about “breaking off philosophizi...
This confuses “meaning is use” with “anything goes.” Witt isn’t saying every utterance is self-justifying. For him, use includes the entire practice, ...
If I don’t know what “niletee ubamba” means, then I can't use it as a meaningful sentence. I treat it as a sound that, “this person is trying to do so...
I'm not surer why you're forcing Witt into a theory-shaped proof, then calling it circular. PI 43 isn’t an axiom, it’s a reminder, and he hedges it, “...
Tool 10 is the therapeutic move. Witt isn’t trying to solve philosophical problems by crreating new theories. He treats many problems as conceptual kn...
I agree with your suggestion, look at what words are being used to do, and don’t treat meaning as a ghostly extra. That’s been the point of my “use/gr...
That “P1, P2, C1” framing is manufacturing a proof where Witt isn’t offering one, and it also smuggles in a bad premise. First, P2 is not Wittgenstein...
Sure, Witt would look at use, but looking at use is exactly why “my truth” is often problematic. In language games where we investigate, correct, and ...
Your point isn't right, and I think it smuggles in exactly the picture Wittgenstein is trying to undo. Wittgenstein doesn't say that rules are “necess...
You're absolutely right about this phrase. "My truth" is fundamentally incoherent and is a dangerous retreat from rational discourse. Truth isn't poss...
Circularity isn't a problem, you’re treating Witt as if he’s offering a foundation argument, as if meaning is a theorem is grounded in axioms. But a l...
Lewis style game theory and Bayesian updating are tools for modeling coordination and belief revision, but Wittgenstein isn’t trying to build a better...
Tool 7 is pictures that hold us captive. This is Wittgenstein at his most diagnostic. Most philosophical problems don’t start with bad logic, they sta...
Wittgenstein isn’t mainly explaining “how we understand each other,” and he isn’t doing an inside to outside story from public talk to private thought...
Yes, without inner life there’d be no human form of life, that's obvious. No hunger, fear, joy, pain, interest, boredom, no motives to act, no point t...
I don’t think there’s a contradiction here, but I do think you’re sliding between two different claims, viz., what makes language possible versus what...
You’re missing Wittgenstein’s point, and a few of your claims are just false. You’re treating inner inspection and then applying a label as some parad...
I mostly agree with the point you were making (although the post was deleted). “Look and see” can sound like an appeal to the obvious, but in Wittgens...
Tool 6 is rule following. Wittgenstein’s point is that a rule isn’t something that contains its own application, and it isn’t made secure by an inner ...
We do have to be careful, because the “open vs closed” split doesn’t map very well onto Wittgenstein and can sneak back in the false choice between in...
I understand the argument, but it slides from a harmless point to a stronger conclusion that doesn’t follow. Yes, if we had no inner life, we wouldn’t...
He doesn’t offer a “foundation” in the sense of a hidden cause or a behaviorist reduction. The language game “I’m in pain” is grounded in the practice...
Tool 5 is family resemblance, and it’s Wittgenstein’s way of solving a very common philosophical habit, i.e., the habit of demanding a single hidden e...
Yes, I’d agree with most of that, but I’d add bit more, so it doesn’t overreach. I agree with the central point, i.e., people hear “there’s no ghostly...
Thanks. Excellent question, and I think your intuition is basically right, with a minor adjustment. In practice, grammar check and language game don't...
You're welcome. Thanks for your thoughts and the pushback. I think you’re right to be concerned about “just copying the surface,” but I don’t think th...
Tool 4 is criteria, and it’s one of the best ways of keeping philosophy honest. If you’ve asked what language game you’re playing in, the next questio...
Tool 3 is language games, this is where Wittgenstein gets concrete. If the Wittgenstein's grammar asks, “What role does this sentence play?” the langu...
Tool 2 - the grammar check, and grammar here in Wittgenstein’s sense, not in the schoolbook sense. He doesn’t mean punctuation or sentence diagrams. H...
Tool 1 is the simplest and, I think, the most important: “Look and see.” When a philosophical question starts to feel deep, Wittgenstein’s first move ...
Thanks for all of the replies. I'm trying to think of another subject for a thread. My philosophical focus tends to be very narrow, but hopefully I'll...
I don’t buy your reading of Wittgenstein. It takes his rule following comments and turns them into a kind of norm skepticism, as if Witt were saying t...
From a Wittgensteinian view, I agree with the method, viz., look at use. But “look at use” doesn’t mean every use is equally in order or valid, or tha...
One way to address of the “why stop?” question is to notice a structural pattern that shows up outside epistemology too. Gödel showed that in any form...
Sure, we should look at how words like reason, doubt, improvement, and justification actually get used. But I think you’re using that point to dodge t...
You’re mixing three different things and then acting as though the mix refutes my point. It doesn’t. I would say Redesign is rule-following is a dodge...
I agree that the question “Could chess be improved?” isn’t meaningless, and I’m not committed to the view that every extra-game question is nonsense (...
I don’t think the chess analogy breaks down; I think it exposes the exact pressure point, viz., what counts as staying in the same game. Inquiry does ...
. Calling hinges arational doesn’t mean they’re irrational, blind, or immune to ideas. It means they don’t operate as moves in our justificatory pract...
The paper needs some revisions, but I think it could be submitted to... 1) Episteme (Cambridge), which is a general epistemology journal. 2) Synthese ...
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