AJJ

You could say despite not being able to perceive or establish how possible worlds exist on a nominalist view that they do anyway, sure. But that seems...

Oh, well yeah. Physical change if you’ve already assumed it to be potentials becoming actuals merely requires space, I agree.

Potentials and actuals.

Perhaps I’ll just leave you with an example of your exemplary skill in reasoned argument:

This is turning into spam now, so perhaps we should draw a line under this instead of going round the same circle again.

And instead of addressing what I said you made what appears to be a simple assertion of what you think intended as a refutation.

I am being serious. You said the above in reply to points that weren’t even about properties. It appears to be a simple assertion of what you think in...

Here’s the definition you get when you Google question-begging fallacy: “begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's pr...

OK. But I consider those question-begging statements and so not valid objections to what I’ve been relating.

I agree - but your contention was that it is “merely” space that enables physical change, which is what I disagreed with.

Only if you assume a univocal use of the word “existent”. Words can be used analogically, so a potential doesn’t need to be said to have being in prec...

Sure, physical change seems always to require spatial movement. But that alone wouldn’t account for change, which seems to require there be potentials...

Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of...

How would space alone enable change?

I agree. Change is the default, so we start by explaining it. You don’t need to explain it if you don’t want to, but it can be and has been explained ...

I don’t know what you mean by this.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. Parmenides thought change was an illusion, then Aristotle managed to give that expl...

I disagree. The positing of potentials is a way of explaining change - a yellow banana can become brown because it has that potential. The potential c...

I disagree. What makes it incoherent?

They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviousl...

I think possible worlds exist independently of the actual world, yeah.

Yes, but only potentially as opposed to actually. It could have a physical instantiation but it doesn’t.

Ah - I see what you’re saying now. Well that’s fine, I don’t mind being in agreement with anyone on that point. But some nominalists such as Terrapin ...

I think you’ve misread my post.

I don’t hold that potentials are non-existent. I hold that they exist in a sense analogical to the way actual things exist.

All the properties of a possible world would have to be non-physical.

I haven’t said they need to exist in the sense univocal to something actual. My view is potentials have being, but in a sense analogical to the sense ...

This isn’t true if you accept the analogical use of language, in which case potentials have being in an analogical sense rather than in a way univocal...

You asked what properties non-material existents can have. On my view possible worlds are non-material existents and have properties in the way I desc...

It seems to me a possible world where everything is identical apart from there isn’t a blue mug in front of me would have all the properties this worl...

What is your reasoning that they can’t exist non-materially?

Underlying the above is this: You’re justification for believing possibilities are groundable materially is an assumed materialism. I’m not assuming t...

I don’t see at what point I beg the question.

So I suspect what you’d be doing there is begging the question, i.e. more circularity.

But I have actually shown them (in a non-circular fashion) to be groundable that way, in the divine intellect.

It isn’t actually a restatement. The premise is that possibilities can’t be grounded materially in the physical world, and the justification is that t...

I disagree. I’m not saying they can’t be grounded in the physical world by simply assuming they can’t; rather I’m offering you the chance to disprove ...

I mean to sum up my (adopted) explanation of things: 1. There are possibilities 2. They can’t be grounded materially in the physical world 3. So they ...

I’ve demonstrated mine is. Can you demonstrate your conclusion is a logical necessity (without arguing in a circle)?

If it’s a logical necessity that abstract objects obtain within the divine intellect then it isn’t circular. If possibilities conceived of as abstract...

It seems to me the circularity is avoided by the abstract objects existing necessarily within a Platonic third realm or the divine intellect. Obviousl...

You’ll have to clearer yourself, I don’t know exactly what you’re saying there.

And I actually think I’ve been unfair to myself, since my explanation doesn’t conclude with what you say. The reason my explanation doesn’t wind up be...

Your claim that possible worlds can depend materially on the present world would have to be backed up in a non-circular fashion. And your explanation ...

You’ve not been saying that in answer to my question of how they obtain. You’ve been saying simply that they’re a consequence of the world not being s...

I’m saying there are possibilities/possible worlds (ways things could have been) and that these are abstract objects (something additional about how t...

And I’m saying that amounts to a simple assertion that there are possibilities without saying anything additional about how precisely they obtain.

So your reasoning it seems is circular: possible worlds are explained by there being possibility which is explained by there being possible worlds. I’...

You’re reasoning there is to the effect that possible worlds exist because possible worlds exist. I’m saying that’s not reasoning anything, rather it’...

So in short: Mine: “Possible worlds exist on my terms by being abstract objects which allows them to exist where on other terms they can’t.” Yours: “P...