Realism, Nominalism, Conceptualism and Possible Worlds
I’ve been reading more from Edward Feser, this time about realism vs nominalism and conceptualism. The argument that most caught my interest was from the nature of possible worlds (abstract objects describing ways things could have been).
-Realism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real and objective.
-Nominalism says abstract objects such as possible worlds aren’t real. Possibility must instead be grounded in the material world.
-Conceptualism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real but exist only in the human mind.
Here are the objections Feser describes against nominalism and conceptualism:
So it seems the existence of possible worlds requires that realism be true - otherwise you’re committed to determinism, where only the present world is possible and possibility is only some or other description of it; either that or the peculiar view that possible worlds begin to exist only when humans do, and are required to include other humans.
Or not?
-Realism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real and objective.
-Nominalism says abstract objects such as possible worlds aren’t real. Possibility must instead be grounded in the material world.
-Conceptualism says abstract objects such as possible worlds are real but exist only in the human mind.
Here are the objections Feser describes against nominalism and conceptualism:
For example, there are possible worlds in which the laws of physics are radically different from those that actually operate, including some with laws that would make it impossible for human beings to exist. Obviously such possibilities cannot depend on the actual material world (which, needless to say, is governed by the laws that actually hold) [rebutting nominalism] or the human mind [rebutting conceptualism]. And before the actual material world or any human mind came into existence, it was at least possible for them to exist. This possibility could not then have depended on either the actual material world [again rebutting nominalism] or the human mind [again rebutting conceptualism], since neither yet existed.
So it seems the existence of possible worlds requires that realism be true - otherwise you’re committed to determinism, where only the present world is possible and possibility is only some or other description of it; either that or the peculiar view that possible worlds begin to exist only when humans do, and are required to include other humans.
Or not?
Comments (229)
This isn't correct, really.
First of all, conceptualism is a species of nominalism.
But more importantly, one need not be a materialist to be a nominalist.
In fact, nominalists do not even necessarily reject abstract objects, although that is one popular form of nominalism.
On Googling conceptualism you get this philosophical definition: “the theory that universals can be said to exist, but only as concepts in the mind.” Then from the Wikipedia page: “Conceptualism is anti-realist about abstract objects”.
On Googling nominalism you get this philosophical definition: “the doctrine that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality.“
Those seem to me to match the ones I’ve given from Feser’s book, which seem fine for the point being made. I understand you can be a nominalist about certain things while being a realist about others, but nominalism or conceptualism about possible worlds appear to have the implications I described.
Have a look at the SEP entry for nominalism:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/
"Nominalism comes in at least two varieties. In one of them it is the rejection of abstract objects; in the other it is the rejection of universals . . . The two varieties of Nominalism are independent from each other and either can be consistently held without the other."
"Similarly, according to Concept Nominalism (or Conceptualism), there is nothing like scarletness and a thing is scarlet in virtue of its falling under the concept scarlet"
I'm a nominalist a la a conceptualist, by the way. I happen to both reject abstract objects and universals, and I'm a materialist, but it's not necessary to hold both types of nominalism or to be a materialist. Nonmateralist nominalists will simply hold that there are nonmaterial particulars.
Sure, I did a moment ago:
Like I said, I understand you can be nominalist about some things and realist about others. The definitions given in the OP are correct for the purpose of the point being made. I can at least concede that realism being true about possible worlds wouldn’t make it true about other abstract objects or universals, although it may as well be given the implications of that (the existence of a Platonic third realm or a divine intellect).
The definitions, for example, say that nominalists are necessarily materialists. This is wrong.
So why are you saying it's correct?
Where does it say that?
"Nominalism says abstract objects such as possible worlds aren’t real. Possibility must instead be grounded in the material world."
It says no such thing as "possibility must be grounded in the material world."
That has nothing at all to do with nominalism.
Your objection was that the definitions say nominalists are necessarily materialists. Being nominalist about possible worlds doesn’t mean being a materialist, it just means being one about possible worlds since they’ve been rejected as existing in the abstract.
What part of "nominalists DO NOT say that possibility must be grounded in the material world" don't you understand?
That has nothing to do with nominalism.
If possible worlds have been rejected as existing in the abstract then possibility must be grounded in the material world. So for example the possibility that it’s going to rain would instead be a description of the black clouds in the sky, say.
No. This is wrong. I already explained the alternative. One can simply posit nonmaterial particulars. "Not abstract" doesn't imply "material." (And likewise, "abstract" doesn't imply "not material.")
Someone could be an ontological idealist (so reject materialism wholesale) AND be a nominalist.
If you edit your posts after I’ve replied to them I might not see the edit.
Can you tell me the difference between a nonmaterial particular and an abstract object such as a possible world?
And I Googled abstract and this is the first definition given: “existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence”.
Particulars are discrete existents, singular instantiations, with properties that uniquely obtain in that discrete instance.
Abstracts range over multiple instantiations of particulars, whether they're types/universals or concepts.
Which isn't correct, because you can have physical/concrete abstractions. For example, if you believe that abstracts are concepts, you believe that concepts are events in a specific individual's mind, and you're a physicalist on mind.
They do not necessarily reject abstracts as concepts. Hence we have conceptualist nominalists (which is what I am).
I don’t see how this applies to possible worlds, which I take to be discrete abstract objects.
Quoting Terrapin Station
In that case concepts wouldn’t be abstract, rather they’d be concrete.
I’d say the definition in my OP recognises that.
There are a bunch of different metaphysical interpretations of what possible worlds are. You'd have to explain how "discrete abstract" makes sense to you (unless you're simply using "abstract" as a synonym for "nonphysical," but I explained why that doesn't work).
Quoting AJJ
They're abstract in terms of content, or in terms of semantics (meaning). Content-wise, they range of a number of particulars. That's the whole function of concepts.
"Abstraction in its main sense is a conceptual process where general rules and concepts are derived from the usage and classification of specific examples, literal ("real" or "concrete") signifiers, first principles, or other methods.
"An abstraction" is the outcome of this process—a concept that acts as a common noun for all subordinate concepts, and connects any related concepts as a group, field, or category.[1]
"Conceptual abstractions may be formed by filtering the information content of a concept or an observable phenomenon, selecting only the aspects which are relevant for a particular subjectively valued purpose. For example, abstracting a leather soccer ball to the more general idea of a ball selects only the information on general ball attributes and behavior, excluding, but not eliminating, the other phenomenal and cognitive characteristics of that particular ball.[1] In a type–token distinction, a type (e.g., a 'ball') is more abstract than its tokens (e.g., 'that leather soccer ball'). "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstraction
I’d say possible worlds are abstract according to the definition I quoted, and they’re discrete because they can be differentiated.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Well I’d want to make a distinction then between an “abstraction” and an “abstract object”. The former being applied more generally to concepts that may actually be physical in nature, and the latter applying to those objects which fit the definition of abstract I quoted.
Could you repost the definition of abstract you're using?
“existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence”
So then, for one, in this context you'd be saying that possible worlds are objective thoughts or ideas? What would that amount to?
It would amount to there being either a Platonic third realm where those objects exist, or a divine intellect where they do.
So we can't do possible worlds unless we buy platonism or god?
You can to an extent. But if you’re a nominalist about possible worlds then they must depend on the world around you and not be abstracted from it, which makes possible worlds such as one where the laws of physics are entirely different from ours impossible to have been.
If you’re a conceptualist then possible worlds can exist in the human mind, but then possible worlds where humans don’t exist become impossible, since if you rewound time to before the existence of humanity that possibility would disappear (as my own understanding has it).
I'm not sure that makes sense to me. Remember that I actually am a nominalist (about everything), and I'm the conceptualist brand of nominalist.
On my view, possible worlds are a way of talking about the simple fact that not everything about our world is strongly/causally deterministic.
Nominalists, by the way, if they reject abstracts, typically are not realists on physical laws, because it's difficult to construe physical laws as such as something other than abstracts. Physical laws as (real/objective) particulars don't make a heck of a lot of sense.
So on your terms (as I understand them) a possible world would be a concrete abstraction in your brain, and so only a possibility so long as it existed there or in another person’s brain.
Possibilities are real--they're the fact(s) that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic. That doesn't hinge on thought, but it's not abstract, either.
Possible world talk is a way of talking about the above fact(s).
How on your terms do those possibilities obtain?
The same thing I've said a couple times already: by simple virtue of the fact that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic. So, for example, we have a particle, a, in state s, and because strong determinism isn't the case, after interacting with particle b, it can be in state q or r.
After interaction with b, one of those possibilities will be what obtains in the actual world. The other we can talk about via possible world counterfactuals. It could have turned out that the other was the case instead, because there were two possibilities.
That's the simplest example. More complex examples work similarly.
What would an example of a 'nonmaterial particular' be?
Incidentally, I find the argument for 'scholastic realism' quite persuasive, because I believe that many 'intelligible objects', including real numbers, are real - i.e. the same for anyone who can grasp them - but not material, i.e. only perceptible to the intellect.
What rational thought enables is the ability to perceive intelligible objects and relations which is what grounds speech, thought and reason in the intelligible order.
Of course this attitude it wildly unpopular in current analytic philosophy.
It's difficult for me to give a descriptive example of a nonmaterial anything, because personally I don't believe that the idea of nonmaterial things makes any sense. But obviously many people don't agree with me, and some of those people can be nominalists.
If one is an idealist, where one rejects that anything whatsoever is physical/material, then any particular would do. For example, a particular rock. The idealist thinks that it's not material, not physical.
I just can't describe what the "nonmaterial" part amounts to, exactly, because that bit seems incoherent to me.
It seems to me what you’ve said there is to the effect that “possibilities obtain because there are possibilities.”
If for example there’s a possible world where the laws of physics (however you understand them) are radically different from the ones we have, how on your terms does that possibility obtain? That it’s there and we can talk about it isn’t a response I’m very willing to accept.
But your argument, at that point, depended on it. You were arguing that one didn't have to be a materialist to be a nominalist, because you could posit a non-material particular, but when pressed as to what this might be, you can't answer the question!
Quoting Terrapin Station
Idealists don't reject that things are physical and/or material; idealism can perfectly well recognise the difference between real and imaginary. What I think idealism rejects is that material things have any intrinsic reality.
And that's certainly the case--describing what possibilities are is going to be a case of describing possibilities, right? In other words, it's basically defining what possibilities are, and that needs to be the same on both sides--the definiendum and the definiens need to amount to the same thing or it's not really a definition. We're just not repeating the word on both sides. We're explaining what it refers to just in case someone doesn't know.
What else would we be doing if we're explaining what possibilities are/how they obtain?
Quoting AJJ
As I mentioned above, I'm not a realist on laws of physics. I mentioned that most (and maybe all) nominalists are not realists on physical laws, because it's difficult to make sense out of real physical laws that are particulars. So there's no world in which literal laws of physics obtain.
I said that it's a possible position. I gave you an example--an idealist nominalist's particular rock. I just said that I can't give you a descriptive account of what a nonmaterial anything would be (which is what you presumably wanted), because in my opinion, nonmaterial anythings are incoherent. They're not to you.
Quoting Wayfarer
Ontological idealists do. I already specified that above.
I'd be surprised if you were to now claim that one can't have an ontology that rejects physical/material things wholesale.
So you’ve explained that possibilities are possibilities (how things could have been), but you haven’t as far as I can tell explained how, on your terms, they obtain.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I know - I addressed this by inserting the “(however you understand them)”. I’m asking about a possible world where everything behaves very differently, and how on your terms that possible world obtains.
I can try another example: If for example there’s a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist, how on your terms does that possibility obtain? The answer to the effect that it’s there and we can talk about it has been covered already.
You'd have to explain why on your view the fact that the world isn't strongly/causally deterministic isn't an explanation for how possibilities obtain. (Or actually that should be phrased as how more than one possibility consequent to identical antecedent states obtains)
What I'm saying there is the fact that enables multiple possibilities. So why wouldn't that be an explanation? What other sort of thing would you be looking for as an explanation?
If I asked you for an explanation why it rains sometimes and you said “because there is a fact that enables there sometimes to be rain” then you’re not explaining anything - you’re just agreeing with me that there is indeed something called rain that happens sometimes.
I explain possibilities by positing abstract objects called possible worlds, with this world being a manifestation of some of them. Obviously you can’t offer the same explanation - yours must be grounded in the material world because you’ve stated you’re a nominalist and a materialist. So if there is a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist, you must appeal to something in the present world which materially contains that possibility - if there isn’t anything then it doesn’t appear you can coherently say on your terms that such a world is possible.
What would be the explanation of rain that wouldn't be identical to the fact(s) that enable(s) rain?
Quoting AJJ
On your view, isn't that the fact that makes possible worlds obtain? If so, how is that an explanation per your criteria? You're insisting that explanations are simply relaying the fact(s) that enables or amounts to what we're explaining.
Those would be identical. But saying “there is an explanation” about something (which I see what you’re doing as) isn’t the same as explaining it.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It’s an explanation for how possibilities as you described them earlier obtain. All you’ve done it seems to me is describe possibilities without offering an equivalent explanation for how they obtain.
Can I take it that what you’re positing is that the existence of possible worlds is some kind of brute fact?
Just to make this clear: Saying the world isn’t “strongly/causally deterministic” is to my mind just another way of saying there are possibilities. Saying there are possibilities doesn’t explain how there are possibilities. If you’re saying it’s simply a brute fact about the world that there are possibilities then fine - I don’t think that’s an adequate way to understand things, but we don’t need to argue about that.
So "positing abstract objects called possible worlds" isn't another way of saying there are possibilities?
It is a way of saying that, sure - but it also explains how there are possibilities: There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist because the possibility is an abstract object that exists independently of the material world.
That's just saying what a possibility is on your view.
I disagree - it’s taking an example of a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist and saying such a possibility can only exist if you’re a realist about possible worlds, i.e. it’s explaining how that possibility exists.
What is different about your formulation?
What yours amounts to is: “There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist because the possibility is a factor of the material world having possibilities.”
What mine amounts to is: “There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist because the possibility doesn’t depend on the material world from which we would not be able to derive that possibility.”
I'm asking not what's different about the content of the explanations, but.what's different about them structurally that makes one an explanation and the other not an explanation.
Here’s the second definition when I Google explanation: “a reason or justification given for an action or belief.”
So what your formulation amounts to structurally is: “There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist [belief] because the possibility is a factor of the material world having possibilities [justification].”
Mine is the same structurally. The problem I have with yours is it doesn’t actually offer a proper justification, so what you’ve made there is an assertion rather than given an explanation.
Where of course you'd need to present what a "proper justification" is supposed to amount to.
Here’s the definition you get when you Google justification: “the action of showing something to be right or reasonable.”
You haven’t in my view shown yourself to be right or reasonable on that point - rather you’ve made an assertion that you haven’t yet backed up.
As you could probably guess, I don't think that positing real abstracts is either right or reasonable. So should I say you're not offering an explanation?
You could, but that would be another assertion. I’m not asserting that you’re not providing a justification for the point under discussion - it seems to me I’ve demonstrated that.
What did you do different than I did? If you're being serious, it seems weird to me that you believe you're doing anything different than I am.
Here’s mine again: “There can be a possible world where this planet doesn’t exist [belief] because the possibility doesn’t depend on the material world from which we would not be able to derive that possibility [justification].”
My justification gives an explanation for how the possible world obtains on my terms, i.e. I reason that it’s being an abstract object which allows it to exist because on other terms it would not be able to.
It seems to me you can condense yours down to this: “There can be possible worlds because there are possible worlds.”
Here’s a parallel example to yours to press the point: “Unicorns can exist because there are unicorns.”
You’re not giving an explanation for how possible worlds can exist on your terms, just asserting that they do without offering that explanation of how I’ve been asking for.
So in short:
Mine: “Possible worlds exist on my terms by being abstract objects which allows them to exist where on other terms they can’t.”
Yours: “Possible worlds exist on my terms because they do.”
Sure, so here's mine again:
"There can be a possible world where this planet doesn't exist [belief] because the possibility is a result of the world not being strongly(/causally) deterministic; if that weren't the case, there would be no non-actual possibilities [justification]."
My justification gives an explantion for how the possible world obtains on my terms, i.e. I reason that being a consequence of a metaphysics that's not strongly(/causally) deterministic allows it to exist because on other terms it would not be able to.
It seems to me you can condense yours down to this: “There can be possible worlds because there are possible worlds.”
So in short:
Mine: "Possible worlds exist on my terms by being a factor of the world not being strongly(/causally) deterministic; otherwise nonactual possible worlds can't exist."
Yours: "Possible worlds exist on my terms because they do."
I said, in another context, that I refuse to do arguments that hinge on whether something is an explanation unless general criteria for explanations are given, and this is the perfect example why.
I got suckered into this one, because it didn't seem initially like it was going to be one of these stupid "That's not an explanation" arguments.
So let's look at general criteria for explanations in a way that we can check them without just saying, "That's not an explanation!" "That's not a justification!" etc. at whim.
In my post above, by the way, I'm simply showing that one can do the exact same nonsense from either side.
You’re reasoning there is to the effect that possible worlds exist because possible worlds exist. I’m saying that’s not reasoning anything, rather it’s making an assertion that possible worlds exist and leaving it there.
Quoting Terrapin Station
But you can’t because I’m saying something additional to that, i.e. I’m explaining how possible worlds exist (as abstract objects) and not simply asserting that they do without any enabling reason why they do/can.
So I reject your claim that you can make the same objection from your side.
So your reasoning it seems is circular: possible worlds are explained by there being possibility which is explained by there being possible worlds. I’m saying that’s inadequate reasoning and so not a justification and so not an explanation as per the definitions I’ve quoted.
But that's what I did. The world could be strongly deterministic. It's not. That's how (non-actual) possible worlds exist.
And I’m saying that amounts to a simple assertion that there are possibilities without saying anything additional about how precisely they obtain.
So what are you saying additional that's not the same as an assertion that there are possibilities?
I’m saying there are possibilities/possible worlds (ways things could have been) and that these are abstract objects (something additional about how they obtain).
Which is not additional, obviously.
Quoting AJJ
So when I say that possibilities are concrete facts, I'm not saying something additional about how they obtain?
Why would "They are abstract objects" be something additional, but "They are concrete facts" isn't something additional?
You’ve not been saying that in answer to my question of how they obtain. You’ve been saying simply that they’re a consequence of the world not being strongly/causally deterministic, which as I’ve pointed out is circular.
So what seems to have happened is you said this:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Which is circular as well it seems, but it does say implicitly that possibilities are concrete (material) facts. So then I asked you this:
Quoting AJJ
And you started giving circular explanations for how possibilities obtain, when what I’ve wanted to know the whole time is how possible worlds such as one where this planet doesn’t exist can obtain as something concrete as opposed to something abstract.
So I made an error in my last post: What I’ve been saying that’s additional is not simply that possibilities are abstract objects, but that their being abstract objects is what allows possible worlds to exist since they can’t depend on the present world for that - it’s that last claim I’ve been trying to verify by asking you how on your terms possible worlds obtain (where the answers so far appear to be point-missing and circular).
You wouldn't think that an explanation has to conclude that something can't depend on the present world, would you?
If the explanation concludes "being concrete objects is what allows possible worlds to exist, since they CAN depend on the present world for that," why wouldn't that be an explanation just like yours, simply with a different conclusion?
Your claim that possible worlds can depend materially on the present world would have to be backed up in a non-circular fashion. And your explanation there isn’t a parallel to mine, which includes the claim that possible worlds can’t exist materially (which is valid so long as you remain unable to explain how possible worlds obtain materially).
So put simply the reason I reject your explanation as an explanation is its circularity, which isn’t something I think mine exhibits.
And I actually think I’ve been unfair to myself, since my explanation doesn’t conclude with what you say. The reason my explanation doesn’t wind up being circular is that abstract objects can be said to obtain within the divine intellect, which (if abstract objects exist) must exist necessarily unless abstract objects can be said to exist otherwise. Not an explanation you agree with obviously, but it doesn’t to my understanding wind up being circular.
I can't even make sense out of it, really. If abstract objects exist aside from "the divine intellect," and that's what we're talking about re possibilities being abstract objects, is that circular?
You’ll have to clearer yourself, I don’t know exactly what you’re saying there.
You're saying that on your view your explanation isn't circular. Is that only because you're positing abstract objects as something "within the divine intellect," or would it not be circular if we're positing abstract objects period (so even if not "within the divine intellect")?
It seems to me the circularity is avoided by the abstract objects existing necessarily within a Platonic third realm or the divine intellect. Obviously objections can be raised against both possibilities, but I don’t think circularity is one of them.
Okay . . . but it's a mystery why you'd think that. You'd need to explain why that would make something noncircular versus alternatives.
If it’s a logical necessity that abstract objects obtain within the divine intellect then it isn’t circular. If possibilities conceived of as abstract objects remain possibilities in the absence of contingent minds, then they must exist within an absolutely necessary mind, one that can’t not exist. It seems to me that once you’ve reached a logical necessity you’re at the end of a straight line of reasoning.
Hmm, so if I were to think that my explanation is a logical necessity, then it wouldn't be circular.
Of course, then we're just disagreeing on whether different things are logical necessities. You'd say your explanation is; I'd say my explanation is.
By the way, on my view, possibilities/possible worlds aren't conceptions, though we have conceptions about them.
Quoting Terrapin Station
So possibilities are both "non-actual" and "concrete facts"? Can you explain how that could be a coherent assertion?
Sure, it's the concrete fact--a specific, material fact about a specific event, that it isn't causally deterministic.
I don't know why you'd be thinking that physicalists have to be determinists. Could you give some info on how you arrived at that conclusion?
So, you say that possibilities are non-actual and yet are concrete facts. How would you describe the concrete existence of a possibility, i.e. in what form would it be physically instantiated? The idea of such possibilities somehow physically existing, and yet being non-actual, seems completely incoherent to me, so I'm just asking for you to give an account that clarifies what you mean by claiming such a thing.
I’ve demonstrated mine is. Can you demonstrate your conclusion is a logical necessity (without arguing in a circle)?
I mean to sum up my (adopted) explanation of things:
1. There are possibilities
2. They can’t be grounded materially in the physical world
3. So they must be abstract objects
4. If they’re abstract objects they can’t exist in the physical world but must exist in a mind or collection of minds
5. To remain possibilities in the absence of contingent minds they must exist within an absolutely necessary mind
Yours it seems to me is this:
1. There are possibilities
2. They can be grounded materially in the physical world
So the reason yours is circular and mine isn’t is our justifications for 2 in each case. I justify my 2 by showing that you seemingly can’t describe the way possibilities are grounded in the physical world, or that you do so simply by arguing in a circle. You justify your 2 by repeating your 1 (while assuming nominalism and materialism).
Wait, we're not really getting to why you're thinking that physicalists would be determinists, though.
Are you thinking of physicalism as being or having some sort of dedication or subservience to the scientific discipline of physics? (And you're thinking of physics as deterministic, with the possible exception of quantum mechanics?)
Your 2 is that one can't describe the way that possibilities are grounded in the physical world, so if that's your justification for 2, that's circular.
It seems almost like you're reading that possibilities are something in the material/physical world into your (1) by the way. And then you're seeing the rest of your argument as explaining how this can be the case by positing them as something other than things in the material/physical world. It seems like you're thinking of it as a parallel to religious-oriented cosmogenesis arguments.
I don't even think that your view is coherent.
I disagree. I’m not saying they can’t be grounded in the physical world by simply assuming they can’t; rather I’m offering you the chance to disprove the premise - if the justification was circular it wouldn’t be open to that disproof. If you were to offer one and I rejected it by simply assuming the premise then in that case it would be circular.
???
It's circular because your support for 2 is just a restatement of 2.
Circularity has nothing to do with other people disproving anything, etc.
It isn’t actually a restatement. The premise is that possibilities can’t be grounded materially in the physical world, and the justification is that they haven’t (despite the opportunity offered) been shown to be groundable materially in the physical world.
1. There are possibilities
2. They can't be grounded in the nonmaterial world
Then
And do the exact same thing
But I have actually shown them (in a non-circular fashion) to be groundable that way, in the divine intellect.
So I suspect what you’d be doing there is begging the question, i.e. more circularity.
What is wrong with you? It's the exact same thing you're doing. Are you trolling?
You've made claims to that effect, sure. I've made claims you don't agree with, too.
Quoting AJJ
I don’t see at what point I beg the question.
2. They can’t be grounded nonmaterially in the nonphysical world
3. So they must be an upshot of material facts
4. If they’re upshots of material facts, they can’t exist in the nonphysical world but must exist in the physical world
If yours isn't circular, that isn't either.
(And this has also had nothing whatsoever to do with nominalism, conceptualism, etc. for awhile)
Underlying the above is this:
Quoting Terrapin Station
You’re justification for believing possibilities are groundable materially is an assumed materialism. I’m not assuming the alternative (I actually think a fully cogent materialist world view would be really interesting), rather I’m reasoning in this case that possible worlds can’t exist materially, and so if they do exist it’s as abstract objects.
I'm not just assuming for no reason that possible worlds can't exist nonmaterially. It's via reasoning that we justify that they can't exist nonmaterially.
In any event, this has nothing to do with whether it's circular.
What is your reasoning that they can’t exist non-materially?
It starts with trying to make sense of the notion of any nonmaterial existent. No one who posits nonmaterial existents will even posit any positive properties that they're supposed to have. ("Positive property" refers to saying properties they're supposed to have rather than listing properties they do not have, that is, rather than defining them via negation of physical properties.)
It seems to me a possible world where everything is identical apart from there isn’t a blue mug in front of me would have all the properties this world has minus the blue mug, but it would have them potentially rather than actually.
I have no idea what that's supposed to have to do with our last two posts.
This intuition is correct, but it has a serious consquence for our account of possible worlds: they cannot exist all (since existing things are actual).
Rather puts a dampener on the supposed contradiction between possible worlds and the material.
That which does not exist does not need it's existence grounded. Materialists get completely off the hook because the non- existence of abstract objects releases any need for them to appear as existing states.
You asked what properties non-material existents can have. On my view possible worlds are non-material existents and have properties in the way I described.
This isn’t true if you accept the analogical use of language, in which case potentials have being in an analogical sense rather than in a way univocal or equivocal to the sense in which actual things have being.
Not true.
Remember the problem was supposedly that possibilities had to exist, had to possess the univocal or equivocal sense of an actual state.
If we are to reject this, whether by analogy or definition as an abstract object, we are committed in the first instance to a position possibilities do not exist at all. Indeed, it is precisely in being possibilities are abstract or referred to by analogy that they are not a material (actual) state.
Ah, okay, so in a possible world sans the blue mug, is there a spatial location of your computer, for example? So that you'd be saying that spatial location is a nonphysical property?
I haven’t said they need to exist in the sense univocal to something actual. My view is potentials have being, but in a sense analogical to the sense in which actuals have being: not in the same way, but not in an entirely different way.
An analogy that's entirely different than what we're analogizing?
In which case you are really in little disagreement with the nominalist: like you, they hold potentials are non-existent. Both of you look out into the material world and assert the possibilities are not found there.
The analogy makes no difference here. All that's required for this similarity is the assertion potentials are not material. Both of you agree potentials are not manifesting states of the material world.
All the properties of a possible world would have to be non-physical.
I don’t hold that potentials are non-existent. I hold that they exist in a sense analogical to the way actual things exist.
I think you’ve misread my post.
I know, which commits you to a position, like a nomilnalist, that these abstract objects are not at all material existence.
Always. That's how analogies work. Two different things are noted to be similar in some respect.
The trouble here is in the space question, material existence, there is nothing shared, no matter how similar or analogous they might be. If someone says, "You run like a penguin", it doesn't make me a penguin.
Sure. So is there a spatial location of your computer in the possible world you mentioned?
Similar in some respect isn't entirely different than it, of course. (Although I did miss his "not.")
Ah - I see what you’re saying now. Well that’s fine, I don’t mind being in agreement with anyone on that point. But some nominalists such as Terrapin claim that abstract objects don’t exist in any sense, which I do disagree with.
Well, that's the trick.
I mean they are always entirely different, despite any similarities they might have. No matter how similar I am to the penguin, I am in no way the penguin. The idea similarity overcomes or eliminates entire difference is an illusion.
Yes, but only potentially as opposed to actually. It could have a physical instantiation but it doesn’t.
So you're claiming that potentials exist as something "independent" basically?
I think possible worlds exist independently of the actual world, yeah.
But you'd say they don't actually exist . . . which seems impenetrably incoherent to me.
They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviously can be.
The problem is that the brownness of a yellow banana doesn't exist in any manner prior to it being actual, and saying that it does is incoherent.
I disagree. What makes it incoherent?
The fact that it makes zero sense. You have to posit more incoherent nonsense a la an "immaterial" realm.
It would be like arguing that it's a fact that brown or yellow bananas are colorless, only not in the actual world, but rather in the "esoteric realm."
I disagree. The positing of potentials is a way of explaining change - a yellow banana can become brown because it has that potential. The potential can’t be actual, because then the banana would be brown, so rather it has to be potential and exist in a different way to what is actual.
"Explaining" something obvious by making up something incoherent seems perverse.
That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. Parmenides thought change was an illusion, then Aristotle managed to give that explanation above of why it isn’t. You say it’s incoherent, but since you haven’t explained in what way I have nothing to argue against, so I simply reject your objection.
Why in the world would you think that "something allows" things to change, as if not changing would be the default that we need permission to depart from?
I don’t know what you mean by this.
Not changing isn't a default. We don't need an explanation for what "allows" change, as if it would need to be allowed.
I agree. Change is the default, so we start by explaining it. You don’t need to explain it if you don’t want to, but it can be and has been explained in at least one way, as described above.
Wouldn't that merely be space?
How would space alone enable change?
But it's not explained by something that's incoherent. An existent non-actual is incoherent.
Why would anything need to allow or "enable" change? That's what you need to explain. Why you'd think that.
If there is nowhere to go, but where you're standing - you can't change position.
Likewise for all things - if they don't have any space but the occupied space, how would they motion?
Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of something (the brownness) appearing out of nothing, which isn’t logically possible so change must be an illusion (Parmenides). But change isn’t an illusion - it’s obvious. So how does it occur? Aristotle seems to have given a very good answer to that.
Sure, physical change seems always to require spatial movement. But that alone wouldn’t account for change, which seems to require there be potentials becoming actuals.
Only if you assume a univocal use of the word “existent”. Words can be used analogically, so a potential doesn’t need to be said to have being in precisely the same way something actual does.
There's the 'actual' frame in play, and then there are the 'potential' frames. Now if all frames were to occupy a single slot, the object would appear static, but if we were to space and layer them - they would motion.
I agree - but your contention was that it is “merely” space that enables physical change, which is what I disagreed with.
Aristotle and Parmenides? No wonder you're in such a mess here.
Properties are characteristics of matter and matter's dynamic relations (always-changing structures) with other matter.
OK. But I consider those question-begging statements and so not valid objections to what I’ve been relating.
You don't understand what question-begging is, really.
It kind of seems like your view is always slanted towards some very stock religious arguments, really. And you see anything outside the scope of that as question-begging.
Here’s the definition you get when you Google question-begging fallacy: “begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.”
It seems to me that in essence your arguments take this form:
Premise: You’re wrong.
Conclusion: I’m right.
Where you support the premise simply by stating the conclusion.
C'mon, be serious, at least.
I am being serious.
Quoting Terrapin Station
You said the above in reply to points that weren’t even about properties. It appears to be a simple assertion of what you think intended as a refutation.
Aside from the fact that anything we talk about in any respect, any changes we talk about, is talk about properties, the specific example at hand was a banana changing color.
And instead of addressing what I said you made what appears to be a simple assertion of what you think intended as a refutation.
This is turning into spam now, so perhaps we should draw a line under this instead of going round the same circle again.
(keep it on the down-low, but it was pretty much spam as soon as you started parsing everything I said as question-begging and everything you said as an explanation, despite it being structured just the same)
Quoting Terrapin Station
Did you want to get into a huge Aristotle discussion? Maybe we could go line-by-line and argue about every assertion?
Parmenides has it right. The reason change is an illusion is precisely because something else is involved. When a change occurs, the same defines it. The world can only change if two different instances are the same, such there is an alteration of one. Same with person. If I am to change, the new way of being must the same, me, or else fail to be the change in myself at all.
Change is defined through something remaining the same
We might think the change has destroyed the same, but it is an illusion. A change is always a song sung by the same, it's an event performed by something which is the same.
So, if we had a universe with a single particle, say one electron, and then that were replaced by a single proton, would it be the case that the contents of that universe changed? What stayed the same?
The universe stayed the same.
Otherwise, our universe would not have changed at all. We would instead just be talking about some different universe and the status of ours would be going unmentioned (has it even changed? We don't know, since we aren't posing anything about it at this second point).
The universe isn't an existent aside from the particle in question. We don't have two things at a time--the particle and the universe. We just have one thing at a time.
Agreed. That's how it is the same universe.
If we had another universe, then we would have two things and there would not be the one undergoing change.
I'm saying that all that exists, period, is a single electron. Then all that exists, period, is a single proton. Was there a change? It wouldn't make any sense to say there wasn't. But there's nothing that stayed the same.
Possibilities are simply the fact that the world isn't strongly deterministic.
So we have a particle, A that interacts with particle B, so that B can have immediately consequent states, with nothing else involved, of either C or D. Prior to A's interaction with B, neither C nor D are actual. They're possibilities--namely, the concrete fact of that A will interact with B non-deterministically. After A interacts with B, one possibility will be actualized, the other is no longer possible, but we sometimes talk about it in terms of counterfactual possible worlds.
But something has stayed the same: the universe.
There is now a proton instead of an electron. In this change, something has stayed the same: we still only have this singular universe. So the universe has indeed undergone a change. It is now a proton rather than electron. Still the same universe though. This is how we say there is a change.
If it weren't the same universe, the change wouldn't be there at all. We would have one universe which was an electron, and another which was a proton, neither of which replaced the other.
No. Again, the universe isn't an existent aside from the particles in question.
I never said otherwise.
Belonging to this universe is just a property of these particles. There isn't a seperate object of universe we might observe and measure.
So that's not something that's staying the same because it's not even something.
Clearly not, we are talking about something.
"Universe" picks out a particular distinction, something is true in virtue of it. To speak of this universe is different then to speak, for example, of our own. In this case, universe is speaking about similarity between the electron and proton, such that they have the relation of change and replacement (as opposed to just talking about any old instance of a proton and electron).
We just aren't talking about a something which is one particular existing thing. In the sense we are speaking now, we might even say this universe is something which does not exist, which is how it stays the same even when existing things (proton>electron) do not at all.
Don't confuse our talking about it with what the thought experiment is proposing. We simply have one thing, and then something else.
So you're telling a falsehood then? These particles are not of this universe?
More to the point, this move engaging in a special pleading. How it is that our language about the electron and proton means something, but our language about the universe does not? If it were all just a thought experiment that said nothing, our language of proton and electron would not refer.
"Given the energetics presented above, there is a strong thermochemical bias for the production of water over hydrogen peroxide when H2 and O2 are reacted together. For instance, when hydrogen gas is burned in the presence of oxygen, a large amount of energy is released and water is produced as the major product. In cases where the reaction is more controlled, however, such as the consumption of hydrogen and oxygen in a fuel cell, the mechanism and kinetics of the O2 reduction process can complicate issues greatly. For instance, the delivery of the protons and electrons derived from the ionization of hydrogen (see redox half-reaction above) to a molecule of oxygen has to be precisely controlled via a process know as proton-coupled electron transfer in order to ensure that the complete four-electron reduction of O2 dominates. Platinum metal is capable of serving as a catalyst that brandishes exquisite selectivity for the four-electron reduction of oxygen to water, and accordingly lies at the heart of fuel cell design and function. Given that platinum is rare and extremely expensive, current research is aimed at the development of structural and functional models for oxygen activation and reduction to water via proton-coupled electron transfer. Similar strategies are also being exploited to drive the energetically uphill reverse reaction, in which hydrogen is produced from water using solar energy. The success of both these areas of work may ultimately prove crucial to the development and sustainability of a global hydrogen economy."
From here: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-does-combining-hydrog/
So,the article seems to be saying that combining water and hydrogen will produce water unless special conditions are present, in which case Hydrogen Peroxide will be produced.
Can you give any examples from science where it has been shown that two particles interacting could produce different outcomes under the same conditions?
There are 'real possibilities'. That a banana can turn brown is a real possibility, that it can turn into a fish is not. So that 'domain of possibilities' is real but doesn't refer to existents. (In fact, there's a good argument that this range of probabilities is what the Schrodinger wave equation describes, which is why Heisenberg re-introduced Aristotle's idea of 'potentia' - he said electrons and the like are in a domain between existent and non-existent, i.e. they too exist 'as potentials'.)
Yes, it's like transmutation or topological formation; whatever transmutes can return to its previous form. The Eterne remains, always, conserved, as the only permanence, all else being so temporary that it never stays as anything particular even for an instant, for the Eterne transmutes continually.
Potentials and actuals.
Do you really not get the thought experiment or are you trying to be an idiot?
Their transition merely requires space.
Now who is changing the topic?
You said that the idea is incoherent in your view.
I explained it. The explanation had nothing whatsoever to do with what anyone else believes is the case.
Was the explanation coherent in your view? If not, why not?
Oh, well yeah. Physical change if you’ve already assumed it to be potentials becoming actuals merely requires space, I agree.
Non-actual possibilities are existents in AJJ's view. He was who I was going back and forth with.
They function like a man locked within a room, who holds no experience of events outside.
They function out of imperceptibility.
You could say despite not being able to perceive or establish how possible worlds exist on a nominalist view that they do anyway, sure. But that seems to me to be an assertion of a brute fact, which I don’t think is an adequate way of explaining anything.
That to my understanding is the use of positing substantial properties and accidental properties. Something remains the same by virtue of its substantial properties while changes occur in its accidental ones.
Nominalism is the smallest container, Conceptualism is the next in line and hence forth.
What would this explanation be lacking?
Is that an explanation? It only seems to me like a representation of expanding possibilities as the dolls grow in size, or of how much each view is willing to posit.
I am saying something else entirely. The words we use in this situation refer to something. They describe something. In making out statement, whether do a thought experiment or not, we are speaking about something. Our language is referring to something specific when we say "universe." We are disingishing the fact of where these electron and proton belong-- they are of this specific universe (as opposed to not).
You misunderstand my point. It's not about properties because sometimes they change. What stays the same is not an accidental or necessary property, but rather an entity which is doing it's properties.
I have changed many times over my life. How have I stayed the same? Well, I remain the same existing entity, which is why my changed properties belong to me rather than something new. The fact I changed depends on the sameness of my existence.
Think of it simply as a logical possibility at the moment. So whether it's consistent with what's commonly accepted in the sciences is irrelevant for that.
Do you agree that the following would be a concrete fact? A particle, A that interacts with particle B, so that B can have immediately consequent states, with nothing else involved, of either C or D.
It's true that if you're thinking just of logical possibility then science is irrelevant. But if you want to claim that possibilities are "concrete facts", then you would need to give some ontic account of the "concrete factuality" of possibility which is consistent with science and coherent on its terms, because otherwise you would be claiming that something obtains despite its not being in accordance with current scientific understanding, an extraordinary claim that it would be incumbent on you to provide evidence for if you want it to be taken seriously or even simply made sense of.
You would also need to explain, as I have said several times now, how something could be a "concrete fact" and yet "non-actual", since that just seems to be a plain contradiction in terms.
:-/ :-\
Do you think that particle A is a concrete fact?
You have explained nothing so far.
Do you think it's possible to talk about a particle where we're talking about a concrete fact?
Again, by the way, I'm in no way appealing to any conventional (or unconventional for that matter) view in the sciences. So forget about what the sciences say.
lol okay. Great conversation like usual.
That wouldn’t fit my understanding of each view in this context. Nominalism denies possible worlds exist apart from the world, conceptualism denies they exist independently of contingent minds and realism claims they exist objectively in the abstract. Beyond thinking about them it seems possible worlds that remain only potential are inaccessible on each view.
Both frames of possibilities fall prey to objectivity, as they would foremost have to be objective, prior to moulding their limits; hence the matryoshka.
This rejection is not a rejection of the existence of possibilities outside of those frames, but a rejection of such a description - due to lack of experience; hence layered acuity - like with anatomy, cells, atoms, etc.
I offered the Matryoshka, as I think it would be the most apt explanation of change and limitations.
If nominalism and conceptualism want to sit inside realism saying we all believe in the same possibilities but disagree about the nature of them then I still say they owe an explanation of how those possibilities can be called real on their terms, as opposed to some or other description of the present world or something imagined.
It is so - we may outline something we've no experience of as real, but we may not name it, as we've no experience of its content.
The two hinge on this inability to name as to wholly disregard possibilities, whereas realism accepts possibilities with disregard to naming.
An allusion can be made to the 'unheard sound'.
If a sound is unheard, does it exist? It does, its existence is a prerequisite to the question - leaving it merely unheard, hence not perceptibly experienced.
It seems to me that the content of a possible world is the potential state of things it amounts to. I don’t see a problem with naming all the potential ways things could have been “possible worlds” or saying they exist in the abstract.
Does the myopia of the two seem apparent now?
:cheer:
Have I shown you this before?
Perhaps the myopia is mine since I don’t actually know what point you’re making that I haven’t answered already. Naming and explaining things we have no direct experience of doesn’t seem problematic to me, but insisting something exists without giving a proper account of precisely how does.
And to discuss an 'unknown possibility' - an unknown possibility is required, discerned through a shared border with known possibility.
It appears to me as though you've got the problems backwards?
I’d say we do have experience of possibility, of an indirect sort: the sense that things could have been different and the often unpredictable nature of events. The only problem I see is nominalism and conceptualism’s account of these apparent possibilities; I have no other problem to get it backwards with.
That's known possibilities of retrospect.
That's what Conceptualism focuses on - missing links via rearrangement. Hence it views Past and Present.
Whereas Nominalism focuses entirely on the Present, disregarding not experienced rearrangements.
In simple terms:
Nominalism is merely an accounting. Present
Conceptualism mixes and matches. Dealing with present and past.
But neither accounts for the unknown future possibilities. That's the myopia.
The unknown can neither be physically nor mentally represented, but it can be accepted.
Does it seem clear now?
It strikes me that you’re making a rather nebulous point which doesn’t address what I’ve been saying. Nominalism and conceptualism can accept possibilities all they want, but they don’t to my knowledge give adequate accounts of them. I don’t think we need to know every possibility, past and future, in order to do that - to account for conceived possibilities is to account for those we haven’t conceived as well, i.e. they’re being accounted for in general, not case by case.
Again, this seems a bit misleading. I'm an example of a conceptualist nominalist (so that's a type of nominalism), and while I'd say that counterfactual possible worlds talk is simply a way of thinking and talking about possibilities that could have been the case, I'd not at all say that the possibilities in question were only mental.
Where are you getting that from?
As established, they cannot.
Quoting AJJ
It isn't.
But I wish to ask, do you mean as in if there are conceived possibilities it follows that there are unconceived ones as well?
Well there you go.
Quoting Shamshir
As in possibilities that no one has thought of, yeah,
I figure there must be. I think perhaps we’re talking past each other here - the OP sums up where I’m coming from with all this.
I'll just add not necessarily, and leave it at that.
No problem :up:
Page one.
Quoting Terrapin Station
How are you getting past/present from that?
Edit: so I looked at the article, and I agree with the idea there that potentials are real (and not merely abstract or logical) but not actual or existent. The problem for a physicalism that allows that only physical existents are real is that potentials cannot be physical existents, which means the physicalist is then committed to saying that potentials are not real. This is just the problem of incoherence I find with Terrapin's view: he wants to say that potentials are non-actual, which I agree with, but he also wants to say that potentials are concrete facts, which is a straight contradiction. And of course he cannot give a coherent account of this, but does not want to admit it.
What? What's internal to mind? What does the word "aspect" refer to in this context? And what does "retrospect" have to do with it?
Are you talking about conceptualists? They reject that abstracts and universals (types) are external to mind. Not other things.
Hence present aspects and retrospection are their limit.
Well, unless we were talking about an eternalist (re philosophy of time). Eternalism/presentism and nominalism (including conceptualist nominalism) have no implications for each other. In other words, you could have a (conceptualist) nominalist eternalist, or a (conceptualist) nominalist presentist, or an eternalist or presentist who isn't a nominalist as well.
Whether an eternalist or presentist (or any other possibility re philosophy of time), nominalists (including conceptualists) aren't necessarily going to think that possibilities aren't real. For example, I'm a conceptualist nominalist who thinks that possibilities are real--it's just that I don't think that possibilities are independent things (just as I don't think that space or time are independent things).
The same thing goes for the past.
And of course, even if presentists, (conceptualist) nominalists will say that the past was real, and the future will be real.