What? You said... Now you're saying you've no actual examples of modern science that are nondeterministic in this field? So how have you come to the c...
Experiences as epiphenomena can't 'make' us say red, only neural activity can do that. No, but the point I'm making is that no 'experience' causes you...
I appreciate the effort, but I still don't see anything in there that's more than just saying there is such a distinction, rather than explaining how ...
Neuroscience doesn't work with behaviours, it works with neural activity, but that aside, what is 'the feeling itself'. Are we talking dualism, epiphe...
Your use of content and structure is becoming problematic as you relate it to conceptual matters such as experience. Physical things have a content (c...
How does that tell us where to cut the continuous and unfiltered 'experience'. If my X response (as opposed to your Y) might be caused in part by my b...
Even to sufficiently advanced neuroscience? What form would this pain take if it had no physical expression whatsoever? To understand my objection to ...
No you couldn't. And contrary to your ad hoc guesswork, there's plenty of evidence to the contrary. For a start, in many cases we can see that the act...
Obviously not. The keys with the code numbers produce a different response to the ones without, otherwise the lock wouldn't work, if all the keys had ...
My apologies. I'm not getting notification for some posts (it's been that way for some time and no-one seems to be able to fix it), @"khaled" reckons ...
And yet words are somehow insufficient all of a sudden when distinguishing them? The artifice here is partly that we can chop up and distinguish eleme...
You've misunderstood the point I was making - which is understandable, as reading back, it was terribly written. You're proposing one has experience X...
Yes. Two distinct (but similar) things can be determined 'the same' for some purpose by seeing similar features. To use the example I just used with L...
So why bring up efficient mechanical causes then. You keep changing the criteria for what constitutes a 'cause', it's like grasping an eel. So now you...
It literally does. 654 exerts a power on the system which unlocks the door, 456 loses all the mechanical power in waste heat. It's basic physics. If 6...
I don't see how that gets around the problem. In positing the possibility of XXY you're implying that the first two experiences are identical, when th...
As I said earlier If I have red hair, then red hair is a property of me, but a property of 'red hair' is not {belongs to Isaac}. Red hair is a public ...
From my current knowledge of cognitive science, all this sounds like nothing more than wishful thinking. I've not read (nor here been presented) with ...
You. The things you possess are a property fo you (and the law of the country you live in, when it comes to stuff not part of your body). The feeling ...
I was asking about the idiosyncratic way you were using the terms. It's obviously not the definition you've given above. The thing applying force to y...
Because the ink is in a different arrangement and so fires different neurons. We scan images (like paper with writing on it) in saccades looking for s...
But as I said earlier. That's not a property of the feelings. It's the same with noses, I can only have my nose, because, even if it were transplanted...
I don't believe you can. I think what you're imagining has properties, on analysis, which render it non-epiphenomenonological. The thing you're imagin...
But that's not going to happen if you simply ignore people who disagree with you. All that's going to happen is you'll re-affirm the ideas thus presen...
What do you mean by 'efficient' and 'mechanical' because the explanations given so far have been flawed. To be 'mechanical' something must cause the d...
Yes, I agree, but I'm not sure how relevant the salient features of the task are by the time it's just one of many signals competing for attention - w...
I'm pretty sure I understand what you're saying now, thanks. It seems an odd theory, but valid. I just disagree about one point, but I think it's more...
I don't disagree with that. It's about parsimony. Why introduce something for which there's no evidence? That's the default position. We don't subdivi...
Yeah, I can agree with that. So is that what you mean by subjective but not intrinsically private? Something which requires a mind but has not yet bee...
That's proof that we have epiphenomenon, not that we have unique epiphenomenon X or Y in response to the same external inputs. Alk the evidence you ha...
Realised I'd missed replying to this. Yes. I think perhaps Clark is not such a good envoy for active inference. Friston is the Messiah of active infer...
There's no knowledge there to be gained. Epiphenomenon X doesn't pre-exist. We've got no reason at all to assume it. The only justification for labell...
Now you're leaving the realm of epiphenomenon. The epiphenomenon X can't 'cause' anything. Similar, but different. If fMRI isn't fine-grained enough, ...
Then why post? If it's irrelevant what people take away from your doing so? Then how does sound and light affect the body, if different sounds and lig...
Yes, I'm gathering that. What's not clear is what the difference is between a cause and a conditions, which you thought so 'obvious' at the start. So ...
Only that tasks (in the sense I think the phenomenologists meant it - 'doing the shopping', eating a sandwich'...) are modelled by areas of the brain ...
Odd. So there could be something publicly shared yet which is entirely subjective? I'm not following you. That seems a reasonable definition, but then...
I don't see how that's at all relevant. You're positing that there's some epiphenomenal effect (X or Y) which is a physical consequence of some partic...
Yeah. Did you happen to read my edit in my third to last statement? I agree with you that we have different brain states in virtually every case. The ...
Comments