You are talking here about the distinction between sentence token and sentence type, and I don't see why this should contradict what I said (that they...
Then what else could it be...? Fine, but this is not the same as saying that they have a semantics like sentences. Obviously yes, his whole Language o...
And by the way, there are even more extreme views than what I've described. There's something called "minimalist semantics" (advocated by Herman Cappe...
The first reason is that Travis' original argument is concerned with sentences, not propositions, so I couldn't use something else instead when presen...
Let me put it this way. From the Travis/Wittgenstein point of view the relevant rule is that the sentence "the leaves are green" apply only whenever t...
No he doesn't, he just says that rules are not enough for meaning, or better - that applying a rule is always a matter of excising a special sort of c...
First I think the argument is neutral on the issue of externalism, semantic or otherwise. And you are correct that the 'traditional' view doesn't comp...
There's a neat argument by Charles Travis that I think illustrates quite well what was meant by Wittgenstein when he said "meaning is use", and it als...
But 'interpretation' is not always a subjective thing, in fact the case of language is precisely where interpretation is not subjective in most cases....
But there's no such thing as a theory of types, and there could be no "syntax errors" in a language (because every sentence in language can be potenti...
Here's the correct formulation of the paradox based on the Stanford article cited by Meta. Fitch's argument proves that if one assumes that all truths...
But you don't have to be a defletionist about truth even if you reject correspondence; one can still maintain that truth is an important and substanti...
Yes, but this is not a 'metaphysical' explanation of truth. When you say that proposition P is true iff such and such is the case, then you simply rep...
Sure, but this argument is interesting because it shows that the correspondence theorist gets into trouble even if we grant him that past events can s...
Here's another objection to correspondence, that I read in Frank Ramsey's "Facts and Propositions". The key idea is that mere physical entities in the...
That's a good suggestion, but strictly speaking "Trump being the POTUS" is not itself an entity but a fact, i.e., something which depends on a descrip...
You don't really need counterfactuals or statements about the past to demonstrate that the correspondence theory doesn't work (there's a lot of philos...
The issue of testimony doesn't change my point. Because for me to know (1) there must've been some scientists who did all the right experiments that c...
OK - but then, they are synonymous by virtue of which meaning? The meaning that you yourself stipulated for the signs, or the meaning they generally h...
He need not to be a witness to the crime, but he must know that a general rule of the form "if such and such evidence exist in the crime scene then pr...
But you said earlier that synonymy is not sameness of meaning, so you can't appeal to semantics here. If A and B are identical, it means that there is...
There's a thing called 'the principle of charity', which says that you ought to try interpret other people's words in the most plausible or charitable...
It doesn't matter if this is not the same sign in this context. If "A=B" means something like "whenever the sign 'A' occurs you can interchange it wit...
Because no one is infallible, and you can learn a great deal by talking and trying to persuade other people. Unless of course you assume in advance th...
If you want to persuade other people (and not just talk with yourself), then you ought to care about what they think and believe in, and attempt to pr...
It doesn't change my point. Synonymy is a trivial thing however you understand it - it doesn't prove anything if you substitute one word for another (...
But you can't say that meaning is synonymous with causality, because that will make your claim vacuous (then you will be saying in effect that causali...
No, because I don't accept the casual analysis. I'm saying that if you define representation in casual terms, then you are in trouble (but the same ar...
"objecting based on ..." simply means that you are using something as a premise in your argument, and since it is true (and you seem to accept it) tha...
Because to know empirically that the wind causes the paper to move you must first be able to observe the wind, and being able to observe the wind mean...
But I just quoted you where you contradict what you just said "The objection can't be that you can't know that without observing the correlation betwe...
I don't see how it is relevant to your objection. You wrote: But the mere fact that the theory analyzes meaning in casual terms doesn't mean that you ...
Yeah I meant something like that. Of course in actual science there are many complications when it comes to determining that two phenomena are causall...
This is because causes cannot be inferred apriori from their effects, but only established by empirical observation (as Hume has thought us). So if a ...
We ignore it because you don't understand the view that you try to attack, and therefore your arguments simply don't make any sense. The 'use' concept...
Meaning cannot be a causal relation. If X means Y because Y causes X (X being some mental state in our heads, or whatever you like), then you can't kn...
Actually I don't think that he ever did, he just changed his method of logical analysis (and his views on what it means to do a logical analysis). (I ...
I don't think that it really matter that much (philosophically at least), and it's not clear exactly what 'concepts' are to begin with... Maybe this i...
Well it depends on what sorts of creatures we are talking about (and there is a sense of 'perceiving' which is not conceptual), but why shouldn't we s...
Not quite. When it is 'decided' that this and that would count as 'a length of an object' then it's not merely a claim about the society (though it ce...
Where did I link concepts to linguistic competence? I brought up this whole topic about the standard meter to illustrate how something which is not li...
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