Fafner

I don't understand what you mean.

But do you agree that it is possible for proposition A to be true while B is false?

So what? I don't see how it is relevant. Which part of the argument you don't agree with?

Proposition A = Caesar died Proposition B = Caesar was murdered Proposition A is true = there's an entity x corresponding to A Proposition B is true =...

But In the example that I gave they were intentional. Let me change it slightly. Imagine someone who doesn't speak English very well, and he utters th...

But what makes it the case the certain words match your intention, and others don't? Obviously what they mean. But what explains their meaning? It can...

More quotes about 'forms of life' and 'communal agreement', this time from Wittgenstein himself (taken from "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics...

To complement StreetlightX's quote from Cavell, here's another quote from Cora Diamond that gives a particularly good illustration in my opinion to th...

You are talking here only about the assignment of meaning to a sentence, which I already agreed is an arbitrary matter (and therefore you can say 'sub...

The difficulty is that when you describe people's linguistic behavior (as in all the examples that you've listed) it may appear like a behaviorist ana...

Because as I explained they are different propositions with different truth conditions, so if they correspond to the same thing, you cannot explain th...

Well, the first problem is that it is simply unclear what 'correspondence' is supposed to be. It is very hard if not impossible to give an non circula...

Sure. But the challenge is not make it sound too anti-realistic or conventionalist. We want our sentences to have objective truth conditions at the en...

I just wanted to pose an open question without trying to answer it :) And I don't want to use any loaded terms like 'language-games', especially since...

Of course there's a story to be told why certain words are appropriate for saying that it rained yesterday, and not some others, but I intended to rem...

That's a lute, not a guitar :)

So do you want to say something like "meaning of a sentence=intent"? If so, then I think it is very implausible that intending something by a sentence...

Oh I see what you mean, yes I made a mistake in my formulation, I'll fix it. As they say in the Stanford article, the paradox is interesting because (...

Which is exactly what I said... You can't know the conjunction of a&b. This is not a solution because you change the subject. The paradox is directed ...

It seems to me that you have an idiosyncratic understanding of 'interpretation' that in my opinion is confused. Give me a concrete example of what it ...

What I meant when I said that words are not important is that there is no necessary definitions that one must understand in order to understand what i...

Sure, ask me anything you want.

Both :)

It ain't easy, nobody understands you.

My personal feeling is that the fishy bit occurs where we take the "P is unknown" part and ask whether it can be known in some possible world where P ...

Mine is self explanatory... I'm a fanatical follower of St. Ludwig.

So are you disagreeing with me? I'm not sure what is your objection (if you have any) to the argument about the leaves.

But do you agree that the sentence 'the leaves are green' has different meanings in the two different examples?

Of course there is intent in the example, but the point is that what one can 'intend' to mean is constrained by the context of the utterance; that is,...

I don't understand this argument. What you said doesn't show anything of this sort. We can use all sorts of words when explaining something, but what ...

I think the problem can be formulated without the use of formal language, that is, it doesn't arise merely because of some formal peculiarity of this ...

Sure I agree, it's much more complicated than how I presented it, and the sentence itself is ambiguous in some respects and can have different meaning...

And how do you think 'P' is treated in the formulation of the paradox (say in the Stanford article) as a constant or a variable?

One difference is that formal languages are invented for particular purposes which are quite different from chatting with your friends or singing "hap...

Yes exactly, Travis' argument is aimed precisely against views that employ Grice's distinction. Conversational impicature seems to be the favorite dev...

I agree that this would not be very useful, but it is also the case that talk about ''syntax error" as a criterion for meaningfulness is also just as ...

Wait, did you assume that I quoted Fodor as someone who agrees that meaning cannot be specified in advance? Because I quoted him as an example of some...

Yes, this is my reading of Fodor as well, and what you said about the meaning of a word not being specifiable in advance is also the view that I've be...

Right. (that is, they are not numerically identical)

Again no, what is identical is not the token but the type to which they belong. Is the sentence "objects A and B have an identical color" an assertion...

OK I see what you mean, but I would assume that if you press most philosophers on this, they would say something like that is not the "strictly correc...

I'm only pointing out that this is a natural use of "the same". Don't you use and understand sentences such as "me and my brother have the same hair c...

I only answered your original question:

Yeah, that's exactly my point. If propositions don't have semantic content then they don't have a semantics period (because this is what "semantics" m...

You have to distinguish between two senses of "the same". On one sense, indeed we don't have the same car (our cars are not numerically or token ident...

Hmm I don't remember ever seeing such a use of 'proposition', can you give an example? Maybe you mean when a philosopher just explains the content of ...

I don't see how what you say contradicts what I said about Fodor. Could you explain a bit more?

Another point about propositions: propositions are usually postulated in order to explain the semantic content of sentences. However, if you treat pro...

Yes, that's what I meant. No, I was argueing the opposite. On the type/token distinction if you say 'cats fly' and I say 'cats fly' then we have utter...

I'm not quite sure what you had in mind, but what Fodor meant (and many other philosophers) is that you need such rules, that tell you in advance what...