None, in the sense that they both have the same truth conditions in that situation. It doesn't follow that "what color it is" and "how it appears" hav...
Yes, it did. Now consider whether there is something about the apple that would cause the apple to appear red to us. That "something" is what the word...
I'm not sure it is fine for you, since you think that red, when analyzed, actually refers to how the apple appears, not what color it is. But my argum...
No, the apple is red tout court. The word "red" picks out a physical aspect of the apple, not how it appears (which is a qualifier meaning "seem; give...
That would be a case of throwing out the baby (ordinary language) with the bathwater (language implying ghostly entities). OK. The apple's composition...
No, it's more straightforward than that (or, at least, doesn't depend on language like "light temperature and intensity", "reflect", "electromagnetic ...
I don't think it has the metaphysical assumptions you think it has, and the assumptions it does have (logical constraints, really) turn out to be very...
Yes. Color terms are abstractions. Is the apple red even at night and even if no-one is looking at it? The answer again is yes, it is. That is, the ap...
Do you mean we can't discover that their experiences are different or in what ways? I'm not color blind, but a quick look at the images on the color b...
See Dennett's Cartesian Theater or Ryle's ghost in the machine. Those are metaphors for subject/object dualism, where experiences are private to a sub...
Just a heads up that we're using the word "experience" very differently. If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are diff...
Because their visual systems differ from the norm. By looking (if you're not colorblind). Or asking someone (if you are). "Red" doesn't refer to an ex...
Yes, it requires a conceptual shift. What you're describing are the spectacular results that can be realized by effective mathematical abstraction. Bu...
Yes, it's a conceptual dispute. Consider whether gravity is a real force (per Newton) or a fictitious force (per GR). On any theory, walking off the e...
I think the first step to unscrambling that omelette is to reject the 'view from nowhere', and thus also the 'bracketing out' of the human perspective...
Statements such as "Alice feels cold" and "the apple is red" abstract over the underlying physical processes. First, as abstractions, they are direct ...
:up: Sorry fdrake! It was satire. I regard qualia as a philosophical fiction. My post was an attempt to vividly illustrate in a slightly different con...
My challenge to Dennett and the qualia-deniers on this thread, answer me this: Location is subjective. I'm standing here and you're standing there. Th...
The ordinary usages are fine. I'm arguing against the specifically philosophical subject/object distinction which is also stated in that source: For r...
So I'm pointing out that it's a purely philosophical distinction that has no use in ordinary life or scientific practice. Arguing against systematical...
It seems to me that the emergence of sentience is the fundamental issue. Now note how Nagel frames the issue: The inclusion of objective and subjectiv...
A separate soul implies dualism. But there is no definite Christian position on a separate soul, as IEP notes: Yes though, as the above IEP quote sugg...
It is. But note that describing that world requires a perspective whether in day-to-day life, or as a scientist performing specialized experiments. Th...
It's actually orthodox Christian doctrine that believers undergo bodily resurrection. So dualism isn't required even there. Here's Hacker's proposal a...
Correct. The phrase "hylomorphic dualism" is a label coined for the Thomist version of hylomorphism: Whereas, to the contrary, Aristotle's hylomorphis...
I pointed out the grammatical distinctions earlier. "Wayfarer observes the world" versus "The world is observed by Wayfarer". Grammatically, the subje...
I'm arguing against the philosophical subject/object distinction which is the underlying premise of both Descartes' and Chalmers' dualism. My main arg...
The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my p...
Yes, seeing someone do something is different to doing it yourself. However yours and my view is not 'a view from nowhere', and neither is Alice's exp...
@"Kenosha Kid" So that is how it appears to an observer. What actually happens once a handshake has occurred, and thus a single destination has been d...
For anyone curious about the puzzle I presented earlier... ...The short answer is, yes, I can trust them. Here's the worked out solution. Euler's form...
Right, I don't agree with Dennett in that respect. I think there is only one world (or dimension) but thinking of it in Cartesian terms, whether as 'f...
I don't agree that that is where we start. That is the philosophical subject-object division that is often an unchallenged assumption in these discuss...
So I opened an account at the bank with $100 at an imaginary 314% interest rate. A year later, the bank claims I owe them $100! They say that if I kee...
Yes, good point. I'm not sure I follow your last sentence (and I read the SEP section). If, on measurement, the superposition state information is los...
As you may know, unitary quantum mechanics conserves information. So given an arbitrary state for a system, any earlier state can be determined. In th...
The error is the "ghost in the machine" model of consciousness, with its presumptions of qualia, sense data, zombies and what not. To reject that mode...
Dennett's point is that Strawson has a mistaken model of conscious experience. Strawson then takes Dennett's denial of his model as being an instance ...
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