Yes There are many examples that have to do with sensory processing. For example, the eye does edge enhancement. The brain converts ciliar motions in ...
I freely admit to having some difficulty understanding @"Terrapin Station". I also have difficulty seeing any socially redeeming value in transcendent...
No, I do not construct concepts in experiencing and abstracting. I find them latent in my sensory representation. So, I actualize prior intelligibilit...
It is not. Before we encounter a duck, it is a duck and capable of evoking the concept <duck>. That capability is its intelligibility as a duck. When ...
The dichotomy was rhetorical. Of course, we cannot stop thinking, but all the content we think about is rooted in experience. So, the alternative was ...
No. Intelligibility is what we grasp in knowing. That is not what I said. Objects can be understood. That means they are intelligible. When that intel...
The content of an experience is the intelligibility actualized in it. The experience is the act (which happens to be that of a subject) actualizing th...
Because we can relate to reality in other ways than thinking. As I said before, you are ignoring the context of "experience is how we relate to realit...
I did not think you were. I was saying this was all that is "just a tree." The content of an experience can be just a tree, but an experience is more ...
No, it does not. My statement was made in the context of the epistemological problem of realism. Taking out of that context is not helpful. No, it is ...
The tree as an independent existent being is ontologically prior, but logically posterior, to our perceptual encounter (the phenomenal tree). The phen...
It can't be interpreted unless it is given -- and "datum" is just Latin for "something given." You have not said why "experience" doesn't mean anythin...
In thinking. If we had no experiential content, we would have no material to think about. No. How do you know that you walk on the road, except by exp...
As humans can only represent a limited number of chunks of information (typically < 8) at any time, we necessarily focus on some notes of intelligibil...
This is because classification involves judgement, that may err, while experience does not. There is a many-to-one map from types of causes to types o...
Carnap has a model in which the yes or no answers to logically independent questions define different dimensions in the vector space of knowledge. Whi...
That is how implication often works. It allows us to move from the data of experience to new realities, many of which are available to experience. For...
The tree in the first instance does not simply exist, it exists in relation to me. I can change my relation to it by doing things to myself, not to th...
Yes. Yes. The first is an experience of a tree, the second the experience of making a judgement about experiencing a tree. My point was that while the...
Reality is "objective" to the extent that it can enter into the subject-object relation of knowledge, which is to say insofar as it is intelligible. I...
Models mix abstracted and constructed elements. They are not pure constructs or they would have no relation to the reality modeled. When we combine di...
Of course. Sometimes they are experiences of reflective thought, meditation, dreams, pains and joys, etc. Over time we learn to divide the content of ...
Of course there is. We call these shoes philosophy and natural science. In my view, the goal of philosophy is to provide us with a framework for under...
... I think it is naming, not theorizing. In what way does "this is something I'm perceiving" go beyond our experience? I think Maritain's analysis is...
To me a projection is first some aspect of reality existentially penetrating us -- projecting itself into us -- and second, our fixing on some part of...
I am not sure I understand this. Are you saying, that as a projection, reality is a construct? That seems odd for an empiricist, for to be an empirici...
What are they aware of? Not some intellectual content, but a desire. In a sense it is knowledge, but not in the same sense that awareness of intelligi...
After reading W. T. Stace, I started taking mystical experience seriously. I now think it is veridical, but not (usually) informative. It is veridical...
The argument is mine. I'm a moderate, Aristotelian-Thomistic realist, who thinks that we can have different projections of reality, which is to say th...
1. I have not assumed or implied that our experience exhausts being. I have only said that our concept of reality begins with what we experience. ("'R...
It depends on how you define "theory." If you mean a hypothetical structure, then, no, it is not a theory. If you mean a way of organizing experience,...
So far we seem to share similar views, though I would not mix modes of neural response with modes of intentional response. (Not that I think that inte...
I don't think we start by positing that. Rather we seek to organize our experience by classifying it, and in doing so we come to concepts that include...
Excuse me for not quite seeing your point. I was not suggesting we really stop thinking, only that all the content we think about is experiential. So,...
It depends on how you explicate your terms. 1) What does "actuality" mean to you? Is it accessible, or quarantined? 2) Are you thinking of "events" as...
Yes, trees are often just present. Often they are not even identified. It is only when we fix on this or that aspect of experience that we distinguish...
I have explained how ere abstract concepts such as that of number from the realization that counting does not depend on what we count. You have not sh...
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