Dfpolis

Thanks for your interest. Would you care to show the contradiction? Please define "material" and "existence" and then show that existence entails mate...

Different how? To take your example, how do I distinguish a signal indicating the existence of a condition causing pain from a signal that says only t...

Yes, that is what I said.

It seems to me that subjectivity (being a knowing and willing subject) is essential to the experience of mind. Functionalism does not cut it.

I agree, but how does this allow us to distinguish body states from external states?

While I tend to agree with this, it does not explain how we distinguish the object from the subject -- which is the problem I have. I think I agree. I...

Thanks for commenting. I agree. As I argued last year, I do not think that intentional (mental) realities can be reduced to physical realities. "Physi...

Thank you also for responding, Still, I do not see that anything you said resolves the three issues I raised. Did I miss something?

Thank you for your comment, While I agree that we have an immaterial aspect that makes us subjects in the subject-object relation of knowing (a soul),...

Aristotle does not talk much about subjective decisions, except for his discussion of proairesis. Proairesis is the process leading to a decision. He ...

I think we become just by actively willing to make just decisions.

Yep

Well, if we understand matter as stuff we can, and the kind of matter that is passive is stuff that is shaped in some way -- like rubber of marble. In...

I had no such expectation.

I am happy to dialog with reasonable people, even if we disagree. Constant equivocation and twisting what is said is not reasonable.

I am done wasting my time.

You refuse to understand that you are using Aristotle's language equivocally. I tried to explain this, but you ignored my explanations. You are so fix...

It is analogous, but has different implications.

You are equivocating yet again. The identity here is not immutability. It is numerical identity or dynamic continuity. Also, Aristotle is quite aware ...

No, they never are. What something has the potential to become is never identical with what it is. The problem is that you are using your notion of ma...

Feser, following Aquinas, does not pay enough attention to the difference between artifacts (which have their form imposed from without), and natural ...

If you take it so. It can also be about what we perceive. As Aristotle is not distinguishing the two (as he is not a post-Kantian), it is not meant as...

I am sorry that "compound" confuses you. It may not be the best term. I discuss the relation of matter and form in my article, "A New Reading of Arist...

No, it is about what we see. Aristotle has not yet turned to the analysis of the relation between what is perceived and what is. He does that in De An...

I think they both would see substances (ostensible unities) as givens, not requiring an argument. Then, on mental analysis, we find and name various a...

No, it is not. An Aristotelian substance is always a whole. Properties are what we separate mentally. This statement can be taken phenomenologically o...

I am saying we have no actual knowledge until we are aware of the processed information. I'd say that physically possibility is prior to our experienc...

I did not say "the whole remains," you did. I said that some properties could change and the substance would still satisfy the definition. That is a l...

And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. Aristotle never speaks of it. That is why it is your idea. The reason substances are n...

The point made by Aristotle is that some properties can change, and the whole remains the same kind of thing (fits the same definition). That relates ...

That is not Aristotle's idea, but yours. Aristotle sees substances as wholes.

No, 'Separable' means that they could have an independent being, which Aristotle explicitly denies. They are distinguishable -- mentally, not ontologi...

This depends on how you define "essential." Aristotle is clear that by "essential" in this regard, he is speaking of species-defining properties.

I used "thing" in an analogous sense -- not to refer to wholes (substances), but to refer to whatever can be predicated. Still substances are not prop...

It depends on how one defines "phenomenon." What is your definition?

Because in this translation "subject" and "substance" mean the same thing. A substance is what other things (including accidents) are predicated of. A...

When people make absurd claims categorically, they need to be called out. Try Categories i, 2: "By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present ...

Of course.

Obviously, you have a third- or fourth-hand hearsay acquaintance with Aristotle. I know of no text in which he separates (as opposed to mentally disti...

I see no reason why you would make such a claim. There are some things he missed, but the framework is quite solid.

I meant "even if we do not know it, it reduces physical possibility." The reduction of physical possiblity is not conditioned on our knowing or not kn...

The information we do not know is still a specification of reality. The more it is already specified, the fewer its remaining possibilities.

To wit? Have I missed an error?

Really? What confuses you? You seem easily confused. Something is possible if it does not contradict a contextualizing set of propositions. So, for ex...

This merely shows that we are defining "awareness" in different ways. What I am taking about is knowing data as opposed to having and/or processing da...

I follow Aristotle and Aquinas in rejecting substance dualism. We define "substance" (ousia) as "this something" (tode ti) -- in other words, we see p...

Thank you. I sympathize with many of Kant's objectives. I just disagree on his mode of execution.

If you say so. My concept <apple> is not a thing to be constructed, it is just me thinking of apples. I do not see how a concept can apply to all appl...

No. Type-defining properties (logical essences) are latent in sense data, not arrived at a priori. If they were not latent in experience, our experien...

Yes, I am an Aristotelian-Thomistic moderate realist.