Terrapin Station

Not if it doesn't include definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "choose" etc. There are no such things as righ...

Whereas I hadn't read him in a long time and had a relatively favorable opinion of him from my student days, but rereading this essay now, I've decide...

Note that when I asked you the question initially, I said, "Picasso paintings." Geez. I didn't realize that you had that view. Quick, let me change my...

And that's it? Or are you cherry-picking a definition? It doesn't have definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "...

Well, thats a huge difference though. Re guarantees we're talking about certainty. That's not the case with "determine." If we're talking about guaran...

But that doesn't have anything to do with what you just said. Where in that is something about a sense data theorist starting with the idea that they ...

I'm not sure where he says this, but to start, why would a sense data theorist begin with the idea that no experiences can be determined to be veridic...

The difference is that I wasn't critiquing a putative sense data theorist view. I was critiquing the idea that that is any sense data theorists' view ...

Simply because the two ideas are contradictory.

Again, I'm saying that I'm extremely skeptical that any sense data theorists say both (a) that sense data provide anything like a foundation for epist...

That's not what I was saying, but sure, if one were making a claim about epistemic certainty yet at the same time saying that one can only know to a l...

The key is the first phrase: "It's extremely dubious that any sense data theorist would say . . ." I'm talking about what sense data theorists would s...

Egos and emotion, the latter especially when offense is taken.

One problem with your idea of an authenticity "sense" as you describe it is that in practice, the audience's attributions of authenticity or a lack of...

Well first, "authenticity" is a nonsensical concept with respect to the arts. The attribution of "authenticity" is subjective and doesn't consistently...

Do you not feel like doing anything? Do you have no interests, desires, etc.?

I'm a nominalist. In my view there are no real (read "extramental") types. Types/universals are concrete ways that we think about things--namely, they...

"Not in the brain" isn't any sort of model. It's just nonsense. Empirical claims are not provable. You can survive with parts of the brain being compr...

Memory, expectations, meanings and the semantic aspect of symbolism are only in the brain. Just like the projection of a drama is only in the TV. You'...

<eye roll>

Yeah, he had a hole in his intestines. That's not evidence of his intestines amounting to mental content, haha. And neither is that. The idea is that ...

Well, it's certainly awareness of other persons' views re morality. But even following social moral norms (as opposed to just being aware of them) isn...

For people for whom their dreams seem just like what they consider their waking phenomenal experience, this must surely be confusing, and I'm not sure...

I don't believe there is any evidence to suggest that neurons elsewhere in the body have anything to do with mentality--lots of folks have had gastroi...

Space and time have locations, it's just that it's not only one location. But that shouldn't be confusing. You don't think that, say, Picasso painting...

This is an aside, really, but I'm curious about this: If only ideal things exist in your view, and experiencers are different than experiences, then j...

Okay, but there's no way to oversome the is-ought problem. Objective facts simply do not imply any (foundational) oughts. I'm not even sure at this po...

Whether it seems ludicrous to you or not, it's true. Also, you seem to be conflating different senses of "meaning." The sense of "meaning" used in "th...

It's not just the object's surface that's pertinent. It's the whole "system" in question--the object's surface, the light traveling from it, the way t...

Yeah, I agree with that.

I don't at all buy that idea in general--that one can only understand (or think etc.) some x if one can understand (or think etc.) not-x or x's "oppos...

And indeed, no one said this. So you say, but you can't give a single example.

Unless we're positing and talking about underlying psychological motivations that the person doesn't explicitly connect with the belief(s) in question...

-fixed- Aka the wild-goose-chase-that-will-hopefully-lead-to-you-just-forgetting-about-the-ridiculous-claims-I-made gambit.

LOL--there are three disconnected formal sentences there (though not expressed strictly formally at that): S entails S* If S then S* If S & S# then S*...

I don't find it odd that when I asked you what the formal logic was that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology," you didn't respond with the...

What is the formal logic that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology"? (Is English your first language?)

You're saying utter nonsense about physicalism being a thesis re whether there's a formal logical "effective decision procedure" about the ontological...

No I didn't. You need to be able to read better than that if you want to not come across like a buffoon. I said, "Physicalism isn't a thesis about or ...

I'll be how you deserve. Physicalism is just physics?

That's some example you buffoon.

Yeah, bullshit. Again, give one example of a physicalist whose physicalism amounts to this.

No it doesn't--not necessarily at least. But is there even one example of a physicalist whose physicalism amounts to "explaining reality with formal l...

Physicalism isn't a thesis about or that depends on formal logic in any procedural way.

The latter. If someone believes that the very idea of non-veridicality is incoherent, they're not going to have the experience of being in error. How ...

It's subjective that it's important (obviously)

An objective ought I'm taking it you mean. But even with subjective oughts, I don't know why it would suggest that to you. You'd have to explain that.

Well, for one if you want to have an accurate ontology. But the more important question was what followed that colon.

The Marquez argument as you quote it seems completely non-controversial. Your final paragraph (starting with "Personally, I find it to be more benefic...

I don't believe that it has anything to do with algorithms. So that's the first place that that idea is going off the tracks. What makes experiences o...