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Terrapin Station

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It doesn't. It's the same old incredibly stupid idea that conceivability has ontological implications (beyond the fact that something is conceivable).
January 24, 2017 at 15:44
No disagreement there. That's not what I said, though. Anyway, for an equally stupid (in my opinion) argument, we could simply say: "If we can't conce...
January 24, 2017 at 15:02
Which it obviously is. But they're not conceivable unless one just ignores details, or changes assumptions, or doesn't understand the details, etc. On...
January 24, 2017 at 14:24
It's conceptually necessary that it's a physical fact, given physical facts as they are. That's the whole point. You can't have physical facts as they...
January 24, 2017 at 14:08
Fallacies are only pertinent to logical arguments (whether formal or "informal"). When you give your definition of something, you're not presenting a ...
January 24, 2017 at 12:56
In my opinion it isn't conceivable though, unless we do the same thing we'd have to do in order to say, "Imagine an acoustic guitar that's exactly the...
January 24, 2017 at 12:29
Does he ever say why he believes that or give an argument for it?
January 24, 2017 at 00:43
Okay--and what was I saying?
January 23, 2017 at 23:54
Man, this can't be this difficult for you. "Rather than" is the same as "instead of." Do you understand that?
January 23, 2017 at 22:42
"x yet y" --means that something is x, but still it's y too. "x rather than y"-- something is x instead of y. In other words, it's not y at all. It's ...
January 23, 2017 at 22:30
Not "incoherent yet conceivable." "Incoherent rather than conceivable."
January 23, 2017 at 22:10
That it's at all taken seriously is a good illustration of that, yes. Hey, we agree on something. ;-)
January 23, 2017 at 22:03
I don't think it helps to say that, especially in association with conceivability, however. After all, we could thus say that anything is conceivable,...
January 23, 2017 at 19:09
With respect to (1), you're then saying that Sellars is agreeing with them that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations? Also, I'm cu...
January 23, 2017 at 19:03
What you'd just said is something about hypothesis verification. That's not the same thing as what you're saying here. At any rate, show me an example...
January 23, 2017 at 18:58
What? "Either or better I declare"? That doesn't make grammatical sense to me. Wait--there are a number of problems with this, but the first one I'm c...
January 23, 2017 at 16:08
The p-zombie argument rests on the idea that creatures physically identical to humans, but with a difference when it comes to whether they have sentie...
January 23, 2017 at 16:02
Science is empirical. Empirical claims are not provable.
January 23, 2017 at 15:53
I don't agree with that requirement. If you had some sort of particle isolated in a vacuum, that for some reason couldn't not be in that vacuum, in pr...
January 23, 2017 at 15:51
We see the brain activity of such things via fMRIs for example. 1 + 1 = 2, for one, hinges on the idea of units--you have two units of something. That...
January 23, 2017 at 15:46
Okay, but again, he says both (1) "These philosophers believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations" (paraphrased, according t...
January 23, 2017 at 15:37
By saying things like, "Is that Stratocaster blue?" and the other person going, "Yeah, that's blue." The fact that both people don't have exactly the ...
January 23, 2017 at 15:27
Could someone break a rock?
January 23, 2017 at 15:24
You realize that she'd agree that there can be no broken cup without there having been a cup, right? If "created by accident," especially in the conte...
January 23, 2017 at 15:23
No, I didn't imagine anything causal about it, and it's not about imagining things anyway. It's simply about logical possibility. There's nothing cont...
January 22, 2017 at 18:40
What's the difference when we're talking about veridicality versus non-veridicality? Re your "yep," hence we're talking about sensation.
January 22, 2017 at 18:23
Say that we have a red ball. Randomly/acausally It disappears and is replaced by a green ball. That's a change, but it's not causal--in fact, we just ...
January 22, 2017 at 18:21
There can't be anything extant outside of time. And time isn't causality, but change. Change and causality aren't the same thing. And what sort if thi...
January 22, 2017 at 15:51
On my view we know that we're not literally thinking the same thing because it's incoherent that two numerically distinct things are identical.
January 22, 2017 at 15:48
"Timelessness" non-poetically being what?
January 22, 2017 at 15:43
X is eternal if x exists for all time, and time doesn't have an end point. We don't know either that (a) time has no end point or that (b) there is an...
January 22, 2017 at 15:15
You could say that in a very loose manner of speaking, with the quotation marks, sure, and certainly that's a common way of talking about it.
January 22, 2017 at 15:04
What does that have to do with her argument? That would only be relevant if something in her argument hinged on the idea of there being no requirement...
January 22, 2017 at 14:00
We don't know that anything is eternal.
January 22, 2017 at 13:45
Right, it definitely doesn't entail functionalism.
January 22, 2017 at 13:43
I'd say that I know we're not thinking the same way, because numerically distinct things (such as one, my thinking, and two, your thinking) cannot lit...
January 22, 2017 at 13:38
Supposing it would be blue if you were to look (it might not be, of course--it could be sunset, it could be a gray, cloudy day, etc.), then it's also ...
January 22, 2017 at 13:34
The difference isn't one of attribution. It's a difference of ontological fact.
January 22, 2017 at 13:26
Seeing is sensation unless Sellars is using the quirky apparent distinction he tried to make that I detailed above (quite a few posts ago, in comments...
January 22, 2017 at 12:32
Types are the conceptual abstractions in question. That's all there is to what a "type" is. In other words, types/universals are concrete particulars....
January 22, 2017 at 00:27
In each brain that has the conceptual abstraction in question.
January 22, 2017 at 00:25
"seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular" isn't a sensation?
January 22, 2017 at 00:24
No, of course you can't perceive others' meanings. We can't make mental phenomena third-person observable period. No, you can't perceive any meaning t...
January 21, 2017 at 21:48
Ah, then he's not saying "Unveridical sensations which strike these philosophers (I took "strikes" rather than "strike" to be a typo/oversight) do not...
January 21, 2017 at 21:39
But that's what meaning is, how it works. Either someone assigns meaning personally to something or there's no meaning (for them) No, it's YOU putting...
January 21, 2017 at 21:26
But individuals create meaning, and different individuals can do that in response to different things. So would you only be saying that you're referri...
January 21, 2017 at 20:11
Jesus Christ what a load of balderdash.
January 21, 2017 at 19:58
Well, the first part isn't at all clear to me: --I have no idea why Sellars thinks that that doesn't make sense. Also his "It is the fact" is grammati...
January 21, 2017 at 19:52
Obviously he doesn't say the word "guarantee" for example, so you must be translating something as that. What phrase there amounts to "guarantee"?
January 21, 2017 at 19:33
January 21, 2017 at 19:31