Relativist

I see what you mean. Thanks for explaining.

I agree it doesn't violate the logic.

Please explain what you think I got wrong.

I already did, by pointing to, and discussing, the supplementary article Classical Possibilism and Lewisian Possibilism. It's pretty explicit when it ...

The notion that "actual" is indexical is not consistent with the terminology in the SEP article, The Possibilism-Actualism Debate: Possibilists claim ...

Lewis does believe that all possible worlds are actual worlds, but that's not a common view. Lots of philosophers disagree about that, but still use p...

The modality is equally relevant. Your modality is epistemic: given the facts available to you, it is (epistemically) possible the sun is shining. But...

That was one of my points. Particularly in the context of this thread, which (per the 2nd article in the Op) IS about the ontological nature of possib...

That sounds reasonable. I stand corrected.

That was part of my point: information does not exist in the absence of (an aspect of) consciousness. Characters on a printed page are not intrinsical...

Of course, and I agree information is relevant to ongoing mental activity. What I was referring to was understanding the fundamental nature of conscio...

What is information, in the absence of consciousness? Words on a page have to be interpreted by a conscious mind. I'm fine with examining aspects of m...

Kripke's defining of "rigid designators" is useful for identifying posteriori necessity (It is a necessary fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus), but it f...

No, that's not what contingent means. Suppose necessitarianism is true. Necessitarianism is the theory that every that event that occurs (past and fut...

I wasn't "defining" possibility, I was discussing the ontology of possibilty - pertinent to the discussion of "The Possibilism-Actualism Debate", refe...

IOW, it ignores the controversies. I have inferred that the controversies are the topic of this theead.

You're conflating possibility with potential. There is no potential for a different past, but we can consider whether a past event was necessary or co...

You're presuming that "real world" human reasoning is somehow beyond duplicating. I don't see any problems at all, because any specific issue you migh...

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic ARE algorithmic- it's feasible to program these. The programmming could keep it predictable (a given input will n...

We seem to be on similar tracks, so far. But I'll expand on this. If determinism is true, then there is actually only one future possibility: the actu...

The reasoning is inescapably circular! It starts with the assumption an object is the same object in a (non-actual) possible world (it has a trans-wor...

The "explanatory order" doesn't falsify the logic: there's s logical dependency on essentialism. But go ahead and explain essence.

The implication is that there is only one possible world: the actual one. Do you agree? When we conceive of (allegedly) possible worlds, we are constu...

Kripke was an essentialist: he believed individual identity was associated with its essence - a subset of an individual's properties. So his theory of...

You have not addressed what it means to be the "same" individual. You simply assume it's the same. That creates a logical contradiction under my defin...

Under my view of individual identity, that is logically impossible. My view is that 100% of an individual's properties (including intrinsic properties...

A rigid designator refers to a specific individual in this world: he has a specific physical composition at each temporal point of his existence, a sp...

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic address this, at least to a degree.

Of course, we can entertain any conceivable "what-if?", but entertaining it does not entail that it was truly possible. Trans-world identity is closel...

This depends on how one defines "conscious". If it's defined as a state that necessarily includes qualia, then it's true. But a qualia-absent being co...

The people engaging in the possible world analysis know which object they are referring to: it's a footballer in one world, a cockroach in the other. ...

Read literally, what you've written makes no sense. I think what you trying to say that IF there is transworld identity, then an object can have the s...

But the sights, tastes, sounds, etc had to be detected in some way. That set of of detected things will be remembered, and that's what the experience ...

No. As described in the article I had linked to (here again), haecceity is just a bare identity, not decomposible into a set of one or more things or ...

:rofl:

Accessibility gets murky when dealing with epistemic, conceptual and metaphysical modality at the same time, because there's overlap - not just subset...

I'm not happy with it either- it seems an ad hoc assumption designed to rationalize trans-world identity in our counterfactual ("possible world") anal...

We do, but this pertains to the 2nd article referenced in the op: The Possibilism-Actualism Debate. We can entertain counterfactuals as "what-ifs", bu...

Determinism seems to suggest that everything that happens, happens necessarily - implying there is no actual contingency in the world. This would mean...

It seems possible, although the technology isn't available today.

Pretty much, except that a Zombie would have more direct experiences with the real world. If their body is damaged, it wouldn't feel pain, but it woul...

I accept a version of physicalism created by by David Armstrong. It is a comprehensive, consistent metaphysical theory, As such, I embrace the theory ...

Because physicalism (at least the specific form of it that I defend) entails determinism - either strict determinism, or probabilistic. By definition,...

There is a related issue that cuts through this: contingentarianism vs necessatarianism. Contingency entails the assumption that some counterfactuals ...

Transworld identity can be accounted for via haecceity: the notion that there is something unanalyzable and immaterial that makes you YOU. It's compar...

(FWIW: A state of affairs does not perdure. Perdurance applies to individual identities). Yes, of course "objecthood" (state-of-affairs-hood) is not i...

What are you alleging I stipulated?

You had seemed to be suggesting that QM was inconsistent with a state of affairs ontological theory. I showed that it is consistent with it. I have ne...

I understand. None of us can avoid the subjectivity of our own judgement.

I would indeed be open to other theories, were they to come my way. I've studied Thomist metaphysics a bit, but judge that it makes a number of assump...