Yes, I thought that's what we were talking about, Lewis' interpretation where all possible worlds are actual. Not at all, like all the terms of modal ...
The point, though was that all the possible worlds are actual worlds. If we say "possible" that means "may" be. But Lewis' interpretation appears to b...
But you said that the possible worlds are actual, so you have no use for actual, regardless of context. The world you perceive is actual, and the poss...
"Contingent" has varied meaning, it's quite ambiguous. I dismiss determinism, fatalism, and necessitarianism as fundamentally incompatible with our ex...
As I explained, it's ontological possibility, and this is very similar to "potential", but potential I consider to be the broader term than ontologica...
Sure, but in the situation we're talking about every possible world is actual, and there's no definition as to what actual means. So "actual" is meani...
There are so many different senses of "possible", and they are radically different, so I think using only one model in an attempt to understand all th...
Yes that's exactly the problem. What we know as the independent, physical world, source of empirical observations, can no longer be accepted as such. ...
Very good. But of course, rejecting one proposal does not resolve the problem of transworld identity. Nor does it make any other proposal more reasona...
But haecceity then cannot account for transworld identity. Transworld identity must allow that the same thing has different properties at the same tim...
Haecceity in itself could not account for transworld identity, because haecceity describes an individual being what it is, in all its uniqueness. Haec...
It seems to me, that the quote supports what I've been arguing very well. Possible worlds semantics is a piece of Platonist ontology. And, Platonist o...
Sorry Banno, it doesn't work that way. You have to actually hang me. I will add the following to your description of the de re/de dicto distinction. I...
Sets are not individuals, they are ideas. The unity required for "individual" is simply assumed by the subject, in the case of a set. That's why I cri...
That some statements about the actual world are objective facts doesn't mean that all are. From what I see, you've just demonstrated the subjectivity ...
Fundamentally, I think it is a problem to try and establish identity between two distinct ideas. There is always nuanced differences which makes such ...
Here's a proposal for a compromise. Since you insist that names like "Frodo" which actually refer to ideas, refer to "things", and you presume the exi...
It's not the case that logic necessarily implies metaphysics, but using metaphysical terms like "thing" and "identity" do imply metaphysics. And if yo...
Yes, I see you understand the issue very well then. Every time you refer to "Nixon" or "the actual world" as if this is a representation of the real p...
We cannot "take the metaphysically actual world as the modally actual world" because the difference between these two is the difference you insisted t...
I don't really think so. Strictly speaking, there is no further "meaning" to an extensional definition, only the set of items. If we switch to a meani...
So here's a summary of the progress which you and I have made, in our discussion of modal logic. We both agree that there is a very clear and signific...
Sure, but "Nixon might not have won the election" is obviously a blatant falsity. And, if you set up a modal model, possible worlds, within which Nixo...
Changing the quote doesn't help you, because now the statement is about what the actual I, in the actual physical world of here and now, wants. That's...
Jesus Banno! Did you not take English in school? The subject of that phrase is "the one", and this refers to the "circumstances". The phrase is about ...
This is exactly the problem which the extensionality of "possible worlds" produces. It creates the illusion that we are talking about a bunch of diffe...
Uh-hu, tell me another one bro. Can you tell me how I can get myself into some of these different circumstances? I want the one where I'm the same fel...
I don't see a definition of "knowledge" there. It says "The operative concept of 'knowability' remains elusive...". That's the problem I mentioned, wh...
Obviously, and I agreed. You have a very strange form of straw manning, in which you project your own errors on to someone else. You equivocate, and b...
Sure, you reject my definitions, as I knew you would. So, what does "know" mean to you in this context, and what does "true" mean in this context? The...
Yes, I think I'm more in the mood for calling out bullshit than for learning. It appears I went through weeks of discussion with you in the other thre...
Because that's what a predication is, to state that a subject has a specified property. Predication is not to say that it might have the property. If,...
That's not what the SEP article says, and I've provided quotes. I suggest you reread the part on extensionality. Well, when it is a possibility, we ca...
Sure, but as I said, with possible worlds we are talking about different properties at the same time. That is what prevents the name from referring to...
We're talking about at the same time, in different possible worlds. If you start trying to describe the difference between one possible world and anot...
That doesn't really make sense. Since the properties of the thing named "Nixon" in this case, are different in the different possible worlds, we canno...
That is contrary to what the SEP article states. Modal logic is intensional. And, it is only the expression of it, the interpretation of separate "pos...
That's right, each time I offer terms of interpretation, you assert that they are erroneous, and you reject them. Then you provide none of your own, s...
My entire discussion with you in this thread is "the same argument". When finally persuaded to clarify your use, you admitted to equivocation. At some...
@"Banno" Now, are you ready to address the so-called Fitch's paradox, and accept that it doesn't say anything about any supposed independent, metaphys...
That's so wrong. You, in the very same argument use "the actual world" to refer to a model-theoretic object, and also to a metaphysical object. When a...
In our discussion, Banno more than once explicitly said that the actual world is the world that we live in. This is completely different from any repr...
It appears like we're not as close to agreement as I thought. If you continue to insist that you can use the same term to refer to different things, w...
When good philosophy is contrary to everyday speech, there is a really good reason for that. It indicates a fundamental problem with everyday speech. ...
I reject your definition as completely different from the one in the article we are supposed to be reading, which I quoted above. Taking a definition ...
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