> The basis for my assumption that conscious experiences are more complex; 1. Conscious experiences seem to be significantly more common with humans, ...
>From my perspective, once the mechanical process is outlined, something is explained. I think we've gone through this cycle of disagreement before, b...
>I assume conscious experiences are more complex, partially based on my understanding that conscious experiences are still considered unexplained, yet...
> I think I mostly understand your point, and agree that it cannot be explained by only reductionism. But I think reductionism is a very effective ste...
> Agreed > Yes, I think this is where we disagree. Which sort of explains some of the disagreements with the previous post, regarding explanation of e...
> I still dont think it would be impossible to describe clearly to the average person. If it is possible to describe the technicalities, then it shoul...
> Fair enough, if that is your intent of the term "conscious sound", but that would mean conscious sound includes the simple (compared to conscious aw...
>I think it is possible. I dont see why a physical process involving the laws of physics should be impossible to describe. How to describe it may depe...
>I disagree, and think the distance is not big. By "experience" do you mean specifically the more conscious aware experience, or any experience? If yo...
>This depends on how you define conscious experience. I assumed by the context, conscious experience refers to requiring the additional mental focus a...
>If you mean on terms of each instance, then stimulus instigates the neural activity. Usually sensory input stimulus would trigger the neural activity...
If the experience etc. is simply neural activity, then I believe we do have a method for studying it, as we have studied lots of neural activity. But,...
It seems you presume that I only believe consciousness is caused by neural activity, because of a bias that it's common belief. That's could be fair e...
Sorry to all for my delayed responses btw. I've been too distracted in the summer... I think I meant that the bell would theoretically be simpler than...
> I'd argue that correlation does imply cause. It doesn't prove cause, but correlation implies a higher probability that it is also a cause. > There m...
> Do you mean, how it can result in specifically the Red experience, or generally any experience? Do you agree that simpler neural activity, results i...
> Basically, the same way that emotions, or dreams, or mindful images/ sounds can come from memory access. The experience of Red is just perhaps a mor...
> Do you mean agreed facts are that there's no evidence that consciousness is related to brain activity? If so, I don't agree to that, as I believe th...
> How do you know your "self" remains intact, compared to your brain? > This could be true, but it is also the most logical position, as I explained. ...
> I see no reason to believe that the self remains regardless of the condition of the machine, or that it moves on after damage. If "self" consists of...
> 1 produces 2 by a complex but coordinated combination producing an intricate outcome. I think they are the same category because it seems logical th...
> Assuming by "consciousness", we mean the awareness and comprehensive perception, the evidence is that brain activity has proven to be directly corre...
Evidence suggests that consciousness involves brain activity. We have not thoroughly tested and understood all aspects of brain activity. So it seems ...
> I don't think I see the difference. If we have a causal explanation of the mechanical function of something, that is the answer of how. If we explai...
I realize those are all types of neural activity. I'm not saying those, in themselves, explain consciousness. I'm saying those are some of the "puzzle...
Sorry, I was unclear. I meant that common experience effects are additional "puzzle pieces", not really added to neural activity. Common experiences t...
I dont mean; common or existing knowledge, which is regarding the overall function of consciousness. The theory is regarding overall consciousness yes...
>I said that they could be considered the same category. I don't mean that this statement proves the problem is solved. Actually, I would argue that c...
Both the Red Experience and Neural Activity could be considered the same category of Memory Access. I suppose you could argue the red experience isn't...
Why do you say that? Why shouldnt a complex combination of simultaneous memory access explain the experience? I don't really see any reason to assume ...
That sounds like it all makes sense, and is a good comparison from computer to brain . My estimate of how the conscious Red experience is created by t...
So, if by definition, the property of "Redness" is only in the conscious experience, doesn't that mean, the property of Redness is just the neurologic...
>I dont think animals' "consciousness" is all that mysterious, since I think humans experience the same degree of consciousness every day. Humans also...
I think I understand what the question is asking. But my answer is still the same; it's just memory. Even when I concentrate on it, and it seems indes...
I don't know how the neural activity functions mechanically, if that's what you're asking. All I know is somehow neurons store memories as information...
>I mean it is the coordinated combination, that creates the experience. If the neural activity of a memory is on its own, the memory doesn't do much f...
> I think my explanation would still be basically the same, The neural activity for Red, causes a conscious experience, because of the combination of ...
>No problem. Everything is an assumption to some degree (or so I assume). >Is the purpose of this, to focus on the ways that different aspects of phen...
>Yes, I did. Maybe I misunderstand something, but I gather bracketing is basically choosing to focus on the minds experience, not on the function of t...
So your saying the psychological agency of figure-ground is a phenomenological act, because it's an act in the mind relevant to the way we experience ...
>Yes, I realize you mean the present moment, but I'm questioning what function in the mind defines your intended meaning of vividness. Hence my mentio...
>Spinning eyes in a circle would be a "conscious decision", but I was referring to subconscious or instinctual action (as I specified "without attenti...
>But what do you mean by perceiving? I think this is coming back to my same question of what you mean by a vivid image. These both relate to the basic...
>But I was describing the phenomenological mind in the 2nd half of that paragraph, here: "Or, if you mean psyche is not physically divisible to allow ...
> I think I understand what you mean, that all the components are combined and constantly a part of the entire structure. But I dont think that means ...
> If an image is photographically vivid, you think that means whatever is perceiving that image, is conscious of it? Or if it's mentally vivid, then y...
>By "Vivid Image", do you mean just the photographic picture of the squirrel, or comprehended overall image of the conceptual idea of the existence of...
Fair enough. >I think I get what you mean, that the light in your mind seems the same. But I think the difference between dreaming and awake rememberi...
That is likely true, if your definition of "seeing" the light includes that which occurs while dreaming. I'd consider dreaming to be a process of memo...
Comments