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Pretty good. So do we want to say that this example has met the challenge?: I'd be inclined to say yes. You? I suppose we could quibble about whether ...

That's good, as far as it goes. But the other kind of "more" that some philosophers (I think including @"Arcane Sandwich"?) want to claim is physical ...

Slow down thar, pardner! You say "Whatever they may be (the epistemic rights)" so let's start there. What are they meant to be?

This needs a lot of expansion. What exactly is at stake with this premise?

Yeah, that might be a little strong, but as a contrast to pure formalism, the point is useful. I realize that my own comments might lead one to think ...

Your exploration of the high-C example is helpful. I know it was my own example, but I'm no longer happy with it because I don't think it's to the poi...

Again, the question of what is expressible in ordinary language. Let me see what I come up with for @"Banno".

Thanks, I see where you're coming from now. I think equating "existence" with "physical 'thingness'," no matter how many scare-quotes we use, is debat...

I’m going to assume you meant “the meaning of ?existence’” as in “what the term means,” as opposed to “the meaning of existence” in the more existenti...

First of all, good OP! You've got your eye on something important in philosophical method. Do you think a model duck can eat, digest, excrete, and rep...

Well, I'm glad we've got that straightened out! :smile: You might be interested in a recent thread on quantifier variance that tackles this question f...

Quine meant, I suppose, that ¬?x P(x), where P is the predicate corresponding to "Pegasus". Is your question about whether predicates need to be under...

Thanks for checking -- I was sort of assuming you were right. It makes it easier to get a grip on what Witt meant, anyway. Talking about objects being...

I agree about the table, and I'm glad you spelled it out, because that's why I added the proviso that the desired "inexpressible something" should be ...

OK, the challenge is to come up with something that is both a) inexpressible, and b) whose inexpressibility can be explained. It also ought to be some...

Can I whistle it in French?

Q. How many Wittgensteinians does it take to change a light bulb? A. Shut up and screw!

Yeah, the high-C example has problems with equivocation on "expressible" -- we can express the fact that she cannot express the note. I'll see if I ca...

No need to apologize. We all jump in as the spirit moves us. And sure, the passage you quote is very germane.

That's what I'm not sure about. I don't think I'm asking for the inexpressible itself (call it P) to be expressed; that would indeed be impossible. Ra...

I took the liberty of adding the bolded phrase, because leaving it out does make it appear that you're asserting that they succeeded in apprehending t...

Others on TPF know the Tractatus a lot better than I do, but I think he meant something more than merely "not truth apt" or "not confirmable." I think...

This is more complicated than I intended. By "justified," I just meant "explained" or "given an account of." Whereas a demonstration would be simply t...

Well, isn't it reasonable to ask why it is? Granted, in some cases the answer will be obvious, but surely not always. The sorts of thing Wittgenstein ...

It seems to me that "I had an experience of God" may be both true and justified, in terms of my own (reasonable) standards. But the degree of justific...

I just want to point out that these two views are not the same. You can indeed move on from inexpressibility to a demonstration or showing of what can...

I don’t recall what Habermas says about unavoidability and irreducibility (of language, I assume), but I have only read sections of the 1,000-page The...

Well, here we are again. That is absolutely one way to employ the terms "being" and "existence," a way with a distinguished history. If you were willi...

That's a lovely display, thanks. Lots to be said about Nagel and religion. Is he really open to religious belief? We know that he doesn't want religio...

You can sense the parodic aspect of the Quinean formula, but I always took him to be saying, essentially, "There is no way to usefully define 'existen...

Sure. And Nagel is one of my favorites. I was raising a brow at the idea that fear of religion, specifically, accounts for the current interest in nat...

Oh, I think he meant it! But more to follow.

Yes, these parallels with Augustine are good. Anyone who favors the idea of an intelligible realm is going to have to say whether there's anything pop...

I agree with the emphasis on the collective creation of counting (if the non-Fregean story is correct). I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say that inte...

I read the Tyler Burge paper. It gives a convincing case for viewing Frege as a pure mathematical platonist. I hadn't known that Frege used the term "...

And I just noticed that "sense act" probably doesn't refer to what, in English, we mean by "sense perception," but rather to an "act of making sense."

Good. Interesting that he includes psychical, abstract, and imaginary objects. I would have thought that contradicted the idea of "concrete data," but...

A very helpful explication, thanks for taking so much trouble with it. I think my question gets addressed in this passage: This helps me imagine the p...

Here's how to raise the issue of "further distinguishing" the SEP definition: "There are abstract mathematical objects whose existence is independent ...

Is it likewise not sensible to argue that both of these are true?: 1. Sherlock Holmes exists. 2. Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist. There is more than one...

Husserl's answer seems be that there is no such essence, and each "thing" is indeed always underway (a nice phrase) as a phenomenon to/for our conscio...

What might be some examples of the concrete contents or data? Is the implication that there is some level of sense impression which is not mediated by...

Count T's answer -- that Harry and Sally need to define their terms -- is the direction in which I was going. With all respect to Michael, we have no ...

Well, let's fill it in. Harry: According to me, propositions exist. Sally: According to me, propositions do not exist. Is their dispute about proposit...

I see where you're going with this. But I don't think that what you're calling the "only approach" is quite so straightforward. Suppose I say, "x exis...

Thanks, I'll read it. I too find Popper's "Three Worlds" concept helpful. It's an interesting question, whether a commitment to World 3 items necessar...

How does the issue of correctness arise? As I understand it, intuitionistic logic doesn't contradict classical logic, it only uses different semantics...

Right, what I was describing as a possible position about numbers was meant to sharpen the question: Are we disputing whether abstracta as such can be...

I just want to point out that the bolded phrase is what's at stake. You can believe that numbers and other abstracta really and truly exist without be...

Me, definitely. Working my way through Self-Consciousness and Objectivity now.