Apustimelogist

Yes, fair. I don't think this changes my interpretation of what was said however since I was explicitly thinking that we accept or reject evidence in ...

I was assuming a separation between one's initial intuitions and the process fo evaluating evidence but this is a good point that they could converge ...

I actually think I more or less agree with a fair amount you talk about in the last two posts you make about information and the "arms-length" separat...

Yes, because at the end of the day, aslong as you are receptive to evidence and change your views based on that then it should lead to the same result...

Well the way I stated it in the OP was meant to just be a counterargument against irreducibility so that a physicalist could use it. But I think my vi...

Obviously your intuitions may be wrong but it also seems to be that I could apply the opposite rule and it wouldn't necessarily have an effect on how ...

That may be, I just thought that these rules would have to work all the time to be objective but I can imagine scenarios where the rules you suggest w...

Its not about generating consciousness but the idea that if something putatively non-experiential can generate experiential concepts, this leads to ab...

Well I am just talking about the concept of qualia and the inability for some kind of statistical learning machine to explain their own concepts; for ...

Its all about the meta-problem of consciousness. If it is plausible for a physical statistical learning architecture to generate experiential concepts...

My view isn't so much about falsifying qualia but about whether our concepts of qualia and their irreducibility can plausibly arise through informatio...

I don't see the problem. It seems to me that under your characterization, physicalism would be falsified if there existed any concepts that were not p...

What do you mean?

I don't think there is anything problematic in entertaining both the mental and physical as concepts that we have constructed due to the nature of our...

In hindsight I think is-ought was a poor analogy/description for what I meant which was just that there doesn't seem to be a straightforward link betw...

I think though that fundamentally, our natural sciences seem to characterize the nature of the universe with physics in a way that doesn't depend on t...

This doesn't violate causal closure due to the fact that everything about the world we create are models or constructs which depend on various context...

I disagree because the problem as usually is seen as telling us about ontology, and I am rejecting that view. The disparity in her concepts or in the ...

Yes, the physical description doesn't entail knowing what red is like and vice versa but notice how her saying "aha, I know what it is like to see red...

Intriguing! I have at times thought about conceptualizing reality in terms of information. I think I have quite a way to go before I can consider myse...

I think maybe there is still a kind of something like an is-ought problem in epistemology in the sense that people may have different amounts of evide...

I think Mary's Room is a very good argument against the reducibility of experiences to physics but I don't think that it entails that this is because ...

Not at all, the metaphor has a completely physical basis so how can it be an argument against physicalism?

I would say that information content isn't a thing in and of itself but is about what an observer can distinguish. My point is not really 1 or 2 but a...

But I am talking about the information contents of the actual image, you are talking about features of the physical object the image has been projecte...

I have to go but I will reply to this in a couple of hours!

Thanks btw!

I don't know how well what I am about to say will come across but ... I don't really understand what immaterial meaning ... means. To me, meaning is l...

I am not sure I totally agree. In the OP I suggest that irreducibility is a natural consequence of the fact that experiences are representational. I t...

@"RogueAI" A: In my view, rejecting the duality of mind and body makes explaining how conscious happens an invalid question. B: I personally don't bel...

I think what should be abandoned is the metaphysical assumption of some kind of dualism where over here sits physical things and over there sits menta...

I don't think that characterization describes the view I promoted so well. I think the explanatory gap is significant enough to question physicalism b...

There's definitely some stuff in what you have written which resonates with the direction I want to go in generally when it comes to my philosophy of ...

Yes, I guess it is a kind of non-reductive physicalism but the root of the irreducibility is explicitly to do with information processing. I see the s...

Well, all I can say is I disagree then. I think the photograph metaphor seems a coherent analogy of the view and that I think it is consistent with so...

Yes, I think there is an important point here if I understood correctly. We can say we have experiences but I don't think they necessarily tell us any...

I think your view is too restrictive of physicalism; how would you characterize what my view is saying then? I would say its plausibly fully physicali...

This is an interesting and good point. We can only go by the evidence of what science gives us which looks like a complicated picture of an outside wo...

But you are presupposing that everything has to be explained in some kind of reduction but the point is that if what we experience are representations...

But if the reason something cannot be explained is not about ontology but about limits in explanation then I don't think that is an argument against p...

To me, it might just be required that a physicalist believes everything is physical. You might expect everything should be describable in physical ter...

Thank you for the welcome. The point I try to make is that if experiences are representations of things in the outside world then maybe they can never...

well said but we can go deeper than that. all of these fields are expressed through math. ultimately our descriptions of the brain and consciousness a...

I feel like he does reject that idea about propositions. I seem to remember a whole section where he is criticising the way a picture is entailed by a...