Hablo (Escribo? Leo?) español pero hace seis años desde era parta del grupo de hablaban de español, y no hablàbamos filosofía. Espero practicar españo...
Though then that's a Some Protestants are Calvinists. Calvinists are Protestants (flipped it about in my head, I always do that) Must an ethic obtain ...
That'd disqualify it from strict Calvinists (although, funnily enough, I'm reading a book going over some of this history right now -- has to do with ...
I agree with respect to theoretical knowledge. And you're right that this is the sort of conflict Kant mitigates with his philosophy: theoretical know...
The part I'm questioning at the moment is whether or not it's correct to call it protestant, after all. The connection and similarity to Pietism is su...
I'd say that, at least by way of my understanding of Kant, that Pietism could be rational in Kant's system insofar that one doesn't claim to have a sc...
sharing this bit from ye olde SEP: (Also, that article opens with life details and highlights some concepts which come from Pietist influence) Still p...
Does being among humanity's strongest thinkers, professional grade mathematician, and a world class physicist indicate that Pietism is no-longer nouri...
I'm thinking the Critique of Practical Reason here where he talks about the three ideas which cannot be known theoretically, but which -- for the summ...
OK this was nice to read because it's giving me better words to what was kind of just a feeling that seemed to work for making sense of theoretical/pr...
Fair. Maybe it'd be better to say -- as I read Kant it seems his motivation for writing the ethic comes from that religious perspective, but he is, of...
I'd be hesitant to go that far, but you're right about him being a Pietist. He believed in faith, but wanted it to also be limited by reason, at least...
OK, I went back to work, but I want you to know that it wasn't because you told me the answers that I went back to work, but because I wanted to go ba...
In truth, I'm not sure what middle, middle left, bottom left, and bottom right are. I think you're right that the top right is split peas -- looks lik...
If so then @"unenlightened"'s point stands: there can be no mistakes when copying genes since we are not intelligently designed by a God or a team of ...
Such behavior would never be tolerated by Kant scholars! ;) :D Honestly I think it comes with the territory of reading "the greats" -- they are great ...
Hegel has been here for a couple centuries, give or take, so I'm sure he'll be around after the more important things. I look forward to reading your ...
(Sticking here to the bits where I have sincere commitments) Not with those words, no -- to be fair to you I'm trying to make a position mostly to und...
Yes. I'd say that one can be a cognitivist without thinking that ethics is a cognitive science. I don't think ethics is a science. Heh, fair. I'll sti...
Mkay, that makes sense to me now. But then it seems to go back to whether or not the subjectivist would accept P1, or your rendition of P2. While P1 i...
I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, wh...
How do you feel about this rendition: All stances are independent All beliefs are stances All beliefs are independent ? That makes sense to me. I'm no...
OK, then maybe I'm back to saying it's an instance of begging the question, after all. :rofl: @"Lionino" I'm (clearly) finding the argument hard to un...
Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it: "Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence. The Liar's sentence, for instanc...
I'm claiming that MS is consistent, at least, and making a steel-man attempt at making it plausible to its detractors. My pet theory is error theory j...
That could be, and @"Bob Ross" would be a better adjudicator since I clearly didn't understand the distinction up front -- I've tried to make the case...
I don't think we know that -- if so the statements would belike Hume's passions which come across as a sort of calculus. But we don't have the calculu...
A feeling isn't a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition. I think the concrete example I gave showed that -- si...
Cool. I should have said that I don't think of reason and emotion in opposition -- I don't see reason or emotion as primary with the other secondary, ...
\ P2 would be "A belief is a cognitive stance taken..." and P3 would be "Feelings make moral propositions true or false" The feeling is the non-cognit...
I'll try to be clearer and shorter. P1 isn't begging the question as much as it's how MS is being rendered -- the MS under attack believes that belief...
I'm less certain about it being mistaken, though that does not in turn mean I'm attracted to it either. I'm still in the "playing around" phase. I don...
Fair, I could be the one being too insulting here -- I like these exercizes, but I don't think the categorization of ethical stances is really too ser...
I'd say the position I'm forging here believes that moral judgments are propositional, true, and subjective. "One ought X" means "I feel commitment to...
Yes. I don't think the desire is about the proposition, though. In the abstract it's just a desire -- but the object of desire is not the proposition,...
The proposition is "One ought X" The feeling is not a proposition, and since all beliefs are propositional, the proposition is not being justified by ...
Nope! That helps. To summarize what I'm understanding: Valence of value is known by liking or disliking or perception of intrinsic value or willing so...
True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and ...
How our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think is certainly more important to my mind than these exercises...
Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that. EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequ...
OK, I have a better idea of what you're saying now -- it's not begging the question, but this is your explicit interpretation of Moral Subjectivism, a...
Would this relationship hold generally: if and only if a person does not have knowledge of valence of X, then it's hard to explain how they have an ap...
I wanted it all in context, but I should highlight the portion that's most relevant to the topic and why I started looking it up in the first place: H...
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