One possible motive for the pessimist's temperament
Let me first note that I include anti-natalists and ascetics when I speak of pessimists. It seems to me that one motive for their general temperament is the feeling of being a traveler in a foreign land, or worse, a prisoner in a foreign land depending on how it is determined.
As Zapffe says, "We come from an inconceivable nothingness. We stay a while in something which seems equally inconceivable, only to vanish again into the inconceivable nothingness." Hence, one's life has the quality of having woken up in a foreign country, where the language, customs, and goals of everything around us are indecipherable at first, and that, even upon learning them, an element of mystery still remains and eludes us, gnaws at us.
Optimists throw themselves into every aspect of the foreign country with great zeal and interest, as if they've always lived there and were born to do so. Pessimists approach the situation they find themselves in with much more caution and forbearance. To them, the very inconceivableness of their existence, not to mention its origin and fate after death, is reason enough to refrain from leaving any deep footprints. Who honestly knows the full repercussions of our actions during our brief stay in this strange and often inhospitable world? In light of this ignorance, who could bring a child into it or more generally acquiesce to the direction of the crowd? They know scarcely any more than you do about why they're here.
The pessimist, and especially the anti-natalist, is like Aragorn outside the walls of Moria, who witnesses Merry and Pippin throwing stones into the pond, and admonishes them, saying, "Do not disturb the water." The optimist seems content to throw stones all the same, though he has no need or reason to; that is, of course, besides his own delight in doing so. It's just a means of passing the time and holding off the ever encroaching advance of boredom and despair. Yet the pessimist will accept despair if they are still able to maintain what I shall call a praxis of humility. This involves never acting hubristically or in ignorance if one can help it, which is the only rational response to the situation of being alive.
As Zapffe says, "We come from an inconceivable nothingness. We stay a while in something which seems equally inconceivable, only to vanish again into the inconceivable nothingness." Hence, one's life has the quality of having woken up in a foreign country, where the language, customs, and goals of everything around us are indecipherable at first, and that, even upon learning them, an element of mystery still remains and eludes us, gnaws at us.
Optimists throw themselves into every aspect of the foreign country with great zeal and interest, as if they've always lived there and were born to do so. Pessimists approach the situation they find themselves in with much more caution and forbearance. To them, the very inconceivableness of their existence, not to mention its origin and fate after death, is reason enough to refrain from leaving any deep footprints. Who honestly knows the full repercussions of our actions during our brief stay in this strange and often inhospitable world? In light of this ignorance, who could bring a child into it or more generally acquiesce to the direction of the crowd? They know scarcely any more than you do about why they're here.
The pessimist, and especially the anti-natalist, is like Aragorn outside the walls of Moria, who witnesses Merry and Pippin throwing stones into the pond, and admonishes them, saying, "Do not disturb the water." The optimist seems content to throw stones all the same, though he has no need or reason to; that is, of course, besides his own delight in doing so. It's just a means of passing the time and holding off the ever encroaching advance of boredom and despair. Yet the pessimist will accept despair if they are still able to maintain what I shall call a praxis of humility. This involves never acting hubristically or in ignorance if one can help it, which is the only rational response to the situation of being alive.
Comments (70)
Or, as Cioran says: “Is it possible that existence is our exile and nothingness our home?”
Quoting Thorongil
The universe is fundamentally irrational. There is no reason to believe we will ever know everything.
Quoting Thorongil
I like this a lot.
Quoting Thorongil
I would like to quote a song:
[i]"And if I claim to be a wise man,
Well, it surely means that I don't know"[/i]
-Kansas, "Carry on Wayward Son"
I would add to your praxis, that one should act compassionately. We are all in the same boat, thrown out into sea, alienated, afraid, and on the edge of drowning. It's all that we can do to stop from capsizing or sinking our ship. So when you come across a fellow seaman, show them a few knots, help patch their ship, and send them on their way. Maybe someday they will help you.
I agree with nearly everything you have said, Thorongil. Well said. (Y)
Your song quote also reminds me that partly what I'm getting at is Socrates' definition of wisdom: knowing that you don't know anything. Here, knowledge does not mean perception or cognition so much as certainty with respect to what is purported to be true. The latter we certainly don't have, which militates against the heedless extroversion of the optimist.
I would like to add some more thoughts to why a pessimist may have a certain temperament.
Society in general seems to be built upon a stack of lies, a stack of "feel good" tricks and impossible delusions. The perpetual existence of the human race is given to be intrinsically valuable, for example. Literature, films and shows, video games, political decisions, etc are filled with plots of an evil villain who is out to kill all life. For example, I just got done finishing a quest line in a mmorpg that required me to defeat an antagonist that wished to wipe out all life on a planet to feed his eternal hunger, and he would have later gone on to eat all life in the galaxy if I hadn't stopped him. The rational of stopping him was said to be the preservation of the galactic civilization. My priorities were that this antagonist would have caused a horribly large amount of suffering. But when the final battle was over, I was left with a happy-sing-song tune playing in the background while wondering if what I did was right, wondering if something like this happened in real life, would I be an active part in opposing it.
This is just one example that shows the incongruency between my pessimistic outlook and the general outlook of society. Another would be birth, as well as the myth of progress, capitalism, religion, and politics. I am surrounded by a society that is fundamentally different than I would prefer it to be. It is comedic at best and despairing at worst. This is why I end up "escaping" from the world via books, video games, music, and philosophy, especially the latter two. And even the escapism sometimes doesn't work, as shown above.
This is a passion Thorongil. Just like the optimists, these pessimists are governed by their passions. They don't see the world as it really is, but through the prism of their own feelings. They see the world with tinted glasses, and then they rationalise this seeing saying that it is because they really are, (transcendentally or in spirit, or bla bla) from a different country that they feel this way, instead of realising that they think as they do because they feel as they do. Another instance where feeling determines thought, instead of the other way around. Isn't it a pity that you diagnose the optimists so well for seeing the world through tinted glasses, and yet fail to see that the pessimists also see the world through the prism of their own feelings? The only thing which is different between the two is the tint of the glasses...
Quoting Thorongil
They only talk of a "fate after death" because they have rationalised their feeling of not belonging to mean something which it doesn't. There's no reason to rationalise that feeling. You feel that way, but why must the fact you feel that way really mean something about the world, and not about you?
Quoting Thorongil
The question is non-sensical once you realise that your "self", sub specie durationis, is a combinatorial product, and just like other such products, it comes into existence fortuitously, and goes out of existence just as fortuitously. So if you accept that, then why ask the question?
Your whole post attempts to be an apologetic. And just like all apologists, it seems you feel the need to justify why pessimists feel as they do. But do pessimists first justify and then feel, or do they first feel and later justify? Post-fact rationalisations are a cognitive bias which prevents you from seeing the causal link as it really is: from your feelings to your reasons instead of from your reasons to your feelings.
A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world.
I find these statements highly contradictory, Agustino. If the self is a combinatorial product of 'chance' then how can this fragmented, random 'self' make sense of/pinpoint or 'see' that which you dub 'reality' (I assume you are a determinist and/or physicalist since you claim reality is an objective, stable entity which can be known)?
Also, please define reality as that would mean defining the nature of consciousness itself in my opinion.
It seems wholly impossible divorcing subjective experience from the nature(s) of realities. Everyone 'stamps themselves all over the world' in the same way the world stamps itself all over us. We exist and create within realities, aren't divorced from them while clinically observing them. We are the world.
I fail to follow what the self being created, fragmented, and random has to do with perception or understanding - the "self" is a construct, which means that it exists "in the past" as it were, while perception and understanding exist in the present. The "self" is the bundle of desires/beliefs, etc that one identifies with. To see "reality" means to attend to perception directly, without overlaying your "self" (ie. desires, beliefs, etc.) over it.
Quoting Agustino
Schopenhauer and Spinoza had more in common than some (even Schopenhauer himself) suspected. Schopenhauer's denial of "will" and Spinoza's "blessedness" have a very familiar final outcome of a sort of detachment into "ideas" (for Schopenhauer) and being content in understanding our being a "finite mode in an infinite number of causes" (for Spinoza). Whereas Spinoza thought by seeing the "necessity" of things in nature's complexity, and underlying laws, we would quiet our "passions" and realize we are just a tiny spec in an infinite realm of existence, Schopenhauer thought that by seeing the contingent nature of the world and understanding our restless unending pendulum of dissatisfaction and boredom that is our nature, we could achieve a certain non-willing state through asceticism.
For Spinoza, our intellectual love of god and blessedness, is supposed to calm us and make us indifferent to our passions. I imagine here, he would think that contemplating geometric proofs, hypothetical chess games, and working on a new proof for advanced mathematical branches are our salvation and way into realizing "blessedness". In this regard, he definitely seems the "philosopher's philosopher"- triumphant ratione. That being said, much of their difference is a fundamental difference in the metaphysics of existence. Schopenhauer's conception is that the main principle of life itself is a Striving he called "Will". Will has a double aspect whereby Will is objectified into ideas, which are further individuated through the Principle of Sufficient Reason (space, time, causality) into the world of science which includes nature, which includes animals, which includes us. So here we are as this objectification of Will, playing out our life in space/time/causality. One way to get out of the "Veil of Maya" is to "deny the will-to-live" which is very similar to the dispassionate lessening of passions as Spinoza claims. The difference being that one is denying in Schopenhauer, and one is affirming nature in Spinoza. Also built into Schopenhauer's ethics is his idea of compassion being a vehicle to become less individuated, though this can probably parallel with some ideas in Spinoza.
One point of similarity between the two is the way that they both view ethics as an unfolding process. By this I mean they think that it happens through a process of sorts. In Spinoza, the philosopher sheds his passions and realizes that the lower passions are no longer needed as one cultivates an intellectual love of god. This is very Platonic sounding (to me at least). With Schopenhauer, we have an unfolding into the idea that our Will is ultimately what causes suffering and thus should be denied in a personal ascetic lifestyle coupled with compassion and aesthetic contemplation on art and beauty.
However, a main difference I see is Schopenhauer's ability to take into account the intractable nature of suffering- that as long as we are alive, there is very little we can do to get around it. Life's eventual realities will confront us. We must seek goals while alive, this will lead to suffering in terms of the journey to obtain the goals, as well as the fact that we are "lacking" in the first place. When we get our goals, we quickly succumb to a sort of existential angst that reflects the instrumentality of existence in terms of the constant need to keep ourselves alive, comfortable, and entertained. Time presses on us and we feel its affects in our need for need and our existential angst when reflected on life itself without anything in particular to strive for. Schopenhauer's understanding is closer to home, it is the life we actually live, not a philosopher's dream of pure intellectual devotion. Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on.
And that's what Schopenhauer gets so wrong. Such a condition only applies to those with a restless nature, to those who fear "becoming," who get riddled with anxiety about what is to come, who try to hold the future before its in reach. He is offering justifications, apologetics, for why every life must necessarily be restless, rather than seeing each individual for what they are. The contingent nature of life, the passing and emergence of restlessness and dissatisfaction, at different times, in different people, is what exactly he cannot abide, for it would ruin his explanation of life as necessary suffering. Schopenhauer, in the end, denies nature, life as it exists, because he is more interested in suffering being logically necessitated than he is in describing living people (even considering the fact they will, invariably, encounter some instance of suffering in their life).
For Schopenhauer, the suffering of life is not enough. He wants suffering to be infinite, as a demonstration of how life consuming it ought to be.
That life is suffering is an argument that we are always deprived. This (I think) was Thorongil's point in one of his posts- the natural lack of something is constant and leads to the goal-seeking/boredom pendulum that Schopenhauer discussed. The contingent factors I was discussing are the particular mental, physical, social, and situational circumstances that lead to suffering that impinge upon the individual on top of the necessary suffering of always lacking something (usually related to survival, comfort, or entertainment goals).
And that's the ignorance of the argument. We are not always deprived. More critically, we are not necessarily deprived. It is counter to the world. A falsehood.
No matter how much suffering the world is (and there is inevitably a ton), the contingent nature of the world, of our lives, means we still experience things like joy, happiness and contentment. We are not always lacking something. Sometimes we are content with the present. Even in instances where there is something we want, we are sometimes content: happy to exist, waiting for it, until its time comes. We do not necessarily suffer. Nor do particular states of the world always impinge upon the individual. I'm happy to wait until my birthday to get my birthday present. I'm not restless with thoughts that I must have it now, even if it is something that I want.
If the self exists in the past as you claim, how can it 'keep up' and 'see' or realize the 'present' which you coin 'reality'? Wouldn't it then constantly be lagging while 'reality' forges ahead?
How can you divorce your experiences or 'self' from 'reality'? You are of the world, aren't you? It appears you propose ultimate objectivity is possible. It's as though you suggest you are divorced from the very thing/place/time you 'are' while simultaneously claiming your self exists within a given time frame in relation to what you believe is reality.
I do not think Schopenhauer meant by restless that we are anxious for a future event, but that each moment in time we are never fully satisfied or satisfied for long. He did recognize brief moments of satisfaction (happiness/contentment) from achieving a goal, but then the lacking feeling continues.
I know that. The stuff about anxiety about future events was directed at your argument about impingement on lives resulting from the mental, physical, social, and situational circumstances, at what you were supposing we had on-top of the necessary suffering as argued by Schopenhauer1.
The problem with Schopenhauer's argument is the restless doesn't continue. New states of restlessness emerge. Each state of restlessness is a new state of existence, rather than a continuation of some infinite necessary foundation of life. The lacking feeling does not continue. It merely, sometimes, even frequently, exists. And then it, frequently, passes out of existence, to be replaced by a state absent restlessness (and not just in response to achieving goals. Sometimes people are just found without restlessness at a particular time). Then that will pass, maybe bring a new state of restlessness. And so on and so forth. What Schopenhauer fails to recognise is that states of restlessness are also brief moments, fleeting and contingent states of existence, which pass not only in death but also in life.
I can accept the totality of contingency, but I think he conveys a truth-like phenomena which is to say that we are never completely contented. He did recognize satiation and repose, but he also recognized that as long as we are alive, full contentment was, for all practical purposes, impossible for the everyday man living his life.
I think you should read Spinoza's letter 12 (http://www.sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/corr/corr27.htm) :p Spinoza does not have a very good view of pure mathematics:
[quote=Spinoza]Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure, time, and number, are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining . It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that all, who have endeavoured to understand the course of nature by means of such notions, and without fully understanding even them, have entangled themselves so wondrously, that they have at last only been able to extricate themselves by breaking through every rule and admitting absurdities even of the grossest kind[/quote]
Quoting schopenhauer1
I see Spinoza accounting for suffering just as well - humans, as finite modes of nature, are bound to be destroyed in the end and replaced. But their death is the source of the birth of new modes - it is new life. In Spinoza, the suffering of the individual is necessary for the good of the whole. Once it is realised that it is the "eternal decree of God", one can becomes detached from one's selfish ego-centrism, and one realises that, sub specie aeternitatis, one is eternal - the present carries within it all the past and all the future.
Schopenhauer's vision of reality doesn't take into account the whole, except from an anthropocentric point of view -> the Will must be denied by the individual because it brings suffering to him. But why should the whole care about the suffering of the individual in the first place? -> Although this latter is a bit of a facile reading - if I am to be charitable I would say Schopenhauer meant to say that the denial-of-the-will is really being most true to the Will as noumenon :p
I will take this into account, thanks. Even if it is not math per se, his use of geometric proof and wanting to have an intellectual love of god indicates a preference for logic-related ways of internalizing nature (and thus being "blessed").
Quoting Agustino
I'm not sure I quite get this the way you phrased it. The Will does not care for the individual, and I think that is Schopenhauer's point. Since it care not one bit for individual suffering, one must try to deny it, as that is the root of the suffering in his model.
I would like to note, that a point of departure I probably have with @Thorongil and Schopenhauer himself (whom I agree with much of the time otherwise) in the fact that I do not think that suffering via contingent forces and our inner restlessness can be abated through ascetic practice. Once we come into existence, we are kind of stuck with our inner wills and contingent reality. I do not believe a Buddha or other mystic figure achieves any higher enlightened state that somehow overcomes this state. Antinatalism comes close to a sort of ethic that is realistic, as it isn't relying on metaphysical underpinnings (Will as noumena) but rather, is a concrete solution to ending future suffering. Although perhaps ascetic practices will help calm the mind, I don't see it as a final salve for all of the suffering from all psychological and contingent sources. We still have responsibilities and burdens of life, and unless one is asleep, this is simply what we were dealt when we were born.
That being said, Spinoza's solution is also a non-starter. I don't see how understanding that we are one part of a bigger whole solves much of the suffering more than reading a good book about science satisfies us that we learned something new. We walk away from the interesting book with a bit of a buzz from the interesting insights we have learned, but then we are met with the problems of life. Nothing metaphysically changes.
It is very likely that Spinoza thought of the geometrical method as simply the best way to convey his philosophy - not that this was necessarily how his philosophy was conceived. But he did think that this was the best way to teach it to other people. Just like Schopenhauer said about his own philosophy - Spinoza's philosophy is a single thought, which requires going through all his propositions etc. in order to understand it.
Quoting schopenhauer1
And my point is that a priori, there is no reason that the Will should care about the suffering of the individual. You seem to think that it would be better if the Will did care, or more, that it is somehow tragic that the Will doesn't care. I'm saying that your demand/desire for the Will to care is nonsensical - we are not that important, we are specks of dust.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's not that which saves - but rather Spinoza's therapy of the emotions which diminishes ego-centrism and develops a love for the world which makes the self see itself as the production of Nature - Nature is more "the self" than the self itself is. Thus, when Nature chooses to destroy the self - the self loves this, for through its death, the triumph of Nature shows itself.
This sounds a bit odd being that you accused Schopenhauer of anthropocentrism. It looks like here Spinoza is anthropomorphosizing "Nature". Why should Nature care about its triumph? Also, how does this realistically translate to the problem of suffering? I don't see the connection from A to C.
Now, this has gotten more convoluted. You must explain in non-self-referential language what you mean by "we love God".. and "God cannot love us back" and how this answers the problem of suffering directly. Again, even if this leads to some super interesting idea about being a "spec" in the "whole", it is no more noteworthy than a buzz one gets from reading about any number of interesting ideas about man's relation with the universe. What gives this particular idea (whatever that is really) anything more that solves the problem of suffering or is of extreme ethical import?
I don't think this adequately answered my last post which was this: You must explain in non-self-referential language what you mean by "we love God".. and "God cannot love us back" and how this answers the problem of suffering directly. Again, even if this leads to some super interesting idea about being a "spec" in the "whole", it is no more noteworthy than a buzz one gets from reading about any number of interesting ideas about man's relation with the universe. What gives this particular idea (whatever that is really) anything more that solves the problem of suffering or is of extreme ethical import?
Nothing. The point is not that it can solved. Rather the point is: the expectation it will be solved is nonsensical and only makes us needlessly anxious. It is to desire a fantasy world which will never be. Better to direct our attention towards mitigating suffering and enjoying the moments we are given respite from it. Pining for a suffering-less world which we will never (worse, a world we know we will never have; to expect a world without suffering is our own wilful ignorance about life) have only results in more suffering than there need be.
The fact that we have to deal with life in the first place leads to philosophical pessimism. The fact that we are dealing with it, is just a given if we are alive and awake. The idea that we don't want to make new individuals have to deal with life leads to antinatalist stances. There is nothing wrong with taking account of the situation and explicating about it. If you don't want to see it, then don't engage with it. However, saying "stop writing about it and deal with it" doesn't make the statements any less true. Trying to ignore it won't make it go away. By definition, whether one acknowledges it in some cohesive theory or not, people must deal with life- its responsibilities, burdens, and suffering. People will also, whether they acknowledge it, seek positive experiences, pleasure, happiness, contentedness or what have you thus I am acknowledging people make do with what they are given.
I don't follow. It clearly doesn't for many people. Unless you can prove that this necessarily follows, then you are engaging in a hasty generalisation. Pessimism is an attitude, and as an attitude, it emerges from how one feels regarding life. But one doesn't necessarily have to feel repulsion when put face to face with life's inevitable difficulties. It may be a struggle to run, but that doesn't mean that one necessarily doesn't enjoy running, or doesn't look forward to it.
Notice that pessimism does play a psychologically defensive role, just like optimism - in order not to be disappointed, one must avoid the world, through a variety of mechanisms: not engaging in so and so actions because they can lead to sorrow; not believing so and so, because one may be disappointed; not forming relationships because it creates vulnerabilities, etc.
Quoting schopenhauer1
There are logical problems with this. It presupposes that new individuals could possibly not deal with life. It is impossible, it's not in the set of possible propositions. As such, it's opposite, is a tautology, and thus has no explanatory value compared to a mere restatement of a personal dislike towards bringing other beings into existence. Perhaps a projection of one's insecurities as a parent onto the world.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well some of us don't have to ignore it, simply because we don't feel this way about the world. Just because you feel so about the world, doesn't mean everyone ought to feel so. I understand that there is a large temptation for those who hold minority positions to attempt to enforce them as necessary on others, in an effort to convert others to their own faith, and thus have more people whom they can relate with, and whom they can feel good around. It happens to me too. I much rather prefer traditional societies to today's overly liberal societies - what that means is that I would like to live in a community of people following these values - but that is not to say that I ought to convince everyone else to follow me. In fact, even if I tried, I would never succeed. Arguments do not convince people. I'm much better off looking for those few people who are already convinced, and learning to live without them until I find them. This is integrity, and courage.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, indeed. But some people like dealing with life's responsibilities, burdens, and struggles. Just because you don't, doesn't mean that everyone is like this. Personally, I much rather prefer a quiet life, as opposed to one with lots and lots of struggles. I don't like struggling, I'm lazy by nature, and I don't like getting a sense of fulfillment from overcoming challenges. It makes me feel as if I am lacking something, and I must struggle in order to obtain it. I don't like that. But it's something personal - I noticed that most people are not like me - for them, it's extremely meaningful to struggle - for them, this is the point of life.
I am not proving it necessarily follows necessarily. I was more reiterating what Thorongil was mentioning in his initial post for why philosophical pessimism as a concept exists, However, as someone else was explaining on these forums, people also tend to say certain things and feel differently when they are actually living their life. For the sake of argument, for an "official" banner, they will embrace an optimistic stance when in these type of debates. This doesn't necessarily mean that people really live optimistically. That is not to say people don't fully have a positive outlook at all times and let nothing get to them, but me suspects this ain't the case in many cases. Actually, I think people's attitudes are generally in a flux depending on a number of physical, situational, and mental factors. Someone can be happy now making hand puppets and then break their leg walking down the street. They can feel miserable and hate their situation and then they can recover and feel the joy of friends at their bedside, but then get bored in the hospital room and have a moment of existential ennui, in which case they crack open a book and read about their favorite philosopher, by which time they get thirsty, and they can't get comfortable in their bed, but then they get used to it, but now something itches, then they worry about the work they are missing, some anxiety takes place and heartbeat quickens as they see in their minds the work piling up, then they think of that person they work with that really makes their day not so good, then they think of strategies to try to deal with it, oh wait the nurse came with a more comfortable pillow and some juice, great.. oh wait the juice is really watered down and kind of nasty, but wait, the nurse left.. come back, I still want more.. oh well, I can press the button but I don't want to be a nuisance, oh the philosopher book, I forgot about that. I'm going to read that. Oh crap, I have to go to the bathroom, I'll just get up myself.. oh crap my leg really hurts and I have a headache..
Agustino thinks: Quoting Agustino
I did not say they could not "deal with life" but rather that they have to deal with life. Let us say there is a middle position between your assertion of people enjoying every aspect of life and my assertion that there are many aspects of life that people would otherwise not want to deal with but have to anyways. Let us say that there are some things people don't mind dealing with and others that people do mind. Is it like a mission to create people who will deal with life? To be frutiful and multiply? No, it is not. So, if there is a mix in each life, and some more negative than others in terms of their subjective preference for dealing with life, than why try to put someone (another individual with their own attitudes and thoughts towards society, the world, themselves) into the world in the first place?
Quoting Agustino
So, all things being equal, just because someone likes dealing with burdens and responsibilities they should put this onto another person?
Also, you didn't answer my question regarding Spinoza a few posts back.
Philosophical pessimism is its own particular state of discourse. It is the existence of a particular experience. An idea in someone's head which is actually distinct from their other states (and so the many instances of suffering in their life). The fact people are dealing with life does not necessarily result in philosophical pessimism. Philosophical pessimism is a certain state in addition to all other states (including suffering) of their life.
I'm not arguing anyone should needs to stop writing about the inevitable suffering of life and "just deal with it." My point is that Schopenhauer's philosophy turns philosophical pessimism into a state of anxiety. Rather than accept that suffering is an inevitable part of life, he ties himself up in knots over our inability to avoid it. To Schopenhauer we are failures because we cannot compete the task of eliminating suffering.
I am specifically arguing Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a state of needless suffering.
Why chastise ourselves for being incapable of a life without suffering? Do we not already suffer enough, without adding restlessness and anxiety over our inability to avoid suffering? Why not a form of philosophical pessimism which recognises we cannot escape suffering, but avoids the practice of beating ourselves up for that inability?
In the most profound way, you do not acknowledge people make do with what they a given. You utterly reject the idea of being comfortable with what we are given. Is life, suffering, something we can accept as inevitable? You don't think so. In your heart you are still desperate to avoid it. You think the world owes us a way to avoid suffering, even when it is impossible. Supposedly, we are miserable failures because we lack the ability to end suffering. You are not comfortable with idea suffering is an inevitable part of life (which is what we are given).
Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a manifestation of pining for this impossible world. It is not a description of how life is suffering. It is a demand for extra suffering; that we ought to be restless and anxious, on-top of any (other) states of suffering we might encounter, because there is suffering we can't avoid.
It doesn't solve much suffering at all. Maybe it might change someone understanding of the world such they experience a little bit less suffering, such as replacing anxiety over not belonging to the finite, but it is a description of ourselves and the world, rather than a means which will necessarily resolve suffering in the world. With respect to preventing most suffering, it has no role. Spinoza isn't even a "non-starter" with regards to solving the inevitable suffering of life. Such a goal was never the point and isn't attempted by the argument.
And of course nothing "metaphysical"changes. "Metaphysics (i.e. logic)" never changes. The metaphysical is the infinite, unlike any state of suffering, which is of the world, which is finite.
I don't mean that philosophical pessimism automatically comes about, I am saying that the idea is a result form dealing with life's problems, not that it is a necessary conclusion from it. The reason it came about is the problem of suffering for those who come to that conclusion.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I think you have it backwards. Philosophical pessimism is the ultimate version of the idea that suffering is inevitable. Your contention should not be with phil. pess. but with the more "optimistic" worldviews that overlooks suffering or tries to downplay it in official rhetoric. However, as stated with Agustino, this doesn't mean they don't deal with it just because they spew out optimistic rhetoric..after the dust is cleared, they still have to live the down and dirty business of life like the rest of us lesser fortunate souls.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Again, I just read this as "just deal with it and stop talking about it".
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
He is just describing what goes on on a meta level, like stepping back and trying to look at the situation from afar. Whether one "knows" the situation from the meta level or one is actually just living out the situation, that doesn't change or amplify the suffering. One person is just living through the suffering and the other is just recognizing what is going on. Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I don't think so, Spinoza's whole "Ethics" is trying to lead the reader from a metaphysical premise of monism through a bunch of proofs that gets to a sort of conclusion about the intellectual love of god and blessedness. He discusses passions and trying to constrain them, and the more we realize we are part of a whole, the less we will be guided by lower passions. At least, that is my take on it. From what I know of Spinoza, he was a great thinker and system builder and his use of the geometric proof was unique and very interesting. His Tractatus Theological-Politicus anticipated a lot of the Enlightenment's view of religion and seemed ushered in modern criticism. I have complete respect for Spinoza. I just don't see what the intellectual love of god really means in practical terms.
So then what's your point? That some people feel so about the world? Sure.Quoting schopenhauer1
There is something fake about this. And what is fake, is that the emotion/feelings generated by reading this are not the same as the emotions/feelings generated in living through, or having lived through the same thing. The experience that you are describing through the text just isn't the experience one would generally have in going through that.
Quoting schopenhauer1
No it isn't. But this applies equally to the opposite. It's not a mission to cease creating offspring and become unfruitful until the species becomes extinct. That too isn't a mission.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Neither should they put it, nor should they not put it. It's not a moral question.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I will answer it, just didn't have much time recently...
My problem isn't with philosophical pessimism per se; I more less agree with that. Suffering is inseparable from life. To create life is to make a person who will suffer. The antinatalist has a strong argument for not bringing new life into the world. If I was to asked to suggest the defining attribute of philosophical pessimism, it would be recognising the suffering of life and that there is no joy in the world which can undo it.
It is Schopenhauer's particular brand of philosophical pessimism which I have an issue with:
Indeed. And that is the problem with his arguments. Suffering it not meta. It is lived. Rather than metaphysical, suffering is of the world. The "restlessness" Schopenhauer identifies is neither a description of any state of suffering nor any particular states of suffering he is worried about. It is "meta" description which says absolutely nothing about any state of suffering. There is no such thing as "meta" suffering. Most critically, a description of instances of suffering is not the state of living through them.
So there is a great deal of difference between a lived moment of suffering and talking about it on a "meta level." The latter is distinct in that it is never the suffering being spoken about. If the "meta" description is suffering at all, it must be its own unique state of anxiety, pain or restlessness which it doesn't say anything about. Rather than a profound insight into the nature of suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is merely one more state of suffering we might encounter. Instead of a description of a states of suffering, it is the state of suffering because one knows there is suffering which one cannot avoid. It is to put an extra scoop of suffering on top all the other suffering we have. Schopenhauer notes the inevitability of suffering and then demands we must suffer for that too.
I'm actually calling something far more excessive and, fortunately, possible: the elimination of a particular state of suffering.
To ask someone to "deal with suffering" does not make sense. The whole thing about suffering is one does not deal with it. It's impossible. Suffering always hurts. One cannot turn suffering into non-suffering. At best one manages to live through a moment of suffering to be relieved at its passing (or perhaps, dies, so they no longer have to endure it).
What I am calling for here is the elimination of the state of suffering which is Schopenhauer's anxiety about having to suffer. We suffer enough otherwise. We don't need to add to that be worrying about how we can't escape it.
Critically, from the point of view of mitigating suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophy is deeply unethical. It implores are to be anxious about our inability to avoid suffering. If we aren't, it accuses us of failing to understand suffering and grossly misrepresenting what it manes to life a life of suffering. Schopenhauer's philosophy attempts to increase suffering, to make people anxious about how they will inevitably be suffering, because it mistakes suffering at the knowledge of the inevitable suffering for the inevitable suffering of life.
In terms of the context of this discussion: to be free of anxiety about the contingency of the world. To accept the inevitable outcomes of the world for what they are. Not to, as Schopenhauer does, feel entitled to a world which never exists.
God is the infinite substance immanent in all states of the world. For us to love God means, without exception, to "love" all that happens; to recognise the world for what it is and avoid the notion it "must be" something else, merely because what exists is so painful. It is to recognise suffering for what it is (including the inevitability of suffering and what that means for ethics). It is to recognise the absence of suffering for what it is (and what this means for ethics).
I don't think Schopenhauer's meta-level analysis of suffering creates suffering. He is just describing it. I don't feel suffering because I read Schopenhauer. Rather, I feel suffering and am drawn to a fellow thinker who so eloquently states what I feel. My bet is this is similar to many other people's draw to the philosopher. Schopenhauer thinks that suffering mainly stems from the restless nature of existence (always becoming but never being). Since, in his view, he has the problem, he also provides the solution. There's nothing wrong with him writing about that. A doctor must know what is wrong in order to figure out how to cure it. Personally, I don't necessarily buy into a metaphysical Will, but I do think that there is an analogous thing going on in terms of the restless nature of human experience and how boredom, survival, and comfort drive much our motivations.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
So this huge insight is that we are to accept suffering as inevitable? That is just a given. We have to deal with the challenges of life. Recognizing that suffering will happen doesn't make me feel any better about it. Again, this just seems to say "suffering happens, deal with it". Unless we are dead, we are dealing with it, what else can you tell me?
No doubt he gives descriptions of the suffering which is the anxiety about suffering too. In the sense that he is describing this of suffering some people are in, he is talking about suffering what is already there. The problem is his position then goes on to advocate this position continue. Instead of recognising the anxiety about having to suffer is state we may (and ought to) avoid, he confuses it with the inevitable suffering of life. His philosophy increase suffering because it drags more people into the state of anxiety about the suffering of life and helps keep those who are already there in that state.
It is no wonder you feel drawn to written which describes what you feel. Everyone one does. The point is not that you shouldn't be drawn to such writing, but rather that what you feel (and what Schopenhauer describes, the (almost) ever present anxiety about having to suffer) is an unnecessary state of suffering. And that his philosophy advocates maintaining this.
But it is anything but a given. The world is full of people who don't accept suffering as inevitable. People deny that all the time. They give ridiculous rationalisation of why suffering is present. Some ignore it under the impression there is something can be done about it. Some still insist the world must be otherwise and the fact it's not means we must be in constant pain (e.g. Schopenhauer). Our world is full of people who don't accept the suffering of life, even amongst those who know its absence is impossible.
The fact you are still thinking of suffering to be "dealt with" clearly shows you don't accept it. You are still thinking of it as something which can be resolved. As if it were possible to somehow take a state of suffering and remove that it was suffering. That's why suffering is so bad. No-one deals with suffering. It is impossible. Nothing can make it better. We just live in a given pain until that pain stops. In life we are never dealing with suffering. We are just hurting until the hurting stops.
My point doesn't ask you deal with suffering. It argues that one form of suffering (anxiety about having to suffer) ought to be eliminated (as much as possible). This is what the acceptance of suffering achieves.
I think that Schopenhauer's description of restlessness is one of his best points. The emptiness one feels and the constant-goal seeking rings very true to the human experience. If anything, it may produce less anxiety to know there is relatively famous thinker out there that not only feels similarly but states the ideas so eloquently. I don't know anyone who reads Schopenhauer who feels an extra source of anxiety from his idea of Will. If anything, it makes people calmer to understand there might be an abstract model that is describing what is going on. Now, in one respect I can see what you are saying- the idea that there is an escape from the suffering might be a pipe dream (like Nirvana, heaven, utopia, etc.). However, that doesn't necessarily cause anxiety. You either except his conclusion like @Thorongil apparently does and go with it (live more ascetically in the hope that this calms the Will), or one does not. If one does not, one simply admires some of the author's main points without accepting the conclusion. Again, no anxiety need be involved in evaluating Schopenhauer's claims. This seems like a strawman or a misconception at the least.
Also, I still don't get this idea of "inevitability of suffering". It still sounds like a tautology "You have to deal with life's challenges". Yep, you do. There is no way to avoid it. The only conclusion I can make from this is the antinatalist stance that you don't have to spread it to other individuals. At least Schopenhaur has some ideas to try to help soothe some of what he sees as why life is suffering (compassion, aesthetic contemplation, and ascetic practice). You can't fault him for trying to explain ways that may make one "escape" some of what may seem painful about life. He thinks that by knowing the situation, you can know how to solve it. Again, even if he is not accurate, by reading his thoughts, one doesn't get more anxious. On the contrary, if one is inclined to agree with his ideas anyways, one may be more comforted that there is a thinker that gives a voice to one's prior feelings. Besides antinatalism, I think compassion is an interesting idea that is useful. If people see everyone else as fellow sufferers and also having to deal with life instead of overlooking life's problems or trying to have a veneer of optimism, then people can commiserate together about it and perhaps feel a bit better knowing that we are dealing with life's challenges. I can also understand the turn towards asceticism if one has these ideas of the suffering and life's challenges because one's natural reaction is to try to rebel against that which is giving suffering. If one is truly adept at being ascetic then perhaps this does provide some relief knowing that one is living in a sort of rebellion against the Willing nature of life. If that doesn't cut it, perhaps knowing you are in the same situation with others who feel the same way will provide at least a moderate amount of comfort.
This pregnantly worded question is only interesting to the degree that it suggests the impossibility of truthfully analyzing the character of the world. If you meant to imply such an impossibility, then you end up begging the question by asserting the impossibility of making true statements about the world by means of purportedly true statements about the world, i.e. that it contains beings who are determined by their feelings and that these feelings in turn determine their statements about the world. Such a claim is self-defeating. If you did not mean to imply such an impossibility, then it is possible to make true claims about the world, and I would again maintain that pessimism truthfully describes the world. It is then up to you to refute my position if you disagree.
Quoting Agustino
I'm not sure I meant it as this. I find it to be more analytic than apologetic, though I suppose an explanation can be a defense in the sense that it clears away misconceptions about the position in question.
Quoting Agustino
Pessimism is realism, in that it adequately describes the world as it is. Do not confuse pessimism as a psychological disposition with pessimism as a philosophical position. The latter is all I am concerned with.
While true, there is a way to read the denial of the will as an affirmation. He says, for example: "It can still be asked from what this will has sprung, which is free to affirm itself, the phenomenal appearance of this being the world, or to deny itself, the phenomenal appearance of which we do not know." So the affirmation of the will results in the world, but the denial of the will is in some sense the affirmation of something of which we know not.
Thanks for your thoughts in this thread, too, by the way.
But that isn't a mission for antinatalism, just a consequence of preventing other's from suffering. What you would have to justify is that a new individual "needs" to live life despite there being suffering. What "x" reason (aka mission/telos/intrinsic good) needs to be carried out by the an individual such that the suffering is justified? If you fill in the "x" reason/mission/intrinsic good, then this starts going down a slippery slope of individuals being beholden to some external principle and then this external principle has to be justified for why it needs to be carried out in the first place without being circular logic.
1. How do you integrate Benatar's "hedonistic calculus" with Schopenhauer's moralistic pessimism (e.g. a normative judgment on existence)?
2. By what standard do you (and Schopenhauer) find life wanting?
2. What makes you reject Nietzsche's Dionysian pessimism? From the standpoint of a Dionysian pessimist, existence is blameless, “one cannot judge, measure, compare the whole, to say nothing of denying it”.
3. Even Schopenhauer saw possibility for the aesthetic perceiver, the artist, the compassionate agent, and the ascetic saint to diminish suffering; why don't you entertain this option as a way out and is antinatalism the natural "consequence" for you?
Nietzsche is quite reproachful towards Schopenhauer and accuses him of lacking the philosophical strength to say "yes" to life. In the Gay Science he claims that Schopenhauer’s pessimism represents “an impoverishment of life”, the reaction of a suffering individual who takes “revenge on all things by…branding his image on them, the image of his torture”. I'll be frank in this respect as well; I find the continuous return by pessimists to discuss pessimism akin to TV evangelism: repetitive, futile and a little annoying - nobody who isn't already a pessimist is going to be convinced by it because it is an interpretation of the world incompatible with personal experience for most.
I would think far more interesting would be, instead of trying to convince one another of one thing or another, to understand what one or the other sees when looking at the world.
I disagree, by the way, with your assertion that any one would have to justify that a new individual needs to live. It's sufficient not to ascribe to Benatar's hedonistic calculus or Schopenhauer's pessimism, which I don't. It's only if we accept the premises of the pessimist that we have to play by those rules.
Quoting Benkei
I think they integrate in the idea of existential angst. While Benatar is more of a classic utilitarian, Schopenhauer believes that life is necessarily a restless Will. However, part of what one can take into the utilitarian calculus is restless Will.
Quoting Benkei
Being that there is always a lack of "something" that motivates human behavior, every act that is trying to achieve a goal means something we didn't have to begin with.
Quoting Benkei
Nietzsche seems to claim that the suffering is itself a sort of meaning, but if suffering is viewed as something to avoid, this would be wrong
Quoting Benkei
I do entertain these notions. If we are all fellow-sufferers then it is easier to empathize with others and commiserate, thus being a source of comfort. If aesthetic contemplation is a source of brief escape from the mundane Will, of goal-seeking and deprivation, this is also a source of comfort. If an individual is comforted by rebelling against one's Will by trying to practice asceticism, that is also good. Antinatalism means that people don't want to spread the responsibilities, burdens, and suffering onto a new person.
Quoting Benkei
Frankly, where else do you see antinatalists or pessimists besides philosophy forums or other niche places on the internet? So, unless you just happen to want to engage with such unfortunate souls like myself, where else will you come into contact with such folk in this day and age? You can simply disengage from us annoying people and live your life in your own worldview. Unless antinatalism got to a point where we took out ads for "not having kids from the standpoint of suffering" and were an intrusive and daily occurrence in the most marketed avenues, I don't see how this is a big deal for anyone.
Quoting Benkei
I'll just propose to you what I proposed to Agustino:
What you would have to justify is that a new individual "needs" to live life despite there being suffering. What "x" reason (aka mission/telos/intrinsic good) needs to be carried out by the an individual such that the suffering is justified? If you fill in the "x" reason/mission/intrinsic good, then this starts going down a slippery slope of individuals being beholden to some external principle and then this external principle has to be justified for why it needs to be carried out in the first place without being circular logic.
The moral judgment of Schopenhauer is "life isn't worth living", which you take into account when making a utilitarian judgment that "life isn't worth living" (I paraphrase). That doesn't seem entirely the right thing to do for several reasons. The most obvious to me is that Schopenhauer's conclusion should not be part of a utilitarian calculus because the utilitarian consequences of a moral judgment are nil.
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is simply not true. The presence of my wife, makes me want to cuddle. It's not the absence of a cuddle that makes me want to cuddle. If it's always a "lack" it would simply make that person profoundly self-absorbed. That's just one particular instance of a motivation but I think people are complex creatures that are motivated by a variety of things - a lack is only one of many possible motivations.
Only a living person can experience a lack of something by the way, so it's not a standard by which to judge life because it presupposes life.
The question stands therefore, by what standard do you find life wanting?
Quoting schopenhauer1
I do not see how that logically follows. If suffering is something to avoid then how could it not have meaning? If it does not have meaning, why avoid it?
I'm not a Nietzsche expert but as far as I'm aware Nietzsche rejects "being" and embraces "becoming". It's in that difference that his judgment of Schopenhauer enters. For, the disorder and suffering of a world of becoming can only be impugned in the context of an imagined world of being, but, if one truly affirms becoming, “one must admit nothing that has being…the better world, the true world…the thing-in-itself".
So perhaps a further study of Nietzsche and Montaigne would be of interest for you as neither of them reject pessimism but - in a way - take it a step further.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't need to justify suffering because it simply is there. I'd neither make the mistake of raising a single example to a standard, nor the reverse, to abstract away individual differences. That my life and that of my daughter are intrinsically meaningless is a given. Luckily, we are human beings and we can build the greatest edifice of meaning in our life time by entering into meaningful relations with the world around us.
Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning.
I am not quite sure what you mean that "utilitarian consequences of a moral judgement are nil." If life's restless nature (always becoming) is (mostly unconsciously) a part of the suffering of existence (the pendulum swing of survival, goal-seeking out of a lack, and general existential boredom), I don't see how this shouldn't be considered part of a calculus of sorts.
Quoting Benkei
You can look at it a number of ways and still come up with the conclusion I gave earlier. Assuming for a moment that the Will is endless, your example just reiterates the lack that pervades our motivations. If, let's say basic drives and boredom are very much at the base of these motivations, the myriad of goals and desires we have are thus not that complicated to see always arising. First the need for companionship and to be loved, then the need for cuddles. But it is never satisfied and if or when it is denied can become a source of further distress. Post facto excuses that the distress and the initial lack are "good for you" seem suspect as a way to justify inevitable pain and want in a life, but not facing the problem directly.
Quoting Benkei
I'm not sure the coherence of the statement. When there is x then y. When there is life, then there is lack of something. This should prove more that life entails a lack. The more self-aware the animal, the more this lack is compounded by nuances of lack, awareness of lack, and distress of lack.
Quoting Benkei
I guess this is how Nietzsche is using meaning. He seems to like the idea that suffering is the highest intrinsic good. Although at times it seems like a means to another end- something like greatness or achievement. Endurance, suffering, and greatness are all kind of intertwined here in this conception and a life worth living is one that endures many hardships related to the maintaining and improving of one's life which leads to perhaps his actual or other intrinsic good which is greatness.
However, a different conclusion follows if one sees suffering as not an intrinsic good but rather an intrinsic bad. Suffering in Schopenhauer's conception of necessary suffering combined with common sense notions of contingent suffering bring us more of a negative view of life. The necessary suffering is tied to the lack (becoming) which always indicates a lack of something. This lack in itself (the noumenal perhaps) doesn't equate to much except a hollow concept but the outcome of lack when substantiated in living animals that experience this sense of lack, is suffering for that animal.
Quoting Benkei
I am not sure how seeing the world as "becoming" is much different than Schopenhauer's ideas. His very noumenal principle is that the world is Will- an ceaseless striving force. However, I think you mean to say that since there is no chance of ever "being" and hence, to free ourselves from the mess, the only option is to embrace it, and embrace it fully. That is not necessarily saying Schopenhauer is wrong though, it is saying that we should be happy that we are suffering. This goes back to viewing suffering as intrinsically bad rather than intrinsically good. One idea conception is saying we simply must deal or cope with with what we are given (which is itself a given if one does not commit suicide). The other is rejecting the premise as not good to begin with (and in Schopenhauer's view) trying to get free of it as much as possible.
This brings me to another point. You may (or will) I am guessing trying to counter that "see, it is just outlook that is determining what is correct or what is most truthful. You choose to suffer by embracing the philosophy". If this is the rebuttal, I lead you back to what I was telling TheWillowofDarkness. There is the life lived and the life analyzed. Schopenhauer is removing himself (metaphorically) from the situation and writing about it as a phenomenon. However, as humans, even if we are not conscious of how it is that we are suffering, we still suffer. Reading Schopenhauer or having similar viewpoints prior to reading him do not add to the suffering, it is just describing it to make sense of what is going on.
Quoting Benkei
So there is your "x" telos, "Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning". Now, you are justifying the inevitable harm of life by saying that a person can make their own meaning and give meaning to things. Now you must explain why someone needs to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic?
If that's your interpretation then you don't understand what teleology is. It's not a goal or purpose of life, it's the natural consequence of living as a human.
It's also a gross misrepresentation of my remarks (as other paragraphs show). As I stated before, I'm not interested in being convinced or trying to convince as it is futile. I was hoping to create understanding but that requires you to read compassionately.
No I can't come up with the conclusion you gave earlier because it requires me to tortuously rationalise my actions in a manner that is simply an incorrect representations of my actual motivations. But ok. I guess I'm not seeing things how they "really" are. :B
PS: I'm sorry you're such a one-dimensional character that the only things that motivates you is the "lack" of things.
I think the quoted remark works either way. If the point of carrying out life is to make meaning through living, as you indicated, or if it the summum bonum of intrinsic goods to be alive, and thus why life life should be carried out, then the question still stands: "Why does someone need to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic?"
Quoting Benkei
I have definitely appreciated your remarks, even if I disagree with them. After I reread your first post, I will try to change the tone of the argument so that it is more of an inquiry and less of an argument/rebuttal style if that is how you so choose. However, you have to play along as well. If I am willing to "see your side" for the sake of argument, you must also meet me half way as we try to make a synthesis of understanding.
This so far is not the compassionate synthesis I was hoping :P . However, to elaborate, I think that there might be two forms of suffering going on here: necessity and contingent. Necessary suffering is determined by the nature of restless beings that lack certain things and thus motivated to obtain certain goals. The basic characteristic in humans is the proverbial survival/boredom pendulum he describes. Beyond this though, we live in a world of contingent forces, where any number of genetic, physical, mental, and situational factors can come into play and cause suffering or at the least slight discomfort that requires a reaction.
With necessity aspect, if we were to base most drives on survival and boredom (products of big-brained animal natures) as Schopenhauer states, leads to the myriads of goal-seeking endeavors we have. Boredom is connected with loneliness in intimate ways for example. Humans, generally surviving as social animals, need each other for survival and entertainment. Life simply is less boring when shared with other people. Survival has also equipped us with sexual pleasure and sexual attraction. Combine these things and the needs exist to and you can see where one (unconsciously through the actions of living or consciously through a deliberate goal) tries to find a companion- preferably someone that can also derive mutual sexual pleasure with. Then let's say one finds this person over time. Then other goals, desires, and things pop in. Perhaps, the person is being courted by someone else. Now a sort of reaction bubbles up of fear that the person will go with this other person. Now a new goal/desire begins. Perhaps you end up being with this person and win them back, then other goals/desires bubble up. Then one stubs a toe and tries to alleviate it, etc. etc. All these motivations are a mixture of contingent forces and necessary desires/goals.
So if we were to split the categories.. the "lacking" part is the necessary part that will never go away. The contingent parts are things that can happen otherwise, but nonetheless cause suffering and thus causes one to try to alleviate it or at the least deal with it.
Put on top of this that besides the Schopenhauer lacking aspect of desire and the contingent suffering of one's environment (sickness, disaster, misfortune, disappointment, negative social circumstances), there is a third kind of suffering that is quasi-necessary. I call it this because although there might be a society where this might not be true, it is almost always a guarantee that in life one will have to deal with responsibilities and burdens that otherwise one would not want to deal with. It is the price of being born.
Combine all these together and there is plenty of suffering that is unavoidable. As I was saying to other people in the thread.. Ways to deal with the suffering is to see everyone as fellow-sufferers and thus use compassion to help relieve others burdens, but also acknowledge that it the suffering is never completely going away.
Certainly not in the context it was written...
That's not the point and you know I already stated as much when I said "my life [...] is intrinsically meaningless". So the question doesn't stand.
Read the following not as a point to argue but as a possible glimpse in how my thoughts work:
I take joy in the fact that I can give meaning and now that I am alive I do find meaning - not in life itself - but what my particular life contains (the summum of my relations to the world). My life isn't meaningful, but my relationship to my daughter is. As it is to you via this forum or to my grand piano. There are obvious degrees in importance there but you get the picture.
I also consider this "giving meaning" a very creative force that only sentience has made possible. We're the only beings that can articulate meaning out of nothing. Where there was no meaning - poof - there's a chair, and a table, and a cat on a mat and a brain in a VAT. "Awesome" doesn't do that possibility justice. The knowledge we have developed through giving the world around us meaning is to me the greatest observable miracle in the world - that despite our total insignificance in this universe and the meaningless of it all, we have a reasonable control over our direct surroundings as a consequence of that knowledge.
It's therefore not that I "must" give meaning (I'm sure most people don't care) or that it justifies whatever suffering there is. It's that despite suffering life is just a lot of fun and in any case not something I can judge based solely on my experience of it - that would be hubris. I can only tell you what it means to me.
As it is, I don't care about most of the things Schopenhauer considers suffering. Restlessness is temporary, as is everything. The "perfect state", the life Schopenhauer would consider acceptable, is a state of being (static) that isn't of a world that is always becoming (flux). So if I stop comparing between "being" and "becoming" because of a rejection of "being" a judgment of "becoming" is no longer possible (at least, not in any absolute sense).
Does that make sense to you? You don't have to agree to it, it only has to make sense.
Quoting Benkei
I'm convinced that isn't the case.
Yes, it does makes sense. I see your argument. I am not going to do the same old arguments by trying to refute it (not yet anyways), so I am going to do a more inquiry based approach. Why do you think Schopenhauer appreciated static rather than flux? I know one can point to Vedic and Buddhist influences for sure, but I think one can easily look to the Western tradition of thought as well. Neoplatonic and Gnostic thought comes to mind regarding the One or wholeness which has been shattered by space-time. Schopenhauer gives this monism a Kantian flavor by giving reality a polar structure, one in which there is a noumenal aspect (which is "flux-proper") and one which is shattered into individuation by space-time (which is flux-as-mediated-by-space-time-and-causation). One can't help but see parallels with Gnosticism whereby the perfect One is somehow disturbed and by various processes of breaking apart, the physical world of space-time is created (albeit explained through mythological analogy).
Expanding more on this "static" and "flux" terminology (which I think is an interesting one, and thus I am going with it), I would say that antinatalism definitely seems to retain this Gnostic aesthetic. Being not born, though strictly speaking is a "nothingness" (which itself is not accurate because there is no "is" with nothingness- but you get the picture) and the idea of nothingness can be seen as pure being (ironically..I know, since nothingness is pure non-being, but you get what I am saying). The idea of being born is seen as flux or a "disturbance" of the static, if you will. Thus, the "becoming" (and always lacking) aspect of life. This could be a matter of differences in aesthetic attitudes towards life. Perhaps it is temperament (this thread, to @Thorongil's credit started as a discussion of temperament). Perhaps it is an ability to step back and see life as a whole rather than in particular events. Perhaps certain people with a propensity for aesthetic synthesis and existential reflection may come to these type of ideas. Certainly there are themes for people who do seem to reflect on existence itself (positive existentialists or otherwise). These themes surround ideas of things like boredom, angst, suffering, choice, and meaning. So, I don't think Schopenhauer is far off from many subsequent (and prior) philosophers in existential issues. In fact, I think he anticipated a lot of modern attitudes towards existential thought more than any other major thinker of his time period who tended to focus more on purely metaphysical abstractions, political theory, and logico-mathematical writing (with some exceptions like Kierkegaard).
Quoting Benkei
In continuing with the theme of flux and stasis, the above question is trying to understand why set up challenges to overcome for a new individual in the first place. The challenges are the flux, the nonexistence is the stasis (let's put picayunish debates about nonexistence aside for now). Why create the challenges? Your life does sound relatively good as you explain it there. No doubt, others have larger challenges to overcome. And in a sort of post facto way, people can make a sentimental 60 Minutes or Nightly News piece about how the challenges of someone's particular life were worth it, but that always seems to focus on the people that have overcome the challenges and not those mired in the suffering of it. People who suffer with mental illnesses, physical illnesses, are going through unfortunate circumstances. This is not to mention the small (but still significant) annoyances of having to figure out daily challenges (insomnia, bad drivers, abrasive personalities, and the list can go on forever it seems). So with all this being said, although I recognize that humans have an amazing capacity to try to make bad things into some sort of learning experience (always in hindsight), it doesn't necessarily justify going through the negative experiences in the first place. Also, these many annoyances are usually unavoidable and are probably will never be overcome. We will all feel the stinging pain of an extremely cold day, the physical exhaustion of this-or-that chore, the occasional sleepless night (or perhaps not-so-occasional). Again, this is the theme of flux and stasis.
Also, you mentioned meaning. Your view is certainly valid in so much as that you seem to hold this to be true. However, at the same time, many people throughout the start of civilization have recognized the instrumentality of the flux of life. I use the word instrumentality because that captures the idea that there is some sort of emptiness/incompleteness at the end of all endeavors. We are doing to do to do to do. But this ceaseless flux and feeling of emptiness is itself a form of suffering. Now, again, we can argue that this is temperament, but certainly, at least some individuals see this throughout the history of civilizations and seem to not be contingent only on a few specific people, but is a relatively common viewpoint.
Nice post!
I don't necessarily think Schopenhauer appreciated static above flux - I haven't read him directly (only second-hand sources) to venture an actual judgment in that respect. That said, it does seem he did have some sort of an ideal on the basis of which he found existence lacking. At least, that's the conclusion at this time that seems logical to me - his judgment appears to be of existence held against that static ideal.
Why this conclusion seems logical to me is that when we accept life as a "becoming", in flux, then the ideal is not part of existence because it is static. It would be a metaphysical construct. All instances of existence, existence in its totality, don't measure up to that ideal. In my view such a comparison would not be fair.
As a metaphor, imagine the painter who has a perfect image in his mind. He paints and paints, each painting never reflecting that image he has and discards them as worthless. Yet to a casual observer some paintings are still masterpieces. The created instances are worthwhile in and of themselves and as a casual observer I can say "that picture is better than this one" but the image inside the painter's mind is unknownable to the casual observer.
So we can compare individual existences, possible existences, past existences or current existences (and their directions) but not to this unknown ideal. We could construct our own ideal, of course, and then find that all individual, possible, past and current existences will be found lacking. Which is why I don't hold an idea of the ideal in this respect. Which in a sense is what, for instance, Stoicism is about in my view, I can't control my existence to such an extent that any ideal is ever attainable because existence is flux so I let go of (absolute) ideals.
So I think the main difference between our viewpoints boils down to what we do with "being" in our philosophy. I more or less state it doesn't have a place because it isn't part of existence (purely mental). You accept it as being there (excuse the pun) and from it, it necessarily follows this world of flux is lacking. Is that a fair approximation?
And if it is, don't you think it's wildly interesting that something that seems so minor has such major implications in our everyday behaviour?
As to predispositions. I think people have a preferred view point but believe both optimism and pessimism are psychologically motivators used alternatively (or simultaneously) by most.
For instance, I had a car accident yesterday. Nobody got hurt, thank god. I was relieved everyone was ok, a bit bummed it will cost me a half month of salary in damages and mostly angry with myself for the mistake last night: I let myself be distracted due to the car seat for the baby not being fastened correctly by my father-in-law (with baby present, eeek!). It could've been worse (optimism), it would've been better if it hadn't happened (pessimism). Both predispositions exist, one allows me not to beat myself up too much and motivates me to carry on and get into that car again right after the accident "shit happens" and the other motivates me to be more careful next time "don't be an ass".
PS: baby thought it was funny.
PPS: I unfortunately don't have time for more for awhile. :(
Thank ye, Benkei! Yours as well!
Quoting Benkei
Yes, you might be right about the static ideal as he scorned Will which, practically speaking, is a stand-in for flux. Will is characterized as insatiable, ever striving, and never satisfied. I think the ideal that you speak of is actually embodied in the concept of stasis itself. It is a sort of metaphoric calm of non-striving akin to a Nirvana-like state.
Quoting Benkei
I like your analogy there of the painter to convey your point.
Quoting Benkei
I see what you are saying. However, I think Schopenhauer's point was that, even if you are not aware of the metaphysical "pull" of your striving Will, it is unavoidable, and does cause suffering when goals or desires are not obtained. Added to this is the transitory, instrumental nature of our desires when we are satisfied with attaining desires and goals. I think Stoicism has some parallels with Buddhism and Schopenhauer's asceticism in that being indifferent is a starting path to "denying" the Will. The difference is that Schopenhauer would go a step further than the Stoics in that Will cannot be fully denied until one actually becomes "self-aware" of the situation, sees the tragedy of it, and then tries to enter a program of sorts of denying the Will. Notice that in Schopenhauer's version, you are suffering whether you understand the metaphysical understanding of Will or not. In fact, in his system, one is not given an added source of tragedy by apprehension of the ideal of "denial-of-Will", but rather one can now save oneself "(metaphorically) from one's own suffering as a result of having this insight.
Quoting Benkei
I think Schopenhauer's "insight" has an aesthetic appeal. To be fair, I think people who agree with Schop will have a predisposition to this aesthetic appeal, and not, by and large, because of any arguments that Schopenhauer makes on behalf of the evils of flux. I could be wrong though. Maybe there's someone out there who was happily whistling along with life, read Schopenhauer, saw the horrors of existence, and decided to become a full-fledged pessimist. This seems less likely though. Let me also say that I don't agree with many of Schopenhauer's metaphysics including the folowing:
-His use of Platonic Forms in his ontology of objects. I think this is unnecessary and runs into issues involving identity. Empirically, we know that evolution provides minor genetic changes and many contingent environmental forces combined with the changes lead to successful adaptation/survival in which case, subsequent environmental forces combined with genetic mutations will lead to more changes, adaptations/survival, etc. This conception ironically has much more in common with Schopenhauer's idea of endless, exhausting flux/Will. It would have been much more interesting if he was able to combine the idea of the Universe's ever-expansion and changing nature with his metaphysics of flux and striving. Unfortunately, Darwin's theory of evolution (though anticipated by Schopenhauer) was not fully developed and explained until 1859.
-His theory of intelligible character vs. empirical character seems strained and unnecessary. He needs to account for why we seem to give agency of someone's action to a person and not cause/effect. If we live in a world mediated by space/time/causality, then agency has no room. This is where he comes up with the idea of intelligible character which is an individual's true character which is beyond space/time and the ultimate originator for how we perceive motives. The empirical character is sort of the contingent way that our intelligible character interacts with the world of space/time/causality. The intelligible character of the individual, as far as I know, is a personalized Platonic Form of each individual human. Again, this seems unnecessary and he could have probably tried to answer the problem of free will and agency in another way than resorting to Forms.
However, with that being said, his strongest point is the instrumental nature of life, its flux, and the fact that we are all dealing with this flux. That has an intuitive appeal. To go back to what Thorongil was saying in his first post. There are some people that embrace the flux and some that give a proverbial sigh to the constant need for having to do to do to do. The ever present need to attain goals/desires and responsibilities of survival is seen as a burden. The emptiness at the end of things seems to be significant. Also, to many pessimists, the many unfortunate contingent pains and annoyances would have rather been avoided in the first place (which is an impossibility) than to have gone through (even if we are somehow "stronger" at the end of it). Isn't it natural for people of this temperament (or insight perhaps) to go on a philosophy forum like this and see if anyone else feels this same aesthetic and to discuss the implications of this?
Quoting Benkei
I'm glad no one was hurt! Oddly enough, I knew someone who got into an accident under the exact same circumstances; he was adjusting his daughter's car seat and got into a crash. Anyways, I see what you're saying by motivation. However, I think there is a common and philosophical version of pessimism. Pessimism, as you just used it is kind of its usage in everyday language for seeing the glass "half empty". The combination of optimism and pessimism might be, "hope for the best, expect the worst". The philosophical version of pessimism is more of an aesthetic idea that life is some sort of burden and that the flux of becoming is as a whole is not something to embrace.
I'd like to see if @Thorongil has anything to add as I know he usually has some interesting things to say about pessimism and Schopenhauer.
Interesting difference of interpretation. ;)
I didn't see Stoicism as denying Will or flux, because that's undeniably there. To me it's letting go of absolute ideals, not having idealistic expectations about the fluctuating world around us. Otherwise we'd be continuously confronted with the fact we can't change the world to that extent (and therefore be disappointed) and that would lead to continuous restlessness. If you don't have those expectations - speaking from experience - it's pretty quiet inside your head.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I agree and I didn't mean to conflate the two. I understood Thorongil's reference to "predispositions" as having a preference for either type of the psychological versions of pessimism and optimism but perhaps I misunderstood. How do you think the psychological meaning of pessimism/optimism are different from predispositions?
I also agree that flux as a whole isn't something to embrace, we (can) embrace the good, fight the bad, if possible, and at worst accept it. And if suffering is really constant and unbearable with no chance of it getting better then we can always get out.
Interestingly enough, speaking of Plato, reminded me that he quite easily accepted (more or less as a given) that the ideal was not attainable. In his Politea he didn't argue for the ideal polis but best (ariste poleis).
I think Thorongil's quote at the beginning describes the dispositions well:
Quoting Thorongil
Pessimists don't want to have to deal with the flux in the first place. The fact that we are given a deficit in order to get out of is not a good situation. Whether the program to "get out" be the "indifference" of Stoicism, self-help, alcohol, or any other coping mechanism, the fact is, there was a deficit to cope with in the first place. Rather than choose a program (or no program, which is still a program of sorts), Philosophical Pessimists rebel against the fact that any program must be heeded at all. Again, it is probably about temperaments. More optimistic-types might relish the challenges, deprivations, hardships, etc.
Regarding your quote about "letting go" of absolute ideals, I don't think that is going to calm the average pessimists "restlessness". The restlessness is just a part of life. A creature that must survive and entertain itself is inherently restless. The annoyances and challenges will be there too.
Oh, it does reduce anxiety in that sense. To see oneself describe is often relaxing- at least one knows what problem is, even if it isn’t resolved. My point, however, is Schopenhauer’s seeks to maintain restlessness, as if the ignitible of suffering in life meant we obligated to be restless.
When I talk about Schopenhauer’s philosophy causing anxiety, I am talking about it failure to conceive of life as anything but restlessness. It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. Instead of redirecting us to think of life in terms of its existence in the moment, it traps us in the cycle of worrying about what goals to find.
In the absence of restlessness, there is no goal seeking. When someone is where they ought to be in a moment, they have their goal, they know what they are doing. To seek a goal is irrelevant because they already have one. And they, as much as they need to, completing or working towards it in the given moment. They need to get nothing because, for that moment, they have everything they require. Suffering included, for as horrible as it might be, it has been accepted (despite being unwanted and horribly painful) until such time as it passes. The suffering which is beating oneself-up about failing to escape suffering is avoided.
The entire point of Schopenhauer’s philosophy works against understanding this. It is so desperate for the pipe dream (sufferingless life) it fails to accept suffering, while also advocating for a form of suffering ( “life is always restless” ) which is frequently avoidable.
My problem is with Schopenhauer’s main points because they tell falsehoods about the world and the relationship of life to suffering. It speaks a falsehood about suffering, suggesting it is something which can be “dealt with,” even though that’s exactly what’s impossible with suffering (and why its so terrible). It misunderstands Will, mistaking it for something to calm, when it is actually needs eliminating entirely.
(and this why the argument to live ascetically fails so often. Sometimes that calms or eliminates the Will, if one is constantly feeling pressured by a hedonistic lifestyle, to a point where stepping back offer respite from restlessness. Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again).
Do you not see the irony here? What is this "pessimism" but a "coping mechanism?" A program of restlessness which is instituted to feel better about the flux which is impossible to deal with. These pessimists might say they don't want to deal with the flux, but that is really what they are interested in doing the most. Anything to draw attention to the abject failure to deal with suffering- "Hurt, be restless, for life will never be without suffering" they say. In no uncertain terms this pessimist thinks: "There is a deficit we have to cope with." They fail to understanding coping is exactly what is impossible.
It really amounts to, I would argue, a failure of pessimism. Instead of, deep down, knowing there is nothing which can save us, that the flux of life is doomed to suffering, it still holds onto the "optimist" illusion there is some action we take to "cope" with it. For a "pessimistic" position, it sure is afraid of stating how the deficits of life cannot possibly be "coped" with.
I feel quite the opposite. I think pessimism is understanding that the deficits of life cannot be coped with. I don't think many things will get rid of the deficit and at best, if there is some magic formula, that fact that one has to undergo this program is also suspect as one was put in a deficit and then one must pursue this formula in order to maintain some balance. Overall, it is simply taking a rebellious attitude towards having to make a lot of sound and fury to survive and keep satisfied. As I stated, just because there is a marked self-awareness that this is the case, does not mean there is added suffering, but just that a the temperament of a pessimist keeps this understanding in mind.
This is a misconception. Schopenhauer does have suggestions to mitigate suffering (mainly aesthetic contemplation, compassion for fellow-sufferers, and ascetic practice).
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I think this is a big distortion of Schopenhauer and is more of "Willow's take on Schopenhauer". It is not about accepting or not accepting. Just because it is accepted that goals are a given of life, doesn't mean we don't suffer because of them. Also, you ignore the point of this thread which is that temperament has a lot to do with it. Telling a pessimist to change their temperament can be like asking to change their personality. Pessimists naturally gravitate towards the idea that the whole project is not good in the first place.
In fact, it is you who adds more stress to the pessimist's life by essentially saying: "you are not as good as these people over here who do not hold this view.. You are not following the magic formula, or not good enough in your outlook like these people." This doesn't seem to create non-suffering either. Also, Willow, if you are happy in your goals, why are you so vehement and earnest in your responses? I can't tell for sure, but your posts have so much bitterness towards the pessimist, it makes me think you are harboring pessimism yourself but trying to defend the other side. Why not live your happy, non-suffering life instead of combating philosophical pessimism on an internet forum? Do you think this is "helping" the pessimists see the light of just dropping their understanding? You have the answer and you seek to promote it? You are on a mission? Why not start a thread that lays out your views in the positive "my view is..." rather than always in the negative "my view is not..." and is always to attack pessimism? You sound like a frustrated pessimist. Provide your view and stop shrouding it in attacks.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Denying the Will is not easy. Schopenhauer himself did not really try it himself. I think Schop's point was that certain individuals of a certain character will be so horrified that they truly will endeavor to see that the Will's flux will be diminished as much as possible. I don't think he thought this was easy or even attainable for most people. He thought that most people can have some reprieves in aesthetic contemplation, art, music, and compassion though. For the most of life, we are just going to have to live out the flux until we die. But the temperament of the pessimist doesn't let this picture of reality recede, but quietly lives his/her life in this understanding and quietly rebels against it by talking about it. I guess the therapy comes from recognizing it, and finding fellow-sufferers who are willing to share their understanding of the situation and realizing we are all part of the same flux story.
I personally don't think there is so grand way out. I don't even think Nirvana-like states can be achieved really. However, that doesn't stop me from seeing the world in a holistic light. If anything, pessimists, with their temperament, see life in a certain aesthetic where the whole flux cannot be discarded in life's evaluation. It is part of his/her sensibility when evaluating life. Tied with pessimism, is antinatalism because this is again, evaluating life holistically. At this decision you must tackle ideas of whether the flux is worth it for the next individual. This is why I pointed out to Benkei that the stasis of the IDEA of nonexistence (notice I said IDEA) seems more appealing than the flux of existence.
Also, you focus solely on Schopenhauer's pessimism. Pessimism writ large does not solely have to be based on Schop's conception. People like David Benatar can happily show you that it can be based on the contingencies of life as well. While life could have otherwise been a charmed one, it is almost always not, and many times much worse. Sometimes it is way worse than we even evaluate it if just given a questionnaire about it in a study about life quality. Life is always giving us challenges we would otherwise not ask for. There are always little annoyances throughout the day, at the least. For some, mental and physical illness is added to the stresses of maintaining a living. For some, the struggle to fit in, get a handle on things, etc, is harder than others. The stress of others saying how it is easier for them, and they have to get on board with the program, doesn't help.
Overall, again, pessimists probably have an aesthetic sense about life that, though perhaps in the minority, cannot help but view it as suffering that is not good to endure in the first place. Though one can try to live the best life one can, this aesthetic sense is always in the background. There is a tendency for pessimists to see existential boredom, instrumentality, and angst more readily in the flux of life.
The life lived without reflection contains suffering. The life lived with reflection, for the person of a pessimistic temperament, sees the suffering and cannot readily accept with joy or (morose indifference) that this is life and so be it. To the pessimist, this is a basic truth of life and truth cannot be simply discarded once recognized. For the pessimist, there is a reaction of rebellion that life is this way in the first place. If one does not commit suicide, one will have to live life, but one doesn't have to view the situation as good. The indifference approach is cold and does nothing more than say a truism: "life is suffering and we know this". The pessimistic approach not only takes into account that there suffering and we know this, but sees the suffering as negative or an "evil". Perhaps it cannot be overcome, but at least it is recognized for what it is and not ignored or downplayed- discounting its pervasive part of life for many people in many instances.
For those who do not "see" this truth or who overlook the suffering- it is their prerogative. I haven't seen a pessimist forcefully make anyone believe anything before. The pessimist has every right in a free society to state his views and see if he finds others who see the same thing as him/her. If people vociferously disagree due to temperamental or aesthetic differences, then they can explain their view to each other. I have no illusions that people have the exact same aesthetic tendencies towards the human condition. Each side can make their case, but this doesn't mean each side will win out the other person's view. Philosophy is all about dialectic, and the same basic themes unfolds over and over again throughout history.
I will say this for the pessimistic theme though- the pessimistic theme is pervasive throughout all of civilization, has been embraced at times by many deep thinkers (not just philosophers), and at one point or another, crosses the minds of most adults at some point in life. Perhaps these fleeting thoughts are simply judged as youthful angst or a depressive mood, but pessimists are willing to stare at it directly and explore this understanding further. The aesthetic sensibility of the pessimist sees these ideas not as fleeting depressive states but as a truth about the human condition itself. They cannot help but see it this way. Life's flux, challenges, contingent suffering, annoyances, instrumentality and existential boredom seem so pervasive to life itself that being indifferent to the suffering is hardly an option if it is one at all.
@jamalrob @The Great Whatever @Baden @mayor of simpleton @180 Proof
False. It is in one sense an attitude, and in another, a position about the nature of the world.
Quoting Agustino
You commit the same presupposition by using the phrase, "dealing with life." That life must be "dealt with" at all already acknowledges an adversarial relationship between oneself and what it is one is dealing with. It implies a problem to be solved, something to wrestle with and combat, and a non-ideal state of affairs. In other words, you acknowledge that life is inherently a struggle, to borrow a Darwinian phrase, and yet think it might be possible for it not to be so. I might be willing to grant that the latter is indeed possible, but then it would cease to be life!
Quoting Agustino
The "ought" is only ever implicit. No categorical imperative about accepting the pessimist's conclusions is being foisted upon you.
Quoting Agustino
I don't see how this amounts to either integrity or courage. In fact, the opposite seems apparent, that this is actually cowardice. Defending what you take to be true is real courage, for it entails sacrifice and an element of danger not present in simply submerging oneself in an echo chamber of like minded opinions.
Quoting Agustino
Sometimes one must struggle to maintain and vouchsafe the quiet life you so desire (and I desire) from those who do like struggling for its own sake. They greatly outnumber us and daily seek to obliterate self-reflection and contemplation.
No, it is not a state of being but a judgment.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I am not aware of him denying that suffering is an inevitable part of life. On the contrary, it sounds like something he would quite readily admit. Nor, also, does he call any human beings failures.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Because we can escape from suffering, according to him. The inevitability of suffering does not negate the possibility of escape from it.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I'm pretty sure Schopenhauer does think this.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Yes it is.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Again, Schopenhauer makes no demands of anyone. You seem intent on ramrodding a very peculiar reading of Schopenhauer onto us that has little basis in the actual words of the man himself. You also seem to be saying that anyone who is already suffering will only multiply their suffering merely on account of reading a book that tries to make generalized statements about suffering, which constitutes a form of philosophical pessimism. This is bizarre! Most pessimists, including myself, take great pleasure in reading pessimistic literature, for it comes as a welcome antidote to the optimistic drivel contained in almost everything else one reads. It reminds me of something Einstein said, which is somewhat related:
"I do not believe in freedom of the will. Schopenhauer’s words: ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of freedom of will preserves me from taking too seriously myself and my fellow men as acting and deciding individuals and from losing my temper.”
Likewise, Schopenhauer's pessimism more generally, far from increasing one's anxieties and suffering, rather aids in alleviating them to a considerable extent.
What a ridiculous statement. No one is evangelizing. We're simply having a discussion on a forum, trying to clarify our own views and correct misrepresentations of our position as best we can. We even welcome debate and criticism, which is necessary to test any position, not just ours. What's wrong with that and how is that any different from debating the merits of any position in a (hopefully) clear and intelligent way?
Quoting Benkei
Schopenhauer is not a utilitarian and no where, to my knowledge, says that life is not worth living, for that directly implies suicide, which he condemns. He rather says that life has no intrinsic worth, which is quite another thing, and that no compassionate, rational person would impose the burdens of existence on the coming generation.
Quoting Benkei
No one would make the absurd claim that you cuddle your wife due to the absence of cuddling in your life. The privation is deeper than that. "There are no real pleasures without real needs," as Voltaire says. There are a whole host of more primitive and primordial needs for which cuddling is merely one minor attempt at fulfilling.
Quoting Benkei
The justification the pessimist is looking for is for not doing anything to prevent it, alleviate it, or escape from it.
No he doesn't.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Actually, this is precisely what Schopenhauer's philosophy intends to do! Have you honestly read the man?
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
No, I'm pretty sure it does.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Schopenhauer would concur. But the will cannot be eliminated by force, by means of its own objectifications. It requires being blown out, like a candle, from within, as a completely free choice.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without.
I know. My point was that his own philosophy works against this by proposing "restlessness" as THE feature of life. Within his understanding of suffering, he is still treating it as if it is something which can be captured and fought, something with which people "cope with."
[quote=Thorongil]He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without.[/quote]
And that's the problem. The absence of suffering is the easiest thing when it happens. One has nothing to do. They just are. Will demands nothing of them, no matter what they might be doing in a moment, for there is none. Schopenhauer's philosophy fails to understanding this, characterising avoiding suffering as if it is a desperate battle we are constantly fighting, as if we would resolve suffering by being "restless." The way his philosophy handles Will is to try and force it out by means of its own objections. In doing so he considers this the means to eliminate Will (even though it doesn't) and ends-up advocates for people to exist in this form of "restlessness."
I'm not entirely sure he would say this, but even if he did, I'm very curious as to what difference it makes. Basically, the full import of your criticism, which has been put so forcefully, is still lost on me.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
And what - you're saying this is a state of boredom? Is that what you think he fails to understand? If so, then you have misunderstood what the denial of the will entails. The ego, as a mere phantasm of the will, dissolves when the will is dissolved, so there is no one to be bored, no one to suffer while the will is being denied.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
How on earth can you say this after quoting my line about it being blown out from within? I explicitly stated that Schopenhauer does not think the will can be denied by its own objectifications. That is precisely the delusion one must overcome, for a fire can't extinguish itself, and the overcoming of it just is the denial of the will. How this is done is by knowledge, which is the water that puts out the fire. The will cannot act in the individual on what it does not know. Hence, so long as one remains ignorant concerning the futility of willing, one will continue to will, believing that what one wills will some day bring one fulfillment (happiness). To recognize the futility of this is to recognize that the world is only the mirror of the will and hence that no single objectification of the will, just as no single spark of the fire, can extinguish it. How does one acquire this knowledge? The simplest, most common, and most tragic way is through suffering, which either over time or through some particularly excruciating event, slowly erodes, chips away at, or detonates the inborn error that we exist to be happy (having our desires be fulfilled) and that one need only affirm one's will to be so. Then a set of choices presents itself: 1) denial of the realization, resulting in the strengthening of the delusion, 2) suicide, or 3) the path of asceticism. Schopenhauer advocates the third option.
This does not mean philosophical pessimism isn't a legitimate position. But the topic of this discussion is the motive of the temperament of the pessimist (not pessimism per se). I can see no correlation between pessimism and depressive symptoms.
Rather, the depressive symptoms arise when one has not let go of their prior expectations of life. Thus, the position of philosophical pessimism can be of legitimacy, but the temperament can be of relentless, sophomoric complaining.
Can you elucidate the differences in the sophomoric complaining of the temperament vs. philosophical pessimism? Also you had some posts a while back on exustential boredom or something of that sort. Is this an indictment of your own views or views you once held? How do I not know, based on your previous posts that, at this point, you are just not trolling?
Like I said above, I don't think being a philosophical pessimist leads to a depressive demeanor. This is the point of this discussion, is it not?: why pessimists generally have a depressive-like temperament.
My opinion is that a philosophical pessimist that has a depressive temperament is fundamentally at fault, not the world. It's the fault of the pessimist that they cannot find a solution to the problems of existence (such as suffering, boredom, time, exile, and death), for if they could, then they wouldn't have such a poor temperament.
I think what you are asking about is the apparent Catch-22 nature of my position: how can someone argue for pessimism without complaining about the world? To which I reply, yes, I suppose pessimism is criticism of the world. But again this topic is about the temperament of the pessimist, not their position. Criticism of the world does not logically lead to depressive characteristics.
To a point, I think pessimists such as myself (and presumably you and others) are unable to completely escape the points of existence that we criticize. This is what depresses me. For example, watching a political debate and seeing just how petty and egoistic it is makes me depressive. Why? Because there is a contradiction between what I expect/desire the world to be like and what the world is really like.
But it is possible to move on from many our points of criticism, or at least mitigate them. It is possible to remove oneself from ennui, from anxiety, from a lot of suffering, from boredom, and even enjoy life (not implying that you do not enjoy life).
So I think, Schopenhauer1, the reason pessimists tend to have a sour temperament is that they see the world as it is, don't like it, but are unable to move past it completely, a case that I would self-diagnose myself with.
Alternatively, the temperament could always just be the result of a chemical imbalance, and the appeal to philosophy is just a silly, post-hoc rationalization (pace Russell).
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't recall this.
Quoting schopenhauer1
What kind of response would satisfy your doubt?
Not boredom per se, it could be any restless state (e.g. boredom, pain, sadness, etc., etc. any time someone gets trapped Willing to be something the are not). I am saying that Schopenhauer doesn't understand what it means to be free of restlessness, to have eliminated Will. He fails to describe such a state and, as a consequence, his philosophy fails to pass on knowledge of what it entails.
He is wrong though. Acquiring knowledge doesn't define the absence of Will. Someone could know everything yet still miss out on the critical change in their own outlook which is the denial of Will. This is what I mean about his philosophy trying to force the elimination of Will from within Will. Schopenhauer begins with an ego towards ending suffering and restlessness and remains there. He still thinks what he Wills (no more restlessness, though knowledge, through suicide, through asceticism) is the solution to eliminating Will. Schopenhauer might know Will cannot be eliminated by the Will, but he nevertheless argues it must be and offers that as THE solution to restlessness.
Critically, this makes his philosophy ineffective at doing what it is supposed to. Knowledge can often trigger a new state someone. Describing what it means to escape restlessness would help many people come to exist in a new state without the burden of Will. Schopenhauer philosophy actually fails to do this. Instead he offers a series moment of Willing, of merely searching for that which will resolve restlessness (maybe suicide? maybe asceticism?), in response to knowledge of suffering. He might say what required (the elimination of Will), but he neither shows it nor practices it within his own philosophy.
The difference it makes in whether or not suffering is recognised for what it is: something which cannot be "fixed," which cannot be "muted," which is not "coped" with under any circumstance.
Schopenhauer philosophy still treats suffering as if it is a problem to be fixed. It Wills the absence of Will from within Will. We can only make the choice, Schopenhauer says, between delusion (absence of knowledge), suicide or asceticism, in an attempt to fix the suffering of our lives. Instead of accepting suffering for what it is, and then asking how we might exist without suffering, Schopenhauer imagines we must fight ourselves (e.g. suffering) from within ourselves (e.g. turn suffering into non-suffering), as if we could Will the elimination of Will and were not bound to the identity of ourselves at a given time.
He does this deliberately, though, for were he to describe such a state, then he would cease to be doing philosophy. Knowledge has applicability only to the world. When the world (as the reflection of the will) disappears through the denial of the will, so too does knowledge along with it. In other words, as he himself claims, Schopenhauer's metaphysical system is immanent; it makes no positive claims about the transcendent. Yet the subject of knowing does not disappear (i.e. upon attaining the denial of the will, "you," at least in the sense of your physical body, do not disappear), which means that something other than the will exists and is affirmed when this occurs. Thus, the denial of the will is simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.
Again, nothing positive philosophically can be said about it, but mystics, according to Schopenhauer, do provide some clues, albeit clothed in the language of religious myth (e.g. they will often describe it as "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" with God, Nirvana, Tao, Brahman, etc, depending on the tradition in question). In sum, where philosophy ends, mysticism begins. If you seek positive confirmation about what the denial of the will entails, as opposed to Schopenhauer's merely negative formulations, then your only recourse is to take the mystic's word for it and begin on the path of asceticism. Otherwise, it will forever remain an unfalsifiable possibility.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Uh, by "knowledge," he's not talking about being a Jeopardy whiz. Schopenhauer would concur that such knowledge is useless and possibly even a hindrance. What he's referring to is, as I said, knowledge of the will and its effects. It's more akin to a fundamental insight into the nature of the world than the memorization of some meaningless fact.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Where are you getting this from? You seem very confused if I may say so.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I have no idea what this means.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Okay, but you're just stipulating this.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
What the deuce does this even mean? I think Schopenhauer does damn fine job of accepting suffering for what it is, i.e. something intrinsically undesirable as an end in itself. What else do you have in mind here?
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
As I said above, your identity is not lost from an objective standpoint when the will is denied. Only from the subjective standpoint of the person in whom the will has been denied is it dissolved. And no, he never says we "must" do anything. He doesn't have any robust normative ethical theory and certainly makes no categorical demands on the reader.
I’m pointing out the error remains even with knowledge of “profound insight.” To know the world is full of suffering or that Will cannot eliminate itself doesn’t constitute the non-existence of Will. Someone could know all about those, could have all the knowledge spoken in Schopenhauer'd philosophy, yet be present with the ego of Will. People need more than “profound knowledge” to be without Will.
“Philosophically,” that is to say in terms of metaphysics, of logic, of the infinite, there is indeed nothing to say about the absence of Will. The problem is that “philosophy” is not the limit of description. We can talk about more than the metaphysical. Our knowledge is about more than just the meaning of logic. Sometimes we know stuff about the world, about states of existence, about finite, about the subject.
If we are taking about a person who is not burned with Will, we are describing the state of a subject. Metaphysics says exactly nothing about the subject of our description. Description seems impossible only because Schopenhauer is looking in the wrong place. Instead or raising what matters to description the absence of Will is the subject, he continue to talk only in the “profound insights” of metaphysics, missing it is in description of the subject where we can describe or show what it means to live without the ego of Will.
Rather than the end of philosophy and the beginning of mysticism, it is the end of metaphysics and the beginning of THE WORLD. As such the absence of Will is not incompatible with philosophy at all. The scope of philosophy is wider than merely questions of describing logic. It is also about asking questions about our descriptions of the world and interrogating how these relate to what is true. Our philosophy may dabble in the context of describing these states or help bring us to a point which allows us to in a specific way.
“Mysticism,” in so far as we are talking about it here (e.g. "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" ) is the confusion of THE WORLD (e.g. the state of ourselves which, in Spinozian terms, is our “Love of God” ) for metaphysics, such that people consider themselves to be defined by Will: as if there person is defined by some logical, metaphysical precept (God, PSR,etc.etc), as opposed to themselves as a state of the world. They say: “I am because of God” when, really, they are just themselves.
The absence of Will is actually the affirmation of oneself, whatever that state might be at the time, rather than the reduction of the subject and the world to nothing. The presence of this may be unstated. Or we may talk about about it, such that we describe that someone exists having rejected Will and is not burdened with the desperation to be something they are not. Shop. gets somewhat close to this. In realising the absence of Will is not defined metaphysically, that we must be “nothing” in those terms to be absent Will, he is right. The problem, however, is he doesn’t carry through to consider knowledge of the world. He limits our descriptions of the world and Will to metaphysics and so misses out on detailing so much knowledge, even to the point of suggesting it is impossible. Like the mystic traditions before (and after) him, he confuses talking about the world for talking about metaphysics. He says: “I am (or perhaps, "Everything) because of Will” when, actually, he (everything) has only ever been himself (itself).
We can’t specify “what it takes” to eliminate Will because, in all cases, it’s defined by the given individual being absent Will. Describing someone taking an action isn’t enough to tell whether to not this has been achieved. The best description we can give is to point out someone no longer has Will, the state in-itself, and trust that are description is an accurate reflection of their thoughts and feelings (just as we do with any other situation go out states of experience). In this respect Shop. is correct not to prescribe on any particular behaviour or ethical position. No suggestion of how to act can define the absence of Will.
However… this does not mean Schopenhauer doesn’t specify a “must.” He does, with respect to the goals of understanding suffering and eliminating Will, as if people must do these things to understand the nature of life and avoid existing with the restlessness of Will. Reaching these goals, he argues, must be achieved through specific practices (e.g. worrying about suffering, fighting suffering, eliminating desire, etc.,etc.), despite the fact it isn’t true at all. In the process, he completely fails to describe what it takes to live without Will and advocate people hold beliefs which fail to describe such a life.
Something undesirable that CANNOT be escaped, altered or fought. If suffering is to be avoided, it must not exist. There is no struggle to turn suffering into the absence of suffering. When suffering is present, it is a state of the world we are powerless to change. Schopenhauer hasn't taken this step. He still viewing states of suffering as something to struggle against, as if we can somehow manipulate them into states lesser suffering or states absent of suffering.
Ah, do you see what you've done here? You've cleverly shifted the language to impute a contradiction where none is present. I never spoke of the denial of the will entailing that the will ceased to exist, and neither does Schopenhauer.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Prove it.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
No, the will is only the word for what is immediately felt in experience. You seem to be mounting here a criticism of the way language functions as opposed to a criticism of Schopenhauer proper, in which case I can only say that we're stuck with language being inherently metaphoric.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
But see, this could be read as a (somewhat misleading) shorthand for what I said about the denial of the will being simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Once again, your criticism here is about how language works, not about Schopenhauer's philosophy. His descriptions are limited precisely to the extent that they are descriptions. The denial of the will cannot be positively described, hence he makes no attempt to describe the indescribable. You seem to lament the fact that he doesn't enter into a blatant contradiction by refusing to do just this.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
As if? No, he nowhere says anyone must do anything. Period. Stop grasping at straw here.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Yes, and this is called a hypothetical imperative. "If you want to do X, then you must do Y." It's entirely contingent on you wanting to do X, which he does not say anyone "must" want to do.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
You have not shown this at all.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
No he doesn't. He has quite lengthy discussions on what it takes to deny the will and moreover refers one to a plethora of sources to further understand how to do so. Read the fourth book of the WWP and the supplements to it in the second volume.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
These are unargued for assertions, my friend.