Objections to Spinoza’s philosophy of “substance”, due to logical inconsistencies
At the very beginning of his “Ethics”, Spinoza proposes or gives two definitions for the term of “substance”; the first being, “that which is in itself”, & the second being, “that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”, i.e., what is conceived through itself.
The first problem (1) with Spinoza’s two definitions of “substance”, in relation to his overall philosophy, is the consideration that, by definition, a conception cannot itself be something, or, that, which is in itself. So the question thus arises, what’s the relationship between conception & “that which is in itself”/“that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”, i.e., between conception & “substance”? If this relationship is that of a mode to substance, then this would necessarily & automatically make his “substance” something which is ultimately mental; since, according to him, “modes exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist” (Part. 1., Prop., VII, Note II.), meaning that we can only form the conception of a mode by means of a conception of the thing in which it exists (i.e., without the conception of it, we can’t have any conception of any mode), yet, conception is a mode of thinking, & so it presupposes in conception a mental thing in which it exists & not an extended thing; which then consequentially excludes the possibility of his definition of “substance” being able to explain the reality (as opposed to its mere ideality [its definition only as appearance]) of extended phenomena (as he pretends to have done past Descartes), as no mental form, subject or substance can rationally/logically be maintained to posses extended properties or predicates.
Moreover, the second problem (2) with his definitions of “substance” occurs if it’s claimed that the mode of conception isn’t a mode of “substance”, per se, but is that of its “attributes.” Since this already contradicts his very first definition of “substance”, in as much as he’s explaining the dependent reality of the mode of conception through another other than “that which is in itself”, i.e., through another other than the independent thing or “substance” upon which the reality of modality depends; that is, in his explanation of the dependent reality of the mode of conception he’s using another, i.e., an “attribute”, to form a conception of “that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”, i.e., of the independent thing or “substance” upon which the reality of modality depends, which is a blatant contradiction.
Lastly, my third problem (3) with Spinoza’s definition of “substance” (for this one I’m only considering his first proposed definition), is its blatant & inexcusable nominalism; in merely claiming that “substance” is “that which is in itself”, he doesn’t actually explain what “that” is, which is in itself, in as much being “in itself” isn’t a thing or object, but a determination of them, & so its mere nominal assertion leaves us without any clue of whatever that is, which is in itself, i.e., he’s only asserted its reality in name (nominally).
The first problem (1) with Spinoza’s two definitions of “substance”, in relation to his overall philosophy, is the consideration that, by definition, a conception cannot itself be something, or, that, which is in itself. So the question thus arises, what’s the relationship between conception & “that which is in itself”/“that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”, i.e., between conception & “substance”? If this relationship is that of a mode to substance, then this would necessarily & automatically make his “substance” something which is ultimately mental; since, according to him, “modes exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist” (Part. 1., Prop., VII, Note II.), meaning that we can only form the conception of a mode by means of a conception of the thing in which it exists (i.e., without the conception of it, we can’t have any conception of any mode), yet, conception is a mode of thinking, & so it presupposes in conception a mental thing in which it exists & not an extended thing; which then consequentially excludes the possibility of his definition of “substance” being able to explain the reality (as opposed to its mere ideality [its definition only as appearance]) of extended phenomena (as he pretends to have done past Descartes), as no mental form, subject or substance can rationally/logically be maintained to posses extended properties or predicates.
Moreover, the second problem (2) with his definitions of “substance” occurs if it’s claimed that the mode of conception isn’t a mode of “substance”, per se, but is that of its “attributes.” Since this already contradicts his very first definition of “substance”, in as much as he’s explaining the dependent reality of the mode of conception through another other than “that which is in itself”, i.e., through another other than the independent thing or “substance” upon which the reality of modality depends; that is, in his explanation of the dependent reality of the mode of conception he’s using another, i.e., an “attribute”, to form a conception of “that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”, i.e., of the independent thing or “substance” upon which the reality of modality depends, which is a blatant contradiction.
Lastly, my third problem (3) with Spinoza’s definition of “substance” (for this one I’m only considering his first proposed definition), is its blatant & inexcusable nominalism; in merely claiming that “substance” is “that which is in itself”, he doesn’t actually explain what “that” is, which is in itself, in as much being “in itself” isn’t a thing or object, but a determination of them, & so its mere nominal assertion leaves us without any clue of whatever that is, which is in itself, i.e., he’s only asserted its reality in name (nominally).
Comments (100)
You're confusing substance with modes. Spinoza' s point is to only assert reality with substance. It offers no determination of modes itself. For that, we must name modes in question.
So Spinoza agrees substance cannot be the definition of a mode. In your terms, modes are not the first or second being, so speaking of doesn't help us identify any mode.
The point was never that he didn't grant reality to both (acomist speech aside, of course), but rather they are not each other.
Reality of substance is not reality of a mode. To speak about substance is to talk about what is not a mode at all. As such, substance cannot account for a mode in terms of the mode (e.g. what exists, how things are caused, which states are caused). It can only account for the self-defintion of a mode. (i.e. that a given mode is itself and can only be justified through itself).
I didn't say I had a problem with anything in my previous post. Clearly, your touchy tone indicates, you have a problem with me asking you to explicitly state the point of the OP. You've yet to make an argument worthy of a considered counter. And as definitions are not truth-claims or axioms (which is why they are introduced subsequently in the first place), whatever their logical status, Spinoza's system is quite rigorously coherent - or not - on some basis other than the one you may wish to discuss. Don't like his definitions of Substance? Ok. Can you improve on them? Well, if you can't, and on that basis Spinoza's system doesn't persuade you, well then move on. Maybe Leibniz or Frege are your jam. Or, maybe, you can competently demonstrate how, rather than merely leap to an assertion that, Spinoza's system collapses thereby refuting his conclusions. That's the point I'm interested in.
”And as definitions are not truth-claims or axioms (which is why they are introduced subsequently in the first place), whatever their logical status,..” — Axioms are most definitely truth-statements. What are you talking about? The point is just that their introduced as self-evident, without requiring to be proven as true.
”Spinoza's system is quite rigorously coherent” — Well, like it or not, I’ve just shown that his first definitions or axioms, from the consideration of the relation between his own proposed terms of “substance”, “mode”, & “attribute”, to be conflicting.
”Or, maybe, you can competently demonstrate how, rather than merely leap to an assertion that, Spinoza's system collapses thereby refuting his conclusions.” Destroy, refute or invalidate the premise or premises of an argument, & the core of its conclusion will also be rendered thus. I don’t see where there’s any room for disagreement with this?
”As such, substance cannot account for a mode in terms of the mode (e.g. what exists, how things are caused, which states are caused).” — I don’t know if this supposed to be a part of your own philosophy, or your personal interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy? But it’s clearly in conflict with Spinoza’s sentiments. He unequivocally defines a “mode” as what is accounted for through another thing, not itself, when he writes, ”By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.”
What part of definitions are not truth-claims or axioms - given the parenthetical qualification that follows the word "axiom" - don't you understand, friend? (Or is English not your first language?) :brow:
[quote=aRealidealist]Destroy, refute or invalidate the premise or premises of an argument, & the core of its conclusion will also be rendered thus. I don’t see where there’s any room for disagreement with this?[/quote]
And yet you've only taken issue with definitions. Not "premises" (i.e. propositions). Not axioms. Not deductions, from either axioms or propositions. Mere definitions which, again, do not convey truth values because they are not truth claims. I don't see any destroyed, refuted or invalidated "premises", friend; you still have all your work - if that's your task - ahead of you. :yawn:
“And yet you've only taken issue with definitions. Not "premises" (i.e. propositions). Not axioms. Not deductions, from either axioms or propositions. Mere definitions which, again, do not convey truth values because they are not truth claims. I don't see any destroyed, refuted or invalidated "premises", friend; you still have all your work - if that's your task - ahead of you.” — Though, again, if there’s contradiction or rational/logical inconsistency found in the definitions, on which everything else is based, such as the axioms, premises or propositions & proofs, then the entire edifice of deduction becomes undermined & questionable; & so there’s no need to argue against these latter determinations, when the founding definitions are known & acknowledged to be rationally/logically inconsistent or contradictory in the first place. A point that you seem to repeatedly overlook.
But "everything else" is not "based" on the definitions. :roll: They merely stipulate the terms of a demonstration or discussion. Since they are not truth-claims they don't convey truth-values and therefore do not contribute directly, or strictly, to the validity of arguments. QED, bro! :victory: In fact, stipulative definitions become clearer, even unpacked more precisely, as they are used throughout lengthy arguments. Nothing is built on them, but rather with them, like parts of a scaffolding or ornamental features of architecture, so to speak. Your contention on this point - the role of definitions - is simply mistaken and thus, on this basis, your broader assertion about Spinoza's system is incoherent.
Can you elucidate why? This sentence is very strangely parsed. What are you challenging, exactly? I’ve read it half a dozen times and I can’t really parse it.
I’ll put it another way: what do you think Spinoza means by ‘substance’? Do you think his conception of ‘substance’ is in some way self-contradictory? This seems to be what you’re saying, although again, very hard to grasp, exactly.
In order to do this you must first accept the terms. You're attempting to deny them.
Invoking the term "semantics" is quibbling with words. Whether or not Spinoza is guilty of incoherence is nothing but semantics. To be clear... his.
That's another matter altogether. The standard for being true is not the same as being incoherent. Which are you focusing on?
Moreover, I don’t see how finding rational/logical, i.e., intellectual, incoherency or inconsistency & contradiction in Spinoza is necessarily a matter of semantics? Since his instances of error in reasoning on “substance” aren’t solely nominalistic, but are actual rational/logical contradictions & impossibilities.
Incoherence is judged solely and exclusively by self-contradiction. Coherent arguments are not self contradictory. Are you charging Spinoza with self-contradiction?
The OP doesn't help. The contentious definitions are above. Can you make the case again, here and now? Which definitions are self-contradictory?
Clearly your OP does not because it tries to assert we would use substance to define which mode was present.
You've not understood Spinoza is speaking from a view of substance. The modes are justified by something different because an idea or conception of a mode is not enough to justify it, not because substance is capable of giving the specifics or form (e.g. tree, car, computer, train station, etc. ).
To merely have a distintion "Tree in my backyard" is not enough to justify it. The distinction might not be true at all. When Spinoza says modes are justified by something else, he means there is a particular feature (self-defintion, being of the unity of reality), which justifies a given mode as part of reality over not. It is in this sense which modes are justified through something else. I need to do more than just posit a distintion of " Tree in my backyard" to justify such a mode.
The posts which consisted solely of insults have been deleted. Play nice.
Rubbish.
That's a problem with your definition, not Spinoza's. As I said earlier... you're just denying Spinoza's definitions. The problem here - of course - is that whether or not Spinoza is guilty of incoherence/self-contradiction is determined by his definitions... not yours. His is below.
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
Duly noted.
So, now, on the grounds of Spinoza’s acceptance of modes of thought, like conception, one can raise the same problem or contradiction to him that Descartes was faced with when positing the absolute reality of both mental & physical forms. Such that Spinoza’s “substance” being able to explain the reality of physical or extended forms is downright false, something which he pretends to have done past Descartes, & cannot be rationally/logically maintained, for it involves contradiction or inconsistency (as the first objection in my O.P. notes).
That's it. We could simplify it without loss.
Substance is conceived through itself.
So, it's wrong to say that a conception cannot be in itself according to Spinoza.
Modes in the attribute of thought also have to be justified in something else (substance) because there are a priori distinctions which are not part of reality (contradictions, misidentifications, etc.).
Substance isn't specifically mental either. It's not the mental substance being posed against the physical substance. Spinoza is rejecting such a separation of substance (hence one substance rather than two). His point is substance is the same for both the mental and physical. The mental and physical share the same substance (i.e.are justified in the unity of reality).
You are misreading Spinoza as a dualist, suggesting he poses separate mental and physical substances.
So, you're saying that "substance" is "a conception", and as "a conception" is "not itself something which is in itself" then "substance" is logically incoherent. Your argument rests, then, on the supposition that "substance" is "a conception". I think this introduces a complexity which is not necessarily present in Spinoza's philosophy.
I agree with some of the comments above that you're introducing a dualism between 'conception' and 'substance' due, I think, to your own philosophical stance, which I would guess to be nearer to representative realism.
One point that might help clear this up: what is the meaning of 'substance' in philosophy as distinct from common language? What about a 'substance' makes it primary or irreducible?
Substance isn't specifically mental either. It's not the mental substance being posed against the physical substance. Spinoza is rejecting such a separation of substance (hence one substance rather than two).”[/i] — Though the whole point is that the very possibility of the justification or explanation for a mode of thinking, like that of conception, can only be had apriori through the reality of some mental, & never a physical, extended or bodily, form; & therefore if the mode of conception is real, then ultimately so must a real mental substance upon which it depends.
Thus in Spinoza accepting the reality of the mode of conception, he apriori excludes the rational/logical possibility of justifying or explaining the reality of physical, extended or bodily, phenomena; such that he never did justify or explain the reality of these, which he considered himself to have done past Descartes, but only irrationality/illogically maintained their coexistence in the same subject in which he based modes of thought (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object).
So, to be clear, I’m not introducing dualism into Spinoza, I’m merely demonstrating that he never actually escaped it.
So, obviously, thoughts or conception cannot be in itself (as I’ve expressed at the beginning of my first objection that you’ve quoted), in as much as they’re modes, & therefore must exist in or through something other than itself (not in itself [according Spinoza’s own statements]).
Moreover, I don’t introduce a dualism in Spinoza, in as much as he himself acknowledges the contrariety between mental & physical, extended or bodily, forms, thus he states, “That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that is, it is not body.” (“The Ethics”, Prop. II, Proof.)
I’m just pointing out that he can’t rationally/logically explain the reality of mental & physical, extended or bodily, phenomena, by merely posting their coexistence in a single subject (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object); for it’s rationally/logically contradictory, & so false.
But that's the very approach Spinoza is abandoning: it is substance which justifies, not a priori mental concepts. Mental concepts are just modes in the attribute of thought.
Substance is not modes (of the attribute of thought).
Spinoza does not exclude the rational/logical possibility of justifying or explaining the reality of physical, extended or bodily, phenomena. In fact, he outright holds the opposite: that these are justified by substance.
:strong: :smirk: (×2) I wish I had more patience for the OP's onanistic twaddle. Good efforts on your parts though! I leave this thread now to your learned yet tender mercies, peeps. Hasta ...
Spinoza's point is that the question of rational/logical grounds has been misunderstood. It is other than to that kind of transcendent account you suggest here.
Only reality (substance/justification) can predicate an instance of insentience or/and sentience (depending on what modes we are talking about).
Since neither the distinction of insentience or sentience is justified on its own (what do either of those concepts mean? Are there any sentient beings in a backyard? What about non-seinteint ones?), they can only be justified under the same substance. To have insentience, it must be of reality. To have sentience, it must be of reality. To have both, they must be of reality.
This is a feature, not a bug. Consider the a priori definitions of sentience and insentience under the attribute of thought. Are these true? Yes, both definitions are necessary so. Why? They are of reality. The words sentience and insentience pick out a specific definitions of meaning as opposed to not. Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.
As for subject and object, this is not true. Substance is not a mode. It's lacks the finite definition of modes. Unlike a sentient mode or a insentience mode, substance is not limited to being only of one. It's of all. As such, it is of all modes which are opposite each other, sometimes simultaneously (if reality happens to have those opposite modes together).
Substance is in itself and conceives through itself(according to Spinoza's own definitions).
Conception is a mode of substance.
There is no self-contradiction here.
”Since neither the distinction of insentience or sentience is justified on its own (what do either of those concepts mean? Are there any sentient beings in a backyard? What about non-seinteint ones?), they can only be justified under the same substance.” — The distinction between the two is very justified, in as much as it’s conceivable, & is therefore capable of possibly being rationally/logically distinguished, which is ipso facto the evidence of the reality of their distinction; for if they weren’t really rationally/logically distinguishable, their distinction would be inconceivable in the very first place. Correspondingly, consider the sun, shining light onto your backyard, are you claiming that either it or its functions cannot be expressed without involving sentience in what’s explained? In explaining nuclear fission, is sentience explained or needed to be? So obviously they cannot be justified in or as the same substance; for one insentient substance doesn’t involve the reality of another sentient one for it be (as is clear from the example of the sun & nuclear fission); but only in the relation of diverse substances.
“To have insentience, it must be of reality. To have sentience, it must be of reality. To have both, they must be of reality.” — One doesn’t “have” insentience or sentience, one either is sentient or insentient. This is a very important distinction, for it excludes sentience & insentience from being viewed as contingent states, such that they cannot rationally/logically be maintained as being modes of a substance, since they aren’t possessions of, i.e., they cannot be “had” by, it.
“Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.” — Both are of “reality”, sure, the point is just that they’re not the same or identical realities. Simultaneity of being isn’t identicality.
”Unlike a sentient mode or a insentience mode, substance is not limited to being only of one.” — As I’ve just explained above in the third paragraph of this post reply, sentience & insentience aren’t something that one can have, it’s something which one is or isn’t. This point alone should show you not only show how these are not, nor can be modes of a substance, let alone modes of the same individual substance.
Conception is a mode of substance. There is no self-contradiction here.” — I never claimed that he contradicted himself by merely asserting conception as a mode.
No. The point is that substance conceiving through itself is not a mode of substance.
Spinoza's point is they are of identical reality. The a priori definition of the modes insentience and sentience in the attribute of thought are of the same reality. Both definitions are true of reality. It isn't the case we have one otherworldly plane with just the definition of sentience and another with just the definition of non-sentience.
And indeed, simultaneity of being isn’t identically. The beings (modes) of insentience and sentience are not identical. It's reality which is identical. Insentience and insentience, are not the same thing, just of the same reality.
Much like all the books on my shelf are entirely different objects, yet all of them are identical in being of my shelf.
Quoting aRealidealist
This is mistaken. For Spinoza, substance isn't predicated over other objects. It's self-defined. There is a thing, the absolute infinite of substance. It is not merely a subjective categorial term. Nor is it a mode of extension (e.g. an empirical state, an instance of some thinking the concept, etc.). Nor is it a mode of thought (e.g. an a priori definition of a mode of thought, like the meaning of sentient or non-seinteint).
It is real outside anyone existing conception and judgement. It is, in the the terms you are using, a thing-itself. Substance is there whether or not anyone thinks about it.
Quoting aRealidealist
I wasn't suggesting they were contingent states. For that, I would have to be referring to a contingent entity which was sentient or non-sentient. I was talking about the a priori (so definitely not contingent) and how as a mode of thought, it could not justify itself. The point being explaining a priori concepts is more complex than just asserting their necessity (though asserting their necessity is a description enough to describe that feature).
This conceiving through itself, yes.
Since it is substance doing the conceiving, and substance is not a mode, this is not conceiving or conception of a mode.
Quoting aRealidealist
No. I'm drawing a distinction between kinds of conception... as one must if they are to understand Spinoza.
Much like all the books on my shelf are entirely different objects, yet all of them are identical in being of my shelf.”[/i] — Dependency on another, &, being identical in reality aren’t the same thing (offspring are dependent on progenitors, not literally identical with them in reality), an important point that’s been repeated a few times now. Sure, Spinoza holds that both are dependent on one, single thing (indistinguishable from or identical with itself), but not that the modes of thought & the modes of extension are identical or of an identical reality; in fact, contrary to such a position, he maintains that both can only be conceived without & independently of each other.
Moreover, the relationship between the two can be, in fact, likened to one worldly plane in relation to another, sort of like parallel universes, in as much as he asserts a parallelism between the reality of states of thought & that of bodies or body, hence, he writes, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (“The Ethics”, Part. 2, Prop. VII); in other words, the series, order or connection of states of thought/ideas correspond or parallel the series, order or connection of states of bodies/bodily things (despite the fact of each of them only being conceivable independently of the other), according to him.
Also, your bookshelf comparison isn’t admissible in the way that you want to use it here, for a bookshelf is an empirical object that’s sensibly perceivable apart from, &, or, relatively positioned with, the book or books which it holds, while this isn’t the case for the modifications of “substance”; yet, nonetheless, simply note that not only is each book separable from the bookshelf, but also from one another, further proving how distinguishable things can never be identical, i.e., can never be thought of as being one & the same, & therefore necessitate a relation between diverse things as their justification or explanation.
[i]“This is mistaken. For Spinoza, substance isn't predicated over other objects. It's self-defined. There is a thing, the absolute infinite of substance. It is not merely a subjective categorial term. Nor is it a mode of extension (e.g. an empirical state, an instance of some thinking the concept, etc.). Nor is it a mode of thought (e.g. an a priori definition of a mode of thought, like the meaning of sentient or non-seinteint).
It is real outside anyone existing conception and judgement. It is, in the the terms you are using, a thing-itself. Substance is there whether or not anyone thinks about it.”[/i] — The referent of the term “substance” or “thing” isn’t a categorical qualification, the point is that the determination of a given thing being in-itself, or, in-another, is; this fact of being either is never self-evident in any bare perception or experience, & so only ever categorically understood. Moreover, “substance” is predicated over “objects”, in as much as it’s acknowledged to not be restricted to or entirely immanent in any particular states of objectification, for it’s beyond & transcends such limitations & constraints, though it’s the condition of them.
“I wasn't suggesting they were contingent states. For that, I would have to be referring to a contingent entity which was sentient or non-sentient. I was talking about the a priori (so definitely not contingent) and how as a mode of thought, it could not justify itself. The point being explaining a priori concepts is more complex than just asserting their necessity (though asserting their necessity is a description enough to describe that feature).” — In the way that you’re speaking of it, to “have” something, or to possess something, particularly sentience or insentience, is or would be a contingent state, though; in as much as possessor & possession are never necessarily related but only contingently (like your books & bookshelf, there’s no necessary relation between them [those books weren’t always & don’t have to be there]), & so aren’t absolutely united (as mode & substance are). Yet, to be clear, it’s not solely about asserting the want of logical necessity, when objecting to Spinoza’s conception of “substance” & “mode”, but also that of a qualitative essentiality which is lacking in his very formation of the conception itself.
Of course you're entitled to believe I'm wrong. What if I'm not though?
Here's what I find important to keep in mind, for starters at least...
Spinoza was of financially solid socio-economic circumstances(privileged well-educated upper class) at a time when the church had the most power(they wrote the rules). Spinoza argues against the church and believers at the time. He was a heretic to many as a result. Blasphemy was sometimes taken much farther than mere exile, which was his punishment. Someone of a lesser important social status might well have been hanged/burned to death for offering/openly espousing an outline of monism, that if true, is solid reasonable ground against the God of Abraham.
Spinoza argues for god as the origen of everything(a creator of some things, and the origen of everything), but his philosophy does not support the God of Abraham. Rather, he argues for god using a methodological approach that I would call ontological monism. His language use is densely populated with key notions at the time. Too much so, to my own chagrin.
Only that which conceives all by itself counts as substance.
When substance(god) first conceives, it(god) does so entirely through(in and of) itself, as it must. It is all that exists. That kind of conception is more along the lines of creation. Some of those new creations are capable of conception themselves. They are dependent upon substance, but not the other way around.
So, not drawing this distinction between kinds of conception leads one to where you're at now. Draw it and the problem dissolves.
Spinoza is making this precise distintion to over come the problem dualism has for accounting for finite/contingent states.
Substance is of a different kind than other things, an absolute infinite, without the sort of contingent form or limitation which defines both the body (each limited state) and the mind (each limited thought).
Rather than being dependent on conception (a singlaur form of thought), Substance is itself a conception which is always. It has no particular form which makes it true over false. Unlike modes of thought and extension, it does not dependent on a specific limited form to be true. Substance is true and the same, no matter which modes are present or true.
Put in your terms, Substance is ALWAYS conceived. There is no moment without the conception of Substance.
If you do not grasp this, if you think Substance might or might not be conceived, you do not understand what Spinoza is arguing.
Any objection to Spinoza made on this terms does not carry. Spinoza was never claiming a conception of Substance which might or might not be, which had to be conceived through a specific, limited/contingent conception to be.
Not according to Spinoza... Look for yourself.
Quoting creativesoul
Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or substance is conceived through itself, and as such is a conception independent of any other conception, and thus he has drawn a distinction between kinds of conception.
:smile:
:rofl:
Directly address my last post, if you want me to continue here. If not, I rest my case on it.
By substance, I mean that which... ...IS conceived through itself...
Further reduced...
Substance is conceived.
Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?
They're also wrong if being conceived not does count as conception, since it would render Substance not a conception.
In this case, Substance would not involve conception to obtain, so the contradiction they suppose would not be present.
Yes.
I'm no Spinozan scholar, but jeez! I've laid it out as simply as I know how.
“By substance, I mean that which... ...is conceived through itself...” — “Substance” is that which is conceived through itself, but it isn’t the conception in which it’s (supposedly) conceived through itself. What’s so hard to understand about that? Do you insist on understanding “substance” as a conception, to thereby contradict the basic views of Spinoza?
You've yet to have addressed the issue I've raised here... today. In very simple terms to understand, Spinoza's definition of substance is all the evidence needed to know that your claim about Spinoza's notion of substance is false, on it's face. Spinoza's own words falsify what you're arguing here. Those same words verify what I've charged you with from the beginning.
You're just denying Spinoza's definition.
Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or being conceived does count as conception and you're wrong...
Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?
*Incorrigible is as incorrigible does.*
Even at Walmart checkouts & airport kiosks now cheap glossy copies of Spinoza For Dummies must be on display racks along side The Inquirer & other tabloids.
:smile:
I could be mistaken here, but I'm fairly certain Spinoza's definition of substance also has everything to do with what it would take for something to be self-caused.
“Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?”— When dealing with realities, the thing of which one has a conception, or conceives, i.e., that which is conceived, is independent of the instance of the conception of it, but the conception itself isn’t. Thus “substance” isn’t a conception. You’re completely overlooking the point.
Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?
That's a simple question with a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Which is it?
It most certainly is according to Spinoza. It's a particular kind of conception. Self-caused. Infinite. Etc.
Sigh...
:roll:
The important prevailing philosophical discourse of Spinoza's time revolved around ideas of what it would take to be self-caused, notions of God, etc. I tried to invoke those considerations, but you said that they were irrelevant. They may be irrelevant to what you are arguing about Spinoza, but they are not at all irrelevant to what Spinoza was arguing.
You're equivocating the term conception.
The irony... given that you've charged Spinoza with self-contradiction and/or incoherence.
Sigh...
Wonderful. So I tell myself... what on earth are you still doing arguing with this person when they believe that Spinoza's own life circumstances are irrelevant to Spinoza's philosophy....
I'm not the "pom-poms" type, son. And don't need my own copy of Spinoza For Dummies with you wantonly plagiarizing your copy all over this thread. You just keep on misconceiving "conceived through itself" all the while proving that my conception of you vis-à-vis your textually uncorroborated muddle is more than ... fair. :kiss:
Equivocating is when an author is using two different senses/acceptable uses/definitions of the same term in the same argument. In this case, you're using two different definitions of the term "conception" in the very same claim...
Quoting aRealidealist
Define "conception" here in a way that we can substitute both instances of it in the above quote with that definition and the claim remain meaningful.
If you can do that, then you're not equivocating.
You can't.
Your equivocating the term "conception" is somehow my fault?
:brow:
Yes, we do claim states otherwise. He outright states substance is conceived through itself.
Substance is itself and also conception through itself. It's not just no other conception, but the conception of itself too. It's not independent of everything (that would be an oxymoron; it would have to independent from itself), just everything but substance (i.e. everything else, rather than everything).
:up:
It has to since there's nothing else but Substance to conceive of Substance. Apparently, an ouroboros or Möbius loop confuses some of the slower kids.
More equivocation of the term "conceive"...
"Right." "Over." "Your." "Head."
(Ah, yeah, projection - the last refuge. :lol: )
All that is needed for you to correct your (mis)understandings has been expressed heretofore...
:up:
Right. You already have a cheerleader. You don't need to be one, too. :kiss: