Whether the gods exists or not, a well structured and developed philosophy of religion is a very good idea.
Perhaps we should preface our assertions about god(s) with the phrase, "whether the gods exists or not": Whether the gods exist or not, religions are a human creation. Theology (about the gods that may or may not exist) is a human creation. Ritual is a human creation. Whether the gods exists or not, religions, rituals, and theology have value and meaning to people.
Can people (ardent believers, lukewarm believers, apostates, agnostics, atheists...) agree that there is a a limit on how much anyone can know about the gods, which is imposed by the differences we suppose exist between humans and gods?
Can we agree that believers can not precisely map out what they can know about the gods (because the gods are to some extent unknowable)?
I’ve put forward Geertz’ general layout for the term ‘religion’ to start discussions before but no one seemed particularly interested.
The best you can hope for is to find people who are willing to accept other people’s views without trying to bend them.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 19, 2019 at 19:47#3433920 likes
God:
Is that which nothing greater can exist; where "greater" means the most "powerful" in the sense of abilities. Quoting Bitter Crank
Can we agree that believers can not precisely map out what they can know about the gods (because the gods are to some extent unknowable)?
Agreed. Although I believe my definition to be correct, it is indeed incomplete. As God would be a higher being that us, we could not fully grasp its concept.
Theology:
Is the scientific (rational) study of truth based on data from the gods, like the bible etc. I agree with @Bitter Crank that it is a human creation, and @180 Proof's definition. This does not imply subjectivity.
Religion:
Is the set of behaviour based on the findings of the theology. I agree with "180 Proof"'s definition again. Quoting Bitter Crank
Whether the gods exist or not, religions [and rituals] are a human creation.
Not necessarily. In some religions like christianity, judaism and islam, the belief is that the religious instructions were given by the gods, or else confirmed by the gods that the existing behaviours were good (like some ethical acts).
I think assertion would yield fruitful discussion, but in line with the concerns expressed in your OP, I think we'd need to narrow the focus, or there might be the tendency for people to go off in infinite directions on a too-broad topic.
So what is it about theology that we might want to investigate:
Not necessarily. In some religions like christianity, judaism and islam, the belief is that the religious instructions were given by the gods
I must respectfully disagree, or point out that you may be jumping the gun by getting into the contents of this religion or that. This goes back to the issue of faith--asserting the belief that human-written texts are the word of the diety.
But talking about the nature of faith is not the same as espousing faith in the doctrine that a diety directly inspired a written text. I don't get the impression that we want to jump into a discussion about whether or not Torah, Koran or Gospels were dictated by a diety.
I majored in comparative religion. In the first class we sort of ‘workshopped’ possible definitions of religion. We found, to my surprise, that we couldn’t arrive at one; that every proposed definition couldn’t accomodate some form of religion.
Soon after we discussed the etymology of the word itself: the first definition being from the Latin ‘religio’, meaning ‘attitude of awe and reverence to the gods’. It seemed the most obvious derivation.
The second possible derivation was from ‘re-ligare’ where ‘ligare’ is related to the root ‘lig-‘ meaning ‘binding’ or ‘tying’ (cf ligature, ligament.) So re-ligare was to join to or unite with.
I formed the immediate impression that this latter was similar in meaning to the Indic ‘yoga’ meaning ‘to yoke or join’. And that understanding of the meaning is very much in line with my own to this day.
Later on we also studied Rudolf Otto’s book The Idea of the Holy. This was an exploration of the defining characteristics of religious epiphanies from a cross-cultural perspective. William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience and Alduous Huxley’s The Perennial Philosophy also became ‘go-to’ texts along these lines.
So as regards the subject-matter, I am of the view that religion is a universal characteristic of human culture. It obviously takes many forms, from the grotesque to the sublime, and many points between. It can be used as oppressive organ of state control or as a liberation from social constraints. It is many things, but one thing I will observe is that it has a specific meaning in Christian and post-Christian culture, but one which if often felt rather than consciously articulated.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 19, 2019 at 23:55#3434370 likes
I must respectfully disagree, or point out that you may be jumping the gun by getting into the contents of this religion or that.
I believe you are missing the point. The original goal as per the OP is to find statements that most groups agree with, and my point is that there are many groups which disagree with the statement that religions are always a human creation.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 20, 2019 at 00:07#3434400 likes
Faith is taking “because X said/thinks so”, i.e. the absence of any reason [...]
The christian catholics would not agree with this definition of faith. As described, this would be called "blind faith", which is not regarded as a good thing. As per Thomas Aquinas, faith falls between zero knowledge (ie blind faith) and certainty about an object. Strong faith is supported by reason; reason which, while not achieving a full proof, yields to the probable or the reasonable. Thus any act based on a belief supported by the probable or the reasonable is an act of faith, which is good; where as any act based on a belief devoid of any reason would be blind, which is foolish.
Reply to Samuel Lacrampe That definition of faith would include basically all secular belief as well though, so doesn’t seem useful for distinguishing faith from other modes of belief.
Another useful definition to consider is fideism which ‘maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior.’ Much of the criticism of religion on this forum assumes that religion is defined by fidiesm but it is not necessarily the case. Catholicism generally is less prone to fidiesm than Protestantism with its emphasis on ‘salvation by faith alone’.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 20, 2019 at 00:29#3434520 likes
Reply to Pfhorrest I believe faith applies to secular topics as well. E.g. trust that your spouse is not cheating without hiring an investigator to confirm, is a type of faith. That said, to stay on the topic of religion, we could say that "faith", in the context of this discussion, is the belief supported by the probable or the reasonable, regarding religious claims.
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[i]"Faith" - irrational belief / practice - is like poor hygiene, pathogenic contagions & pollution: failure to resist oppose & prevent is more often than not hazardous to y/our health."
Faith consists of:
"[....] wholly subjective, worshipful trust or hope in [ ... ] 'Ultimate Mystery'."[/i]
~
"Faith" = trust-in/assent to mysteries & fact-free practices - beliefs/just-so-stories for 'placebo fantasy effects' ... [...]
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Reply to tim wood Over the course of 4 years we made some progress, but better to keep it short in this environment. I'll contribute if anything relevant comes.
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Reply to Samuel Lacrampe My objection is then that you have defined faith as “probable or reasonable belief about religious topics”, which is most problematic for excluding all unreasonable or improbable beliefs (“blind faith”) as not faith at all, but even if we fix that, that just means that faith is any belief about religious topics, which would then make religion defined in reference to faith circularly defined.
The thing that distinguishes faithful belief from other belief is its independence of good reasons. Thomists may claim that you should strive also to have good reasons in addition to your faith, but that is just saying not to go on faith alone, as faith alone (without reason) is blind. Faith per se is thus exactly what they would call “blind faith”, and it is only in fortifying a belief with something besides faith that it becomes not blind.
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The second possible derivation was from ‘re-ligare’ where ‘ligare’ is related to the root ‘lig-‘ meaning ‘binding’ or ‘tying’ (cf ligature, ligament.) So re-ligare was to join to or unite with.
The modern definition of "Religion" typically refers to an authoritative creed, of which there are many. But I think religion-in-general goes deeper than that, into the essence of human nature. It's not just intellectual assent to a list of specific "truths", "facts" or commandments. Instead, it's an emotional bond to a family or tribe or social group. The details differ from tribe to tribe, but the feeling of belonging is the same for all people of all places and all times. It's the same emotional connection that unites a family or football team, or military unit. And it may even be motivated by the same neurotransmitters (e.g. oxytocin) that bond a mother and her baby.
But, in a more general sense, I like to use the Latin roots to see what the word originally referred to. As you noted, "re-" = back, again, past; and "ligare-" = join, unite, bond. a link. So I conclude that the essential meaning of "religion" is "tradition" : an emotional link to a common history.
For example, many Christian Catholics and Protestants are more loyal to their local social group than to the required creeds of their sect, or to the official leaders of their church. So, when push comes to shove, they would place more weight on their 2000 year old Christian tradition, than on any abstract belief, such as Trinity or Transubstantiation. Hence, their common bond of Christian fellowship would outweigh any milder feelings for fellow humans, who belong to a different tribal tradition, such as Hinduism or Islam. Emotionally, religion is Us versus Them.
Dictionary.com, word origin for "re-" : a prefix, occurring originally in loanwords from Latin, used with the meaning “again” or “again and again” to indicate repetition, or with the meaning “back” or “backward” to indicate withdrawal or backward motion: regenerate; refurbish; retype; retrace; revert.
Jesus admonished the Pharisees, who he viewed as apostates from the true religion (tradition) handed down by Moses. In the words of Isaiah, referring to God : "Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. 8 You have let go of the commands of God and are holding on to human traditions.”. Mark 7:7-13 [ Ironically, the Pharisees considered themselves to be conservatives. But apparently not conservative enough for the fundamentalist Jesus people. ]
Every time we use empty names like these in a sentence they mean something in a relevant language-game but not in others. "Meaning is usage", no? Anyway, skim the wiki for empty name I again link here and you'll be hard pressed to object to my definition of "God" in a serious manner. The Rorschach-like semantic baggage of this (transcendental) signifier in particular nearly screams "Empty Name" ...
[quote=tim wood]How, it being an empty name, do you account for the persistence of the idea?[/quote]
See the empty names above? Now ask yourself, tim, how you can ask such a vacuous question.
I like sushiOctober 20, 2019 at 04:20#3434850 likes
Reply to tim wood Yeah, but I doubt anyone will bother reading it sadly :(
Let's start this way: three terms: god, religion, theology. Pick one, and start your post with "God is," or "Religion is," or "Theology is."
Religion is a set of beliefs that consists of two parts.
The transcendental part are rituals, prayers, festivities, and similar behaviours. The religous-law part is a set of rules that forbid particular behaviour types and from which the believer can derive the moral status of the behaviour he intends to engage in.
It is the religious-law part that tends to cause political issues.
Politicians may argue that their lawmaking activity would be above religious law, while religious communities will insist that it is exactly the other way around. Since I benefit from anything that damages the political power of the ruling elite, I definitely side with the religious view.
In other cases, I do not even seek to side with one, particular party, because I already benefit from the mere existence of the conflict. I find the position of the arms trader to be the most interesting. That is especially so, when it is possible to simultaneously sell weapons to both sides.
Reply to tim wood Logic is only the form of reason, evidence is its substance. Reason means offering exactly that, reasons, to (dis)favor one opinion vs another.
Quiddities, genus/species, special features, four causes? It seems strange that a crew of smart people couldn't have been more specific.
Comparative religion covered a very broad range of material. But there was a big emphasis on 'history of ideas'. 'The history of ideas is a field of research in history that deals with the expression, preservation, and change of human ideas over time. The history of ideas is a sister-discipline to, or a particular approach within, intellectual history. ...The historian Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962) coined the phrase and initiated its systematic study in the early decades of the 20th century.'
Personally, the history of ideas has really shaped my approach to philosophy also, insofar as I tend to understand it in terms of underlying themes or tropes that you can trace in different cultures and historical epochs. Another unwritten factor behind that is the kind of minds or forms of consciousness associated with different cultural epochs - minds vastly different from our own which moderns will usually find extremely hard or impossible to comprehend (although will be generally quick to categorise as simply archaic and of no relevance on those grounds).
'Old school' comparative religion tended to be very conservative and based on the field work and observations of anthropology and sociology, but also incorporated theories of religion, such as studies from, and criticism of, well-known texts like The Golden Bough - A Study in Comparative Religion by anthropologist Sir James George Frazer. Also Durkheim, Max Weber, Peter Berger (another favourite) and many names that now escape me.
One scholar that I really liked was Max Mueller. I found his work on 'linguistic archeology' and the common roots of the Indo-European languages utterly fascinating.
My own approach was driven by an interest in the spiritual enlightenment pointed out by such luminaries as Ramana Maharishi (30 December 1879 – 14 April 1950) an Indian sage and jivanmukta (liberated being), born Venkataraman Iyer, but most commonly known by the name Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi.
Also by Swami Vivekananda who introduced Advaita Vedanta to the US in the late 19th century and underwent long speaking tours by train.
And also Soyen Shaku who spoke alongside Vivekananda at the Parliament of Religions which was held in Chicago, 1880's. He was the first Rinzai Zen monk to speak in the US, and his reprinted Lectures of a Buddhist Abbott still stand up quite well (and are still in print).
It was these kinds of books (along with Alan Watts and D. T. Suzuki), mainly discovered via the then-thriving Adyar (Theosophical Society) bookshop, that drove my interest in comparative religion in the first place, as it seemed the most likely faculty in which to find discussion of those kinds of teachings and ideas.
In a way it was, but again old-school comparative religion was very much arms-length, you studied religions like you might study species of butterfly pinned to a board, and it was in no way 'confessional' in orientation (as it ought not to be). But this had begun to change in the mid-20th century with the advent of 'scholar-practitioners', of whom a famous example was the Romanian scholar Mercia Eliade. His works were quite influential in the Department. Also Huston Smith, who died not that long ago at 97, and who was an eclectic scholar-practitioner.
. So I conclude that the essential meaning of "religion" is "tradition" : a link to the past.
Can't completely agree - while it is of course true that 'tradition' means 'to carry forward', but the idea of 'joining' or 'union', as in 'union with the divine' (or theosis or apotheosis) is not temporally-bound in any way. The tradition is seen in some sense as a vessel for preserving the gist of such teachings, but from their perspective, the subject is 'the deathless'.
-------
I think one thing that hasn't been stated in this thread, is the role of, or idea of gnosis, or 'higher knowledge'. It is universally assumed by the participants here that religion is invariably a matter of belief, and by most people, belief in non-existent mythological figures.
However, of the many tributaries that formed what became known as 'religion', were streams such as shamanism, yoga, and other such disciplines, traces of which you even find in Pre-socratic Greek philosophy (and for that matter, related to the Orphism of Plato). Amongst these streams also was what were to become various gnostic schools, which were generally, and successfully, suppressed by the nascent Roman Church in its formative stages. "History", it is said, "is written by the victors" - and no more so than in this matter. So the idea of there being higher states, direct knowledge, and so on, which are relatively commonplace in Hindu and Buddhist schools, more or less went underground in Western culture, which has had many profound consequences for the 'history of ideas' in the West.
there are many groups which disagree with the statement that religions are always a human creation
I suppose a bunch of somebodies will disagree with the statement that 2 + 2 = 4. Be that as it may...
I think religion is ALWAYS a human creation. This isn't a reflection on the gods. Suppose that the gods are real. Religion, as @Wayfarer said, is "an attitude of awe and reverence to the gods". If a people have an encounter with a god, they are likely to feel awe, fear (or terror), reverence, and more all to overwhelming degrees. Religion is the response to an encounter with the holy, a connection. Since the gods thought to be real don't conveniently pop in every day religion finds ways of recreating the encounter. The Eucharist, Passover, the gods in the Hindu temples, meditation practices, ascetic practices, and so forth provide a way for subsequent generations to share (symbolically) the encounter.
That religion (a response to the holy) is a human creation would seem axiomatic. The gods do not need religion.
In some religions (thinking here of the classical period) the gods were thought to need sacrifices. A passage in the Epic of Gilgamesh states that when a sacrifice of burnt offerings was being made, "The gods gathered around the altar like flies". The gods were hungry. Since the gods didn't literally descend from the heavens and consume the sacrifice, the sacrifice was eaten by humans, and thus shared with the gods. In other references, libations are poured out on the ground for the gods. I don't know how many extant religions operate with that idea.
Without any consensus, discussions tend to fall apart.
With this I can agree. However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much off philosophy, essecialy Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive.
A better approach would be to map out the differences...
With this I can agree. However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much off philosophy, essecialy Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive.
A better approach would be to map out the differences...
Absolutely. Definitions can't be treated as if they were some technical matter enabling the true meat of a discussion, definitions are what a discussion consists of entirely. To really agree on definitions is to just agree. The reason why we can't agree on a definition of God/Religion/Theology is because they are no mere acts of taxonomy, the meaning of the words is their use and their use is intimately tied to people's lifestyles, identity etc. You can no more easily get someone to give an inch on a definition than you can persuade them to act this way or that, best to simply present alternatives.
Elephantine, indeed. A species of belief, to be sure; but not a species of truth. Mapping out the differences and similarities between faith and certainty might be interesting.
I majored in comparative religion. In the first class we sort of ‘workshopped’ possible definitions of religion. We found, to my surprise, that we couldn’t arrive at one; that every proposed definition couldn’t accomodate some form of religion.
A family resemblance, then. Given any definition of [i]religion[/I], there is some item that counts as religious and yet does not fit that definition...
Reply to Swan And yet some things must be taken as given in order for the discussion to even begin.
I like sushiOctober 20, 2019 at 06:43#3435110 likes
Perhaps it would be worth while attempting to discuss ‘god’, ‘religion’ and ‘theology’ without using those terms.
BAN those terms from the discussion but keep them in the title. Then people will have to reconsider how to express their views by other means.
That could be a fruitful means of finding some common terminology if not a universal concept everyone can partially agree with.
No matter how it is approached I don’t see a way to get away from bringing up terms and phrases like ‘rational’, ‘emotional content’, ‘universal pattern’ and/or ‘learned habit’.
I’d be up for the above or an in-depth discussion on Geertz def. If you start a thread along either of those lines let me know.
faith", in the context of this discussion, is the belief supported by the probable or the reasonable, regarding religious claims.
Just because Tom Aquinas says it doesn't make it so. All of these arguments are easily deconstructed these days: probability and reason cannot prove the contents of faith.
Elephantine, indeed. A species of belief, to be sure; but not a species of truth. Mapping out the differences and similarities between faith and certainty might be interesting.
:up:
Might be.
:mask: - "hygiene"
In the context of Biblical, Vedic and other extant theistic traditions wherein worship consists in submission of the child/female/servant/Profane to the elder/male/master/Sacred, Faith denotes trusting hopeful dutiful worship (via second-hand anecdotal accounts (e.g. revealed)) of Mysteries.
At further remove, as I discern it, Faith is nothing but magical thinking, that is, trust hope confidence in Supernatural Mysteries (via "thoughts & prayers") over above defeasible thinking vis-à-vis Natural Evident Problemata (via reflective inquiry & problem-solving) -- and positing all 'meaning & value' in terms of any one of arbitrarily countless, otherworldly, spiritual Hereafters at the expense of demeaning & devaluing this worldly, ineluctably singular, physical Here & Now.
Faith doesn't have to be blind, like love or hatred, to be blinding like staring at the midday sun. 'Believing is seeing' the Faithful preach trumping 'seeing is believing' (e.g. "Crede ut intellegas" ~Augustine ... "Credo quia absurdum" ~Tertullian(?) ... Indeed, the NT says, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and frustrate the intelligence of the intelligent." ~1 Corinthians 1:19).
But isn't this 'disposition' retrograde? degenerative? infantilizing? As babies we learn to believe long before in later childhood we learn to think adequately, and longer still before, if ever, we learn to think for ourselves; yet Faith consists in prioritizing 'believing over thinking' - imploring us to be "Born Again", which sounds like willing a prematurely senescent 'second childhood'.
This seems correct: magical thinking, which is an infantile mode, is quite comforting. It reduces complexities to simple answers; one definitely doesn't have to think as much (unless they have to go on a proselytizing campaign and think up ways to convince people to accept the same tenets of faith. In that sense, Paul was an excellent salesman.) It even stops all sorts of nagging questions from arising in the first place. It neatly ties up all sorts of loose ends. I always thought this was the purpose of faith..., no?
Can't completely agree - while it is of course true that 'tradition' means 'to carry forward', but the idea of 'joining' or 'union', as in 'union with the divine' (or theosis or apotheosis) is not temporally-bound in any way. The tradition is seen in some sense as a vessel for preserving the gist of such teachings, but from their perspective, the subject is 'the deathless'.
Yes. But I was talking about the physical motivation behind the felt human need for union with Mother, Father, Family, Tribe, and God. That urge to unite is "deathless" as long as it has roots in human nature. And Culture, including Religion, is the offspring of Human Nature, which is an outgrowth of Physical Nature, and so forth.
External traditions (e.g memes; ceremonies) are symbolic cultural models of inner natural emotions. When we observe Hindus bathing in the Ganges, and Baptists immersed in rivers or water tanks, we can see the common human urge for purging and purification. Inner Meanings are preserved and propagated in outer traditions.
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Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition.
...and are, as you say, butchered. Socrates knows that he knows nothing; further, as demonstrated by his method, nor does anyone else, since they cannot provide definitions that will stand.
Did you note in the OP reference to two kinds of definitions? One the always already agreed to and established, and the other contingently granted "for the sake of argument," that could turn out to be not the case?
Socrates knows that he knows nothing; further, as demonstrated by his method, nor does anyone else, since they cannot provide definitions that will stand.
Though he still manages to believe that beauty=knowledge=virtue. That death is not important. That people do evil out of ignorance. (and if he knows nothing, how does he avoid this?) He certainly seemd to have epistemological beliefs; iow he has his process for demonstrating ideas are incorrect. He seemed to know the qualities that made up virtue; courage for example. He seemed to be a dualist, since our true self was our soul - not like the Christian soul but neverless not the body, but the internal thinking and deciding self - rather than what we own and status, etc.
Of course this is all reported by others, but then so is his quote about his knowing he knows nothing.
Terrapin StationOctober 20, 2019 at 22:08#3437270 likes
I prefer to just assume that one is using one of the standard definitions (a la those found in major dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc.), unless one specifies otherwise.
God is a word with meaning. What meaning may be a good question, even one that, surprise, is being looked into here.
Of course empty names can be meaningful; I've repeatedly said (shown) as much already (re: theology, etc) . And the OP asks for a definition "God is ..." and not an interpretation (or testimonial) e.g. "God means ..." so moving the goal-posts now is just ... evasive. :yawn:
Does reason in any sense dictate we terminate the discussion as nonsense because "God" is an empty name -
What are you talking about? I've neither attempted to nor implied we should "terminate the discussion" in any way for any reason; in fact, I'd hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia. Apparently, you, tim, are not interested in - capable of(?) - a more freethought (i.e. atheological) approach.
d hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia.
As for definitions of the 'ground of being':
one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, transcendent to, but also immanent in, all beings.
From review of D B Hart 'The Experience of God'.
TheWillowOfDarknessOctober 20, 2019 at 23:32#3437600 likes
The necessity of ground of being allows for no counterfactual. If we understand the ground of being, we know nothing is given without it. We have nothing to just trust, sans reason.
Indeed, we are in the exact opposite position to faith: reason has given us understanding of that which is beyond death and possibility.
Though he still manages to believe that beauty=knowledge=virtue. That death is not important. That people do evil out of ignorance. (and if he knows nothing, how does he avoid this?) He certainly seemd to have epistemological beliefs; iow he has his process for demonstrating ideas are incorrect. He seemed to know the qualities that made up virtue; courage for example. He seemed to be a dualist, since our true self was our soul - not like the Christian soul but neverless not the body, but the internal thinking and deciding self - rather than what we own and status, etc.
Of course this is all reported by others, but then so is his quote about his knowing he knows nothing.
All good points. He abases himself to be exalted. I like Socrates, but he's only different from other gurus on the level of quality. He's not playing a different game altogether or refusing to play the game. To engage in conversation at all is already a self-assertion, a claim on attention, respect, trust, etc. And then a truly ignorant person is not only useless but dangerous.
If knowledge of our own ignorance is the most important kind of knowledge, then somehow this wonderful humility ends up back on top. What a surprise...
religion-in-general goes deeper than that, into the essence of human nature. It's not just intellectual assent to a list of specific "truths", "facts" or commandments. Instead, it's an emotional bond to a family or tribe or social group. The details differ from tribe to tribe, but the feeling of belonging is the same for all people of all places and all times. It's the same emotional connection that unites a family or football team, or military unit. And it may even be motivated by the same neurotransmitters (e.g. oxytocin) that bond a mother and her baby.
Yes, and it's manifest in actions. The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary. We bookish philosophers inherit the fantasy of justified systems of beliefs. What we don't like is our radical immersion in material circumstance and tacit knowledge that not only cannot be justified but also cannot even be made explicit. (This immersion itself can be and has been made fairly explicit by various famous 'anti-philosophers' who tended to have more sophisticated notions of religion like yours above.)
As this is a philosophy of religion thread, I would like to contribute something on the reality of soul.
I believe there is a way into understanding 'the nature of the soul' as connected with 'what grasps meaning'. Being able to grasp meaning is something fundamental to all living organisms in the sense that even so-called instinctive behaviours are responses to environmental stimuli and can be understood in terms of signal and response (which is basic to the emerging science of biosemiotics [sup]1[/sup].)
But what I want to concentrate on here is the sense in which the mind draws together and synthesises the meaning-world which underlies all acts of judgement. This is the faculty of 'transcendental apperception' in Kant, which provides the basis of experience - without it, we would not be able to interpret or understand anything, all of our sensory perceptions would be a mere chaos. It is analogous to what might be described as 'the ground of being'.
I'm inclined to see this conception as the philosophical descendant of Aristotle's 'rational soul', subject of the famous and controversial passage in De Anima of the 'active intellect'. Of course anything of this kind is nowadays dismissed as archaic but I suggest that there is a conceptual space for the possibility of the 'rational soul', and that it plausibly corresponds with what Kant and later Husserl called the 'transcendental ego'.
Transcendental ego, the self that is necessary in order for there to be a unified empirical self-consciousness. For Immanuel Kant, it synthesizes sensations according to the categories of the understanding. Nothing can be known of this self, because it is a condition, not an object, of knowledge. For Edmund Husserl, pure consciousness, for which everything that exists is an object, is the ground for the foundation and constitution of all meaning.
Bolds added.
You might object 'where can this 'transcendental ego' be found? And I think there's a clue in the examination of the so-called 'neural binding problem', in particular the problem of the 'subjective unity of experience'. This refers to the capacity of the brain to synthesise all manner of perceptual stimuli into a coherent unity - the 'subjective unity of experience' - which is, at least, strongly suggestive of the 'transcendental ego'.
In his paper on this issue, Jerome S. Feldman says that:
There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).
...There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.
But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.
So does this mean that the rational soul/transcendental ego exists? I would say not, because, as noted above, 'nothing can be known of it', and by its nature, it can never plausibly be an object of cognition (hence, 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense.) Yet without this faculty, we would not function as conscious beings. I am suggesting that this is a plausible account, even if only by way of analogy, of the reality of 'soul' - not as the ethereal 'res cogitans' of Descartes but the native faculty which grasps meaning.
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1. Interestingly, 'semiotics' as a distinct discipline originated with St Bonaventura who wrote that 'sensible things are understood to be signs that ultimately can direct humans to the divine art or wisdom through which all things have been made. ... In addition, Bonaventure posits two higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are ”images“ (imago) pointing to the First Principle through its properly rational powers which have their source and highest object in God and ”likenesses“ (similitudo) of God to the extent that they are recipients of divine grace and conform themselves to the divine will. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.1
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 21, 2019 at 01:04#3437850 likes
Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition.
This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. They start out with a preconceived notion (a sort of definition) of what "knowledge" is. Then in all the proposed examples of how this supposed "knowledge" might actually exist, they find that the examples are lacking, and cannot assure them of what they are looking for within their defined essence of "knowledge", i.e. truth. At the end of the dialogue they realize that they were misguided by their own preconceived definition, knowledge as it exists cannot fulfil the criteria of their definition. The definition mislead them
This is why the method of Platonic dialectics is to not accept, as "the definition", any possible definition, but to respect them all, as exactly that, possible definitions. Then by analyzing possible definitions we proceed to get a firm idea of how the word is actually used. From here we can develop an idea of "the thing" which is referred to by the word.
[quote=jellyfish]The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary. We bookish philosophers inherit the fantasy of justified systems of beliefs. What we don't like is our radical immersion in material circumstance and tacit knowledge that not only cannot be justified but also cannot even be made explicit.[/quote]
So, (e.g. JCI) religions aren't in the theological & liturgical/pastoral businesses of trying to "justify" their "beliefs" in order to "authorize" the applications of said "beliefs" in practice? Damn those "bookish" Theologians & Preachers!
I like Socrates, but he's only different from other gurus on the level of quality. He's not playing a different game altogether or refusing to play the game. [ ... ]
If knowledge of our own ignorance is the most important kind of knowledge, then somehow this wonderful humility ends up back on top. What a surprise...
So, (e.g. JCI) religions aren't in the theological & liturgical/pastoral businesses of trying to "justify" their "beliefs" in order to "authorize" the applications of said "beliefs" in practice?
Often enough, yes. But I maintain that religion is misunderstood when it's examined as a mere set of silly concepts. The concepts can afford to be silly, because the concepts aren't really it.
My comments on humility aren't anti-Socrates. I'm just pointing out a tension. We orient ourselves. We want to experience ourselves as dignified, noble, decent, valuable, etc. We abase ourselves only to be exalted. Personally I love the notion of learned ignorance. And non serviam. I will not serve. I assert my learned ignorance as (more importantly) the ignorance of those who would dominate me with their tales of this and that. The questioning mind is a weapon, and its target is whatever humiliates or diminishes the questioner (who sits so sly). The fiction of God the monster actually gets something right, as an image of our impossible project. Once out of nature [and its vulnerabilities and indignities], I shall never take my bodily form from any natural thing....
Abilities? Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, faster than a speeding bullet. Those abilities? Or do you mean that at the maximum of ability, nothing beyond that can exist?
Mainly the latter. Of course this implies the former, but it is less important. Also I assume we are excluding dead religions like the ancient greek religions.
By "scientific (rational) study of truth," do you mean putting the question to what you suppose is the truth to see if it is - or can be - truth?
Not sure I understand your question haha. To give my definition in other words, it is finding what conclusions can be inferred from divine revelations, which serve as the premises.
Religion: a set of behaviours. Based on? Entirely? Or does religion add to theology?
Upon reflection, I now think the term has two meanings. (1) is the subject matter itself, and (2) is the practice based on the theology, as per my first definition. E.g. Christianity is a religion, but also a christian is religious strictly if he practices the acts described in the theology.
This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition.
Starting with a definition might also assume some questionable project of making the 'ground' explicit. A big system of words is supposed to be its own foundation.
Deleted UserOctober 21, 2019 at 03:56#3438510 likes
Earlier in the thread there was talk about religion being largely sub-conceptual. It's what we do, perhaps, more than it is what we say about what we do. The 'religious' person who gets and spends and obeys like the 'non-religious' person is not that interesting. It's make-up for Facebook, a little flag. But IMV this also applies to 'non-religious' and maybe even 'anti-religious' politics.
My point isn't that anti-religion is good or bad. And I do see the usefulness of the word 'religion.' But I also see the usefulness in understanding 'religion' metaphorically. The quote below does not express my own position in general, but it's a good description of 'culture' as 'religion.'
[quote=Hegel]
The spiritual individual, the people, insofar as it is organized in itself, an organic whole, is what we call the State. This designation is ambiguous in that by “state” and “constitutional law” one usually means the simple political aspect, as distinct from religion, science, and art. But when we speak of the manifestation of the spiritual we understand the term “state” in a more comprehensive sense, similar to the term Reich (empire, realm). For us, then, a people is primarily a .spiritual individual. We do not emphasize the external aspects but concentrate on what has been called the spirit of a people. We mean its consciousness of itself, of its own truth, its own essence, the spiritual powers which live and rule in it. The universal which manifests itself in the State and is known in it – the form under which everything that is, is subsumed – is that which constitutes the culture of a nation. The definite content which receives this universal form and is contained in the concrete actuality of the state is the spirit of the people. The actual state is animated by this spirit in all its particular affairs, wars, institutions, etc.
This spiritual content is something definite, firm, solid, completely exempt from caprice, the particularities, the whims of individuality, of chance. That which is subject to the latter is not the nature of the people: it is like the dust playing over a city or a field, which does not essentially transform it. This spiritual content then constitutes the essence of the individual as well as that of the people. It is the holy bond that ties the men, the spirits together. It is one life in all, a grand object, a great purpose and content on which depend all individual happiness and all private decisions. The state does not exist for the citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the end and they are its means. But the means-end relation is not fitting here. For the state is not the abstract confronting the citizens; they are parts of it, like members of an organic body, where no member is end and none is means. It is the realization of Freedom, of the absolute, final purpose, and exists for its own sake. All the value man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state. For his spiritual reality is the knowing presence to him of his own essence, of rationality, of its objective, immediate actuality present in and for him. Only thus is he truly a consciousness, only thus does he partake in morality, in the legal and moral life of the state. For the True is the unity of the universal and particular will. And the universal in the state is in its laws, its universal and rational provisions. The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth.
[/quote]
What is the separation of church and state but the implementation of a state 'religion' ? I'm not objecting to this apparent privatization of spirituality. I'm just pointing out that it's something like individualism or freedom as the state religion. In fact it's more like oligarchy, but with lots of great TV.
[quote= Debord]
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious degradation of being into having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the economy leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which all actual “having” must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate function.
[/quote]
I like sushiOctober 21, 2019 at 09:18#3439300 likes
Reply to Wayfarer Don’t have time to go over this just now. The link looks very good though! Right up my alley :)
It the initial quote from the same source? I couldn’t see it.
Reply to I like sushi All the links work for me. When you do have time, have a read, I'd be interested in any feedback as I think I'm making a novel and valid point.
I like sushiOctober 21, 2019 at 09:45#3439390 likes
Reply to Wayfarer I meant it isn’t at all clear where the first quote (not link) is sourced from. The quote, “Transcendental ego, ...”
I like sushiOctober 21, 2019 at 10:12#3439470 likes
Reply to Wayfarer That’s surprising! That site is usually pretty careful with its wording. The quote fails to highlight the sense in which Husserl uses the term ‘object’ in regards to phenomenology. To the causal reader they may not pick this up unless they look further.
Actually, much closer to the ground, in that for certain words I wonder if any agreement, even provisional, on meaning is possible. On "God" for example, unless I've missed it, no one has pinned anything down. Yours is the empty name, mine the idea, some Anselm, and X. That's it for God.
Perhaps a different approach to the generic name "God" would be helpful. For Atheists, "god" refers to an empty set. But for Theists, "God" refers to a meaningful, but abstract concept, with associated feelings. For example, "United States" is not a concrete thing, but an abstraction that invokes positive feelings for some, and negative feelings for others.
In order to avoid the conflicting theological baggage attached to the "God" designation that means different things to different people, I spell it "G*D", and provide a definition that fits my personal worldview*1. But I cannot give a concrete description, or claim that "G*D" is real and empirical. Instead, my "G*D" is a gap-filler in the same sense that scientists use "Dark Matter" and "Multiverse". They don't know what Dark Matter is, only what it does. Likewise, Multiverse is an explanatory hypothesis, with no possibility for empirical confirmation. It has to be taken on Faith. I don't know what G*D is, only what it has done : enform this non-self-existent universe. And since generic Information is the fundamental substance of the material universe, I must assume that G*D is an Enformer. *2
These knowledge-gap-filler terms are useful in that they convey a meaning that can be communicated, even though the referent is not accessible to objective confirmation. For me, "G*D" refers to the logical "First Cause" and "Logos" hypotheses of Aristotle. Objectively, we can all agree that the world exists. But how it came to be is debatable. So. those with Materialist assumptions imagine an eternal mechanical Multiverse, while those with Spiritualist assumptions imagine an eternal king-like magician (Jehovah), or an infinite abstract power with no human characteristics (Allah). None of us has any direct knowledge of the object referred-to by our gap-filler names. But we can use the agreed-upon definitions of those terms for philosophical discussions. We may not accept that those definitions are factual, but at least we can know what we are talking about.
*1 G*D : " I refer to the logically necessary and philosophically essential First & Final Cause as G*D, rather than merely "X" the Unknown, . . . ."
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html
Reply to 180 Proof Don't you think it's significant that placebos actually work? I have always thought of them as an argument against physicalism. Physicalism would expect that aspirin has physical efficacy i.e. causes the cells to behave differently by chemically altering them - call that 'bottom-up' causation. But the placebo effect doesn't rely on anything physical, instead, the subject's belief in the efficacy of the sugar-pill causes physical change - call that 'top-down' causation. And top-down undermines physicalism, which by definition is always bottom-up. And if the placebo principle effect works in respect of human physiology then there's no reason it may not be an instance of a broader type of non-physical causation.
That is, that god, religion (theology), are all results of a more fundamental push. As results of pushes at different times and places for different reasons, all different and differing, it is therefore (on this idea) a mistake to look in these things for a sameness and consistency that isn't there. Instead, it would seem that understanding must go back behind to consider the primitive - or at least original, because imo the whole thing is recapitulated in the development of the individual - the bonfire, and the jaws that hover indistinctly in the shadows at the dark edges of it.
Pushed from or by whom or by what? John Hick is relevant here, and as he was a philosopher of religion, as distinct from a theologian, perhaps his Who or What is God might be worth a glance.
The concept [of god-of-the-gaps], although not the exact wording, goes back to Henry Drummond, a 19th-century evangelist lecturer, from his Lowell Lectures on The Ascent of Man. He chastises those Christians who point to the things that science can not yet explain—"gaps which they will fill up with God"—and urges them to embrace all nature as God's, as the work of "an immanent God, which is the God of Evolution, is infinitely grander than the occasional wonder-worker, who is the God of an old theology.
Reply to Wayfarer Placebos work roughly a third(?) of the time and never treat (or cure!) underlying ailments just the symptoms. And they definitely count as evidence for a physicalist interpretation, or model, of the human brain-CNS (which is a survival - environmental perception-behaviour coordination - engine and only tangentally (if ever) a "truth engine") in my book. :wink:
Placebos work roughly a third(?) of the time and never treat underlying ailments just the symptoms.
They don't always work, but they lead to genuine cures, and they work sometimes. They plainly undermine the physicalist model, and they're routinely described as 'not scientific' because no objective or measurable reason can be found for them to work at all. However
the placebo effect seems to be becoming stronger as time goes on. A 2015 study published in the journal Pain analyzed 84 clinical trials of pain medication conducted between 1990 and 2013 and found that in some cases the efficacy of placebo had grown sharply, narrowing the gap with the drugs’ effect from 27 percent on average to just 9 percent.
So simply asserting that they 'count as evidence for physicalism' does not constitute an argument.
I see merit in all the perspectives offered in this thread. I don't know if it helps to make this observation but it is interesting to me how trying to say that religion is one sort of thing is bound up with separating it from what it is not. I am drawn to the language of Zhuangzi as a way to approach the problem of referring to experiences while trying to have them. The way that mysticism and reason are engaged with each other as countervailing forces requires a lot of assumptions before the scrum can commence.
It is difficult to approach the matter from that direction.
But the OP asked for more than muttering into my beard. So, I will assert that the intersection of the cultural and personal frames of experience, the distance between past expressions and the needs of the present moment, involve a desire to embrace a disproportion between explanation and action. The flickering messages of what must be done and the call to make your own way are not the consequences of this or that set of beliefs but reflects the problem of our existence.
So simply asserting that they 'count as evidence for physicalism' does not constitute an argument.
"... count as evidence ... in my book" I wrote: not an "argument" at all, merely an as far as I know aside. My use of 'placebo' is analogical not literal or scientific, which works fine - gets my point across - in the prevailing context of this thread. Let's agree to disagree on this point here and now, Wayf; maybe fodder for a later discussion / debate on some other thread. :victory:
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 22, 2019 at 03:02#3442150 likes
Reply to Pfhorrest I concede that since this discussion is about religions in general and not only about catholicism, then we may include "blind faith" as part of "faith". So "faith" could be defined in this context as: the beliefs regarding claims about the gods and related topics, which are not known with certainty to be true.
The thing that distinguishes faithful belief from other belief is its independence of good reasons. Thomists may claim that you should strive also to have good reasons in addition to your faith, but that is just saying not to go on faith alone, as faith alone (without reason) is blind. Faith per se is thus exactly what they would call “blind faith”, and it is only in fortifying a belief with something besides faith that it becomes not blind.
But if faith is always blind faith, and you should not go on faith alone and should also use reason, then why use faith at all and not just always use reason instead? The Thomists are not that bad at logic.
For Atheists, "god" refers to an empty set. But for Theists, "God" refers to a meaningful, but abstract concept, with associated feelings. For example, "United States" is not a concrete thing, but an abstraction that invokes positive feelings for some, and negative feelings for others.
Hi. Perhaps you are oversimplifying atheism here. I'm an 'atheist,' but I also think God is a concept of central importance. I'd say that an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept. A theist might instead separate their concept of God from God itself.
But I cannot give a concrete description, or claim that "G*D" is real and empirical. Instead, my "G*D" is a gap-filler in the same sense that scientists use "Dark Matter" and "Multiverse".
Fair enough, but this looks like a philosopher's 'God.' It's a piece of sculpture. It scratches an itch that most people don't have.
In the philosophical context, it ignores some of the modern ideas about just how entangled we are in the world --so entangled that most of our knowledge cannot be made explicit. And the knowledge that can be made explicit has a dark foundation. Whatever castles we build (however sharp their towers) rise from the mist.
'I think therefore I am.' But what is it to even be able to say this? What is it to know a language?
Deleted UserOctober 22, 2019 at 03:50#3442230 likes
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So "faith" could be defined in this context as: the beliefs regarding claims about the gods and related topics, which are not known with certainty to be true. [...] I have removed the term "religion" from the above definition of "faith" to avoid any circularity.
I have two objections still to this revision. One is that by restricting to topic to being about "gods and related topics", it possibly excludes things that we probably want to count as religions, like Buddhism, that are not necessarily theistic, but still rely on faith in the sense that I mean, and so should still count if we are to use the "religions are belief systems that appeal to faith" definition. The second is that I think most people both religious and irreligious would say that their beliefs about such things (and most philosophers and scientists would say, most belief about most facts about the world) are not known with certainty to be true; science doesn't prove things with certainty, only math does that. So this definition turns out to be equivalent to "any beliefs about gods and related topics", which is a pretty common first-pass definition of what "religion" is, but has the problem outlined in point one at the start of this paragraph.
I should note that the definition of "faith" I'm using here is not "believing something without being absolutely certain in it", but rather "putting forth an empty 'because' as a reason to believe something". On a critical rationalist epistemology (like mine), everything is believed for insufficient reason, because there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. So everyone is epistemically free to believe whatever they want, until someone can show that what they believe is false; and conversely, everyone is free to disagree with what you believe, until you can show that disagreement with you is categorically false. Holding such tentative beliefs is not "faith" in the sense I mean it. Rather, appealing to faith is telling someone else that what you believe is right and disagreeing with it is wrong just because (because your gut tells you so, or everyone knows it, or this infallible book or person says so). It's making an epistemic move that calls for a reason to back it up, without any reason to back it up.
But if faith is always blind faith, and you should not go on faith alone and should also use reason, then why use faith at all and not just always use reason instead? The Thomists are not that bad at logic.
I'm not an expert on medieval philosophy (it's my weakest area actually) but I think the Thomist view is that faith (even blind faith), as the vehicle of revelation, is a valid source of knowledge to tell you what is true, and that is strictly speaking sufficient for purposes of salvation and such, but reason is there to deepen your understanding of why it is true, and in doing so grow closer to God and greater in spirit.
Reply to I like sushi Well, I thought the post makes an important point. Then you say ‘I will give you feedback if you can explain the point’. Which must mean I made the point very poorly, so there’s probably no use saying it again.
the intersection of the cultural and personal frames of experience, the distance between past expressions and the needs of the present moment, involve a desire to embrace a disproportion between explanation and action.
Do you mean, a non-fit, an impasse? If it is a non-fit, then explanation creates a story which claims to represent the action as true. If it is an impasse, then one knows that there is no explanation other than physics.
A non-fit is the creation of religion as ideology to control masses of people. An impasse is addressed by those who reject religion: action signifies, not metaphysics: what's your next action? (Although that never stopped philosophers from writing tome upon tome...)
I should note that the definition of "faith" I'm using here is not "believing something without being absolutely certain in it", but rather "putting forth an empty 'because' as a reason to believe something". On a critical rationalist epistemology (like mine), everything is believed for insufficient reason, because there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. So everyone is epistemically free to believe whatever they want, until someone can show that what they believe is false; and conversely, everyone is free to disagree with what you believe, until you can show that disagreement with you is categorically false. Holding such tentative beliefs is not "faith" in the sense I mean it. Rather, appealing to faith is telling someone else that what you believe is right and disagreeing with it is wrong just because (because your gut tells you so, or everyone knows it, or this infallible book or person says so). It's making an epistemic move that calls for a reason to back it up, without any reason to back it up.
Quoting myself to add an addendum: another way of describing this sense of "faith" as I mean it is believing something in a way that holds it as beyond question (precisely because it is "supported" by such an empty "reason" that nothing could possibly counter that "reason"). Faithful belief is the opposite of critical belief; unquestioning, infalliblist belief versus questioning, falliblist belief.
Which reminds me of a pithy definition of religion I came up with a long time ago, framing religion as belief based on such faith and also as belief in transcendental things that (being beyond all possibility of evidence for or against them) can only be believed on such faith:
"Religion: unquestionable answers to unanswerable questions".
Edit to add further: note that this isn't to say that there cannot be rational discussion about traditionally "religious" topics like God. Depending on what who means by "God", that might be something about which one could have non-religious (non-faith-based, rational) beliefs. Natural theology does not strictly count as religion on my account, as it tries not to appeal to faith.
I like sushiOctober 22, 2019 at 07:45#3442480 likes
Reply to Wayfarer It does make a point. I was just unsure what was ‘novel’ about it? Who’s to say the point I take away is the point you intended to make.
Don’t beat around bush, please.
It says there is a disjoint between the original framing of the term ‘soul’ and perceptions of old ideas. We know ‘psyche’ is ‘soul’ and that psychology followed by neuroscience flows that idea into the current situation.
I’m not inclined to jump on the homunculus type interpretation, or anything resembling it. I’m much more in favour of the manner in which Damasio leans toward the so-called ‘hard problem’.
Husserl is a tricky one to bring into the mix, as is Kant, because they were not really overly concerned with the ‘existing’ world directly. Kant explored limitations of knowledge in COPR and Husserl tried to construct a new ‘scientific’ discipline that had not direct concern (although it certainly had meaningful concern) for ‘objects’ other than as eidetic (immediate) phenomenon. The may conceptusl difficulty with his ideas being the application of ‘bracketing’ imo. It does all sound quite esoteric (but I believe him when he said he was attempting to bolster the natural scientific and logical grounding of human investigation rather than pull the rug out from under it - something others did under the guise of a firm of ‘phenomenology’ he dismissed.
I should note that the definition of "faith" I'm using here is not "believing something without being absolutely certain in it", but rather "putting forth an empty 'because' as a reason to believe something" ... Rather, appealing to faith is telling someone else that what you believe is right and disagreeing with it is wrong just because (because your gut tells you so, or everyone knows it, or this infallible book or person says so). It's making an epistemic move that calls for a reason to back it up, without any reason to back it up.
:up:
[quote=Pfhorrest]On a critical rationalist epistemology (like mine), everything is believed for insufficient reason, because there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. So everyone is epistemically free to believe whatever they want, until someone can show that what they believe is false; and conversely, everyone is free to disagree with what you believe, until you can show that disagreement with you is categorically false. Holding such tentative beliefs is not "faith" in the sense I mean it. [/quote]
Reply to Wayfarer
Substantive post worthy of a separate thread so it doesn't get lost in this tangle.
Will save it for a later chew over.
Currently taking time out for a quiet re-read of Marcus and life :smile:
Kant explored limitations of knowledge in COPR and Husserl tried to construct a new ‘scientific’ discipline that had not direct concern (although it certainly had meaningful concern) for ‘objects’ other than as eidetic (immediate) phenomenon
Thank you for your perceptive comments. I have still much more study to do in this area and will make a determined effort to do so in the next little while.
should note that the definition of "faith" I'm using here is not "believing something without being absolutely certain in it", but rather "putting forth an empty 'because' as a reason to believe something".
But, why believe anything at all? I think it's quite impossible not to believe anything, but I also think that Christian dogmatism has engendered a 'current of unbelief', so to speak.
But you can't say that the Christian religion has an 'empty "because"'. The very thing that the Christian faith provides, is reason, in the grandest possible sense - a reason for being, a reason for striving towards understanding, and a reason for believing. And conversely, one of the casualties of Enlightenment rationalism, is reason herself - not in the scientific sense of 'instrumental reason', but the sense that we have no reason to exist, that we're the accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms, to quote Russell. Enlightenment rationalism actually brackets out 'reason' in that larger sense, in favour of 'verifiability'.
I think the Thomist view is that faith (even blind faith), as the vehicle of revelation, is a valid source of knowledge to tell you what is true
I think that's pretty right, but it's not so much a matter of 'telling' as of 'demonstrating'. Actually in all religious epistemologies, the question of warrant for belief is, or ought to be, of central importance. Obviously in any revealed religion, there is an acceptance that something has been revealed which would not otherwise be known; but again Enlightenment rationalism starts by saying, well let's sweep all the traditional accounts off the table, and start again with what can be demonstrated in the laboratory, that anyone can see and agree to. Then the 'burden of proof' is put on the believer, having first removed [s]all[/s] much of what he or she would have considered evidence for their belief in the first place.
Deleted UserOctober 22, 2019 at 16:10#3443280 likes
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Deleted UserOctober 22, 2019 at 16:37#3443360 likes
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Hi. Perhaps you are oversimplifying atheism here. I'm an 'atheist,' but I also think God is a concept of central importance. I'd say that an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept. A theist might instead separate their concept of God from God itself.
It was a simple dichotomy, for purposes of illustration, not argumentation. However, to complicate the issue further, let's say that, "an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept", while a Theist thinks of God as the 'referent' of the concept. So the question boils down to whether there is Content for the Concept.
In my view, there is no concrete humanoid person out there playing the role of God. No "teapot circling Mars". Instead, since the real material world ultimately consists of immaterial Information (e.g. mathematics), G*D is not just out-there in eternity-infinity, but in every particle of space-time. I have detailed arguments to support that assertion, but I can't claim that it is revealed Truth, merely my personal opinion. For all practical purposes, it makes me an A-Theist. But for philosophical purposes, it makes me a Deist.
Fair enough, but this looks like a philosopher's 'God.' It's a piece of sculpture. It scratches an itch that most people don't have.
This is indeed the abstract philosopher's God. But, as a hypothesis, it explains a lot about "entanglement" and the ubiquitous role of Information in the world. As a popular religion, it would be impractical, since it doesn't "scratch an itch" that most people of the world have always had : someone to give us unconditional love and to defend us from evil. Instead, it merely puts the ointment of theory on "itches" that philosophers have always had : ultimate "why" questions.
"Scientists and Philosophers are always on the lookout for significant patterns in Nature from which they can extract specific meanings. Those extracted pieces of meaning are then labeled generically as information. But how that “information” came to be encoded in the material of nature is not often questioned by scientists. That’s not considered to be a practical project, so it’s left to impractical amateur philosophers to speculate on the origins of information: e.g. which came first, the informer or the information---the sculptor or the sculpture?" http://enformationism.info/enformationism.info/page2%20Welcome.html
But, why believe anything at all? I think it's quite impossible not to believe anything
You just immediately answered your question. We cannot help but believe something or another. And a critical rationalist epistemology says sure, go ahead and believe whatever, at least until it's shown to be false, and then move on to whatever else seems the next best alternative. (This is in contrast to a justificationist, classical rationalist, epistemology, which says "don't believe anything until it is conclusively proven", which critical rationalists like me think would necessarily entail believing nothing at all ever, because nothing can be conclusively proven from the ground up).
The very thing that the Christian faith provides, is reason, in the grandest possible sense - a reason for being, a reason for striving towards understanding, and a reason for believing. And conversely, one of the casualties of Enlightenment rationalism, is reason herself - not in the scientific sense of 'instrumental reason', but the sense that we have no reason to exist, that we're the accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms, to quote Russell. Enlightenment rationalism actually brackets out 'reason' in that larger sense, in favour of 'verifiability'.
You seem to be using "reason" here in a sense meaning "purpose". I disagree that rationalism deprives life of purpose, but that's besides the point, because we're not talking about reason as in purpose, we're talking about reason as in evidence.
In other words, you're saying Christianity gives a cause or goal or aim toward which believing (and striving toward understanding, and being) serves as a means, but we're talking about what gives an explanation of why something is or isn't true.
I think that's pretty right, but it's not so much a matter of 'telling' as of 'demonstrating'. Actually in all religious epistemologies, the question of warrant for belief is, or ought to be, of central importance. Obviously in any revealed religion, there is an acceptance that something has been revealed which would not otherwise be known; but again Enlightenment rationalism starts by saying, well let's sweep all the traditional accounts off the table, and start again with what can be demonstrated in the laboratory, that anyone can see and agree to. Then the 'burden of proof' is put on the believer, having first removed all much of what he or she would have considered evidence for their belief in the first place.
When it comes to public knowledge, public claims asserted to other people as though everyone should agree with them, then the reasons (see above for disambiguation of that word) we give to those other people should be reasons available to them, which is why we appeal to what "anyone can see and agree to". Otherwise, we'd just be demanding that others take our word for it, on faith -- which is, I'm claiming, the defining characteristic of religion, and what distinguishes it from other forms of belief. But when it comes to people's private beliefs, they're free to hold them for whatever private reasons they want (not just politically free as in they shouldn't be punished, but epistemically free as in they're not committing an error of reason), so long as they don't contradict other reasons that are available to them -- which is precisely why the public claims of science have to appeal to things "anyone can see and agree to", otherwise it would be telling people who disagreed to disregard their private reasons for thinking as they do, without giving them any better reason to do that.
In my view, there is no concrete humanoid person out there playing the role of God. No "teapot circling Mars". Instead, since the real material world ultimately consists of immaterial Information (e.g. mathematics), G*D is not just out-there in eternity-infinity, but in every particle of space-time.
Right. That's how I've understood you. 'God' is something like the form or logic of matter. I don't object to this as superstitious. Maybe I find the choice of 'G*D' as a name for it sub-optimal. Maybe I think it doesn't really answer the question. (Is there a question?)
I've read quite a few of your posts, btw. I like seeing sincere meta-physicians around.
This is indeed the abstract philosopher's God. But, as a hypothesis, it explains a lot about "entanglement" and the ubiquitous role of Information in the world. As a popular religion, it would be impractical, since it doesn't "scratch an itch" that most people of the world have always had : someone to give us unconditional love and to defend us from evil. Instead, it merely puts the ointment of theory on "itches" that philosophers have always had : ultimate "why" questions.
Exactly. So we agree. We naturally secrete theory to make sense of things, so I really can't complain. Personally I think that theorizing leads us to an aporia or blank spot. The ground 'must' remain obscure. The metalanguage cannot be formalized. At the same time, we still have our grand theories. As I see it, they give us better mousetraps, spiritual-social comfort, and/or some blend of these things.
When people complain of 'woo,' I think it's a distaste for spiritual-social comfort being associated with better-mousetrap thinking. To me it's more complicated than that. While I am somewhat allergic to 'woo,' I'm also less than dazzled by the religion of prediction and control. 'Fitter, happier, more productive.' To what end? A life without 'magical thinking'? But that image itself gleams as a goal with no rational justification.
Well instead, woody, consider God is the ur-Placebo.
— 180 Proof
As palliative, sure. But if in some cases a palliative happens to be curative too, then it's not just palliative, is it. A problem, yes?
No problem! And no oxymorons allowed either. A placebo that's "curative" is not a placebo, it's medicine. Anyway, how about fetish instead? God is the ur-Fetish ... works for me, how's it for you?
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 23, 2019 at 03:01#3445710 likes
Reply to Bitter Crank If we define "religion" merely as "a response to the holy", then I suppose it is indeed only man-made. But this would omit religious acts and rituals, which I believe is essential, for a man is religious insofar that he acts according to the religious doctrine.
While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans. Unlike the disbelief that 2+2=4, I don't think that this religious belief constitutes a small minority. E.g. take christianity and the eucharist. The belief is that Jesus Christ is God, and that the ritual of the eucharist was instructed directly by Jesus. "Take this bread and eat, for this is my body". Similar rituals instructed by the gods are found in the other western religions as well.
A placebo that's "curative" is not a placebo, it's medicine
Nonsense. If it contains only sugar, then it's not 'medicine', because the curative effects originate somewhere else altogether i.e. in the subject's mind. Really you ought to stop trying to use 'placebos' as an analogy or an argument if you don't understand the point of them, which is to plainly suggest 'mind over matter'. The fact that they work at all is inconvenient for materialism.
they definitely count as evidence for a physicalist interpretation, or model, of the human brain-CNS (which is a survival - environmental perception-behaviour coordination - engine and only tangentally (if ever) a "truth engine") in my book. :wink:
Must be a damn short book, and by it's own reckoning, containing no truth :-)
Reply to Wayfarer Pay attention, Wayf! For tim wood's sake I've already moved on from placebo analogy to fetish analogy. Surely a rattle shaker like you has got some glossolalia to say now about me co-opting 'fetishes' as a prop for my materialist critique of (your) woo ... :roll:
point of them, ... is to plainly suggest 'mind over matter'. The fact that they work at all is inconvenient for materialism.
So why don't placebos work on people with Alzheimer's Disease? Is the fact that Alzheimer's damages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (where learnt initiates of neurotransmitters like the pain-reducing endorphin are are mediated), just a coincidence?
What about the fact that Naloxene - an endorphin reduction agent - has been found to eliminate the pain reduction effect of placebos? That just coincidence too, or has Naloxene somehow made it's way over to the mysterious non-material realm where you were hoping placebo effects were coming from?
You seem to be using "reason" here in a sense meaning "purpose". I disagree that rationalism deprives life of purpose, but that's besides the point, because we're not talking about reason as in purpose, we're talking about reason as in evidence.
There's some equivocation associated with 'reason' here. First, the 'rationalism' you're referring to, is what I describe as scientific or Enlightenment rationalism, which has very specific characteristics mainly inherited from scientific method. 'Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations.... Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.' E R Dougherty
From within that perspective, 'reason' is absent in the larger sense of there being a 'reason for existence'. This is at least in part because modern science operates within the 'horizon of the observable' so to speak, rather than inference from the observable to any purported first or super-natural cause. The only kind of inference that is regarded as acceptable is that based on mathematical abstraction of empirical data (although even that is now coming under strain from speculative cosmology, 'string theory' and so on).
And the point is, the kind of reason that is said to be absent, is any reason for existence in the sense of an intentional creation. Furthermore intention on the individual level is assigned to the subjective domain thereby preserving the purportedly 'mind-independent' nature of the observed universe, although this has also come under pressure from the 'observer problem' in quantum physics.
In another sense, the whole notion of intent, and also of telos - a reason for existence in the Aristotelian sense - was rejected along with the scholastic philosophy with which it was associated, by the early moderns, coinciding with the adoption of the mechanist paradigm. And within that paradigm, 'reason' or 'causation' is generally only understood in terms of efficient and material causes (of which physical laws are said to be paradigmatic, hence, 'physicalism'.)
Looking again at Bertrand Russell's essay, A Free Man's Worship, he writes:
That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms... -all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.
Bolds added. But this point has itself been called into question by the 'fine-tuning' or 'naturalness' problem, which suggests that there are a small number of fundamental yet apparently unnatural constraints (unnatural in the sense of seeming to vary widely from what might naturally be expected) which no underlying or more fundamental theory can explain, and which, had they varied in the most minute of degrees, would not have culminated in a Universe characterised by complex matter. Regardless of arguments over the interpretation of this observation, it undermines Russell's notion of the primacy of the 'accidental collocation of atoms'; were there not an order, there could be no accidents. And as various scientists have felt obliged to admit, there seems a sense in which 'the universe knew we were coming' (as Freeman Dyson put it.) I don't to try and leap from there to a metaphysical conclusion, although I do contend that the way in which the 'multiverse conjecture' is used to defray the appeal of this argument strikes me as highly disingenuous.
It's also been called into question by the discoveries of quantum physics, philosophy of science, and phenomenology, all of which recognise the inextricable role of the observer in the formulation of scientific theories. Accordingly I feel that the kind of materialism of which Russell's essay is such an impassioned testament has had it's day.
When it comes to public knowledge, public claims asserted to other people as though everyone should agree with them, then the reasons (see above for disambiguation of that word) we give to those other people should be reasons available to them, which is why we appeal to what "anyone can see and agree to". Otherwise, we'd just be demanding that others take our word for it, on faith -- which is, I'm claiming, the defining characteristic of religion, and what distinguishes it from other forms of belief.
I generally agree, with the caveat that this attitude, while completely understandable in the framework of the secular state, cannot differentiate the subjective from the transcendent; in other words, what really is a private matter, and the kinds of truths that transcend individual conscience, but are still not strictly speaking simply objective. In other words, the kinds of truths which orientate the moral compass, which in some sense surpass objective judgement but which are ethically normative.
Don't know, but it's also not relevant to the point; it's the fact that they work at all which undermines the model of 'bottom-up' causality.
How? How would the chemical in the drug causing a release of endorphin be 'bottom-up' yet the learnt response from the venrtomedial pre frontal cortex to the visual stimuli of pill-taking causing a release of endorphin is somehow not? They seem like exactly the same type of causal relationship to me.
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A Christian PhilosophyOctober 24, 2019 at 03:02#3449340 likes
Ridding Anselm's notion of inconsistency is a work of ages...
I interpret your comment as saying that it is not a proper definition of god; is that right? Would you have a counterexample, in which the term "god" in the common language does not fit this definition? I would imagine that even for pantheistic religions, which belief is that all that exists is god, still fits under this definition.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 24, 2019 at 03:10#3449350 likes
in the meantime I can at least relax in my favourite armchair (or God, as I call it). The armchair than which no greater armchair can exist.
Supposing your armchair is indeed the perfect armchair, it still does not fit the definition of god I have given, because it is not perfect in every way. "4" is the perfect answer to the question "what is 2+2?". This does not make it god either.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 24, 2019 at 03:19#3449360 likes
Just because Tom Aquinas says it doesn't make it so. All of these arguments are easily deconstructed these days: probability and reason cannot prove the contents of faith.
Right back at you I'm afraid. Merely saying this doesn't make it so. There are many arguments that defend the objects of faith (I'm thinking particularly of the christian faith). The people doing so are called "apologetics", and they are still kicking to this day.
Reply to Samuel Lacrampe For exactly that reason (what makes something perfect depends on what it's supposed to be), there can't be such a thing as a general-purpose "perfect being". So if you want to define God in terms of perfection, it'd have to be something like a "perfect person": identify whatever it is that are the defining characteristics of a person, and say that a god is a being that has all of those characteristics perfected. That's where we get the usual "all knowledgeable, all good, all powerful" kind of definitions.
In a funny coincidence, while churning through my 300+ notes to myself I've accumulated over the past decade-plus on things to write about in my philosophy book, I stumbled upon this tonight, from eight and a half years ago when I was still leaning toward pantheism. Some of the phrasing is a little off from what I would use today, but it's still more or less the same idea I just wrote above:
an old note to myself:A god is a perfect person: a being with
-perfect accuracy of experience of everything (perfect sensation and appetites),
-perfect accuracy of reflection upon experience (perfect intuition and emotion),
-perfect effectiveness of reflection upon behavior (perfect belief and intention), and
-perfect effectiveness of behavior upon everything (perfect speech and action).
The whole of the universe necessarily has perfect accuracy of experience of itself and perfect effectiveness of behavior upon itself. No mere part of the universe can have these traits; and nothing beyond the universe can exist.
The question is, does the whole of the universe reflect upon itself; and are those reflections in turn accurate and effective? Is the universe a person? Some mere parts of it are, such as humans. Can the whole of the universe be a person, or can only mere parts of it? Such a universal person, a god, would have nothing to experience or act upon but itself; can such an isolated being be a person at all?
If mere parts of the universe can grow to encompass progressively more of the universe, can they ever grow to encompass the whole of the universe, to become the whole of the universe, and thus become God; or is that forever an unattainable goal? Can we mere parts even continue, indefinitely, to get arbitrarily close, or will we some day reach a limit beyond which we cannot progress?
There are many arguments that defend the objects of faith (I'm thinking particularly of the christian faith). The people doing so are called "apologetics", and they are still kicking to this day.
And they can kick it all day every day. To defend objects of faith is a perfectly respectable occupation. I repeat: Probability and reason can't prove the contents of faith.
Maybe I find the choice of 'G*D' as a name for it sub-optimal. Maybe I think it doesn't really answer the question. (Is there a question?)
As I began to develop my own personal Agnostic worldview, I tried to avoid any religious terminology. But eventually I realized that the Ultimate Source of ubiquitous Information is equivalent in most respects to the ancient concept of an abstract world-sustaining creator God (e.g. Brahman). When I used evasive terms in discussions, I had to provide long round-about definitions. So I gave-up and made-up a neologism that suggests a creator deity, but with a question mark. Since I have no direct evidence of this hypothetical Enformer, the asterisk in "G*D" means "to be determined". Pre-scientific thinkers were not idiots; they were just working with incomplete information about how the world works.
Interestingly, the modern understanding of Information/Energy is similar to the archaic notion of Spirit : invisible, intangible, causal agency. So I view Enformationism as a 21st century update of outdated philosophical theories of Materialism and Spiritualism. Information is the essence of both Matter and Mind. Unfortunately, few people have read my thesis, so they don't fully grasp what I mean by Enformation or by "G*D".
Yes, there are many questions that are answered by the G*D concept. But the new answers are not found in conventional Science or Religion. The Enformationism thesis asks those age-old queries, and proposes theoretical answers. But Atheists dismiss them as "gap fillers" or "empty set", because they have an outdated understanding of Physics and Metaphysics.
Do you mean, a non-fit, an impasse? If it is a non-fit, then explanation creates a story which claims to represent the action as true. If it is an impasse, then one knows that there is no explanation other than physics.
You present an either/or I never thought of. When putting the matter as broadly as I did, I figured the observation was not evidence for any state of being but a possible point of departure as a beginning of the kind the OP asked for.
I think the Taoist perspective says it is a non-fit and an impasse at the same time. It is a non-fit in so far as the referent can never be captured in any explanation and it is an impasse in regards to what change we can directly bring about. The two perspectives come from accepting our limited degrees of freedom. It is presented as a discovery of a situation, not a project for what must be. But it also argues for what should not be.
Pfhorrest:Is the universe a person? Some mere parts of it are, such as humans. Can the whole of the universe be a person, or can only mere parts of it? Such a universal person, a god, would have nothing to experience or act upon but itself; can such an isolated being be a person at all?
I have asked those same questions about my hypothetical G*D. And my answer is No.
First, my G*D is not Theistic or Pantheistic, but PanEnDeistic. Defined as Eternal-Infinite, hence wholly transcendent (Ideality) and partly immanent (Reality). If G*D is ALL, Omni-existent, then any experiences or actions must be internal. Such a G*D is not a being, but BEING itself : the power to exist. And "person" is an anthropomorphic concept that could not apply to an abstract generality. Example, the United States is an abstract concept, a generalization, not a person. G*D can be personal, only in the sense that You are part of ALL.
As I began to develop my own personal Agnostic worldview, I tried to avoid any religious terminology. But eventually I realized that the Ultimate Source of ubiquitous Information is equivalent in most respects to the ancient concept of an abstract world-sustaining creator God (e.g. Brahman).
Indeed. Your theory (to the degree that I know it) reminds of other philosophers'.
So I view Enformationism as a 21st century update of outdated philosophical theories of Materialism and Spiritualism. Information is the essence of both Matter and Mind. Unfortunately, few people have read my thesis, so they don't fully grasp what I mean by Enformation or by "G*D".
I understand the desire to transcend that dichotomy. In some ways it reminds me of German philosophers who wanted to bring God down to this world. The species is Christ, and history is the unfolding/incarnation of God. That's the gist as I understand it.
[quote= Strauss]
if reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be niggardly towards all others † —to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—-in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realization of the idea? is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time.
This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power;‡ it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one, pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species.
[/quote]
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/strauss/conclusion.html
The vision blends Christianity with technological progress. It's optimistic. It doesn't address the mortality of the species (God himself is mortal). Humanism is arguably the best thing we have. Is it good enough? Smaller notions of the group allow for a human enemy, and we tend to love our human enemies as the glue that binds us to our friends. We need an alien attack. If we win, we might be in the mood for the New New Jerusalem.
Unfortunately, few people have read my thesis, so they don't fully grasp what I mean by Enformation or by "G*D".
Well you have lots of competition. While generating a new vocabulary has its advantages, you thereby lose out on the ability to connect your work to other philosophers. And then philosophers just love being skeptical. Personally I respect the creativity. I've written philosophy too, even a kind of system, when I trusted more in the possibility of a system. These days I think that 'my' thoughts have all tended to be out there already. I only tie fragments together and try to choose words appropriate to the moment. Despite having this view now, I think it's crucial that I strove and strive to break new ground.
But the new answers are not found in conventional Science or Religion. The Enformationism thesis asks those age-old queries, and proposes theoretical answers. But Atheists dismiss them as "gap fillers" or "empty set", because they have an outdated understanding of Physics and Metaphysics.
Some atheists are quite exposed to philosopher's gods and even like or embrace them. 'Atheist' is just too vague to express much more than a critical attitude. As far as 'gap filler' goes, I think even you spoke of God as an axiom or place in a structure.
Interestingly, the modern understanding of Information/Energy is similar to the archaic notion of Spirit : invisible, intangible, causal agency.
Have you looked into Douglas_Hofstadter? He writes some fascinating stuff about causality and the nature of cognition.
[quote=Wiki]
Hofstadter's thesis about consciousness, first expressed in Gödel, Escher, Bach (GEB) but also present in several of his later books, is that it is an emergent consequence of seething lower-level activity in the brain. In GEB he draws an analogy between the social organization of a colony of ants and the mind seen as a coherent "colony" of neurons. In particular, Hofstadter claims that our sense of having (or being) an "I" comes from the abstract pattern he terms a "strange loop", which is an abstract cousin of such concrete phenomena as audio and video feedback, and which Hofstadter has defined as "a level-crossing feedback loop". The prototypical example of this abstract notion is the self-referential structure at the core of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Hofstadter's 2007 book I Am a Strange Loop carries his vision of consciousness considerably further, including the idea that each human "I" is distributed over numerous brains, rather than being limited to precisely one brain.
[/quote]
christian2017October 25, 2019 at 02:38#3451430 likes
i would argue religion is just a set of beliefs in reference to a super natural concept (typically that super natural notion is the notion of a god or gods).
The Bible actually doesn't say all religion is bad. In the Bible there is good religion and bad religion. (letter of James or epistle of James)
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 25, 2019 at 03:15#3451500 likes
"religions are belief systems that appeal to faith" definition
The problem with this definition is that it is too broad. It sounds like believing in bigfoot, or believing that this football team will win tomorrow's game, are religions. On the other hand, adding "the gods and related topics" (along with behaviour) fixes that, and should be able to include Buddhism if the "related topics" include the after-life, ultimate reality, and such things.
there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things.
Don't these two claims contradict? To disbelieve in p is to believe in not-p. E.g. "I have good reasons to disbelieve in an atheistic world; this must mean that I believe in a god."
faith (even blind faith), as the vehicle of revelation, is a valid source of knowledge to tell you what is true, and that is strictly speaking sufficient for purposes of salvation and such, but reason is there to deepen your understanding of why it is true
I think your are attempting to say that reason can support faith; and even though I agree with this under my definition of faith, this cannot work under your definition: If faith is belief devoid of reason, and reason serves to explain the belief, then faith and reason are in contradiction, for a belief cannot be both without reason and with reason at the same time.
The problem with this definition is that it is too broad. It sounds like believing in bigfoot, or believing that this football team will win tomorrow's game, are religions
Only if by "faith" you mean "believing something not conclusively proven", which I don't. I tried to explain this before, but maybe I can use a conversation about sportball to explain it better.
Alice believes the Stars will win tomorrow's sportball game, even though she doesn't have any good reason to believe that. Bob believes the Stripes will win that game instead, even though he doesn't have any good reason to believe that. Alice and Bob both acknowledge that, lacking any evidence with which to convince the other, they must agree to disagree; each has their own expectations that they believe will happen, but no grounds on which to assert that those who disagree are wrong, so they don't assert that those who disagree are wrong, even though they go on believing as they do. So neither of their beliefs are "faith" in the sense that I mean.
Meanwhile in an alternate universe, Alice and Bob believe the same things about who will win tomorrow's game, but both insist that the other is wrong. Alice still doesn't have any reason to give Bob for why he needs to change his mind, she has the same (lack of) reasons for belief as the Alice in the first universe did, but her attitude toward those (lack of) reasons is different. She just knows it, in her gut, and also the Stars coach swore confidently on TV that his team was sure to win the game tomorrow, and besides the Stars are more popular than the Stripes anyway and that many fans can't all be wrong. That is faith in the sense that I mean. Bob meanwhile explains to Alice his reasons for thinking that the Stripes have better odds than the Stars, and will therefore win over them, pointing to their win/loss ratios and player characteristics and so on. Alice doesn't care; Bob is wrong, as far as she's concerned, because she just knows he is, even though she's got nothing to counter his argument with. That is faith in the sense that I mean.
Faith isn't incompletely justified belief. All belief is incompletely justified.
Faith is uncritical, unquestionable belief. Not all belief is uncritical.
On the other hand, adding "the gods and related topics" (along with behaviour) fixes that, and should be able to include Buddhism if the "related topics" include the after-life, ultimate reality, and such things.
"Ultimate reality" is a topic that non-religious studies like physics and (irreligious) philosophy also investigate.
It sounds like what you really want that category to be is "supernatural things", which would actually work for me, but only because I hold that all belief in the supernatural is necessarily held on faith, since by definition opinions about supernatural things cannot be supported by evidence, for if there was evidence, the supernatural would have an observable effect on the natural world, and would therefore be natural.
Don't these two claims contradict? To disbelieve in p is to believe in not-p. E.g. "I have good reasons to disbelieve in an atheistic world; this must mean that I believe in a god."
Well technically, disbelieving P and believing not-P are not equivalent; if we write it in functional notation that becomes clear, the opposite of believe(P) is not-believe(P), which is not necessarily equivalent to believe(not-P), although the latter would certainly entail the former, but only in that direction. But that's a minor aside to the main point.
When we start out, with no knowledge, all possibilities are live, any possible world might be the actual world so far as we know. We cannot pick out one of those infinite possibilities and conclusively show that that is definitely the actual world. All we can do is show that whichever possibility is actual, it mustn't contradict this or that bit of evidence, ruling out swathes of possible worlds, leaving a narrower selection of those that might be actual. But there's always still a selection, always still multiple live possibilities. The more evidence we accumulate, the more we can narrow in, but we're always just whittling away possibilities, never positively supporting any particular one of them.
Believing the unbelievable (all-too-often, even) in order to defend of the indefensible.
In the millennial wake of religious wars, pogroms, inquisitions, martyrdoms, marital rapes, misogyny, homophobia, chattel slavery, self-abasing vicarious guilt, bigotry & scapegoating, the above sounds to me very much like an apt definition of Faith. As a learned wit once said "... For good people to do evil things, that takes religion." :victory:
The way that mysticism and reason are engaged with each other as countervailing forces requires a lot of assumptions before the scrum can commence.
It is difficult to approach the matter from that direction.
....I will assert that the intersection of the cultural and personal frames of experience, the distance between past expressions and the needs of the present moment,involve a desire to embrace a disproportion between explanation and action. The flickering messages of what must be done and the call to make your own way are not the consequences of this or that set of beliefs but reflects the problem of our existence.
What I understood you to be saying is that there's always a "countervailing," a "disproportion" between issues of faith or mysticism and those of reason. What I meant to convey in my response to what you wrote is that institutionalized religion, in my sweepingly generalized view, does everything in its power to make people not question their existence. This is the boulder of ideology that oppresses so many minds so easily. This kind of ideology relieves the individual of any requirement to think and question; the goal is obedience.
To confront the impasse, as I meant it, is to acknowledge the aporia: the problem of existence does not have an answer = the disproportion between explanation and action.
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 25, 2019 at 11:05#3452550 likes
While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans.
This is the problem with such exclusive definitions. It is quite possible, and probable, that acts which fulfill the requirements for "religious acts" were being carried out before animals evolved so as to fulfil the requirements of being human.
This tactic of exclusion is common with philosophers who argue to prove a position rather than to learn the truth. We find it in definitions of things like "language", "meaning", and "intention". It is argued that these things are exclusive to human beings ("created BY humans") when evidence from the science of biology clearly demonstrates otherwise. Evidently it is profoundly wrong to assert that these things were "created By humans".
But I do not think it is correct to say that they were "created FOR humans" either. That appears to be some form of inverted anthropomorphism, or a misinterpretation of the purpose, or final cause which is apprehended as being the reason for existence of these things. To say that some prior creatures, or even God, did such and such acts "FOR" the sake of human beings, rather than for the sake of something else, with a lack of understanding of the intention behind those acts, therefore without sufficient proof, is to make an unjustified conclusion.
Deleted UserOctober 25, 2019 at 15:30#3453510 likes
For good people to do evil things, that takes religion.
Or money. Or good intentions...road to hell is paved and all that. Or someone lying to them. Or being in a hurry. or thinking you know better than other people. Cluelessness. Cultural biases. Following authorities.
Reply to uncanni
Thank you for the clarification. The aporia is what I was focused upon.
I will need to mull over the role or momentum of institutions as an agent opposing the observation of the impasse. It seems that both sides are preserved in the traditions and language of the established religions.
Believing the unbelievable (all-too-often, even) in order to defend of the indefensible.
In the millennial wake of religious wars, pogroms, inquisitions, martyrdoms, marital rapes, misogyny, homophobia, chattel slavery, self-abasing vicarious guilt, bigotry & scapegoating, the above sounds to me very much like an apt definition of Faith. As a learned wit once said "... For good people to do evil things, that takes religion." :victory:
I agree with all of this, but why wouldn't this include secular politics? Like some of the stuff that happened under Stalin? This isn't a defense of theism by any means. It's more an extension of atheism. Gods and angels are the superstitions of less critical, less conceptual times. Our superstitions are 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality' ,' rationality', 'science.' I don't mean that these concepts are bogus, but I do mean that these high words get tangled up in low deeds. In other words, magical thinking is just as happy with secular abstractions.
Oh and (at others, not you jellyfish) I get the impression that this thread isn't supposed to be for arguing for or against faith, religion, god, or theology, but just for trying to come up with definitions of all of those things that satisfy all parties. It seems like some people are trying to argue for or (mostly) against some of them here. I'm definitely against all of them, but I'm not trying to argue against them here, just to give my understanding of what they are. Refined a bit from the conversation since I last stated it, that understanding its:
Faith is uncritical belief.
(I think that's a bad thing).
Religion is a system of belief appealing to faith.
(Belief about anything, not necessarily about God).
God a perfect person, the best that is possible in all the ways a person should be.
(I don't think that exists).
Theology is the study of God.
(Any kind of study, not necessarily religious).
Thanks for the link. This part caught me.
[quote=link]
The archetypical examples of such appeals to faith are essentially appeals to authority. Some trusted religious figure or holy book says that something is true, and that assertion is taken as not needing any support: the assertion itself is taken as self-sufficient.
[/quote]
http://geekofalltrades.org/codex/fideism.php
I get the impression that this thread isn't supposed to be for arguing for or against faith, religion, god, or theology, but just for trying to come up with definitions of all of those things that satisfy all parties.
Fair enough. I guess I've just tried to emphasize that intellectual types tend to focus on articulated beliefs when it comes to religion, as if religion was a competing philosophy. I see philosophy instead as a competing religion. I'm oversimplifying, but philosophy is roughly humanism. Questioning is sacred.
So I'm against fideism too, because I'm invested in some image of the sacred, autonomous mind.
[quote=Emerson]
Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.
[/quote]
On the other hand, this to me is some kind of faith. How do I know that I'm not crazy?
[quote=link]
By rejecting appeals to authority, just like with appeals to popularity, and raw appeals to your own faith, I am only saying to hold all such opinions merely tentatively, remaining open to question and doubt.
[/quote]
I'm down with this principle....but, in the spirit of this principle, why are we attached to detachment? In what are we invested that urges us not to be fools? I agree that expecting others to believe on authority is bad. Bad how? I think free minds want a symmetric relationship with other free minds. They want to see their own freedom/infinity reflected and recognized.
[quote=jellyfish]I agree with all of this, but why wouldn't this include secular politics? Like some of the stuff that happened under Stalin?[/quote]
Of course not. 'One-party state' politics, such as Stalinism (Maoism Nazism Fascism, etc), are the very manifestations of sectarianism which is antithetical to secular politics, or secularism (i.e. democratic plurality ... e.g. vide Dewey, Arendt).
[quote=jellyfish]Our superstitions are 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality' ,' rationality', 'science.' I don't mean that these concepts are bogus, but I do mean that these high words get tangled up in low deeds. In other words, magical thinking is just as happy with secular abstractions.[/quote]
This muddle amounts to a false equivalences - religious vs secular "superstitions" - the usual superstitions of a facile ahistorism. Yeah, "high words get tangled up in low deeds", but that in no way demonstrates the latter is caused by the former. Nearly a century of misreading - misappropriating - Nietzsche's coinages imagery & tropes by e.g. salon existentialists, nazis / crypto-fascists, luddite/hippie heideggerians, poseur punkers/anarchists, p0m0 anti-oedipal lacanian feminists/queer theorists, et al reminds us (me) that great ideas aren't responsible for the lunatics & criminals who often misuse them (i.e. great books aren't responsible for what their willful misreaders do to/with them). One could, likewise, also defend church dogmas & biblical preachments this way against the atrocities of "true believers"; but it's the everyday micro-atrocities of "common faith" for which there are no apologia (except, maybe, some ad hoc theodicy) to redeem the "concepts ... high words" of credo, canon & liturgy. That said --
When reading the following keep in mind the current Stalinist regime in North Korea where, according to their "constitution", a "holy trinity" (of Great Leader (d. 1994), Dear Leader (d. 2011) & Supreme Leader) rules:
"A totalitarian state is in effect a theocracy, and its ruling caste, in order to keep its position, has to be thought of as infallible. But since, in practice, no one is infallible, it is frequently necessary to rearrange past events in order to show that this or that mistake was not made, or that this or that imaginary triumph actually happened." ~George Orwell
Furthermore, the myth of atheist totalitarianism (in the 20th century) has also had its taste Hitchslapped from many, if not by now most, snouts: Gott mit uns (video) ... and other officially self-proclaimed and church-sanctioned sigils of "destiny" (e.g. "The End of History", "das Tausendjähriges Reich", etc)
why are we attached to detachment? In what are we invested that urges us not to be fools? I agree that expecting others to believe on authority is bad. Bad how? I think free minds want a symmetric relationship with other free minds. They want to see their own freedom/infinity reflected and recognized.
Lovely. The quintessence of Bakhtin's dialogism: interlocutors understand their own ideas from different perspectives by listening to how the other uses their own words/concepts. This should lead to expansion, clarification and deeper understanding of said ideas. Free minds never try to repress or distort an other's ideas.
This reminds me of the very beginning of the Cuban revolution. There was a burst of cultural creativity and expression that was quite avant garde and included homosexual art. This was very quickly shut down by the Soviet Union's pressure on Castro, who then came up with the very Orwellian phrase, "Within the revolution: everything; outside of the revolution: nothing." And complete censorship clamped down on any but the most socialist realist artistic expression. Ultra-orthodox.
Lovely. The quintessence of Bakhtin's dialogism: interlocutors understand their own ideas from different perspectives by listening to how the other uses their own words/concepts. This should lead to expansion, clarification and deeper understanding of said ideas. Free minds never try to repress or distort an other's ideas.
who then came up with the very Orwellian phrase, "Within the revolution: everything; outside of the revolution: nothing." And complete censorship clamped down on any but the most socialist realist artistic expression. Ultra-orthodox.
Ah, I didn't know about that. But the Orwellian paint-job is familiar and believable. Domination usually has a flowery excuse. I'm quite fascinated by ins and outs of such justifications.
I think we are (all too often) bound ourselves by our desire to bind others.
I think we are (all too often) bound ourselves by our desire to bind others.
Now that is a profound statement, with multiple resonances or over-determinations:
* to force others into some kind of rigid structure;
* to reduce all meaning to a supreme Monologic meaning (one correct interpretation);
* sadism
It's when we realize that the dialogue is open and infinite--that that is the nature of the philosophical dialogue--that we can settle in and let our ideas develop and our understanding deepen. In striving to have a rational understanding of our interlocutor, I think that we deepen our experience with the world at large. Even us cyber-dialogists.
Let me just take one thing back: We never settle in: I believe above all that "Learning not increased, is learning decreased."---Hillel
Now that is a profound statement, with multiple resonances or over-determinations:
* to force others into some kind of rigid structure;
* to reduce all meaning to a supreme Monologic meaning (one correct interpretation);
* sadism
I like your breakdown. The sadism/cruelty is what Nietzsche understood so well. To me sophistication is related to turning this sadism inward, against the self. My sense is that it can't just be abolished but only steered. Any life structuring narrative seems to impose at least an implicit hierarchy. Every crystallized notion of virtue casts a shadow.
'Monologic meaning' is a good description, I think. Our temptation is to find and impose this meaning. Spengler called it 'ethical socialism.' It's what we Faustians take for granted: one true path and the duty of homogenizing the world in the name of this path. I like Feuerbach for demonstrating the birth of humanism from Christianity. Monologic has monotheistic roots, it seems. I can't be against it in a simple way, since my own pursuit of truth is the pursuit of single truth. To me the living option is irony of some sort.
It's when we realize that the dialogue is open and infinite--that that is the nature of the philosophical dialogue--that we can settle in and let our ideas develop and our understanding deepen. In striving to have a rational understanding of our interlocutor, I think that we deepen our experience with the world at large. Even us cyber-dialogists.
I totally agree. I think this realization can be painful. It's the death of the usual spiritual comforts. One has to set sail on a dark ocean of personality and even embrace a permanent identity crisis. One becomes everyone and no one. For me the journey has been strange. It's lonely and yet the opposite of lonely, humble but proud.
Somehow cyber-dialogue fits all of this. I don't want to be publicly tied to the wild thoughts we're exploring here. I don't want to force freaky-difficult-'infinite' consciousness on others. We strangers meet here to be wildly honest about the wonder and terrors of life. We create a wall of digital graffiti.
I don't think I was ever so honest in a paper written for school.
There are beliefs which it is unreasonable to doubt. That this is a sentence of English, for example. Such beliefs are foundational. Consider Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs.
Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him?
Being clearly sufficiently supported and being excluded from all attempts at questioning are different things. There are lots of things that was for all practical purposes sure enough, but agreeing with that and saying “nope, not going to consider any arguments against it” are different things.
There are beliefs which it is unreasonable to doubt. That this is a sentence of English, for example. Such beliefs are foundational. Consider Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs.
Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him?
:up: :cool: Reminds me of the good old PF days - praise be goober!
Being clearly sufficiently supported and being excluded from all attempts at questioning are different things.
Yep.
I'm thinking of the faith found in the trial of god. There is questioning, even rejection, and yet there is still faith. In that play the arguments against god are considered, and god found wanting. And yet the play ends in prayer.
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 27, 2019 at 01:56#3458740 likes
Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him?
How does this make any sense to you? It's like saying 'if what I tell you is true, then it is unreasonable for you not to believe me'. But of course your reasons for believing or not believing me are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether or not what I say is true. Likewise, our reasons for believing or not believing in god are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether there is or is not a god.
There are things that stand outside the tournament of justification, because they are needed in order for that tournament to take place. Isn't god just the sort of thing that would justify everything else?
But I suspect that will be anathema to you, old friend.
When I say all belief is incompletely justified, I’m referring to the problem of infinite regress, how you can keep asking for reasons to justify your reasons forever, until you give up on trying by either asserting a foundation on faith or writing everything off as unjustifiable. This shows the flaws of justification and motivates critical rationalism in its place: you don’t have to “completely” justify a belief as in answering that infinite regress, that’s impossible; instead believe whatever you want, but only tentatively, until it can be shown false, and then move on to a remaining option.
you don’t have to “completely” justify a belief as in answering that infinite regress, that’s impossible; instead believe whatever you want, but only tentatively, until it can be shown false, and then move on to a remaining option.
Considering what must be the case, in order for one to doubt in this way. There must, for instance, be beliefs, however tentative. And I suppose there must be some sort of language in which this doubting may take place. Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts.
I think this realization can be painful. It's the death of the usual spiritual comforts. One has to set sail on a dark ocean of personality and even embrace a permanent identity crisis. One becomes everyone and no one. For me the journey has been strange. It's lonely and yet the opposite of lonely, humble but proud.
It's painful and liberating, as you suggest. I am quite isolated where I live--there are absolutely no old leftie hippie intellectuals around these parts; I'm surrounded by devout, hypocritical christians. So I have indeed found in this forum a respite, a breather.
I really like your phrase, "permanent identity crisis": but this doesn't have to be a painful or uncomfortable constant: it can be seen simply as the evolution of oneself, one's philosophy.
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 27, 2019 at 12:17#3459500 likes
Omnipresence. IF there were a god, wouldn't His presence be utterly overwhelming? This seems to be what many of the devout describe.
What the heck is "presence"? By the time I say "now" it's in the past. I'm afraid the presence of anything is not overwhelming. It's actually very difficult to affirm what it means to be present.
There are things that stand outside the tournament of justification, because they are needed in order for that tournament to take place. Isn't god just the sort of thing that would justify everything else?
I believe this is contradictory. Such a thing would be unjustifiable. And an unjustifiable thing cannot itself justify anything. Placing god in this contradictory category only makes the reality of god impossible. It would be an atheist definition. If we want to understand how a theist sees, apprehends, understands, or defines "God" an atheist definition is not helpful because clearly these two apprehend the meaning of that term in completely different ways.
I didn't think you were an idealist Banno, but that is the affirmation of an ideal. The only thing beyond doubt would be something perfectly well known, and such perfection is proper only to an ideal.
Now, if there were a God, wouldn't it be that sort of thing?
This may be the case, but I know you well enough to know that you will deny that the "stuff that is beyond doubt" is 'ideal'. You will claim that this "stuff" is some sort of foundational belief such as "this is a sentence of English", which is not an 'ideal' at all because it actually can be doubted. I can for instance doubt that it is a "sentence" because the "t" in "this" is not capitalized. and if that is not supposed to be the sentence referred to, what does "this" refer to? In fact, your example is a complete misrepresentation of what an ideal is supposed to be.
Try looking at mathematics, where each symbol is supposed to directly represent an object (mathematical object) instead of meaning something. When the symbol directly represents an object instead of having meaning, (such as the numeral "3" represents the number 3), there can be no doubt as to what the symbol means. Therefore we have ideal representation. Ideal representation is what is required to put an expression beyond the reach of doubt. The problem though, is that the whole system may be cast into doubt, by doubting the existence of such ideal objects.
The vision blends Christianity with technological progress. It's optimistic. It doesn't address the mortality of the species (God himself is mortal). Humanism is arguably the best thing we have.
Apparently, I have given you the wrong impression of Enformationism. It is not an attempt "to bring God down to this world". And it is not a Christology in any sense. It is instead an attempt to understand the traditional disputed dichotomies of Science, Philosophy, and Religion. As expressed in the heading of my BothAnd Blog : "Philosophical musings on Quanta & Qualia; Materialism & Spiritualism; Science & Religion; Pragmatism & Idealism, etc."
However, in view of my thesis, it might seem that the only reasonable religion for humans would be some form of man-made Humanism. Yet, I can't imagine that it would ever appeal to enough people (non-philosophers) to have any effect on the masses. So, I compromise on Deism as my religious philosophy : although I have no direct experience or knowledge of G*D, I have concluded that the evolving world seems to be organized by a Mind, instead of by random collisions of atoms, or by an infinite regression of materialistic Multiverses. And, since modern science has discovered that both Energy and Matter are forms of metaphysical Information, it follows that everything in the world is a piece of that Cosmic Mind. By that, I don't mean Panpsychism, but PanEnDeism. :cool:
Yes. I was impressed, although at times mystified, by Hofstadter's books. I have quoted him in some of my essays on The Self. But I wouldn't mention that abstruse Strange Loop argument to non-scientists or non-philosophers, because it's so technical and abstract. :nerd:
.
Deleted UserOctober 27, 2019 at 23:03#3461770 likes
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
It's painful and liberating, as you suggest. I am quite isolated where I live--there are absolutely no old leftie hippie intellectuals around these parts; I'm surrounded by devout, hypocritical christians. So I have indeed found in this forum a respite, a breather.
Me too. And I know what you mean by hypocritical Christians. The leftist hippies are the true Christians, as I see it, as they continued with the implicit humanistic core of the Christian tradition.
I really like your phrase, "permanent identity crisis": but this doesn't have to be a painful or uncomfortable constant: it can be seen simply as the evolution of oneself, one's philosophy.
I totally agree. I have found my ecstasy in this crisis. I live largely for this crisis. I suppose I chose those words to emphasize that it's the way of death and despair, too. Philosophy has opened up for me both new highs and new lows.
Apparently, I have given you the wrong impression of Enformationism. It is not an attempt "to bring God down to this world". And it is not a Christology in any sense. It is instead an attempt to understand the traditional disputed dichotomies of Science, Philosophy, and Religion. As expressed in the heading of my BothAnd Blog : "Philosophical musings on Quanta & Qualia; Materialism & Spiritualism; Science & Religion; Pragmatism & Idealism, etc."
Thanks. I am now seeing it as a metaphysical system that wants to resolve traditional confusions and overcome apparent dichotomies. This too is in Hegel, along with a religion element that you aren't concerned with.
I'm more with philosophers like Wittgenstein and Heidegger on this theme. To me the situation is far more organic and subconscious and ultimately 'uncurable' by an explicit system. We can't dominate the metalanguage, which is ordinary language. All explicit systems are little boats on the dark ocean of being-in-the-world, being-with-others, being-in-language. Explicit systems can be good for organizing explicit knowledge, but I think most of our knowledge is tacit.
Yes. I was impressed, although at times mystified, by Hofstadter's books. I have quoted him in some of my essays on The Self. But I wouldn't mention that abstruse Strange Loop argument to non-scientists or non-philosophers, because it's so technical and abstract
His books are indeed complex. I do think I am a Strange Loop is beautifully unpretentious given its depth and complexity. It's hard to imagine how he could have written it better.
I agree that it's hard to discuss with those not into that kind of complexity. Philosophy can be a lonely path, especially in this junk-food social-media age, where everything is bite-sized click-bait. Even the people I'm close to don't have the same appetite for the conceptual journey. And it's only that appetite that leads to enough reading to make Hofstadter digestible rather than mystifying.
that institutionalized religion, in my sweepingly generalized view, does everything in its power to make people not question their existence. This is the boulder of ideology that oppresses so many minds so easily. This kind of ideology relieves the individual of any requirement to think and question; the goal is obedience.
To confront the impasse, as I meant it, is to acknowledge the aporia: the problem of existence does not have an answer = the disproportion between explanation and action.
I'm with you on confronting the aporia. But I also think this is a terrifying path ('condemned to be free') and that religion is also an opiate in demand: people want a master, a system. You nailed it with 'relieves the individual.' Of what? Of the permanent identity crisis that might otherwise drive them to despair and self-destruction.
As in Brave New World, the people are protected from their own depth and potential for madness. Heretics can be cast as enemies of the people, who would thrust them into a permanent revolution in the means of seduction (of self and others via flattering-comforting grand narratives.)
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 28, 2019 at 02:42#3462760 likes
Reply to Pfhorrest The problem with using any terms other than "being" after the term "perfect" is that any other term is "defined", that is, has boundaries, is limited. E.g. a perfect maggot is just that, a maggot; which is not commonly seen as a high being on the ontological scale. So unless you claim that a person is the highest species ontologically, then it automatically ranks our god definition lower than the highest level.
That said, since god as I have defined possesses all abilities that exist (or more), and since persons exist, then god must possess the ability of persons too. But as the perfect being, it is not limited to possessing the abilities of persons only.
I have found my ecstasy in this crisis. I live largely for this crisis. I suppose I chose those words to emphasize that it's the way of death and despair, too.
There's no way around crisis, death or despair for humans. The way I see it, we had best find the "healthiest" ways we can manage for dealing with them. I think a lot of people give up before they finish growing up, and I believe it takes a lifetime for humans to grow up. If we stop working on it, we're screwed; we've settled into mind-numbing stasis. Stasis and ecstasy derive from the same Greek word stasis--standing or stoppage. We will find the bits of ecstasy in moving forward.
I think a lot of people give up before they finish growing up, and I believe it takes a lifetime for humans to grow up. If we stop working on it, we're screwed ...
Pearls before swine. :clap: :cool:
Metaphysician UndercoverOctober 28, 2019 at 10:49#3463750 likes
And apparently you would doubt doubt. Where does that leave you?
It leaves me doubtful. Some people here at TPF claim it's impossible for me to doubt some of the things that I doubt, therefore my doubt of my doubt is warranted. Perhaps I'm misusing the word "doubt". This possibility warrants the doubt of doubt as well.
Do you think there's something wrong with claiming to doubt doubt? I think it's better than claiming to know that I know. There's an infinite regress implied here, and infinite regress is conducive of doubt. So there is nothing wrong with claiming to doubt doubt, while there is something wrong with claiming to know that I know.
That said, since god as I have defined possesses all abilities that exist (or more), and since persons exist, then god must possess the ability of persons too. But as the perfect being, it is not limited to possessing the abilities of persons only.
I agree. But, when god is labeled as "a perfect being", it's an Oxymoron. In our experience, no created or mortal beings are perfect. Because, given Life & Time, they have the potential for further development. That's why I try to avoid the confusion by labeling G*D as "BEING" : defined as the eternal-infinite power to exist. Since that includes all possibilities, it means that G*D has the potential for Personality. But only in the world of imperfect created beings is that opportunity actualized into reality. "Person" is a relative term, while "BEING" is an absolute concept.
There's no way around crisis, death or despair for humans. The way I see it, we had best find the "healthiest" ways we can manage for dealing with them.
I must see it that way too, because I try to be kind.
Now I do think 'healthy' pretty much has to be ambiguous here. If we avoid 'ideological' stasis, then (seems to me) we haven't settled exactly on what the good life is, on exactly how to be grown up and virtuous. Another uncomfortable issue in my mind is the connection of 'sin' or irrationality or immaturity with great art. Even moral progress seems to require that the 'sinner' (moral revolutionary) violate today's norms in order to install tomorrow's. In other words, domination these days is likely to be justified in terms of public health, public safety. There's also the problem of whether violence is ever justified. Is antifa dealing with things in a healthy way, even if it gets them or others killed? Or perhaps we'll take a 'do no harm' approach. Even this passivity can be accused.
I'm not trying to be buzzkill but only articulate the complexity of not-stasis as I see it. I guess I find an ecstasy in this complexity -- at the cost of having anything like a solution for existence.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 29, 2019 at 02:51#3466160 likes
Reply to uncanni Bro. If you think I misunderstood your claim the first time, then repeating it in the exact same way does not help my understanding. If you are merely saying that, since a proof by definition gives certainty, then an argument that gives probability or reasonableness is not a proof, then yes, I agree; but that is merely a tautology.
With that said, faith, the beliefs supported by the probable or the reasonable, is quite necessary. Very few beliefs are supported by absolute proofs.
I'm not trying to be buzzkill but only articulate the complexity of not-stasis as I see it. I guess I find an ecstasy in this complexity -- at the cost of having anything like a solution for existence.
I agree: I'm not seeking an easy resting place for my mind or my beliefs. Sometimes I think things would be a lot easier if I just knew that I was saved by Jesus, but then other times I think that everyone who has gotten "the good news" really knows, deep down inside, that it's bollocks. The restlessness of the negative dialectic keeps calling me...
I'm not seeking an easy resting place for my mind or my beliefs. Sometimes I think things would be a lot easier if I just knew that I was saved by Jesus, but then other times I think that everyone who has gotten "the good news" really knows, deep down inside, that it's bollocks. The restlessness of the negative dialectic keeps calling me...
Sometimes I think things would be a lot easier if I just knew that I was saved by Jesus, but then other times I think that everyone who has gotten "the good news" really knows, deep down inside, that it's bollocks. The restlessness of the negative dialectic keeps calling me...
Nice. Here's a passage that I think maybe you'll appreciate. To me it's about the glory of the negative what it tends toward.
[quote=Hegel]
The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity.[1]
[/quote]
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm
This to me describes the 'infinity' of the godless/divine wanderer.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 30, 2019 at 04:03#3468900 likes
I understand. But I persist to say that your definition of religion is therefore too broad, because sportball would be a religion for Alice and Bob in the second alternate universe; but this is not how people commonly use the term "religion", is it?
"Ultimate reality" is a topic that non-religious studies like physics and (irreligious) philosophy also investigate.
Actually the study of reality is metaphysics, not physics; and indeed it is not strictly religious. But that is why another essential component to "religion" is the act. The mere study of topics even about gods would be called theology, for which the theologian who does not act in accordance to the findings from the theology is technically not religious.
Well technically, disbelieving P and believing not-P are not equivalent; if we write it in functional notation that becomes clear, the opposite of believe(P) is not-believe(P), which is not necessarily equivalent to believe(not-P)
We need to make the distinction between the terms "disbelief" and "non-belief". A rock is in a state of non-belief, for it can neither believe nor disbelieve in anything. On the other hand, the proposition "disbelief in p" is the opposite to "belief in p". As opposites, they are also mutually exclusive.
I was saying that the Thomists think that. That wasn't my opinion, that was my report of their opinions.
I understand that you discuss the Thomists' view, which is not necessarily your own view. But my point was that Thomists, who are somewhat competent at logic, would not make the simple error to believe that reason supports faith when, under the definition of faith you have given, reason destroys faith.
Anyways, to close this part of discussion about what Thomists believe, here is an extract about Aquinas: "The theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas did not hold that faith is mere opinion: on the contrary, he held that it represents a mean (understood in the Platonic sense) between excessive reliance on science (i.e. demonstration) and excessive reliance on opinion." - Source.
This to me describes the 'infinity' of the godless/divine wanderer.
I wasn't attracted to Hegel and read very little of him. I believe that for various German writers, it's a travesty to translate them to English; Martin Buber's work is practically unreadable in English.
What does he mean, "absolute inwardness"? Why does he keep using the word absolute over (4 times)? It makes me suspicious."A pure and infinite self-identity": does "infinite" acknowledge the différance of that self-identity? "Absolute independence"? "Free unity with itself"? I don't get it.
I'm uncomfortable. I don't think I understand or know his discourse at all, like the way I do Bakhtin, Freud, Lyotard and a few others that I read repeatedly to understand really well. I'm outside of Hegel, and I know I'd have to study him intensely to get him.
What strikes me about the passage is that it seems to contradict what you've written about our need for the monologician in our midst so that we remember not to transform our own dialogic notions into any kind of self-righteous, authoritarian or repressive take on other views. The float like a butterfly sting like a bee struggle against or dance around stasis (or hypostasis as Adorno called it), and certainly against the concept of a stable self-identity. Just as my philosophy continues transforming, so do myselves. Freud's ego has been dehisced like a seed pod into infinite selves of which we may or may not be conscious. Of course, some of these selves are completely unconscious, and it would take serious psychoanalysis to abreact them. Myselves are kind of infinite like the cosmos...
I prefer aspects of Modernism to Romanticism.
A Christian PhilosophyOctober 31, 2019 at 03:02#3472260 likes
Reply to Gnomon Sounds good to me. It seems to only be a matter of definition of the term "being". Using the scholastic definition, being is "that which is not nothing". As such, if God is not nothing, then he is a being. It sounds like you use the term "being" the way I would use the term "creature", that is, "that which is created, or begins to exist".
And an unjustifiable thing cannot itself justify anything.
Why not?
I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase.
I like vanilla. There's no reopen that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what?
I like using this kind of example to illustrate the argument for critical rationalism.
When it comes to why to do (or intend) something, it's pretty much accepted that everyone is free to do what they want just because they want to do it, unless there is some good reason not to do it. Nobody insists that everybody stop doing anything at all until they can justify from the ground up why they should do something, because it's clearly impossible: maybe you want to buy a car so you can get to work so you can earn money so you can buy vanilla ice cream so that you can eat vanilla ice cream so that you can enjoy the taste of it, but at some point you get to something like that where your only justification is that it sounds good to you, you just want it, and "so you have no good reason to do it then" doesn't count as a reason not to do it, at least not to any reasonable person.
But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it.
But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it.
The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.
And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus.
Reply to Banno They can be in error, sure, which is why it's possible that someone could show you good reason not to believe it. But "you don't have good reason to believe it" is not, in itself, good reason not to believe it.
And unless you're a moral nihilist (in which case it's not worth arguing, just stop reading here), it's possible for the things you want to be "in error" too (for you to want the wrong things, things you shouldn't want), so good reasons can also be given to not want those things. But "you don't have a good reason to want that" is not, in itself, good reason not to want it.
I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase.
It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.
Notice that explaining something requires no judgement of success or failure, while justifying something requires success. You say something, you believe that what you have said explains something, and that is your explanation, regardless of whether anyone understands it, let alone believing or agreeing to it. To justify on the other hand requires agreement, that's where "the correctness of" comes into play.
But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it.
That's right, providing the reason for an act does not justify the act. One must provide a "good reason" for the act This is evident from the fact that providing a bad reason (unsound argument) cannot justify an act. That's why it's very difficult to justify acts, as well as beliefs, through reference to "feelings". This is contrary to the common belief that we justify by referring to sensations ("I saw it" for example), which just provides us with appearances and no real principles.
The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.
And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus.
Right, error is common place, and that's why this notion of "fit" is not a good principle to base such judgements on. One person's method of judging a "fit" is completely different from another person's method. What method does your auto-correct use? You might notice here at TPF that some people have very odd ways of choosing words. I find it very odd that you would be judging whether the world fits to the words rather than judging whether the words fit to the world. When making a "fit" something must conform to the shape of the other. We conform the words to fit to the world, not vise versa.
You clearly use a completely different method for judging the "fit of wold-to-word" from me. You judge that "justified" is a word which fits your vanilla purchase, when all you've said in your attempt to justify, that you buy vanilla because you like it. I see that you are trying to conform the word "justify" to fit your perception of 'the world', but I reject your proposed conformation as a misunderstanding of the world.
Even if one accepts this, "I like vanilla" is sufficient to justify my purchase.
If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.
And you seem to have misunderstood direction of fit.
it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world.
The problem, as I explained, is that justification requires success. And you've failed. Sorry.
If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.
Sure. That just doesn't negate my point. Flavours and numbers are different.
it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world.
Seems to me you haven't read Anscomb, nor Austin.
god must be atheistNovember 01, 2019 at 09:51#3476890 likes
As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world.
A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible. Hence, bible scholars.
I met a bible scholar who said, when reading the line from his version of the bible, "there will be no women", that it does not mean there will be no women. He said his interpretation was derived from reading other parts of the bible.
How can you trust a narrative if it is misleading or irreconcilable with itself? By declaring that some parts of it did not mean what it actually said. Instead of admitting to a mistake, you make up an intricate set of reinterpretations, which necessitates the alteration of the normative meaning of the text. The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises. Which they do, hence the sectarianism in Evangelist Christianity. The alternative, that is, to not take this approach, is impossible for a Christian, since normative understanding of the text leads to discrepancies, which the bible critics with the persuasion of secular atheism thrive on.
To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three. Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit.
A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world.
You don't need to read Anscomb, Aristotle, Astute, or Augustine, (or Austin for short) to see that. (In alphabetical order of appearance.)
god must be atheistNovember 01, 2019 at 09:58#3476900 likes
@Metaphisical Undercover, it is true that it is not justified why @Banno likes vanilla ice cream. But it is also conceivable, that not everything needs justification.
There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.)
god must be atheistNovember 01, 2019 at 10:01#3476930 likes
"I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla
I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified.
god must be atheistNovember 01, 2019 at 10:07#3476960 likes
It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.
1. Buying vanilla instead of Rocky Road is not a sin, or an unethical act.
2. It is the taste that is unexplained-- and hence, unjustified. To buy something to satisfy one's taste preference I see as justified, because it prevents the person's suffering. Minor suffering, such as one that would present, should the person buy chocolate flavoured ice cream instead of vanilla, when both are equally available with no moral restriction. So the avoidance of minor suffering is a cause that renders the selection justified.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 01, 2019 at 11:26#3477050 likes
A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible.
What purpose does "has" serve here? I really do not know what you mean here. Are you saying that the person shapes the world to fit to the bible? I do not believe this, I believe the religious person shapes the words of the bible to fit to the world.
The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises.
This is a matter of interpreting the words differently. And that is shaping the words, just like Banno wants to shape the word "justify" to suit some personal goal. Interpretation is not an act of making the world fit to the words, it's an act of making the words fit to the world.
To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three
You are totally neglecting the role of words here. This 'fitting' is done through the use of words. The "bible's teaching" is not "a world" to the reader, it is a bunch of words. So there is not "three worlds" here. Furthermore, I do not believe you can distinguish between "perceived reality" and "inner model of the world" as you claim. One's "perceived reality is one's "inner model of the world", the two are the very same thing. So now I have reduced your "three worlds" to just one world.
Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit.
Now you introduce a fourth world, the "existing world". But you've given no ontological principles to justify the claim of an existing world, so the "existing world" is still nothing more that one's "perceived reality', of 'inner model" of the world. This claim of an existing world is no more justified than Banno's claim that buying vanilla is justified by "I like it". Justification requires demonstrating the correctness of the act, or assertion.
A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world.
Again, you are leaving out the role of words. A person has an inner model of the world, a perceived reality. The person will try to fit words to this world. There is no such thing as trying to "fit the world" to this mental model, because until the person apprehends that other people have their own inner models, (perceived realities) this is the only world that there is. So, what the person does is try to fit words to this mental world. There are two distinct types of this activity, one is putting words together to speak or write, and the other is interpreting spoken or written words. Each is a different type of shaping words to fit one's "world".
If you want to talk about shaping "the world" we would have to consider how one's inner model, one's perceived reality, comes to exist, and changes over time, because this is the only instance of "world" which has been justified.
it is true that it is not justified why Banno likes vanilla ice cream. But it is also conceivable, that not everything needs justification.
There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.)
Right, I agree that there are many situations in which justification is not asked for. Justification is only really needed when it is asked for, and we often accept things without asking for justification. This is the case for instance when we trust the authority of the person speaking.
What Banno was arguing, is that there are things which are unjustifiable, personal taste for example, and that these unjustifiable things form the basis, the foundation, of all justifications.
I think that this is a misunderstanding. What forms the foundation of all justifications is things which we do not ask for justification of. These are things which for some reason or another (perhaps we trust the authority of the person speaking), we do request justification for. This is very distinct from Banno's claim that these things are unjustifiable.
The things which we do not ask for justification of, which Banno calls "unjustifiable", are in fact justifiable, and all we have to do is doubt them, and ask for justification, to get someone motivated to move on justifying them. Banno wants to claim that they are somehow beyond doubt, because it would be ridiculous to ask for justification of them. But this is an incorrect approach, because it is by doubting these foundational things, asking for justification, that we expand our knowledge beyond the limits set up by those people, who at one time, were the authorities whom we would not ask for justification.
So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 01, 2019 at 11:32#3477070 likes
I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified.
The demand is for justification, and this by definition is to demonstrate the correctness of the thing being justified. If Banno claims "I like vanilla", I can request proof that this claim is true, i.e. justification. Bannno has used the claim to justify buying vanilla, and implied that the claim is unjustifiable. It is not. The preference for vanilla may be demonstrated.
god must be atheistNovember 01, 2019 at 11:54#3477110 likes
So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it.
I don't know if you're right, @Metaphysician Undercover. One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA.
Beyond that, I would be really hard pressed to state if Banno ate the ice cream because he wanted to perform a just, moral, ethical and correct act. He ate it because he likes it, is my opinion, and I think justification of it may be available (by DNA analysis) but it certainly is a modern development in the history of justification theory.
But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.
Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way.
One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA.
So you agree then, it is possible to account for taste.
This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one.
Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way.
Right, I'll agree to that. One form of justifiable things is propositions, they may be true or false, so we might ask for justification of the proposition, demonstration of its truth.. However, justification goes further than this, because like in the example of Banno's purchasing vanilla milkshakes, we also ask for justification of actions.
This leaves things which are neither correct nor incorrect, as unjustifiable. Banno's proposition "I like vanilla", as a proposition, may be either true or false, therefore it is justifiable. Now the question is whether something which is unjustifiable (neither correct nor incorrect) could be used to justify something else. Notice that a proposition cannot fall into this category (unjustifiable) because a proposition must be either true or false, and true is a instance of being correct.
I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing.
This would be an atheist's definition. A theist believes that God has real independent existence. It does not make sense to use an atheist's definition, because if you want to define a term, you must refer to those who actually use that term, to determine the definition. You wouldn't turn to someone without an education in physics, to get a definition of "quantum entanglement", you'd turn to a physicist. Likewise, you wouldn't turn to someone without an education in theology to get a definition of God, you'd turn to a theologian.
This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one.
Not so much. My dictionary says you are wrong; but what would it know?
Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?"
But then, you like obtuse.
As do I, when there is something to be revealed by it.
SO is there a point to your being obtuse? I've missed it, if so. Can you try again?
I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing.
No, I would not concur with that. The issue with reducing 'God' to an idea or a projection, construction, or social consensus, is that it deflates it to an artefact of the mind, individual or collective. This is the common attitude, practically the default. But I think the question is understood this way because modern culture doesn't have any scale along which to understand what 'transcendent' means, which is an inevitable consequence of the process of secularisation. So the secular response is: by transcendent, you mean deity, and that is not something objectively ascertainable, so it must be subjective or social. There's simply no other place to envisage it or put it.
But the point is, whether or not there is God or supreme being, this principle or person does not exist in the sense that material phenomena exist. Everything that exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and end in time. As 'the sacred' is not composed of parts and is a-temporal, ergo, not something that exists. This is the subject of the essay - by a Bishop - God does not exist.
There is an old maxim, 'God is never what you think'. The principle is that thought itself is inherently incapable of comprehension of the sacred. That is why spiritual philosophies rely on silence, meditation, 'un-knowing', and the like; although this understanding is not so much characteristic of modern religion, it's associated more with contemplative spirituality (although you now find it in alternative spirituality, like Eckhardt Tolle.)
Deleted UserNovember 02, 2019 at 01:06#3479300 likes
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But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence.
Are you serious? I think it is quite clear in Christian religions that human beings are dependent on God as creator, and God is not dependent on human beings for His existence. Therefore God has real independent existence for Christian based thinkers.
Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?"
Your claim was that there are unjustifiable things which could be used to justify other things.. These unjustifiable things are beyond doubt, because they are foundational, and to doubt them would undermine one's own capacity to doubt. You suggested that god might be like this.
The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. There are no such things. If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. That's why we can doubt god (for example). If they cannot be doubted, they are neither correct nor incorrect, as janus pointed out. But they are not foundational.
Regardless of whether "I like vanilla" justifies your purchase, it is not itself unjustifiable, and not beyond doubt. So the example does not suffice and is a digression.
It really isn't. It's a fundamental idea in philosophical theology. The trouble is, whenever I try to explain it, you first become exasperated, and then hostile, because of your 'mind-map' or the heuristic by which you categorise all these ideas. Which is something like: It's perfectly OK to believe in God, because by so doing, all you're doing is professing faith, saying something about yourself. But if you wish to show there is such a being, then you obviously can't, because it's not objectively verifiable.
Is that close?
What I'm arguing is that what is 'objectively verifiable' is not all there is to be known. Or, put another way, there are other modes of knowing, or cognitive models, within which 'ideas of the sacred' are quite demonstrable, if not necessarily objective.
I acknowledge it's a deep subject and topic, and not everyone will want to go there, but if you start a thread on 'towards a philosophy of religion' then you might at least be willing to think outside your particular square about it instead of continually blowing up about it. :wink:
To those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us!
OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. (Although there's always Andrew Newberg....)
ValentinusNovember 02, 2019 at 01:58#3479430 likes
I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing.
Theologically speaking, the role of the creator as being imminent or transcendent has been mostly dealt with as differences of opinion to how closely such an agent may be involved with the concerns and affairs of a single person. So, in one sense, it has always been a problem of accepting an idea because thinking one way or another changes the decisions a person makes.
But making decisions of that kind is not the same thing as deciding what is valid to accept as evidence for one state of affairs or another in a discussion of our creation as a shared reality and wondering what made it the way it is. Nobody starts their journey as an ethical being by making sure it can be defended through philosophy.
Kant, particularly in the Critique of Judgement, makes a distinction between the two approaches. In that tome, he complains that Spinoza was too dark in his view of the person and what they could hope for.
So I propose it is difficult to move forward with these considerations because we, as people trying to sort things out, cannot simply point to this or that articulation of the problem as a shared point of departure.
If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt.
That's muddled. If they are foundational then they are true. Are you claiming that all propositions can be either true or false? but that's wrong, too.
But this is the same stuff we have been over many times before.
Further, Theists, many, absolutely believe, and as seems best to them profess that belief. With them I at least have no issue. I have my beliefs too, and I think believing is an important aspect of moral thinking. But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. Kant's denial of knowledge to make room for faith is also significant here. But to those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us! Or
To believe something is to think that it is true. Christians generally think that God exists, in an objective way, independent of humans thinking that he exists; that he existed before there were any humans to think that he existed. They may not claim to know with certainty or be able to demonstrate that to other people, but they still think that God exists independent of human opinion, and would disagree vehemently (see this thread) that he's "just an idea".
More on the topic of the OP, I thought what you were looking for was consensus on what the idea of God is of, regardless of whether or not that exists. Like, we can probably come to a consensus agreement on what "unicorn" means, and then debate whether or not there are any such things. I thought that's what you were looking for.
God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that.
Nope, even if we're talking about my paragraph above, just agreeing on what it is we're to debate the existence of. The creator of what, and does absolutely anything count as that, whatever it should turn out to have created whatever you mean? E.g. if the creator of the Earth, then does the Sun's protoplanetary disc count as "God"? Or maybe whatever old dead star whose remains that protoplanetary disc (and the Sun itself) coalesced out of? If the creator of the universe, would "quantum fluctuations in eternally expanding space-time" count as God? If "whatever created..." something is all you mean by God, then you're going to end up concluding that there necessarily is a God, because nothing comes from nothing, and even atheists won't disagree that that thing (that whatever came from) exists, they'll just disagree that it deserved the label "God".
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The point here being that believing in something and claiming it to independently exist are two different things. Confusion on this point abounds, and people who are confused can be in this respect toxic.
This seems to be a confused use of the word "believes". I believe that the sun exists, and that its existence is independent of anything anyone thinks about it. My understanding of most Christians, and most theists generally, is that they have the same opinion about God as I (and probably they too) have about the sun, in that respect.
There might be a difference in their opinion between God and the sun in the respect that they can easily demonstrate the existence of the sun to other people and demonstrating the existence of God might not be that easy. But there are plenty of other mundane things that it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of (faraway celestial objects, tiny subatomic particles) that nevertheless can be shown to exist with indirect evidence and reasoning from that evidence, and plenty of theists seem to think that the existence of God can be indirectly demonstrated in the same way (just look at all the many arguments for why God must exist).
As an atheist I of course think all of those attempts to demonstrate the existence of God fail, but theists obviously disagree.
Beyond that, what reality can you give [God], that is not an idea or any material form?
That God is transcendent and beyond material form is not an idea of my devising.
Even without any explicit faith commitment, who or what the name ‘God’ refers to is necessarily a very slippery matter. But I will quote some passages from Comparative Religion scholar Karen Armstrong, from an essay of hers on the question Should we believe in belief? which I think it highly germane to the topic.
She leads with:
The extraordinary and eccentric emphasis on "belief" in Christianity today is an accident of history that has distorted our understanding of religious truth. We call religious people "believers", as though acceptance of a set of doctrines was their principal activity, and before undertaking the religious life many feel obliged to satisfy themselves about the metaphysical claims of the church, which cannot be proven rationally since they lie beyond the reach of empirical sense data.
Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach?
Well, she says:
Most other traditions [i.e. other than Christian] prize practice above creedal orthodoxy: Buddhists, Hindus, Confucians, Jews and Muslims would say religion is something you do, and that you cannot understand the truths of faith unless you are committed to a transformative way of life that takes you beyond the prism of selfishness. All good religious teaching – including such Christian doctrines as the Trinity or the Incarnation – is basically a summons to action [or a way of being]. Yet instead of being taught to act creatively upon them, many modern Christians feel it is more important to "believe" them. Why?
In most pre-modern cultures, there were two recognised ways of attaining truth. The Greeks called them mythos and logos. Both were crucial and each had its particular sphere of competence. Logos [corresponding with the modern conception of “science"] was the pragmatic mode of thought that enabled us to control our environment and function in the world. It had, therefore, to correspond accurately to external realities. But logos could not assuage human grief or give people intimations that their lives had meaning. For that they turned to mythos, an early form of psychology, which dealt with the more elusive aspects of human experience.
Stories of heroes descending to the underworld were not regarded as primarily factual but taught people how to negotiate the obscure regions of the psyche [what we now call ‘the unconscious’]. In the same way, the purpose of a creation myth was therapeutic; before the modern period no sensible person ever thought it gave an accurate account of the origins of life [i.e. that it was literally true]. A cosmology was recited at times of crisis or sickness, when people needed a symbolic influx of the creative energy that had brought something out of nothing. Thus the Genesis myth, a polemic against Babylonian religion, was balm to the bruised spirits of the Israelites who had been defeated and deported by the armies of Nebuchadnezzar during the sixth century BCE. Nobody was required to "believe" it; like most peoples, the Israelites had a number of other mutually-exclusive creation stories and as late as the 16th century, Jews thought nothing of making up a new creation myth that bore no relation to Genesis but spoke more directly to their tragic circumstances at that time. [And actually there’s more than one creation myth in Genesis.]
Above all, myth was a programme of action. When a mythical narrative was symbolically re-enacted, it brought to light within the practitioner something "true" about human life and the way our humanity worked, even if its insights, like those of art, could not be proven rationally. [Scholar Mercia Eliade said it was a way of symbolically entering the ‘eternal domain’.]. If you did not act upon it, it would remain as incomprehensible and abstract – like the rules of a board game, which seem impossibly convoluted, dull and meaningless until you start to play [like a deaf alien watching the performance of a symphony orchestra and wonder what all those beings were doing ]
Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.
Setting aside God as a nonliteral, metaphorical, mythical character as Wayfarer describes above, and focusing instead on the logos interpretation, I was thinking this could be a useful way of helping frame the "what is God" question:
Picture the world you think atheists believe exists.
Now picture the world you think theists believe exists.
Now describe the difference between those two pictures.
That difference is what you think "God" means.
For me, I think that difference is generally the existence of a person of some sort -- some being with a mind and will -- that excels to perfection at all the things that are virtues of a person, having complete knowledge of everything in the universe (omniscience), perfect function of mind and will within itself (including omnibenevolence), and complete power over everything in the universe (omnipotence).
And I don't think such a thing exists.
Other nominal theists seem to think that "God" means either something that atheists wouldn't dispute the existence of, just the labeling of (so there is no difference in the two pictures above), or something poetic, literary, or metaphorical, like "love" or other theologically noncognitivist referents. But for theists who do posit a difference in the world they think exists and the world that atheists think exists, it seems to be something like the above.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 02, 2019 at 13:32#3480380 likes
Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others.
Your example, "I like vanilla" is not beyond doubt. Perhaps it's beyond doubt to you, but it's not beyond doubt to me. So when you use that in your attempt to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes, it may be questioned by me, doubted. Therefore you have not provided an acceptable example.
By Christians not claiming God as independently existing, I mean that the founders of Christianity, and the thinkers on it, have (near as i can tell) believed and never questioned, and, never questioning, never bothered to spread their claim to nature or natural science. In short, God is simply a presupposition of their thinking.
This is the way you look at Christian theological thinking, as presuppositions, but it is not the way that the founders of Christianity looked at God. If you read some of the material you'll see that it's mostly all questions, with some proposed answers. St. Augustine for instance questions everything from the earth to the heavens, and especially the presupposition that God is omniscient, in relation to Augustine's own experience of "free will". Take a look at the table of contents of St Thomas' Summa Theologica for example, the entire book is a series of questions, discussion of the questions, objections, and replies. Your claim that these thinkers presupposed God, and never questioned the presuppositions, is the exact opposite of the truth. That is exactly what they did, question the presuppositions. And that is why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's ontological proof as unsound.
OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about.
This is the key point which tim wood doesn't get. Certain individuals will make a serious quest toward whether there really is a God. These individuals will question (doubt) all the fundamental presuppositions, which Banno is claiming are beyond doubt, in regard to the reliability and truth of such presuppositions, which others insist are beyond doubt. Some of these thinkers, like St Thomas for example, became the most profound theologians for that very reason, that they got beyond the prior presuppositions, to establish new principles of a deeper an higher understanding.
Tim wood portrays the theologian as believing in God only because God is a presupposition. It is implied that if one doubts or questions God that person looses the presupposition and will necessarily become atheist by the very fact that the presupposition of God is cast aside. So tim does not accept the profound reality which you and I have experienced first hand, that if one makes a serious quest, the reality of God becomes evident. And, it does not require the presupposition that God is real, as tim believes, it just requires a human being with an inquisitive (doubtful) nature. Some of these human beings who seriously doubt the existence of God end up as the most profound theologians.
That's why I said, "I think...". From your survey of the posts, what did you come up with?
You seem to have missed my post, way back earlier in the thread. I said that to think that there is such a thing as "the definition" would be a mistaken thought. So you will not get my consent on any proposed definition. And, it is evident in this thread that my position is correct, because there has been no consensus.
And I think you ned to renew your credential either/both as a Christian or someone who claims to know what Christianity is. The fundamental tenet is belief.
I've read a considerable amount of Christian theology and never have I seen it stated "the fundamental tenet is belief". You really are just making this stuff up. Faith is very important, but faith, as that which supports or propagates belief, is not the same thing as belief. And faith itself is propagated, cultured, not indoctrinated, so faith is not even the type of thing which could be a tenet. That's a category mistake. This category mistake is very similar to the reason why Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological argument. We cannot make God real simply by believing or having faith that God is real, we must actually understand that God is real. So Aquinas points to the human disposition which is required in order for a human being to understand that God is real.
Aquinas succinctly states that the existence of God, and other things which can be known about God by natural reason, are not articles of faith. However, to those who cannot understand the reasoning by which the existence of God is known, this can be accepted by faith.
Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach?
As stated above, Aquinas assures us that the existence of God, as well as some things about God, can be known by natural reason. He explains this by describing how we can know a cause through its effect by reason. We can observe the effect, create principles based on that observance, and deduce that there was a cause, and some things about the cause.
What appears to be missing for your quoted passages is the Aristotelian distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge, made in his Nichomachean Ethics. In modern epistemology it is know-how and know-that. In post-Socratic times, the distinction between logos and mythos was mostly supplanted by the Aristotelian system.
It appears like this came about because Socrates was highly critical of ambiguity in the use of "techne". Through rhetoric and sophistry logos and mythos got all mixed together, conflated such that the combined two became techne or episteme, and there were no hard principles to separate knowldege which was based in theory from knowledge which was based in practise. And theory is not necessarily supported by sound premises. A significant portion of Aristotle's work is actually aimed toward sorting this out, starting with his fundamental logical Categories, and the designation of "substance" as what grounds logic (theory).
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Picture the world you think atheists believe exists.
Nature minus mystery. :chin: :clap:
[quote=Pfhorrest]Now picture the world you think theists believe exists.[/quote]
Nature plus mystery. :scream: :pray:
[quote=Pfhorrest]Now describe the difference between those two pictures.[/quote]
• plus Mystery. Begs all questions, answers none (e.g. "Mystery did it ..." "Mystery said it ..." "It's the Mystery's Will ...") Mystery-of-the-gaps. A(nother) just-so story. Magical thinking.
• minus Mystery. Explicable answers at least in principle - criterion for filtering out pseudo-questions (e.g. "What happens to me after I die?"). Complexity (perplexity) exorcises mystery (anxiety). Defeasible thinking.
[quote=Pfhorrest]That difference is what you think "God" means.[/quote]
But would you also agree that material existence is criteriological? To exist, the materially existing thing must meet some criteria? If you agree, then demonstrate. If you do not agree, then for you, anything and everything exists.
No - and this is the crux of the issue for philosophy of religion. Western culture has lost the ability to understand or envisage different modes of being. There's a very interesting article on IEP about 17th Century Theories of Substance. It notes that:
For 17th century philosophers, the term 'substance' is reserved for the ultimate constituents of reality on which everything else depends. This article discusses the most important theories of substance from the 17th century: those of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Although these philosophers were highly original thinkers, they shared a basic conception of substance inherited from the scholastic-Aristotelian tradition from which philosophical thinking was emerging. ...
Degrees of Reality
In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.
I'm arguing that the possibility of 'degrees of reality' (and the corresponding sense of 'ontological proximity' to the absolute) has generally been lost in the transition to modern thought - and that, therefore, we believe that the term 'existence' is univocal - something either exists or it doesn't. Birds, bats, and the number 7 exist; unicorns, phlogiston and the square root of 7 do not. And that I believe is what we have in mind when we ask whether 'god' is 'materially existent'. Then the answer is 'no'. And that's the only answer available, in the flattened-out worldview that we nowadays inhabit, because we've lost a dimension or a mode of cognition.
So, in answer to your question as to whether I accept that simply 'anything and everything exists' - the answer is no, but empiricism is not the appropriate method to deal with the question. I do accept there are levels of being that are outside the purview of the scientific worldview, and that they are real. But this is the question of metaphysics, par excellence, and empiricism reduces any consideration of what is real, to what can be seen, felt, and touched, or theories arrived at by way of mathematical inference based on what is measurable, and it conditions our entire outlook and way of being in the world on that basis. So it tends to foreclose the possibility of there being a metaphysics (although I should add, I think that metaphysics is only ever provisional in nature, that it's a "pointing out device", not a final truth.)
With its strict division between selves and the world, subjects and objects, or mind and nature, this picture sets us against the world, in effect treating it as alien to us. And it is a bad picture, since in reality, Heidegger argues, we and the world cannot, even notionally, exist without one another: “self and world” are not “two beings”, but mutually dependent. The Cartesian picture results from viewing us in an over-intellectual way – as, essentially, “thinking things” who observe objects and mentally represent them. Phenomenological attention, undistorted by theory, to “things themselves” yields a very different picture of how we relate to the world, however. We do so, not as “spectators” or “thinkers”, but “primordially” as agents...[sup] 1 [/sup]
Let's work with that. I say I prefer vanilla, You ask if I am sure - it was chocolate yesterday, Banana (yuck!) the day before...
Or you notice that there is only one serve of chocolate remains, and you know that I know you prefer chocolate, and hence suspect that I am putting up with the vanilla so that you can have the chocolate.
IS this what you have in mind?
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 03, 2019 at 03:21#3482050 likes
But it's material existence we're stuck on, and you don't seem to get that the claim of material existence must be heretical and destructive of the essential nature of the God you appear to want.
Why are you stuck on material existence? No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. But this does not mean that Christians believe that God's existence depends on the human mind, like other immaterial things seem to. On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
I don't insist on dictionary meanings, though they're a good place to start. Do you care to expand on these, or do you accept them as is.
Sure, I'll accept those definitions of "faith". Now did you read what I said Aquinas stated very succinctly, that the existence of God, and some things about God are not articles of faith, because they are known by natural reason. But they may be accepted on faith by those who do not understand the reasoning.
This is barely worth comment. I note the "can." The sense of it is that sometimes we may know the cause via effects and thinking, not that we will (nor how we might know that we do, or don't). And to be sure, he was all about plugging in just what he needed.
Again, this is all reasonable if you grant the founding argument of the existence of God. Without that, not-so-reasonable.
The founding premise is that each and every material object has a cause of its existence. Notice that there is no presupposition of "God" here. But when we notice that the first material object must necessarily have a cause which is immaterial, we give that immaterial cause a name, "God".
Of course, if you do not understand the argument, you might accept "God" on faith, as Aquinas said, but I see no reason to reject the argument. And I've seen many who have attempted to give reason to reject the argument, but all those attempts have proven to be unreasonable. So in reality it appears to be unreasonable not to accept the founding argument for the existence of God.
Yes, you might be lying. You purchased vanilla. You claimed to be able to justify your purchase with "I like vanilla". This assertion does not justify your purchase because I am not convinced that you actually do like vanilla, and I think you were buying the vanilla milkshakes for someone else. Either justify your claim or I'll continue to believe that you were buying the milkshakes for someone else.
The point being that any claim which is purported to be "beyond doubt", must be substantiated, in order to actually be beyond doubt. And to substantiate a claim is to justify it. So your claim "I like vanilla" can only act to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes if it has itself been substantiated, or justified.
The regress in justification does not end in the way that you think it does. It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. So if I trusted you for example, when you said "I like vanilla", that might put an end to the need for justification. In general, we commonly appeal to authority to put an end to the regress in justification, citing a scientific principle, or some such thing, which will not be doubted by people who trust science.
I may be misunderstanding here, but here's my reaction to a possible distinction between the two. There is a difference between what I need to have no reason to doubt and what is beyond doubt. If I have experiences X, this could lead to a rational belief A that I have which I cannot demonstrate to others, but which I have no reason to doubt. This could be mundane - I see a pumas of different sizes and ages - in a state where they are not supposed to exist, I see them engaged eating a recent killing stalking prey raising young. And over a period of the last decade. I decide pumas are in this state. (like New Hampshire, say). Others have good grounds to not accept my belief. They don't know me, how good my observational skills are, if I have an agenda, what I saw, if I can tell the difference between a lynx (or bobcat, whichever one it is that's in that region) and a puma, if I am nuts, was high and so on. So they have very good grounds to go with whatever the official state and scientist position is on the demographics of pumas and ignore my belief. I on the other hand have no reason to doubt my own belief - unless I was high, or had an agenda, or am subject to visual hallucinations and so on. But I can have good grounds for ruling these out.
I think often in discussions it is as if two rational people with different experiences must reach the same conclusions. I don't think this is the case.
Now I realize this mundane example is still dealing with something scientists, in general, would say has some, extremely tiny chance of being possible. They don't dispute the existence of pumas, in fact they believe they exist, just not there - though often in practice they will speak in terms of impossibilitiy and rule out rather than remaining agnostic - the history of rogue waves is a good example of this where people were told their estimates of the waves were wrong and that such things were impossible and so on. Only later did technology shift and it was found out the scientists were ruling out something that was real and correctly interpreted and described by the people on ships at sea.
There does come a point where the side that rules out is not really accepting the problem of other minds. Their assertions come very close to: if I experienced whatever you did, I would not believe it and interpret it as you do.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 03, 2019 at 14:16#3482850 likes
I don't see this as different from what I have suggested.
So I'll explain to you the difference.
You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them. This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."
On the other hand, I say that these are things which we simply choose not to doubt. This does not assign to them any sort of certainty or indubitableness, nor does it categorize them as somehow outside the theatre of justification, or inherently beyond doubt. In fact, the majority of these things which we choose not to doubt, have actually been doubted, and justified many years ago. Then they appear to us as "common knowledge" past down from generation to generation by parents, teachers, and other authority figures. As common knowledge they might appear to be beyond doubt when they really are not.
The point being that I believe it is a mistake to categorize these things as "beyond doubt". When human knowledge (as a whole) grows and evolves, the principles which were once used to justify these things which we accept from the authorities, without doubting them, may become outdated and inconsistent with modern principles. This means that within human knowledge s a whole, there are inconsistencies. Over time, as the inconsistencies within our knowledge continue to glare at us with an increasingly blinding light, it becomes more and more irrational not to doubt these things which might appear to be "beyond doubt". The irrationality is compounded by philosophers who insist that such things actually are beyond doubt.
So we can place "God" in this category of foundational things, as you suggest, and I agree with you on that point. But I believe it is a mistake to portray these foundational things as beyond doubt. We must categorize them in the exact opposite way, as extremely dubious because they are ancient conclusions. We must therefore doubt them all, revisit the principles whereby they were originally justified, and establish consistency with the principles believed today. To have a human "body of knowledge" which contains inconsistencies is incoherent and contradictory. Such inconsistencies exist as a result of us choosing not to doubt fundamental principles.
Reply to Coben
You'll see that I prefer to categorize these things which Banno says are "beyond doubt" as things which we choose not to doubt. This places "doubting" as the natural human condition. We do not choose to doubt, it comes naturally when the conditions which produce certainty are not created, and we choose not to doubt with a judgement of certainty. We must choose not to doubt, suppress the urge to doubt, in order to accept and believe things without first doubting them.
This is consistent with Socrates' portrayal of the root of philosophy being "wonder". The philosopher has a desire to know, and this presents itself in its primitive form as wonder. Doubt is a type of wonder. It is only by doubting things, seeking justification for things, that we produce higher levels of certainty. Therefore I would replace Aristotle's classification, 'man is a rational being' with 'human beings are philosophical beings'. This emphasizes the role of wonder, doubt, and uncertainty, in relation to the desire, want, and lack of certainty.
So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. Most likely you have already doubted, which would be your natural inclination, so you researched material to verify what you actually saw. Now your judgement is beyond doubt to you. Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.
To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. A debate is based in doubt, it is not based on the two opposing sides both being certain. So abstaining from, and ignoring the debate, is contrary to the natural desire for certainty, which manifests as doubt.
And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.
You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them.This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."
I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put.
So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less.
And that's Wittgenstein's antidote to Socrates' senseless wondering.
One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se.
So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess.
How could we have a coherent omnipotent, omnipresent omniscient being? Wouldn't such a being be so overwhelmingly present as to be beyond doubt?
And I suspect that there are theists who think like this; they suppose atheism to be incomprehensible.
TheWillowOfDarknessNovember 03, 2019 at 21:18#3483630 likes
It should be beyond doubt, the contention is God is found everywhere. Metaphorically (since such a God, being everywhere, cannot have a specfic empircal manifestation to watch), would see such a God wherever we looked.
But if we understand that, there is no question of faith. We know God is present for sure. We no longer have an uncertainty or nihilism for belief to make safe.
I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put.
This is where the majority of our difference lies. I think there is no certainty in language use. Look at the way you use "justify" compared to me. Look at this thread, and the different ideas of what
"God" means to different people.
You might claim that there is certainty "in the use to which the language is being put", meaning that you are certain of what you are saying, and certain of the effect you desire to get from that use of words, but this does not mean that you are certain that you will get the desired effect when you use words. If you are, then this is a false sense of certitude, because there is always the possibility that the other person will misunderstand and you will not get the desired effect. That is why we must choose our words carefully. This is the case with all things that we do, as human beings, there is always the possibility of failure in any endeavour. So we cannot take success for granted and we must proceed with care and caution, always aware of that possibility of failure, lest it be actualized due to carelessness. That false sense of certitude actually causes carelessness and therefore failure.
So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less.
Oh no, this is completely false. The bishop doesn't do a thing. The player moves the bishop, and does so by choice. If a player decides to make a move which the other player thinks is contrary to the rules, they might consult the rules to decide who is right. The rules are there to resolve such doubt. It is not the case that moving the bishop in a row is beyond doubt, because one who has never played the game, and does not know the rules, will have doubt as to how to move the bishop. However, it is the case that doubt as to how to move the bishop is quelled by wanting to play the game, and understanding the rules. Then the player chooses to move the bishop in the correct way.
You must see that it's pure nonsense to say of the bishop moving diagonally, "that's what it does; no more, no less", when in reality this is what the player chooses to do with the bishop. What about the end of the game, when the bishop moves back into the box, isn't this a little more? And when a player gets frustrated and throws the board, the bishop will fly threw the air, and "that's what it does", but it can do a lot more and it can also do a lot less.
One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se.
Sure, but in the case of language use there is no rule which says that we must play this language game, and not some other language game. So you might be playing chess, while I'm playing checkers and tim wood is playing backgammon while wayfarer is playing Ouija, etc.. There's a lot more than four games to play with language so how do you propose to determine what game it is that another person is playing?
So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess.
If this is your mental exercise, then don't you see that the theist is not playing chess at all? You are saying that you'd have to change the rules of your game (chess) to produce a coherent theism, without recognizing that the theist is actually playing a completely different game. Are you ready to play another game, or is chess all you are interested in?
If by "immaterial cause" you mean, "I - we - don't know," and further that "God" is just a shorthand expression for the "I-don't-know", and, the "I-don't-know" itself is meant to imply that we think that there is something to be known, then no further comment from me.
The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial.
I find I'm obliged to suppose that those heavy thinkers understood this entirely well but felt for reasons sufficient to them that the idea of God had to be made both real and flesh for most people to find it both acceptable and accessible, as well as to make fate a little easier to reconcile to. .
You've just gone off on a tangent without paying attention to a word I've said. First, instead of addressing the logical argument which proves why God is necessarily real, you replace the conclusion with "I don't know". Then, in your ignorance of that argument which demonstrates why God is real, (ignorance professed by "I don't know"), you go off to say that the thinkers "felt" that they had to make the idea of God real. Can't you see that it's not a case of having "felt" this or that sensation, or whatever type of feeling, it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real?
Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 04:59#3484570 likes
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Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) Thus unicorns and the wicked witch of the West both exist. Included in this species are verbal constructs, like square circles, that can be named, but for which there is no corresponding idea.
What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?
Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 09:09#3484910 likes
So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt.
No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. I wouldn't say it is beyond doubt for a number of reasons: 1) that is contextless. I could certainly understand why others might doubt it. I wouldn't tell Banno that 'it is beyond doubt there are pumas in New Hampshire.' I have no reason to doubt it, myself. And I would likely make bold statements about it to those I know. Oh, actually, pumas are here...I might say. I might witness even in public contexts. But I would not presume others should just go along with what I say. 2) I could doubt it. Perhaps at some point I would. Maybe I end up seeing a lynx that is enormous and I might think, wow, I didn't realize they could be puma-sized. And further I could doubt in a philosophical sense. Perhaps I am in a simulation.
Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.
I think this is often the case. Not just because humans have a tendency to doubt, but because if the experiences are different, then the conclusions will tend to be. Add in paradigmatic biases or model based biases and what is required as evidence can become enormous.
I think there is tremendous resistence to the idea that rational people can rationally reach different conclusions if they have different experiences.
But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt.
agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case.
Here's an example: I have seen many doctors tell people they are not sick. IOW the doctor cannot find an illness he or she recognizes and cannot find a physical basis for the symptoms the person claims to have. I have experienced and know countless others have experienced doctors say with great certaintly that 'you' or 'your child' does not have an illness. Often there is a referral to a psychiatrist or psychologist.
Any doctor should of course know that new illnesses arise or ones previously known arise with idiosyncratic symptoms. A more honest and epistemologically grounded response would be: I can find nothing wrong with you. As far as I can tell there is no disease or illness causing your symptoms. It is possible that it is somethign we have not encountered, but I would like you consider that it might be stress related or psychological in origin.
IOW the doctor cannot know there is no underlying physical pathology and agnosticism is both grounded and honest. Even a look at the last 30 years in the history of medicines will innumerable cases where people have been told they are not ill and then it is found out later that they are. Not just individual cases, but even large groups.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.
You seem to be seeing agnosticism as a permanent state. I don't take it that way. All I am suggesting is that people realize that there are, now, and here and for them personally, epistemological obstacles. These may or may not change.
I am nto suggesting we should just throw up our hands.
We should not assume that we can know all truths now. We should not assume that if something goes against current models (or seems to) it must be false. We should not assume that if the other person is rational and correct they can demonstrate it. We should not assume that individual experiences are irrelevent. We should not assume that two rational people with different experiences should nevertheless draw the same conclusions.
I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.
I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 04, 2019 at 12:17#3485150 likes
Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.)
This is where we disagree. As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. This cannot be a human idea because the existence of human ideas is limited to after the existence of human beings.
So it is very clear that your definitions which assert that only material things are real, and that immaterial things are dependent on the human mind are unsound, incoherent in relation to other known principles, and need to be replaced with definitions which are closer to the truth.
don't buy this argument. But I note that in it you make the material/immaterial distinction. If you then deny that God is an idea, your work is cut out for you.
The argument I presented is quite clear, expressed in very simple terms, and easily understood. "I don't buy this argument" does not demonstrate any weaknesses of the argument. However, the argument demonstrates weakness in your definitions. Therefore, without further ado, your definitions are rejected.
No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it.
But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? Did you not look in books, or online to confirm that what you thought were pumas, actually were? I assume you were not a specialist on the physical characteristics of pumas prior to seeing them. It's only this activity of confirmation, which is inspired by doubt, which leads you to the position of having "no good reason to doubt". So the situation is not "at some point I would" doubt it, it's 'at some point I did'.
When the judgement is made, doubt is removed, and then a reason is required to revisit the issue with fresh doubt. These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before.
But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible.
At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt".
agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case.
Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved.
I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.
I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all.
OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved.
Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 13:07#3485230 likes
But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it?
Oh, probably I would. I was talking about after the events I listed. After I had sufficient evidence, for myself, that I no longer needed to doubt. I was not saying that in the first moment I see what looks like a puma I instantly believe.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before.
I haven't read all of Banno, so I don't know if you are framing this as he would, but I agree with you. Doubt can return.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt".
I don't disagree, though I consider this a different issue from the one I was addressing. Clearly related, but different. And, yes, I do take other people's words for things. There are various factors that weigh in when I do this. I could go into that topic, but I won't yet.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved.
I don't think either skepticism or agnosticism really fits. But I think you get what I mean. The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely.Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved.
Yes, I don't think it has to be a universal, timeless and/or absolute position. I don't want to call it skepticism, since this to me implies a relation only to other people's beliefs. IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. It may seem like they lack a belief, but actually they are taking a rather strong epistemological stand. I can't no anything about God and no one else can. That is a belief founded on a lot of supportint beliefs.
Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 14:57#3485580 likes
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Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 16:22#3485880 likes
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What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?
— Wayfarer
I think you will answer this better than I if you give thought to what you're referring to. Given a 3-4-5 triangle, what there is a 3-4-5 triangle. No theorem at all. You've got the rest of this, yes?
That doesn’t address the point, however, which is kind of reality that such principles as the Pythagorean theorem possess. They’re ‘intelligible objects’ i.e. objects of reason only, but which are real in that they’re the same for anyone who can grasp them.
Reply to Metaphysician Undercover WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.
Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess.
Nor does it mater that there is more than one game, except that its not a bad idea to keep an eye on what game you are playing, and what others are playing. The alternative would be quite confusing. As would mixing the rules of chess, checkers and backgammon. Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting.
For a moment there I thought you had a point, but in this last post you seem to have lost it. If I many...
There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading.
Deleted UserNovember 04, 2019 at 19:48#3486760 likes
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Real as constructs of mind. Indeed intelligible to any who can grasp them. Underlying this is nothing - but the ability of the mind to notice what happens when it combines in its considerations things that otherwise have nothing to do with each other. No mind, no theorem. No mind, no combining, no recognition of relationships. No mind, no relationships. And so on.
But I still feel as though you’re missing the vital point here. In Greek philosophy, such principles are said to be real independently of any particular act of perception, but nevertheless only perceptible to the ‘eye of reason’. So - not constructs of mind, but rational percepts. That then goes back to the ‘is mathematics invented or discovered’ conundrum but my view is that the natural numbers and fundamental geometrical principles are discovered - they’re the same for all who can think, but they are more than simply acts of thought. They’re real but incorporeal.
This is why man qua ‘rational animal’ is able to ascertain the reason for things - the logos, which is root of knowledge. But again, this is not to say that these principles are a product of the human mind - rather that the human mind has evolved to the point of being able to perceive them through reason.
How is this relevant to philosophy of religion? Because it indicates the nature of ‘ideal reality’, which is not the product of the human mind, but is only perceptible through reason. In the broader Platonic tradition this was a fundamental principle and also an analogy to the nature of higher truths.
ValentinusNovember 05, 2019 at 00:51#3488190 likes
Reply to Wayfarer
I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency.
The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time.
I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency.
I don't think that Kant lent his arguments to the notion of an 'intelligent designer', and I'm pretty sure he wouldn't have agreed with today's ID arguments, although I could be wrong. (quick google....)
reflecting judgment enables us to discover empirical laws of nature by leading us to regard nature as if it were the product of intelligent design ....Since this principle only regulates our cognition but is not constitutive of nature itself, this does not amount to assuming that nature really is the product of intelligent design, which according to Kant we are not justified in believing on theoretical grounds. Rather, it amounts only to approaching nature in the practice of science as if it were designed to be understood by us. We are justified in doing this because it enables us to discover empirical laws of nature. But it is only a regulative principle of reflecting judgment, not genuine theoretical knowledge, that nature is purposive in this way.
The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time.
Very perceptive, and I agree with you.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 05, 2019 at 03:19#3488530 likes
The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely.
I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. They tend to believe that there are physiological conditions which correlate to the psychological problem, but the correlated physiological are not necessarily identifiable. This may be a type of compromise, but it's most likely just a justification for treating the psychological problem with medication. If it's a real physiological, medical problem, then the use of medication to treat it is justified.
IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God.
I think what I meant is that the closed minded agnostic believes that we can never know whether there is or isn't God, so we ought not even talk about this, or try to determine the answer to this question. In other words, if we cannot know whether there is a God, what's the point in saying anything about God? This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism.
Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be.
Adding fancy words like "existential truth" to your claim that the argument does not "cut it", does not refute the argument. You need to show how the argument is existentially false. That you happen to be of the opinion that non-material things are not real doesn't cut it as a criticism, because the premises do not refer to any non-material things. The real existence of a non-material thing is necessitated as a conclusion.
It is akin, then, to an argument as to whether superman could beat aquaman under water. Maybe great fun, or even at one time considered substantive and therefore serious. But not today. As substantive, it's from the chest of toys in the attic and nothing for a grown man to waste time on beyond an appropriately few moments of remembered pleasure.
In other words, it's extremely obvious that the argument is very sound, so there's no point wasting time trying to refute it.
And neither you nor others seem to grasp that what you have as idea is endless possibility.
Actually, the fact that "endless possibility" is truly impossible, is the key premise to Aristotle's cosmological argument. This is the principle which the Neo-Platonists use to prove that God is necessary. Endless possibility, if it were reality, would exclude any actuality. Therefore if this were something real, there would be nothing actually existing.
Make your case, then make it real. That would convert me.
You've yet to address the argument. Which premise lacks existential truth, relative to your presuppositions? Is it that material things are contingent? Or is it that there's a first material thing?
WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.
Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess.
Right, we were not talking about chess. You said there is certainty in language, and you tried to justify this by referring to the game of chess. Stay on topic. When we use language we are rarely playing chess, so this is irrelevant.
Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting.
Excellent, I can almost agree with you here. However, there are many instances where you can be intelligible and interesting without being clear about what it is you are doing. Ever read mysteries, for example? Interest is created by the suspense cause by not being clear about what is going on. Then there is poetry, where intentional ambiguity seems to rule the day. The poetry is still intelligible, and interesting, without being clear.
Furthermore, there's a very curious aspect of ambiguity which allows the author to create a huge audience. If I say something extremely ambiguous, it could be meaningful to you, and meaningful to various other different people, each having different reason for the meaningfulness, seeing different meaning in it. The simple, ambiguous phrase may be meaningful and interesting to all sorts of people from all different walks of life, while the precise expression of a clear thought will only be interesting to a few.
There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading.
The theologian doesn't play by the rules, you ought to have picked up on this by now. Rules are man made, and the theologian turns to God, who lets us know that we have free will. I think that was Moses' downfall, he wrote rules and pretended that they came from God. Jesus tried to rectify this by rebelling against the supposed rules of God.
Deleted UserNovember 05, 2019 at 10:09#3489140 likes
I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues.
Yes, but if you think you have a parasite but get sent to a psychiatrist for having chemical imbalances leading to hypochondriacal symptoms, it ends up being the same thing. The doctor is ruling out that you have a traditional physical illness caused by some organism or cancer, etc.
IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion.
IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion.
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.
Reply to tim wood
Please reconsider my point now. If we are to define "God" we must refer to those who have real use for the term. It's wrong to say, "this use makes no sense to me so let's make a different definition". That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. Therefore, if theologians see a real need to conclude that there's an immaterial cause which they call "God", it's wrong to say that an immaterial thing with real causal existence makes no sense to me, so I'm going to steal there term "God" and make it refer to something else. That is not philosophy of religion.
In Banno's terms, if the theologians are playing "chess", then we can either learn the rules which they've laid down, and join in, or else we stay out of their game. But it's wrong to say I don't like this game called "chess" that they're playing, and I have no inclination to abide by the rules and play that game; but I'm going to make another kind of similar game, one which better suits my inclinations, and I'm going to call this game "chess", just to spite the others.
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God.[/quote]
Strawman (1).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded.[/quote]
Strawman (2). Special pleading (1).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.[/quote]
Special Pleading (2).
Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do.[/quote]
Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. And evidently, theologians talk about 'things' which are, no matter how subjectively or discursively 'meaningful', indistinguishable from fairytales or hallucinations.
Of course, we could be mistaken; but ... to wit:
"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish." ~David Hume
"The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness." ~Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace
"If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims."
~Tenzin Gyatso, The 14th Dalai Lama
Deleted UserNovember 05, 2019 at 13:56#3489910 likes
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God.
Or any of a wide range of phenomena. Just as medicine does somatic conditions. It's natural, we work with our models. But if you are going to put yourself in the position of claiming to be on the rational/sane team with the right to judge others irrational/insane, then having a basic knowledge of the history of your own discipline and what this implies about current knowledge seems a must to me.
Deleted UserNovember 05, 2019 at 13:58#3489930 likes
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
Strawman (1).
I have enountered this argument made by atheists. That current scientific knowledge precludes the possibility of a deity. I suppose we could try to figure out if 'Many' in the assertion he made is fair or not, but otherwise it certainly seems true that some atheists believe this is the case.
Reply to Coben I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions.
Deleted UserNovember 05, 2019 at 14:17#3490050 likes
Reply to 180 Proof But notice you shifted from atheists - what he wrote about - to scientific epistemology. yes, I agree and I would guess MU would agree that there is nothing inherent in science - in fact quite the contrary as you point out - to support this attitude. And yet it is there. First off atheists need not be scientists. But even beyond this scientists themselves have encountered this kind of reaction when they present to peers research that does or seems to contradict current models. IOW even people who should know better since they actually work with the epistemology, rather than just being a fan of it's findings, can act as if knowledge is final, current models are final. Of course theists do this kind of thing also. It is a human tendency to consider one's models final. But it is a problematic one, and especially so if the epistemology you are implicitly or explicitly supporting as the rational one is open to revision, does consider it likely that knowledge is currently incomplete.
As a somewhat related example: advocates of evolution - and please note, I believe in current evolutionary theory: so many times I have found people arguing that evolution means survival of the fittest and this entails stronger organisms - rather than organisms well adapted to the environments they live in. Smaller physically weaker organisms my be better adapted. Or that any trait an animal has must be beneficial - when in fact it may be neutral, it just didn't lead to that species being selected out of existence. Or they engage in teleological explanations for traits.
Just because people tend to be fans of science - which atheists do tend to be, but need not to be atheists - does not mean they even understand basic things about science. I have often found myself in disagreement with people who are identifying as 'on the science team' who are confused about all sorts of scientific facts and theory, let alone what scientific epistemology entails. And I have encountered the implicit assumption that science is complete in a wide range of topics. If X were true, they would know.
Deleted UserNovember 05, 2019 at 17:49#3491180 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 06, 2019 at 12:01#3493980 likes
On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions.
Actually, this claim is false, because the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God. Clearly "God" has an effect on us, so we cannot remove that concept from the category of efficacious, just like we cannot remove "quantum entanglement" from that category.
I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions.
I was talking actually talking about some atheist who profess scientism. I wasn't referring to "most scientifically literate positions". Your claim of strawman is unfounded, because clearly there are many people who fit my description of the type of atheist I dislike. Please don't ask me to name names because I won't. But you, being offended by my claim without having been named, and seeing the need to defend those persons described, says something about you.
And to MU Metaphysician Undercover, please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to. I have said that for cause you would not. Show me at least in this mistaken (or point me back to where it is so that I may look at it).
Where have you been tim? I presented the argument at least twice in the last few days, you first ignored it, and when I referred to it, you said you don't "buy it", and "it doesn't cut it for existential truth", without ever addressing the premises.
On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial.
Deleted UserNovember 06, 2019 at 16:24#3494800 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 07, 2019 at 03:02#3497830 likes
Question: what is the standing or kind of your argument/conclusion? Is it a piece of physics? Religious apologetics? An exercise in drawing conclusions as a matter of logic? Maybe another way: if you had to give a billboard statement of it as if it were an ad for a motion picture, what would you say?
It's a simple deductive argument, with two premises, the first an inductive conclusion drawn from observation (material things have a cause of existence), the second a logical statement concerning the nature of temporal order (there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing).
If I may, the underlying argument looks like this:
1) There are things, i.e., material things.
2) These things are caused; i.e., have efficient causes.
3) If things are caused by things, then there cannot be a first thing as cause, because it itself would need a thing to cause it.
4) Therefore the first thing is caused by an immaterial cause, that we call God.
Please accept this formulation as an agreed starting point, or edit or provide your own for me to agree with.
The thing I'd object to here, is 2). The cause of "a thing" is not necessarily an efficient cause, because an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. This is why the human will is understood as "free", it is free from efficient causation. So in human acts of intention, we have an immaterial cause, (free will), working with immaterial objects (ideas), which causes things. This is how we can understand the reality of immaterial cause through the examples of intentional human acts.
Contrary to what you claim, the idea of an immaterial cause is highly intelligible. The problem is that the scourge of determinism has set into the minds of the many, punishing these minds by banishing them from associating with the free, immaterial world of the soul, to the point that only purge can rectify.
In passing, Aquinas acknowledged that God is unknowable, but that we can have indirect knowledge through "negative" theology - what I call above a neither/nor argument.
As I said earlier, Aquinas clearly states that the existence of God and some things about him can be known by natural reason. it's in your quoted "Reply to Objection 1".
Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
See, "faith presupposes natural knowledge". So we first know the existence of God through natural reason, and by having this natural knowledge of God, we are then predisposed toward accepting on faith, other things, which other say about God. And so we have as "Reply to Objection 3", that from His effects, the existence of God can be clearly demonstrated, and known, though we cannot perfectly know God "as He is in His essence.
As apologetics, I have no issue with Aquinas. And as well for us who are not Thomas, it becomes an exercise in what we want to believe, the presuppositions that stand as axiomatic to those beliefs, and what emerges from that mix and for what purpose. Inevitably this involves some close and careful definitions, themselves to be demonstrated if they're not granted. All trending towards a medieval-style argument of granting major and minor premises, agreeing to forms, and so forth.
I think there is a problem with classifying Aquinas as an apologetic, depending on how you understand "apologetics". Prior to him, Aristotelian principles were generally not accepted into Christian theology. Aquinas adapted Christian principles to accept his interpretation of Aristotelian principles, so he was more of a shaper, or creator of Christian principles than a defender of Christian principles.
Theology is always "an exercise in what we want to belief". It is accepted that we have free will, and can believe what we want. The question is whether we are ready to accept the truth. Many, as yourself it seems, are not ready to believe the truth, so you find excuses not to accept the very simple and straight forward arguments demonstrating the existence of God, casting them aside because they are not consistent with what you want to believe.
That, or we can jump right away to an evaluation of the argument in modern scientific terms.
There's no point to evaluating the argument in "modern scientific terms", because it's not written in modern scientific terms. That would be like trying to play chess using the rules of checkers, it's fool's play. The terms are metaphysical, used in a metaphysical context, to be understood by metaphysicians. Either you have a desire to understand these terms, and understand the truth in these matters, or you do not. If you do not have such a desire, you can leave it well enough alone, and perhaps accept on faith the existence, or non-existence of God. But you are in no position to argue the non-existence of God without understanding the terms.
Why modern scientific terms and standards? Because ultimately that's what you're insisting on (as I understand the argument of you and others). That is, you insist on the efficacy of yours or Aquinas's arguments in absolute terms beyond their original scope. If you want to be medievalist in your thinking and exhibit examples of that thinking as examples of what you believe, have at it and I stand aside. But as in any sense scientific is simply an absurdity - and a curiosity. And it might be argued that one should just let it pass in silence, but we live in a world that for too long lets too much pass in silence that is harmful. As someone apparently versed in the details of these quaint pursuits, you ought to know better! Do not even think of asking what harm!
I can't understand what is meant by this passage at all. it seems very confused. Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. Are you suggesting that medieval writings are not meaningful? The "original scope" of these referred writings is religion, and the existence of God, exactly the scope of this thread. Why would you think that referring to these articles, in a discussion about God is an attempt to take them beyond their original scope? In reality, God is beyond the scope of science, so it is you who has the desire to take something beyond its scope. You want to use science to judge metaphysics, when metaphysics is not a subject of science, and therefore cannot be subjected to science. I agree with you, that this is harmful.
Deleted UserNovember 07, 2019 at 05:35#3498120 likes
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we might as well find out now if mathematics and geometry, and all similar things are included in - or excluded from - the world of non-mental independently existing immaterial things.
Well, if there is such a world, then these are precisely its denizens.
As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things.
I read once, as a throwaway line, in a polemic by (I think) Rowan Williams, with an allusion to Heidegger, that ‘there’s no such thing as a thing’. And indeed this or that chair is simply a ‘collocation of parts’ that serves a purpose. What, really, is a chair? It can be a log, or a rock, or an objet’d’art. (found the Williams reference.)
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 07, 2019 at 12:58#3498810 likes
First things first. You clearly have not thought through the meaning of the words "material" and "things." On using those term uncritically, your argument fails. Now lets move on. ("Material" and "things" are abstract terms applied to abstractions.)
I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept. If you think that the argument fails due to a misunderstanding of "matter", then you need to present an interpretation of that concept which demonstrates that the argument fails.
"What a thing is" refers to a thing's form, and the form of a thing is distinct from its matter. So thinking about "what a chair is" doesn't give me any understanding of matter. The same matter which composes the chair could potentially, exist in many different ways. That's why matter is understood by the concept of "potential".
And this presupposes a first material thing without defining "first." And I'll note right now that my objections would be absurd and ridiculous in most arguments, but are substantial here.
I told you, it's a temporal order. "First" means earliest in time. You do understand that "cause" is a temporal concept, or do you not?
And the final cause, intention. I agree immaterial, but a thing-as-idea; i.e., an idea. Your reification of this, if that's what you're doing, is slipshod manipulation of an ancient word thorough multiple filters. But at the same time your usage may be revealing.
As a cause, final cause or what we call intention, in Aristotle's principles, is real, just like "the good" is real in Plato's principles. This is very clear in Aristotle's principles. To make intention into something unreal, as you are doing, and accuse me of reification, is a distorted interpretation which leaves the existence of artificial things as unintelligible. The world is full of such things, and if we trace a chain of efficient causes to account for the existence of any such thing, the chain stops at the intent of the creator. The concept of free will disallows that the actions of the creator can be accounted for by efficient causation. So to say that the intent of the creator is not a real cause, is to say that the artificial object just happened, by chance, to get the form which it has, instead of recognizing the reality, of final cause. Then you deny the fact that the form of the object was given to the object by the mind of the creator.
Question: do you hold the Pythagorean theorem to be an immaterial existing thing not a mental construct?
I believe the Pythagorean theorem to be a mental construct. But this does not mean that this mental construct (or model of reality) is not intended to represent something real and independent of human minds. The concept's usefulness is dependent on the accuracy of its representation.
Aristotle presents two premises by which Pythagorean idealism (and the idealism of some Platonists he says) is refuted. The first is that these ideas exist only potentially, prior to being actualized by the human mind. Despite the fact that the potential for an idea like the Pythagorean theorem exists prior to it being "discovered" (which Aristotle calls actualized) by the human mind, it is the human mind which gives the idea actual existence. The second premise is Aristotle's cosmological argument. This argument proves that it is impossible for potential to be eternal. Therefore it is impossible that ideas have eternal existence prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, as Pythagorean idealism, and Platonic realism claim.
It is this argument which separates modern Platonic realists from Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians. The Neo-Platonist and Christian theologians respected Aristotle's cosmological argument, and went on to posit separate "Forms". The "Forms" are distinct from human ideas, having actual existence independent from human minds; "form" being actual under Aristotle's principles. It is necessary to respect this separation between ideas and Forms, in order to understand human fallibility. Human ideas have problems because of imperfections in the human mind. Therefore the human ideas do not perfectly map reality as intended. Pythagoras himself was extremely bothered by the "irrational" ratio which relates two perpendicular sides of a square. The square root of two does not resolve and this indicates a fundamental deficiency in the Pythagorean theorem's representation of reality. There is a basic incommensurability between one dimension of space and another (also evident in the irrational nature of pi), which indicates that this way of conceiving "space" is somewhat faulty.
But we need a starting place. Let it be with your first premise and the words therein in question, "material" and "thing" and "material thing." These are all concepts based in practical knowledge. That is, descriptive in functional terms. As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. And that just is that all of these terms are ideas! Now, is that your understanding of God, an understanding of God as God? That is, as a functionality that you attribute to a Him? In short, an idea?
Before you can say what a "material thing" is, you need to apprehend the concept of "matter". "Matter", as derived from Aristotle's Physics, is completely theoretical, it is not a practical concept at all. What we observe is that things change as time passes. Logically, if something changes it is no longer the thing which it was; it requires a new description, having a distinct form. In pre-Socratic times, sophists could perform all sorts of magical tricks with this fact. Fundamentally, at every moment of passing time, the existing object ceases to exist, and is replaced with a new distinct object. What we observe however, is a temporal continuity of things staying the same, with only certain aspects changing.
So Aristotle posited the existence of "matter" to account for the continuity of existence, the things which stay the same as time passes. Now, the form of the object might be changing as time passes, but we can still say that it is "the same" object, based on the assumption that the object's matter is not changing. Aristotle has a division of reality into matter and form in order to account for the two aspects, what stays the same as time passes, and what changes as time passes. Form is what is active, actual, and changing, whereas "matter" is a theoretical principle, posited to account for the observed reality that some things do not change as time passes. In Newton's laws, "matter' is replaced by inertia, what he posits as a fundamental property of matter.
These considerations and more are reasons that some - many - most old ideas are suitable for museum cases only. Relegated to the mothballed fleet of curiosities that modernity has ruled will never again - if they ever did - stand in the line of battle where knowledge is won. On your understandings, you cannot even speak intelligibly on these matters. You reject the only possible grounds, yet claim grounds that cannot be. You wave some words around that you cannot use correctly, announce "proved," and think you've done something.
Clearly it is you who has not said anything intelligible about what "material" refers to.
And indeed we must - agreed. But this not a warrant to make nonsense of science. And it is you who claim independent real immaterial existence. Throw out the understandings that condition our overall understanding of the world, and you can claim to walk through walls. You can claim anything you like, and adduce "arguments" that will prove every claim. But unless you meet the criteria of reason, they will all be unreasonable nonsense.
What Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates (and this is fundamental to his Metaphysics) is that it is impossible for matter to exist without any form. This means that for any material existence, there is always, necessarily, a "what it is". To think otherwise is to think the unintelligible, and to allow yourself to be consumed by contradiction. However, he also explains in his Metaphysics, that the first question of being (ontology), is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, and not something else. And, it is also a case of thinking the unintelligible if we propose that there is no reason (as in cause) for an object being what it is instead of something else. These two principles together indicate that the form of an object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object. This is why post-Aristotelian metaphysicians posited independent Forms. The Neo-Platonists have a procession, or emanation of Forms from the One, whereas the Christians have a hierarchy of angels from God.
Deleted UserNovember 07, 2019 at 21:30#3501000 likes
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I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept.
— Metaphysician Undercover
You've said it all here with this. Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue.
:up: :cool:
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]"Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?"
— 180 Proof
We could start with the cosmological argument ...[/quote]
(a) At best the argument is unsound. (b) Otherwise, it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction from the experience of the cosmos to [wait for it, wait for it] a-cosmos. (c) Also, there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise. (d) Lastly, one of the argument's hidden assumptions - nullifying soundness - is that the cosmos, consisting of cause and effect relations, is itself the effect of a cause (i.e. "First Cause") - compositional fallacy, no? (e) And, nailing this apologia's coffin shut for good, this purported "First Cause" is not even uniquely, or identifiably, (JCI) theistic, but just as arbitrarily can be attributed to deistic or pandeistic or ... QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic "creation"-concepts. Caveat: And some, or most, of these same objections also defeat the rest of that toothless old quaint Quinque viæ (due, in no small part, to Aristotlean 'teleological' pseudo-physics). :yawn:
So no, MU, like e.g. Spinoza Hume or Kant, I do not find (any version of) the "cosmological argument" to be "compelling evidence" of any thing other than poor reasoning (i.e. ad hockery).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]... the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God.[/quote]
Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that.
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]But you, being offended by my claim ...[/quote]
Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 08, 2019 at 13:29#3503070 likes
Unless you're prepared to argue that concepts are non-mental immaterial independently existing things I see no need to continue.
What's your reasoning for this? Why can't reality be such that human concepts are immaterial things which do not exist independently of the human mind, yet there are other immaterial things which do exist independently of the human mind?
Here's an example. I know there are immaterial things within my mind because I have contact with them, and apprehend them with my mind. I do not however, have direct contact with immaterial things independent from my mind. But I apprehend all sorts of things in my environment, words, writing, and other artificial things, which indicate to me that there are immaterial things which are independent from my own mind, in the minds of others. Even a human being itself, I observe as a material object, but I conclude from this object's activities, and my own experience of immaterial objects, that there is an immaterial cause of these activities. And that immaterial cause is independent of my mind.
Therefore, based on my own experience of immaterial things, and the material evidence of other immaterial things active In the world, the conclusion that there are immaterial things independent of my human mind is very sound. Aquinas' arguments state that based on the evidence of existing material things, we can conclude that there are immaterial things independent of all human minds. This is done in the very same way that I conclude that there are immaterial things independent of my own mind. We see in our environment, the effects of immaterial things, and based on our own experience with immaterial things within our own minds, we conclude that there are immaterial things independent of our minds. On what principles would you base an argument to deny this?
If this is your opinion, let me state to you, a simplified version of Aristotle's cosmological argument, and see if you can tell me why it is unsound. Remember, it is the argument which Aristotle used to refute Pythagorean idealism, what we now call Platonic realism. But it also demonstrates that "prime matter" is an impossibility, as unintelligible.
Through observation we see that the potential for the existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. And, the actual existence of an object requires a prior actuality (this you might interpret as a cause). If the potential for existence of objects preceded the actual existence of objects, and there was nothing actual, then there would always be the potential for existence of objects, and nothing actual. We observe that there is actual existence, therefore there is something actual which is prior to the potential for existence of objects.
Please, point to the fallacies which you claim are inherent within the argument, so that I can rectify my thinking. I will grant you, that the premises can be demonstrated as unsound through a process ontology, which denies the reality of "objects". But process philosophy ends up with the related problem of temporal continuity, the temporal extension of an event or process. So process philosophers end up turning to God to account for the observed continuity (consistency in the observed world) from one moment to the next.
Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that.
Well of course it is. "Efficacy" means to have an effect on. Clearly the existence of these things, conventions, websites, etc., demonstrate that these concepts... "The Force", etc, have efficacy. the concepts have an effect on the way people behave. C'mon 180 Proof, think about what you are saying for a minute before you blurt it out.
There seems to be a modern determinist/materialist movement to deny the idea that concepts have efficacy. This is pure nonsense, because all we need to do is to look around at all the marvels of the engineered world around us, which couldn't have been accomplished without concepts, to see first hand the efficacy of concepts. That movement is simply determined to isolate concepts and ideas in some Platonic realm of eternal existence, banishing them from our world, such that it is impossible for them to have an effect on our world. This is exactly the type of nonsense which Aristotle's cosmological argument was intended to combat. The cosmological argument brings immaterial objects, human concepts and ideas, right into our world, as natural objects in our world, existing as the property of human beings. This allows for the overwhelming evidence, that these ideas and concepts have causal efficacy in our world. That is the reality at the basis of "ideology".
Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me.
I invite criticism, that's how we learn. Please, be my guest and criticize the argument. But simply throwing every term for every form of fallacy which you can muster, stating "the argument is unsound", "it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction", "there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise", "compositional fallacy", etc., is just random nonsense.
If you have something constructive to say about the argument, please point to the fallacious parts. I assure you that I can address all of your seemingly random criticisms. Here's an example:
a) The argument appears unsound to you because you misunderstand the premises.
b) The idea that the potential for an object precedes its actual existence is not an incoherent induction. If it were false, there'd either be eternal objects, or objects which come from nothing. Since none of these have been found, and these ideas are unreal, the induction is coherent, and the premise is very sound.
c) I see no attempt to make "a posterior argument justify an a priori premise". That's just a random claim, probably derived from a misunderstanding of the argument.
d) No, there is no composition fallacy. If the argument is applied to "the universe", (which I didn't do in the first place, I referred to a "first object"), then "the universe" refers to an object. The composition fallacy would be associated to a straw man, produced by those who make "the first object" into "the universe", and claim that "the universe" is not a natural whole.
e) The fact that others might refer to God by another name is irrelevant. Aquinas for example concludes that this is what "we call God". There is however, a problem with referring to the conclusion of the cosmological argument as consistent with "QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic". In fact, this is exactly the type of Platonism (giving reality to a statistical model) which the cosmological argument attacks. Symmetry-breaking theoretical systems do not account for "the act" which breaks symmetry, and that is why they are inconsistent with the cosmological argument.
Deleted UserNovember 08, 2019 at 16:34#3503520 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 08, 2019 at 23:28#3504780 likes
Lack of evidence, special pleading, lack of definition, equivocation, failure in defining terms, begging the question - really, there is more wrong than I have words to name. In some respects I'm like the horse that refuses to advance over a rickety bridge.
You agreed that there are immaterial things in human minds, called ideas. If you want to take that back, because of the rickety bridge it leads to, then go ahead. But you are in denial.
Kindly tell us what immaterial thing is in your mind that is not some sort of idea or mental construct, or in short a product of your mind (being mind, presumably thinking, whether voluntary or involuntary), but that is instead an independently existing thing. And in the mind of others that you deduce from your apprehensions of your environment.
You clearly did not understand what I wrote. Please go back and reread. Or if you prefer, pay attention and I'll state it very simply for you. There are immaterial things in my mind, mental constructs, ideas. From the existence of artificial material things, and the actions of other human beings, which I sense, I deduce that there are immaterial things independent of my mind, i.e. in the minds of others. I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. According to theologians, the existence of natural material things is evidence of immaterial things independent of all human minds.
Why do you see a problem with this? It is very clear that we do not have direct mental access to immaterial things which are independent of our own minds, yet it is very true that there are such things. We logically deduce that there are immaterial things independent of our own minds, through observing the existence of material objects. It is this logical process which leads us to the existence of God.
I think of Aristotle as a thinker who, finding himself in a world with few or no good accounts of it, tried to find and provide those accounts, his tools comprising mainly logic and reason as he understood them. If he could craft in words a good account, that would be his account of that part or aspect of the world. And so heavy objects fall faster than light objects, smoke "falls" upwards, & etc. You, near as I can tell, uncritically misuse both the force and substance of those arguments to draw conclusions that only stand within the framework of the thinking that produces them, and not elsewhere.
It appears to me like you haven't read any Aristotle. I've read all his work except some which is debatably not properly attributed to him. And, the majority of his work I've read multiple times. If you think that I attribute to him a kind of thinking which is 20th century thinking, this is simply because his principles are still relevant today.
You seem to have a bias against ancient principles. "If it's ancient then it cannot be of any value." Actually the opposite is true. A principle which was written thousands of years ago, and is still accessible today, has stood the test of time. Principles which have little or no value are dropped and disappear.
Christian thinkers didn't fall into that particular trap. They themselves established their own form of the Kantian divide between faith and reason 1500 years before him. It's all faith, and if within the faith some reason can be employed, all the better. And faith can be a very good thing. But at the boundaries, where the iron meets the rest of the world, all is rust and corruption at the hands of people who don't know any better, and as well those who do. And mainly what they do is claim that matters of faith are matters of fact. I do not imagine the phenomena of these corruptions unique to Christianity.
We aren't talking about faith, we are talking about reason. This is the hole which you have dug for yourself, and seem to be incapable of escaping from. Religion is based in reason, not faith. Faith only exists where it's supported by reason. In your deluded state of denial, you refuse to accept this fact.
But his was preeminently the effort to explain nature, to make it conform to reason by inventing the reason, but in any case not to "put nature to the question."
Yes, it's quite clear from this passage that you have not read Aristotle. Precisely what Aristotle did was "put nature to the question". For example, read his Physics, De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. These books very explicitly "put nature to the question". His logical principles are put forward to prepare the student by developing a critical mind. Remember, Aristotle partook in the tradition of Socrates and Plato, criticizing the knowledge of the day. His logic is aimed at the demise of sophism, and this same goal was later maintained by the Skeptics.
Deleted UserNovember 09, 2019 at 05:59#3505440 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 09, 2019 at 13:09#3506290 likes
MU, if you and I are going to continue it is clear to me we are going to have to start at the very beginning.
For example, I am content to acknowledge there such things as chairs, and this simply as a practical matter. And that the chairs are material things. At the same time I am aware that this language of "chairs" and "material" is equivocal and ambiguous - but not in the practical context of chairs. This language in its context is absolutely meaningful.
I also know that there is love, justice, three, and all abstract ideas. These are all manifestly somethings. Equally manifestly, they are not material. It seems accurate to call them ideas/mental constructs, In the sense of no mind, no idea/mental construct, nor can you ever sit on one. I call them ideas, and for as long as we can keep in mind that our use of the word "thing" has two least two very different referents and thereby avoid confusion, "thing" is a convenient word to use. And this I made clear several post ago
OK, I see this as an acceptable starting point. You have described two distinct categories of "things".
But now you present it as an immaterial thing in minds that we call ideas. Perhaps you mean the same thing I mean, but in inverting the order you make me very suspicious.
Yes I do invert the order, and there is very good reason for this, clearly explained in Plato's Republic. Do you recognize that the idea of "the chair" exists in the mind of the carpenter before the carpenter builds the material chair? Therefore the material existence of the chair is dependent on the immaterial "chair" in the carpenter's mind.
An idea/mental construct is a product of thinking (thinking broadly defined) that is immaterial, and that for convenience we can call it a thing, and that in doing so do not at all imply that ideas are in any way material. Agreed?
I agree with this. Now, do you agree that there are material things which are the product of thinking, just like there are immaterial things which are the product of thinking? We see these engineered, artificial things all over the earth.
Since both types of things, according to your categorization, immaterial and material, may be the product of thinking, the question we need to address is if it is possible that there are any things which are not the product of thinking.
You've defined the immaterial category of "things" in such a way that this type of thing requires a mind. Consequent to this definition (your definition) of "immaterial thing", all immaterial things are the product of thinking.
Now here's the problem. Aristotle demonstrates in his Metaphysics, (and this seems to be where your point of denial lies), how it is necessary to conclude that the "form" of each and every material object is prior in time to the material existence of that object. From this argument, we can conclude that every material thing is dependent for its existence, on an immaterial thing, just like the chair is dependent on the carpenter's idea, in the example above. Incidentally, this fact (where your point of denial lies) is empirically demonstrated by particle physics.
I see two possible solutions to this problem. Either we adjust your definition, allowing that there are immaterial things such as "Forms", which are not the product of a mind, or we propose a "divine mind" to account for the existence of these immaterial things. Choose your poison.
I don't understand how you can make this assertion. Check these reasons:
1) I can only make conclusions concerning the existence of immaterial things based on logic, because I cannot sense immaterial things.
2) There is very strong evidence of immaterial things independent of my mind.
3) There is evidence, not quite so strong, that there are immaterial things in the minds of other animals.
4) Plato, Aristotle, and even modern physicists, have demonstrated the need to assume immaterial things as prior to all material things.
5) You have given me absolutely no reason why we ought to restrict our definition of "immaterial thing" in such a way that immaterial things are necessarily dependent on a human mind.
Therefore, I have no reason to restrict "immaterial thing" in the way you suggest. In fact, I have very strong reason against this. So I just can't understand your assertion that I "have every reason" to do this.
"Very true," "logically deduce," "logical process." You are the one making these claims. I merely trying to get you to put your money where your mouth is. So far you have not.
This is false, just like your claim above, that I have "every reason to". I provided the logical argument in a number of different formats. You and 180 have both asserted that it is fallacious, but neither one of you has "put your money where your mouth is".
Exhibit these demonstrations for us; let us see how very true they are, how they are logically deduced, the result of logical process. If you cannot or will not - and of course you cannot - then you're just a snake-oil man. a thief of language and ideas, a sophist and not a very good one, a troll, and the only correct thing to do is to challenge you as a seller of nonsense.
You're so fucking full of shit that it frustrates me Woody. I produced the argument at least twice. Each time, you said something like "that argument doesn't cut it", and "I don't buy it". After this, you said "please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to". So I re-presented the argument again, and you said "thank you for re-presenting". Now you're right back to "Exhibit these demonstrations for us". Sometime I feel like I'm "Tied to the whippin' post, tied to the whippin' post."
Deleted UserNovember 09, 2019 at 15:33#3506510 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 09, 2019 at 18:57#3507200 likes
But this is wrong. With will power we move our bodies and this produces material things. So thinking clearly has a material effect. Thinking produces material things. The evidence for this is all around us in the form of artifacts and engineered things.
You want your notions to be non-mentally-constructed, non-material, independently existing real "things." Then make the kind of demonstration that reveals them. That's part of the program of "putting to the question": a compelling to meet a standard; the standard, one hopes, crafted so that with respect to the thing sought, it becomes a sine qua non.
This is a misrepresentation. All my ideas are mentally constructed in my own mind, I agree with you on that. However, there are immaterial things independent of my mind, such as the ideas in your mind. How can you not agree with me on this?
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 10, 2019 at 00:13#3508360 likes
In a nutshell, right here. Did you not see and read the "by itself"? What am I to make of this misreading? If nothing else, and as charitably as possible, it's suggestive of a very unrigorous even uncritical and undifferentiated understanding of what a cause is.
The "by itself" is irrelevant. You're just trying to create a distraction here. No cause works "by itself", it works on what is existing at the time. The cause of free will works from within an existing human being.
I do agree. but you have added the qualification, "such as the ideas in your mind." Until now, your claim as I have read it, is that there are independently existing non-material things that are not ideas/mental constructs.
I added the qualification to get agreement, a starting point. Now let's see if we can proceed slowly and cautiously from this agreed starting point. You agree that there are immaterial things independent of your mind. Do you also agree that you do not have direct access to these other immaterial things (ideas of others)? You conclude that there are other immaterial things, independent of your mind, through judging the material things which you sense. Now, is it not the effects of those other immaterial things, on the material world, things like words, artifacts, and human actions, which justify the conclusion that there are other immaterial things independent of your own mind?
With respect to particular chairs, that are the result of the process you describe, yes. It seems to me debatable without any conclusion how the first chair, or ideas or notions of chairs, came about. But maybe that's not to the point. Yes, the blueprint for this chair preexists, and the general concept of chair (by now) preexists, any recently made or thing used as a chair.
OK, that's a start, you agree that the idea pre-exists the chair. Do you also agree that the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the chair? The immaterial thing, the idea, is necessary for the existence of the chair, and is necessarily prior to (pre-exists) the chair. The material chair could not exist if the immaterial idea to make it, was not there first. Doesn't this necessity justify the claim of "cause"?
Deleted UserNovember 10, 2019 at 05:06#3508960 likes
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Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 10, 2019 at 12:38#3509520 likes
Nothing about my point was about my mind or your mind or anyone else's mind. It was about your claim that there exist independent non-material "things" that are not ideas/mental constructs - nothing to do with mind at all.
Right, I have made the conclusion that there are immaterial things which are not mental constructs of human beings. I have produced the argument which necessitates that conclusion. You have rejected the argument and asked me to "exhibit these demonstrations for us". My obligation is to take it very slow and easy to facilitate understanding by even the most simple minded human being. First step, do you agree that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) independent of your own mind?
Of course we were talking about causes, where have you been? That's the crux of the argument, as Aquinas said, we can know the existence of God through His effects. Am I talking to a board? Second step, you logically conclude that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) which are independent of your own mind, from sense observations of the effects that the immaterial things have on material things.
I ask you to kindly make clear how any thinking produces any material thing. -and you simply ignore the question and keep on going.
I already answered this for you, it's very simple. Thinking moves the human body, producing material change, effect in the material world, creating material things. This is the essence of free will. If you are deterministic, and insist that these actions may be explained by material causes, rather than the immaterial cause of intention or free will, then this explains your stance toward immaterial things.
If that's the case, then I can only tell you that I see inconsistency in your principles. You allow that mental constructs exist as immaterial things, but you deny the efficacy of these immaterial things. How could the material chair come into existence if the immaterial idea does not play a causal role?
So I'll repeat myself. The idea of the chair which the carpenter builds, is necessarily temporally prior to the material chair, and, the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the material chair. This necessity indicates that the idea is a cause of existence of the chair.
To demonstrate causality does not require a demonstration of "how", it just requires a demonstration of necessity. We do not need to demonstrate how cold temperatures freeze water to show that cold temperatures are a cause of water freezing. The immaterial idea is necessary for the existence of the chair, therefore it is a cause of existence of the chair, regardless of whether we can demonstrate how it acts.
Metaphysician UndercoverNovember 12, 2019 at 03:24#3514600 likes
How can you make any claim to consistency when one day you write this:Quoting tim wood
You and your ideas, in their proper context, are among the world's finest, most durable, productive, and honorable...
Reply to tim wood
It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one that follows:
1. If there is something that can be used in a discussion to allow it to not fall apart, then that something should be used in every discussion
2. Definitions, when used as starting points, allow a discussion to not fall apart.
3. Therefore, any discussion should require definitions to be used as starting points.
This argument runs a modus ponens to argue that "definitions" are what are needed for a discussion to not fall apart, which seems to be what you are (generally) arguing for. While I agree that definitions, in the way describe them as "Religion is" or "Theology is," can help add some structure to discussions and help discussions from falling apart, I do not think that means that every discussion should use them as starting points or that there could not be discussions that use them and do not still fall apart in the end.
I think an objection arises against premise two of my above argument. Certainly, it is easier to have a discussion that begins with a claim or foundational principle, but does that mean that it will not fall apart? I do not think so, for many people could not understand the definition to begin with, or if they do, then they could eventually stray off topic from what was initially being discussed. I think both of these things, if not addressed and corrected, could cause a discussion to ultimately collapse, though a definition is acting as an established starting point for the discussion.
Because of this objection, I think the argument fails. Maybe a reply to this could be that the argument is not charitable enough, and that this is not in fact what the argument is. I would disagree with this reply, especially in light of the section that we should start all of our discussions with definitions of what "God is," what "Religion is," or what "Theology is." So, ultimately, I think the argument fails.
Comments (287)
Perhaps we should preface our assertions about god(s) with the phrase, "whether the gods exists or not": Whether the gods exist or not, religions are a human creation. Theology (about the gods that may or may not exist) is a human creation. Ritual is a human creation. Whether the gods exists or not, religions, rituals, and theology have value and meaning to people.
Can people (ardent believers, lukewarm believers, apostates, agnostics, atheists...) agree that there is a a limit on how much anyone can know about the gods, which is imposed by the differences we suppose exist between humans and gods?
Can we agree that believers can not precisely map out what they can know about the gods (because the gods are to some extent unknowable)?
Quoting tim wood
Holy hat trick! This trinity seems to me too entangled to pick just one term to begin with; so ...
"God" is an empty name.
Theology is a litany of rationalizations (i.e. dogmas) for suspending disbelief in "god".
Religion is ritualized daily living as if (a) theology is true.
"I Am hath sent me unto you."
(Thus Spoke 180 Proof)
I’ve put forward Geertz’ general layout for the term ‘religion’ to start discussions before but no one seemed particularly interested.
The best you can hope for is to find people who are willing to accept other people’s views without trying to bend them.
Is that which nothing greater can exist; where "greater" means the most "powerful" in the sense of abilities.
Quoting Bitter Crank
Agreed. Although I believe my definition to be correct, it is indeed incomplete. As God would be a higher being that us, we could not fully grasp its concept.
Theology:
Is the scientific (rational) study of truth based on data from the gods, like the bible etc. I agree with @Bitter Crank that it is a human creation, and @180 Proof's definition. This does not imply subjectivity.
Religion:
Is the set of behaviour based on the findings of the theology. I agree with "180 Proof"'s definition again.
Quoting Bitter Crank
Not necessarily. In some religions like christianity, judaism and islam, the belief is that the religious instructions were given by the gods, or else confirmed by the gods that the existing behaviours were good (like some ethical acts).
I think assertion would yield fruitful discussion, but in line with the concerns expressed in your OP, I think we'd need to narrow the focus, or there might be the tendency for people to go off in infinite directions on a too-broad topic.
So what is it about theology that we might want to investigate:
Quoting Bitter Crank
BC, would this lead to a discussion on the nature of faith?
Quoting 180 Proof
180, this is an interesting proposition: that all theology consists of (psychological, I take it) rationalizations or manipulations of the story line?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I must respectfully disagree, or point out that you may be jumping the gun by getting into the contents of this religion or that. This goes back to the issue of faith--asserting the belief that human-written texts are the word of the diety.
But talking about the nature of faith is not the same as espousing faith in the doctrine that a diety directly inspired a written text. I don't get the impression that we want to jump into a discussion about whether or not Torah, Koran or Gospels were dictated by a diety.
What is faith?
Religion is any system of beliefs about reality or morality grounded ultimately in faith thus defined.
“God” can mean different things to different religions.
And theology is the attempt to study “God” (whatever that means) with reason.
Soon after we discussed the etymology of the word itself: the first definition being from the Latin ‘religio’, meaning ‘attitude of awe and reverence to the gods’. It seemed the most obvious derivation.
The second possible derivation was from ‘re-ligare’ where ‘ligare’ is related to the root ‘lig-‘ meaning ‘binding’ or ‘tying’ (cf ligature, ligament.) So re-ligare was to join to or unite with.
I formed the immediate impression that this latter was similar in meaning to the Indic ‘yoga’ meaning ‘to yoke or join’. And that understanding of the meaning is very much in line with my own to this day.
Later on we also studied Rudolf Otto’s book The Idea of the Holy. This was an exploration of the defining characteristics of religious epiphanies from a cross-cultural perspective. William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience and Alduous Huxley’s The Perennial Philosophy also became ‘go-to’ texts along these lines.
So as regards the subject-matter, I am of the view that religion is a universal characteristic of human culture. It obviously takes many forms, from the grotesque to the sublime, and many points between. It can be used as oppressive organ of state control or as a liberation from social constraints. It is many things, but one thing I will observe is that it has a specific meaning in Christian and post-Christian culture, but one which if often felt rather than consciously articulated.
I believe you are missing the point. The original goal as per the OP is to find statements that most groups agree with, and my point is that there are many groups which disagree with the statement that religions are always a human creation.
The christian catholics would not agree with this definition of faith. As described, this would be called "blind faith", which is not regarded as a good thing. As per Thomas Aquinas, faith falls between zero knowledge (ie blind faith) and certainty about an object. Strong faith is supported by reason; reason which, while not achieving a full proof, yields to the probable or the reasonable. Thus any act based on a belief supported by the probable or the reasonable is an act of faith, which is good; where as any act based on a belief devoid of any reason would be blind, which is foolish.
[i]"Faith" - irrational belief / practice - is like poor hygiene, pathogenic contagions & pollution: failure to resist oppose & prevent is more often than not hazardous to y/our health."
Faith consists of:
"[....] wholly subjective, worshipful trust or hope in [ ... ] 'Ultimate Mystery'."[/i]
~
"Faith" = trust-in/assent to mysteries & fact-free practices - beliefs/just-so-stories for 'placebo fantasy effects' ... [...]
God: X
Theology: discussion about X & practice
Religion: practice
The thing that distinguishes faithful belief from other belief is its independence of good reasons. Thomists may claim that you should strive also to have good reasons in addition to your faith, but that is just saying not to go on faith alone, as faith alone (without reason) is blind. Faith per se is thus exactly what they would call “blind faith”, and it is only in fortifying a belief with something besides faith that it becomes not blind.
The modern definition of "Religion" typically refers to an authoritative creed, of which there are many. But I think religion-in-general goes deeper than that, into the essence of human nature. It's not just intellectual assent to a list of specific "truths", "facts" or commandments. Instead, it's an emotional bond to a family or tribe or social group. The details differ from tribe to tribe, but the feeling of belonging is the same for all people of all places and all times. It's the same emotional connection that unites a family or football team, or military unit. And it may even be motivated by the same neurotransmitters (e.g. oxytocin) that bond a mother and her baby.
But, in a more general sense, I like to use the Latin roots to see what the word originally referred to. As you noted, "re-" = back, again, past; and "ligare-" = join, unite, bond. a link. So I conclude that the essential meaning of "religion" is "tradition" : an emotional link to a common history.
For example, many Christian Catholics and Protestants are more loyal to their local social group than to the required creeds of their sect, or to the official leaders of their church. So, when push comes to shove, they would place more weight on their 2000 year old Christian tradition, than on any abstract belief, such as Trinity or Transubstantiation. Hence, their common bond of Christian fellowship would outweigh any milder feelings for fellow humans, who belong to a different tribal tradition, such as Hinduism or Islam. Emotionally, religion is Us versus Them.
Dictionary.com, word origin for "re-" : a prefix, occurring originally in loanwords from Latin, used with the meaning “again” or “again and again” to indicate repetition, or with the meaning “back” or “backward” to indicate withdrawal or backward motion: regenerate; refurbish; retype; retrace; revert.
Jesus admonished the Pharisees, who he viewed as apostates from the true religion (tradition) handed down by Moses. In the words of Isaiah, referring to God : "Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. 8 You have let go of the commands of God and are holding on to human traditions.”. Mark 7:7-13 [ Ironically, the Pharisees considered themselves to be conservatives. But apparently not conservative enough for the fundamentalist Jesus people. ]
[quote=tim wood] "God is an empty name"? is that the best you can do, 180?
Whatever "God" may be, it cannot be an empty name: it would seem that in every usage, it means something.[/quote]
C'mon, you can do better than that, tim.
[i]Pegasus
Elf
Hell
Ghost
Atlantis
Magic
Limbo
Angel
Paradise[/i]
Etc ...
Every time we use empty names like these in a sentence they mean something in a relevant language-game but not in others. "Meaning is usage", no? Anyway, skim the wiki for empty name I again link here and you'll be hard pressed to object to my definition of "God" in a serious manner. The Rorschach-like semantic baggage of this (transcendental) signifier in particular nearly screams "Empty Name" ...
[quote=tim wood]How, it being an empty name, do you account for the persistence of the idea?[/quote]
See the empty names above? Now ask yourself, tim, how you can ask such a vacuous question.
Religion is a set of beliefs that consists of two parts.
The transcendental part are rituals, prayers, festivities, and similar behaviours. The religous-law part is a set of rules that forbid particular behaviour types and from which the believer can derive the moral status of the behaviour he intends to engage in.
It is the religious-law part that tends to cause political issues.
Politicians may argue that their lawmaking activity would be above religious law, while religious communities will insist that it is exactly the other way around. Since I benefit from anything that damages the political power of the ruling elite, I definitely side with the religious view.
In other cases, I do not even seek to side with one, particular party, because I already benefit from the mere existence of the conflict. I find the position of the arms trader to be the most interesting. That is especially so, when it is possible to simultaneously sell weapons to both sides.
Comparative religion covered a very broad range of material. But there was a big emphasis on 'history of ideas'. 'The history of ideas is a field of research in history that deals with the expression, preservation, and change of human ideas over time. The history of ideas is a sister-discipline to, or a particular approach within, intellectual history. ...The historian Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962) coined the phrase and initiated its systematic study in the early decades of the 20th century.'
Personally, the history of ideas has really shaped my approach to philosophy also, insofar as I tend to understand it in terms of underlying themes or tropes that you can trace in different cultures and historical epochs. Another unwritten factor behind that is the kind of minds or forms of consciousness associated with different cultural epochs - minds vastly different from our own which moderns will usually find extremely hard or impossible to comprehend (although will be generally quick to categorise as simply archaic and of no relevance on those grounds).
'Old school' comparative religion tended to be very conservative and based on the field work and observations of anthropology and sociology, but also incorporated theories of religion, such as studies from, and criticism of, well-known texts like The Golden Bough - A Study in Comparative Religion by anthropologist Sir James George Frazer. Also Durkheim, Max Weber, Peter Berger (another favourite) and many names that now escape me.
One scholar that I really liked was Max Mueller. I found his work on 'linguistic archeology' and the common roots of the Indo-European languages utterly fascinating.
My own approach was driven by an interest in the spiritual enlightenment pointed out by such luminaries as Ramana Maharishi (30 December 1879 – 14 April 1950) an Indian sage and jivanmukta (liberated being), born Venkataraman Iyer, but most commonly known by the name Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi.
Also by Swami Vivekananda who introduced Advaita Vedanta to the US in the late 19th century and underwent long speaking tours by train.
And also Soyen Shaku who spoke alongside Vivekananda at the Parliament of Religions which was held in Chicago, 1880's. He was the first Rinzai Zen monk to speak in the US, and his reprinted Lectures of a Buddhist Abbott still stand up quite well (and are still in print).
It was these kinds of books (along with Alan Watts and D. T. Suzuki), mainly discovered via the then-thriving Adyar (Theosophical Society) bookshop, that drove my interest in comparative religion in the first place, as it seemed the most likely faculty in which to find discussion of those kinds of teachings and ideas.
In a way it was, but again old-school comparative religion was very much arms-length, you studied religions like you might study species of butterfly pinned to a board, and it was in no way 'confessional' in orientation (as it ought not to be). But this had begun to change in the mid-20th century with the advent of 'scholar-practitioners', of whom a famous example was the Romanian scholar Mercia Eliade. His works were quite influential in the Department. Also Huston Smith, who died not that long ago at 97, and who was an eclectic scholar-practitioner.
Quoting Gnomon
Can't completely agree - while it is of course true that 'tradition' means 'to carry forward', but the idea of 'joining' or 'union', as in 'union with the divine' (or theosis or apotheosis) is not temporally-bound in any way. The tradition is seen in some sense as a vessel for preserving the gist of such teachings, but from their perspective, the subject is 'the deathless'.
-------
I think one thing that hasn't been stated in this thread, is the role of, or idea of gnosis, or 'higher knowledge'. It is universally assumed by the participants here that religion is invariably a matter of belief, and by most people, belief in non-existent mythological figures.
However, of the many tributaries that formed what became known as 'religion', were streams such as shamanism, yoga, and other such disciplines, traces of which you even find in Pre-socratic Greek philosophy (and for that matter, related to the Orphism of Plato). Amongst these streams also was what were to become various gnostic schools, which were generally, and successfully, suppressed by the nascent Roman Church in its formative stages. "History", it is said, "is written by the victors" - and no more so than in this matter. So the idea of there being higher states, direct knowledge, and so on, which are relatively commonplace in Hindu and Buddhist schools, more or less went underground in Western culture, which has had many profound consequences for the 'history of ideas' in the West.
I suppose a bunch of somebodies will disagree with the statement that 2 + 2 = 4. Be that as it may...
I think religion is ALWAYS a human creation. This isn't a reflection on the gods. Suppose that the gods are real. Religion, as @Wayfarer said, is "an attitude of awe and reverence to the gods". If a people have an encounter with a god, they are likely to feel awe, fear (or terror), reverence, and more all to overwhelming degrees. Religion is the response to an encounter with the holy, a connection. Since the gods thought to be real don't conveniently pop in every day religion finds ways of recreating the encounter. The Eucharist, Passover, the gods in the Hindu temples, meditation practices, ascetic practices, and so forth provide a way for subsequent generations to share (symbolically) the encounter.
That religion (a response to the holy) is a human creation would seem axiomatic. The gods do not need religion.
In some religions (thinking here of the classical period) the gods were thought to need sacrifices. A passage in the Epic of Gilgamesh states that when a sacrifice of burnt offerings was being made, "The gods gathered around the altar like flies". The gods were hungry. Since the gods didn't literally descend from the heavens and consume the sacrifice, the sacrifice was eaten by humans, and thus shared with the gods. In other references, libations are poured out on the ground for the gods. I don't know how many extant religions operate with that idea.
With this I can agree. However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much off philosophy, essecialy Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive.
A better approach would be to map out the differences...
Absolutely. Definitions can't be treated as if they were some technical matter enabling the true meat of a discussion, definitions are what a discussion consists of entirely. To really agree on definitions is to just agree. The reason why we can't agree on a definition of God/Religion/Theology is because they are no mere acts of taxonomy, the meaning of the words is their use and their use is intimately tied to people's lifestyles, identity etc. You can no more easily get someone to give an inch on a definition than you can persuade them to act this way or that, best to simply present alternatives.
Elephantine, indeed. A species of belief, to be sure; but not a species of truth. Mapping out the differences and similarities between faith and certainty might be interesting.
Sure; but it doesn't stop the discussion. Take
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Ridding Anselm's notion of inconsistency is a work of ages...
True, but in the meantime I can at least relax in my favourite armchair (or God, as I call it). The armchair than which no greater armchair can exist.
A family resemblance, then. Given any definition of [i]religion[/I], there is some item that counts as religious and yet does not fit that definition...
BAN those terms from the discussion but keep them in the title. Then people will have to reconsider how to express their views by other means.
That could be a fruitful means of finding some common terminology if not a universal concept everyone can partially agree with.
No matter how it is approached I don’t see a way to get away from bringing up terms and phrases like ‘rational’, ‘emotional content’, ‘universal pattern’ and/or ‘learned habit’.
I’d be up for the above or an in-depth discussion on Geertz def. If you start a thread along either of those lines let me know.
Thanks
Just because Tom Aquinas says it doesn't make it so. All of these arguments are easily deconstructed these days: probability and reason cannot prove the contents of faith.
Quoting Banno
:up:
Might be.
:mask: - "hygiene"
In the context of Biblical, Vedic and other extant theistic traditions wherein worship consists in submission of the child/female/servant/Profane to the elder/male/master/Sacred, Faith denotes trusting hopeful dutiful worship (via second-hand anecdotal accounts (e.g. revealed)) of Mysteries.
At further remove, as I discern it, Faith is nothing but magical thinking, that is, trust hope confidence in Supernatural Mysteries (via "thoughts & prayers") over above defeasible thinking vis-à-vis Natural Evident Problemata (via reflective inquiry & problem-solving) -- and positing all 'meaning & value' in terms of any one of arbitrarily countless, otherworldly, spiritual Hereafters at the expense of demeaning & devaluing this worldly, ineluctably singular, physical Here & Now.
Faith doesn't have to be blind, like love or hatred, to be blinding like staring at the midday sun. 'Believing is seeing' the Faithful preach trumping 'seeing is believing' (e.g. "Crede ut intellegas" ~Augustine ... "Credo quia absurdum" ~Tertullian(?) ... Indeed, the NT says, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and frustrate the intelligence of the intelligent." ~1 Corinthians 1:19).
But isn't this 'disposition' retrograde? degenerative? infantilizing? As babies we learn to believe long before in later childhood we learn to think adequately, and longer still before, if ever, we learn to think for ourselves; yet Faith consists in prioritizing 'believing over thinking' - imploring us to be "Born Again", which sounds like willing a prematurely senescent 'second childhood'.
:eyes: - "gesundheit"
And there are also secular bigots.
I just want to point out that this quote isn't in the TANAKH; just in New Testament.
Quoting 180 Proof
This seems correct: magical thinking, which is an infantile mode, is quite comforting. It reduces complexities to simple answers; one definitely doesn't have to think as much (unless they have to go on a proselytizing campaign and think up ways to convince people to accept the same tenets of faith. In that sense, Paul was an excellent salesman.) It even stops all sorts of nagging questions from arising in the first place. It neatly ties up all sorts of loose ends. I always thought this was the purpose of faith..., no?
Yes. But I was talking about the physical motivation behind the felt human need for union with Mother, Father, Family, Tribe, and God. That urge to unite is "deathless" as long as it has roots in human nature. And Culture, including Religion, is the offspring of Human Nature, which is an outgrowth of Physical Nature, and so forth.
External traditions (e.g memes; ceremonies) are symbolic cultural models of inner natural emotions. When we observe Hindus bathing in the Ganges, and Baptists immersed in rivers or water tanks, we can see the common human urge for purging and purification. Inner Meanings are preserved and propagated in outer traditions.
...and are, as you say, butchered. Socrates knows that he knows nothing; further, as demonstrated by his method, nor does anyone else, since they cannot provide definitions that will stand.
Quoting tim wood
Yep. It doesn't help.Quoting tim wood
Well, no. We start with some agreement, sure; we don't need preliminary definitions. Indeed, the thread seems to be doing well despite their absence.
Though he still manages to believe that beauty=knowledge=virtue. That death is not important. That people do evil out of ignorance. (and if he knows nothing, how does he avoid this?) He certainly seemd to have epistemological beliefs; iow he has his process for demonstrating ideas are incorrect. He seemed to know the qualities that made up virtue; courage for example. He seemed to be a dualist, since our true self was our soul - not like the Christian soul but neverless not the body, but the internal thinking and deciding self - rather than what we own and status, etc.
Of course this is all reported by others, but then so is his quote about his knowing he knows nothing.
I prefer to just assume that one is using one of the standard definitions (a la those found in major dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc.), unless one specifies otherwise.
Of course empty names can be meaningful; I've repeatedly said (shown) as much already (re: theology, etc) . And the OP asks for a definition "God is ..." and not an interpretation (or testimonial) e.g. "God means ..." so moving the goal-posts now is just ... evasive. :yawn:
Quoting tim wood
What are you talking about? I've neither attempted to nor implied we should "terminate the discussion" in any way for any reason; in fact, I'd hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia. Apparently, you, tim, are not interested in - capable of(?) - a more freethought (i.e. atheological) approach.
As for definitions of the 'ground of being':
From review of D B Hart 'The Experience of God'.
Faith is gone in that context.
The necessity of ground of being allows for no counterfactual. If we understand the ground of being, we know nothing is given without it. We have nothing to just trust, sans reason.
Indeed, we are in the exact opposite position to faith: reason has given us understanding of that which is beyond death and possibility.
All good points. He abases himself to be exalted. I like Socrates, but he's only different from other gurus on the level of quality. He's not playing a different game altogether or refusing to play the game. To engage in conversation at all is already a self-assertion, a claim on attention, respect, trust, etc. And then a truly ignorant person is not only useless but dangerous.
If knowledge of our own ignorance is the most important kind of knowledge, then somehow this wonderful humility ends up back on top. What a surprise...
Yes, and it's manifest in actions. The obsession with beliefs misses what religion shares with other expressions of membership. Religion is continuous with politics and art. Life and action are primary. We bookish philosophers inherit the fantasy of justified systems of beliefs. What we don't like is our radical immersion in material circumstance and tacit knowledge that not only cannot be justified but also cannot even be made explicit. (This immersion itself can be and has been made fairly explicit by various famous 'anti-philosophers' who tended to have more sophisticated notions of religion like yours above.)
I believe there is a way into understanding 'the nature of the soul' as connected with 'what grasps meaning'. Being able to grasp meaning is something fundamental to all living organisms in the sense that even so-called instinctive behaviours are responses to environmental stimuli and can be understood in terms of signal and response (which is basic to the emerging science of biosemiotics [sup]1[/sup].)
But what I want to concentrate on here is the sense in which the mind draws together and synthesises the meaning-world which underlies all acts of judgement. This is the faculty of 'transcendental apperception' in Kant, which provides the basis of experience - without it, we would not be able to interpret or understand anything, all of our sensory perceptions would be a mere chaos. It is analogous to what might be described as 'the ground of being'.
I'm inclined to see this conception as the philosophical descendant of Aristotle's 'rational soul', subject of the famous and controversial passage in De Anima of the 'active intellect'. Of course anything of this kind is nowadays dismissed as archaic but I suggest that there is a conceptual space for the possibility of the 'rational soul', and that it plausibly corresponds with what Kant and later Husserl called the 'transcendental ego'.
Bolds added.
You might object 'where can this 'transcendental ego' be found? And I think there's a clue in the examination of the so-called 'neural binding problem', in particular the problem of the 'subjective unity of experience'. This refers to the capacity of the brain to synthesise all manner of perceptual stimuli into a coherent unity - the 'subjective unity of experience' - which is, at least, strongly suggestive of the 'transcendental ego'.
In his paper on this issue, Jerome S. Feldman says that:
Source
So does this mean that the rational soul/transcendental ego exists? I would say not, because, as noted above, 'nothing can be known of it', and by its nature, it can never plausibly be an object of cognition (hence, 'transcendental' in the Kantian sense.) Yet without this faculty, we would not function as conscious beings. I am suggesting that this is a plausible account, even if only by way of analogy, of the reality of 'soul' - not as the ethereal 'res cogitans' of Descartes but the native faculty which grasps meaning.
------------------
1. Interestingly, 'semiotics' as a distinct discipline originated with St Bonaventura who wrote that 'sensible things are understood to be signs that ultimately can direct humans to the divine art or wisdom through which all things have been made. ... In addition, Bonaventure posits two higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are ”images“ (imago) pointing to the First Principle through its properly rational powers which have their source and highest object in God and ”likenesses“ (similitudo) of God to the extent that they are recipients of divine grace and conform themselves to the divine will. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bonaventure/#3.1
Quoting tim wood
This is the lesson of the Theatetus, to start with a definition is to be mislead by that definition. They start out with a preconceived notion (a sort of definition) of what "knowledge" is. Then in all the proposed examples of how this supposed "knowledge" might actually exist, they find that the examples are lacking, and cannot assure them of what they are looking for within their defined essence of "knowledge", i.e. truth. At the end of the dialogue they realize that they were misguided by their own preconceived definition, knowledge as it exists cannot fulfil the criteria of their definition. The definition mislead them
This is why the method of Platonic dialectics is to not accept, as "the definition", any possible definition, but to respect them all, as exactly that, possible definitions. Then by analyzing possible definitions we proceed to get a firm idea of how the word is actually used. From here we can develop an idea of "the thing" which is referred to by the word.
So, (e.g. JCI) religions aren't in the theological & liturgical/pastoral businesses of trying to "justify" their "beliefs" in order to "authorize" the applications of said "beliefs" in practice? Damn those "bookish" Theologians & Preachers!
Quoting jellyfish
:chin:
:up:
Often enough, yes. But I maintain that religion is misunderstood when it's examined as a mere set of silly concepts. The concepts can afford to be silly, because the concepts aren't really it.
My comments on humility aren't anti-Socrates. I'm just pointing out a tension. We orient ourselves. We want to experience ourselves as dignified, noble, decent, valuable, etc. We abase ourselves only to be exalted. Personally I love the notion of learned ignorance. And non serviam. I will not serve. I assert my learned ignorance as (more importantly) the ignorance of those who would dominate me with their tales of this and that. The questioning mind is a weapon, and its target is whatever humiliates or diminishes the questioner (who sits so sly). The fiction of God the monster actually gets something right, as an image of our impossible project. Once out of nature [and its vulnerabilities and indignities], I shall never take my bodily form from any natural thing....
Mainly the latter. Of course this implies the former, but it is less important. Also I assume we are excluding dead religions like the ancient greek religions.
Quoting tim wood
Not sure I understand your question haha. To give my definition in other words, it is finding what conclusions can be inferred from divine revelations, which serve as the premises.
Quoting tim wood
Upon reflection, I now think the term has two meanings. (1) is the subject matter itself, and (2) is the practice based on the theology, as per my first definition. E.g. Christianity is a religion, but also a christian is religious strictly if he practices the acts described in the theology.
Let me know if any objections.
Starting with a definition might also assume some questionable project of making the 'ground' explicit. A big system of words is supposed to be its own foundation.
Going through my personal belongings again... :kiss: :hearts:
I get it.
(Atheism, irreligious, 'discussions' etc.. are just meta).
My point isn't that anti-religion is good or bad. And I do see the usefulness of the word 'religion.' But I also see the usefulness in understanding 'religion' metaphorically. The quote below does not express my own position in general, but it's a good description of 'culture' as 'religion.'
[quote=Hegel]
The spiritual individual, the people, insofar as it is organized in itself, an organic whole, is what we call the State. This designation is ambiguous in that by “state” and “constitutional law” one usually means the simple political aspect, as distinct from religion, science, and art. But when we speak of the manifestation of the spiritual we understand the term “state” in a more comprehensive sense, similar to the term Reich (empire, realm). For us, then, a people is primarily a .spiritual individual. We do not emphasize the external aspects but concentrate on what has been called the spirit of a people. We mean its consciousness of itself, of its own truth, its own essence, the spiritual powers which live and rule in it. The universal which manifests itself in the State and is known in it – the form under which everything that is, is subsumed – is that which constitutes the culture of a nation. The definite content which receives this universal form and is contained in the concrete actuality of the state is the spirit of the people. The actual state is animated by this spirit in all its particular affairs, wars, institutions, etc.
This spiritual content is something definite, firm, solid, completely exempt from caprice, the particularities, the whims of individuality, of chance. That which is subject to the latter is not the nature of the people: it is like the dust playing over a city or a field, which does not essentially transform it. This spiritual content then constitutes the essence of the individual as well as that of the people. It is the holy bond that ties the men, the spirits together. It is one life in all, a grand object, a great purpose and content on which depend all individual happiness and all private decisions. The state does not exist for the citizens; on the contrary, one could say that the state is the end and they are its means. But the means-end relation is not fitting here. For the state is not the abstract confronting the citizens; they are parts of it, like members of an organic body, where no member is end and none is means. It is the realization of Freedom, of the absolute, final purpose, and exists for its own sake. All the value man has, all spiritual reality, he has only through the state. For his spiritual reality is the knowing presence to him of his own essence, of rationality, of its objective, immediate actuality present in and for him. Only thus is he truly a consciousness, only thus does he partake in morality, in the legal and moral life of the state. For the True is the unity of the universal and particular will. And the universal in the state is in its laws, its universal and rational provisions. The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth.
[/quote]
What is the separation of church and state but the implementation of a state 'religion' ? I'm not objecting to this apparent privatization of spirituality. I'm just pointing out that it's something like individualism or freedom as the state religion. In fact it's more like oligarchy, but with lots of great TV.
[quote= Debord]
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious degradation of being into having. The present phase of total occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the economy leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which all actual “having” must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate function.
[/quote]
It the initial quote from the same source? I couldn’t see it.
Thanks
There is no link directly beneath that quote.
Perhaps a different approach to the generic name "God" would be helpful. For Atheists, "god" refers to an empty set. But for Theists, "God" refers to a meaningful, but abstract concept, with associated feelings. For example, "United States" is not a concrete thing, but an abstraction that invokes positive feelings for some, and negative feelings for others.
In order to avoid the conflicting theological baggage attached to the "God" designation that means different things to different people, I spell it "G*D", and provide a definition that fits my personal worldview*1. But I cannot give a concrete description, or claim that "G*D" is real and empirical. Instead, my "G*D" is a gap-filler in the same sense that scientists use "Dark Matter" and "Multiverse". They don't know what Dark Matter is, only what it does. Likewise, Multiverse is an explanatory hypothesis, with no possibility for empirical confirmation. It has to be taken on Faith. I don't know what G*D is, only what it has done : enform this non-self-existent universe. And since generic Information is the fundamental substance of the material universe, I must assume that G*D is an Enformer. *2
These knowledge-gap-filler terms are useful in that they convey a meaning that can be communicated, even though the referent is not accessible to objective confirmation. For me, "G*D" refers to the logical "First Cause" and "Logos" hypotheses of Aristotle. Objectively, we can all agree that the world exists. But how it came to be is debatable. So. those with Materialist assumptions imagine an eternal mechanical Multiverse, while those with Spiritualist assumptions imagine an eternal king-like magician (Jehovah), or an infinite abstract power with no human characteristics (Allah). None of us has any direct knowledge of the object referred-to by our gap-filler names. But we can use the agreed-upon definitions of those terms for philosophical discussions. We may not accept that those definitions are factual, but at least we can know what we are talking about.
*1 G*D : " I refer to the logically necessary and philosophically essential First & Final Cause as G*D, rather than merely "X" the Unknown, . . . ."
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html
*2 EnFormAction : http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page29.html
Whatever "God" may be, it cannot be an empty name ...[/quote]
Well instead, woody, consider God is the ur-Placebo. :smirk:
Quoting tim wood
Pushed from or by whom or by what? John Hick is relevant here, and as he was a philosopher of religion, as distinct from a theologian, perhaps his Who or What is God might be worth a glance.
Overall a good article. :up:
Placebos work roughly a third(?) of the time and never treat (or cure!) underlying ailments just the symptoms. And they definitely count as evidence for a physicalist interpretation, or model, of the human brain-CNS (which is a survival - environmental perception-behaviour coordination - engine and only tangentally (if ever) a "truth engine") in my book. :wink:
They don't always work, but they lead to genuine cures, and they work sometimes. They plainly undermine the physicalist model, and they're routinely described as 'not scientific' because no objective or measurable reason can be found for them to work at all. However
So simply asserting that they 'count as evidence for physicalism' does not constitute an argument.
It is difficult to approach the matter from that direction.
But the OP asked for more than muttering into my beard. So, I will assert that the intersection of the cultural and personal frames of experience, the distance between past expressions and the needs of the present moment, involve a desire to embrace a disproportion between explanation and action. The flickering messages of what must be done and the call to make your own way are not the consequences of this or that set of beliefs but reflects the problem of our existence.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I have removed the term "religion" from the above definition of "faith" to avoid any circularity.
Quoting Pfhorrest
But if faith is always blind faith, and you should not go on faith alone and should also use reason, then why use faith at all and not just always use reason instead? The Thomists are not that bad at logic.
Hi. Perhaps you are oversimplifying atheism here. I'm an 'atheist,' but I also think God is a concept of central importance. I'd say that an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept. A theist might instead separate their concept of God from God itself.
Quoting Gnomon
Fair enough, but this looks like a philosopher's 'God.' It's a piece of sculpture. It scratches an itch that most people don't have.
In the philosophical context, it ignores some of the modern ideas about just how entangled we are in the world --so entangled that most of our knowledge cannot be made explicit. And the knowledge that can be made explicit has a dark foundation. Whatever castles we build (however sharp their towers) rise from the mist.
'I think therefore I am.' But what is it to even be able to say this? What is it to know a language?
I have two objections still to this revision. One is that by restricting to topic to being about "gods and related topics", it possibly excludes things that we probably want to count as religions, like Buddhism, that are not necessarily theistic, but still rely on faith in the sense that I mean, and so should still count if we are to use the "religions are belief systems that appeal to faith" definition. The second is that I think most people both religious and irreligious would say that their beliefs about such things (and most philosophers and scientists would say, most belief about most facts about the world) are not known with certainty to be true; science doesn't prove things with certainty, only math does that. So this definition turns out to be equivalent to "any beliefs about gods and related topics", which is a pretty common first-pass definition of what "religion" is, but has the problem outlined in point one at the start of this paragraph.
I should note that the definition of "faith" I'm using here is not "believing something without being absolutely certain in it", but rather "putting forth an empty 'because' as a reason to believe something". On a critical rationalist epistemology (like mine), everything is believed for insufficient reason, because there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. So everyone is epistemically free to believe whatever they want, until someone can show that what they believe is false; and conversely, everyone is free to disagree with what you believe, until you can show that disagreement with you is categorically false. Holding such tentative beliefs is not "faith" in the sense I mean it. Rather, appealing to faith is telling someone else that what you believe is right and disagreeing with it is wrong just because (because your gut tells you so, or everyone knows it, or this infallible book or person says so). It's making an epistemic move that calls for a reason to back it up, without any reason to back it up.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not an expert on medieval philosophy (it's my weakest area actually) but I think the Thomist view is that faith (even blind faith), as the vehicle of revelation, is a valid source of knowledge to tell you what is true, and that is strictly speaking sufficient for purposes of salvation and such, but reason is there to deepen your understanding of why it is true, and in doing so grow closer to God and greater in spirit.
Do you mean, a non-fit, an impasse? If it is a non-fit, then explanation creates a story which claims to represent the action as true. If it is an impasse, then one knows that there is no explanation other than physics.
A non-fit is the creation of religion as ideology to control masses of people. An impasse is addressed by those who reject religion: action signifies, not metaphysics: what's your next action? (Although that never stopped philosophers from writing tome upon tome...)
Quoting myself to add an addendum: another way of describing this sense of "faith" as I mean it is believing something in a way that holds it as beyond question (precisely because it is "supported" by such an empty "reason" that nothing could possibly counter that "reason"). Faithful belief is the opposite of critical belief; unquestioning, infalliblist belief versus questioning, falliblist belief.
Which reminds me of a pithy definition of religion I came up with a long time ago, framing religion as belief based on such faith and also as belief in transcendental things that (being beyond all possibility of evidence for or against them) can only be believed on such faith:
"Religion: unquestionable answers to unanswerable questions".
Edit to add further: note that this isn't to say that there cannot be rational discussion about traditionally "religious" topics like God. Depending on what who means by "God", that might be something about which one could have non-religious (non-faith-based, rational) beliefs. Natural theology does not strictly count as religion on my account, as it tries not to appeal to faith.
Don’t beat around bush, please.
It says there is a disjoint between the original framing of the term ‘soul’ and perceptions of old ideas. We know ‘psyche’ is ‘soul’ and that psychology followed by neuroscience flows that idea into the current situation.
I’m not inclined to jump on the homunculus type interpretation, or anything resembling it. I’m much more in favour of the manner in which Damasio leans toward the so-called ‘hard problem’.
Husserl is a tricky one to bring into the mix, as is Kant, because they were not really overly concerned with the ‘existing’ world directly. Kant explored limitations of knowledge in COPR and Husserl tried to construct a new ‘scientific’ discipline that had not direct concern (although it certainly had meaningful concern) for ‘objects’ other than as eidetic (immediate) phenomenon. The may conceptusl difficulty with his ideas being the application of ‘bracketing’ imo. It does all sound quite esoteric (but I believe him when he said he was attempting to bolster the natural scientific and logical grounding of human investigation rather than pull the rug out from under it - something others did under the guise of a firm of ‘phenomenology’ he dismissed.
Quoting Pfhorrest
:up:
[quote=Pfhorrest]On a critical rationalist epistemology (like mine), everything is believed for insufficient reason, because there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. So everyone is epistemically free to believe whatever they want, until someone can show that what they believe is false; and conversely, everyone is free to disagree with what you believe, until you can show that disagreement with you is categorically false. Holding such tentative beliefs is not "faith" in the sense I mean it. [/quote]
:clap:
Substantive post worthy of a separate thread so it doesn't get lost in this tangle.
Will save it for a later chew over.
Currently taking time out for a quiet re-read of Marcus and life :smile:
Thank you for your perceptive comments. I have still much more study to do in this area and will make a determined effort to do so in the next little while.
Quoting Amity
Thanks for your kind words.
But, why believe anything at all? I think it's quite impossible not to believe anything, but I also think that Christian dogmatism has engendered a 'current of unbelief', so to speak.
But you can't say that the Christian religion has an 'empty "because"'. The very thing that the Christian faith provides, is reason, in the grandest possible sense - a reason for being, a reason for striving towards understanding, and a reason for believing. And conversely, one of the casualties of Enlightenment rationalism, is reason herself - not in the scientific sense of 'instrumental reason', but the sense that we have no reason to exist, that we're the accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms, to quote Russell. Enlightenment rationalism actually brackets out 'reason' in that larger sense, in favour of 'verifiability'.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I think that's pretty right, but it's not so much a matter of 'telling' as of 'demonstrating'. Actually in all religious epistemologies, the question of warrant for belief is, or ought to be, of central importance. Obviously in any revealed religion, there is an acceptance that something has been revealed which would not otherwise be known; but again Enlightenment rationalism starts by saying, well let's sweep all the traditional accounts off the table, and start again with what can be demonstrated in the laboratory, that anyone can see and agree to. Then the 'burden of proof' is put on the believer, having first removed [s]all[/s] much of what he or she would have considered evidence for their belief in the first place.
It was a simple dichotomy, for purposes of illustration, not argumentation. However, to complicate the issue further, let's say that, "an atheist thinks of God as 'only' a concept", while a Theist thinks of God as the 'referent' of the concept. So the question boils down to whether there is Content for the Concept.
In my view, there is no concrete humanoid person out there playing the role of God. No "teapot circling Mars". Instead, since the real material world ultimately consists of immaterial Information (e.g. mathematics), G*D is not just out-there in eternity-infinity, but in every particle of space-time. I have detailed arguments to support that assertion, but I can't claim that it is revealed Truth, merely my personal opinion. For all practical purposes, it makes me an A-Theist. But for philosophical purposes, it makes me a Deist.
Quoting jellyfish
This is indeed the abstract philosopher's God. But, as a hypothesis, it explains a lot about "entanglement" and the ubiquitous role of Information in the world. As a popular religion, it would be impractical, since it doesn't "scratch an itch" that most people of the world have always had : someone to give us unconditional love and to defend us from evil. Instead, it merely puts the ointment of theory on "itches" that philosophers have always had : ultimate "why" questions.
Russell's Teapot : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot
"Scientists and Philosophers are always on the lookout for significant patterns in Nature from which they can extract specific meanings. Those extracted pieces of meaning are then labeled generically as information. But how that “information” came to be encoded in the material of nature is not often questioned by scientists. That’s not considered to be a practical project, so it’s left to impractical amateur philosophers to speculate on the origins of information: e.g. which came first, the informer or the information---the sculptor or the sculpture?" http://enformationism.info/enformationism.info/page2%20Welcome.html
You just immediately answered your question. We cannot help but believe something or another. And a critical rationalist epistemology says sure, go ahead and believe whatever, at least until it's shown to be false, and then move on to whatever else seems the next best alternative. (This is in contrast to a justificationist, classical rationalist, epistemology, which says "don't believe anything until it is conclusively proven", which critical rationalists like me think would necessarily entail believing nothing at all ever, because nothing can be conclusively proven from the ground up).
Quoting Wayfarer
FWIW I'm not talking about Christianity specifically, at all.
Quoting Wayfarer
You seem to be using "reason" here in a sense meaning "purpose". I disagree that rationalism deprives life of purpose, but that's besides the point, because we're not talking about reason as in purpose, we're talking about reason as in evidence.
In other words, you're saying Christianity gives a cause or goal or aim toward which believing (and striving toward understanding, and being) serves as a means, but we're talking about what gives an explanation of why something is or isn't true.
Quoting Wayfarer
When it comes to public knowledge, public claims asserted to other people as though everyone should agree with them, then the reasons (see above for disambiguation of that word) we give to those other people should be reasons available to them, which is why we appeal to what "anyone can see and agree to". Otherwise, we'd just be demanding that others take our word for it, on faith -- which is, I'm claiming, the defining characteristic of religion, and what distinguishes it from other forms of belief. But when it comes to people's private beliefs, they're free to hold them for whatever private reasons they want (not just politically free as in they shouldn't be punished, but epistemically free as in they're not committing an error of reason), so long as they don't contradict other reasons that are available to them -- which is precisely why the public claims of science have to appeal to things "anyone can see and agree to", otherwise it would be telling people who disagreed to disregard their private reasons for thinking as they do, without giving them any better reason to do that.
I agree.
Quoting Gnomon
Right. That's how I've understood you. 'God' is something like the form or logic of matter. I don't object to this as superstitious. Maybe I find the choice of 'G*D' as a name for it sub-optimal. Maybe I think it doesn't really answer the question. (Is there a question?)
I've read quite a few of your posts, btw. I like seeing sincere meta-physicians around.
Quoting Gnomon
Exactly. So we agree. We naturally secrete theory to make sense of things, so I really can't complain. Personally I think that theorizing leads us to an aporia or blank spot. The ground 'must' remain obscure. The metalanguage cannot be formalized. At the same time, we still have our grand theories. As I see it, they give us better mousetraps, spiritual-social comfort, and/or some blend of these things.
When people complain of 'woo,' I think it's a distaste for spiritual-social comfort being associated with better-mousetrap thinking. To me it's more complicated than that. While I am somewhat allergic to 'woo,' I'm also less than dazzled by the religion of prediction and control. 'Fitter, happier, more productive.' To what end? A life without 'magical thinking'? But that image itself gleams as a goal with no rational justification.
No problem! And no oxymorons allowed either. A placebo that's "curative" is not a placebo, it's medicine. Anyway, how about fetish instead? God is the ur-Fetish ... works for me, how's it for you?
While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans. Unlike the disbelief that 2+2=4, I don't think that this religious belief constitutes a small minority. E.g. take christianity and the eucharist. The belief is that Jesus Christ is God, and that the ritual of the eucharist was instructed directly by Jesus. "Take this bread and eat, for this is my body". Similar rituals instructed by the gods are found in the other western religions as well.
Nonsense. If it contains only sugar, then it's not 'medicine', because the curative effects originate somewhere else altogether i.e. in the subject's mind. Really you ought to stop trying to use 'placebos' as an analogy or an argument if you don't understand the point of them, which is to plainly suggest 'mind over matter'. The fact that they work at all is inconvenient for materialism.
Quoting 180 Proof
Must be a damn short book, and by it's own reckoning, containing no truth :-)
So why don't placebos work on people with Alzheimer's Disease? Is the fact that Alzheimer's damages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (where learnt initiates of neurotransmitters like the pain-reducing endorphin are are mediated), just a coincidence?
What about the fact that Naloxene - an endorphin reduction agent - has been found to eliminate the pain reduction effect of placebos? That just coincidence too, or has Naloxene somehow made it's way over to the mysterious non-material realm where you were hoping placebo effects were coming from?
There's some equivocation associated with 'reason' here. First, the 'rationalism' you're referring to, is what I describe as scientific or Enlightenment rationalism, which has very specific characteristics mainly inherited from scientific method. 'Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations.... Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.' E R Dougherty
From within that perspective, 'reason' is absent in the larger sense of there being a 'reason for existence'. This is at least in part because modern science operates within the 'horizon of the observable' so to speak, rather than inference from the observable to any purported first or super-natural cause. The only kind of inference that is regarded as acceptable is that based on mathematical abstraction of empirical data (although even that is now coming under strain from speculative cosmology, 'string theory' and so on).
And the point is, the kind of reason that is said to be absent, is any reason for existence in the sense of an intentional creation. Furthermore intention on the individual level is assigned to the subjective domain thereby preserving the purportedly 'mind-independent' nature of the observed universe, although this has also come under pressure from the 'observer problem' in quantum physics.
In another sense, the whole notion of intent, and also of telos - a reason for existence in the Aristotelian sense - was rejected along with the scholastic philosophy with which it was associated, by the early moderns, coinciding with the adoption of the mechanist paradigm. And within that paradigm, 'reason' or 'causation' is generally only understood in terms of efficient and material causes (of which physical laws are said to be paradigmatic, hence, 'physicalism'.)
Looking again at Bertrand Russell's essay, A Free Man's Worship, he writes:
Bolds added. But this point has itself been called into question by the 'fine-tuning' or 'naturalness' problem, which suggests that there are a small number of fundamental yet apparently unnatural constraints (unnatural in the sense of seeming to vary widely from what might naturally be expected) which no underlying or more fundamental theory can explain, and which, had they varied in the most minute of degrees, would not have culminated in a Universe characterised by complex matter. Regardless of arguments over the interpretation of this observation, it undermines Russell's notion of the primacy of the 'accidental collocation of atoms'; were there not an order, there could be no accidents. And as various scientists have felt obliged to admit, there seems a sense in which 'the universe knew we were coming' (as Freeman Dyson put it.) I don't to try and leap from there to a metaphysical conclusion, although I do contend that the way in which the 'multiverse conjecture' is used to defray the appeal of this argument strikes me as highly disingenuous.
It's also been called into question by the discoveries of quantum physics, philosophy of science, and phenomenology, all of which recognise the inextricable role of the observer in the formulation of scientific theories. Accordingly I feel that the kind of materialism of which Russell's essay is such an impassioned testament has had it's day.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I generally agree, with the caveat that this attitude, while completely understandable in the framework of the secular state, cannot differentiate the subjective from the transcendent; in other words, what really is a private matter, and the kinds of truths that transcend individual conscience, but are still not strictly speaking simply objective. In other words, the kinds of truths which orientate the moral compass, which in some sense surpass objective judgement but which are ethically normative.
Quoting Isaac
Don't know, but it's also not relevant to the point; it's the fact that they work at all which undermines the model of 'bottom-up' causality.
How? How would the chemical in the drug causing a release of endorphin be 'bottom-up' yet the learnt response from the venrtomedial pre frontal cortex to the visual stimuli of pill-taking causing a release of endorphin is somehow not? They seem like exactly the same type of causal relationship to me.
Quoting Banno
I interpret your comment as saying that it is not a proper definition of god; is that right? Would you have a counterexample, in which the term "god" in the common language does not fit this definition? I would imagine that even for pantheistic religions, which belief is that all that exists is god, still fits under this definition.
Supposing your armchair is indeed the perfect armchair, it still does not fit the definition of god I have given, because it is not perfect in every way. "4" is the perfect answer to the question "what is 2+2?". This does not make it god either.
Right back at you I'm afraid. Merely saying this doesn't make it so. There are many arguments that defend the objects of faith (I'm thinking particularly of the christian faith). The people doing so are called "apologetics", and they are still kicking to this day.
And they can kick it all day every day. To defend objects of faith is a perfectly respectable occupation. I repeat: Probability and reason can't prove the contents of faith.
Yeah: a member of the empty set ... Hallelujah! Amen. :pray:
As I began to develop my own personal Agnostic worldview, I tried to avoid any religious terminology. But eventually I realized that the Ultimate Source of ubiquitous Information is equivalent in most respects to the ancient concept of an abstract world-sustaining creator God (e.g. Brahman). When I used evasive terms in discussions, I had to provide long round-about definitions. So I gave-up and made-up a neologism that suggests a creator deity, but with a question mark. Since I have no direct evidence of this hypothetical Enformer, the asterisk in "G*D" means "to be determined". Pre-scientific thinkers were not idiots; they were just working with incomplete information about how the world works.
Interestingly, the modern understanding of Information/Energy is similar to the archaic notion of Spirit : invisible, intangible, causal agency. So I view Enformationism as a 21st century update of outdated philosophical theories of Materialism and Spiritualism. Information is the essence of both Matter and Mind. Unfortunately, few people have read my thesis, so they don't fully grasp what I mean by Enformation or by "G*D".
Yes, there are many questions that are answered by the G*D concept. But the new answers are not found in conventional Science or Religion. The Enformationism thesis asks those age-old queries, and proposes theoretical answers. But Atheists dismiss them as "gap fillers" or "empty set", because they have an outdated understanding of Physics and Metaphysics.
You present an either/or I never thought of. When putting the matter as broadly as I did, I figured the observation was not evidence for any state of being but a possible point of departure as a beginning of the kind the OP asked for.
I think the Taoist perspective says it is a non-fit and an impasse at the same time. It is a non-fit in so far as the referent can never be captured in any explanation and it is an impasse in regards to what change we can directly bring about. The two perspectives come from accepting our limited degrees of freedom. It is presented as a discovery of a situation, not a project for what must be. But it also argues for what should not be.
Tricky stuff.
I have asked those same questions about my hypothetical G*D. And my answer is No.
First, my G*D is not Theistic or Pantheistic, but PanEnDeistic. Defined as Eternal-Infinite, hence wholly transcendent (Ideality) and partly immanent (Reality). If G*D is ALL, Omni-existent, then any experiences or actions must be internal. Such a G*D is not a being, but BEING itself : the power to exist. And "person" is an anthropomorphic concept that could not apply to an abstract generality. Example, the United States is an abstract concept, a generalization, not a person. G*D can be personal, only in the sense that You are part of ALL.
Indeed. Your theory (to the degree that I know it) reminds of other philosophers'.
Quoting Gnomon
I understand the desire to transcend that dichotomy. In some ways it reminds me of German philosophers who wanted to bring God down to this world. The species is Christ, and history is the unfolding/incarnation of God. That's the gist as I understand it.
[quote= Strauss]
if reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be niggardly towards all others † —to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest: it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other—-in the alternate appearance and suppression of a series of individuals. And is this no true realization of the idea? is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time.
This is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power;‡ it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one, pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history. It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of Humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species.
[/quote]
http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/strauss/conclusion.html
The vision blends Christianity with technological progress. It's optimistic. It doesn't address the mortality of the species (God himself is mortal). Humanism is arguably the best thing we have. Is it good enough? Smaller notions of the group allow for a human enemy, and we tend to love our human enemies as the glue that binds us to our friends. We need an alien attack. If we win, we might be in the mood for the New New Jerusalem.
Quoting Gnomon
I agree.
Quoting Gnomon
Well you have lots of competition. While generating a new vocabulary has its advantages, you thereby lose out on the ability to connect your work to other philosophers. And then philosophers just love being skeptical. Personally I respect the creativity. I've written philosophy too, even a kind of system, when I trusted more in the possibility of a system. These days I think that 'my' thoughts have all tended to be out there already. I only tie fragments together and try to choose words appropriate to the moment. Despite having this view now, I think it's crucial that I strove and strive to break new ground.
Quoting Gnomon
Some atheists are quite exposed to philosopher's gods and even like or embrace them. 'Atheist' is just too vague to express much more than a critical attitude. As far as 'gap filler' goes, I think even you spoke of God as an axiom or place in a structure.
Quoting Gnomon
Have you looked into Douglas_Hofstadter? He writes some fascinating stuff about causality and the nature of cognition.
[quote=Wiki]
Hofstadter's thesis about consciousness, first expressed in Gödel, Escher, Bach (GEB) but also present in several of his later books, is that it is an emergent consequence of seething lower-level activity in the brain. In GEB he draws an analogy between the social organization of a colony of ants and the mind seen as a coherent "colony" of neurons. In particular, Hofstadter claims that our sense of having (or being) an "I" comes from the abstract pattern he terms a "strange loop", which is an abstract cousin of such concrete phenomena as audio and video feedback, and which Hofstadter has defined as "a level-crossing feedback loop". The prototypical example of this abstract notion is the self-referential structure at the core of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Hofstadter's 2007 book I Am a Strange Loop carries his vision of consciousness considerably further, including the idea that each human "I" is distributed over numerous brains, rather than being limited to precisely one brain.
[/quote]
i would argue religion is just a set of beliefs in reference to a super natural concept (typically that super natural notion is the notion of a god or gods).
The Bible actually doesn't say all religion is bad. In the Bible there is good religion and bad religion. (letter of James or epistle of James)
The problem with this definition is that it is too broad. It sounds like believing in bigfoot, or believing that this football team will win tomorrow's game, are religions. On the other hand, adding "the gods and related topics" (along with behaviour) fixes that, and should be able to include Buddhism if the "related topics" include the after-life, ultimate reality, and such things.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Don't these two claims contradict? To disbelieve in p is to believe in not-p. E.g. "I have good reasons to disbelieve in an atheistic world; this must mean that I believe in a god."
Quoting Pfhorrest
I think your are attempting to say that reason can support faith; and even though I agree with this under my definition of faith, this cannot work under your definition: If faith is belief devoid of reason, and reason serves to explain the belief, then faith and reason are in contradiction, for a belief cannot be both without reason and with reason at the same time.
Only if by "faith" you mean "believing something not conclusively proven", which I don't. I tried to explain this before, but maybe I can use a conversation about sportball to explain it better.
Alice believes the Stars will win tomorrow's sportball game, even though she doesn't have any good reason to believe that. Bob believes the Stripes will win that game instead, even though he doesn't have any good reason to believe that. Alice and Bob both acknowledge that, lacking any evidence with which to convince the other, they must agree to disagree; each has their own expectations that they believe will happen, but no grounds on which to assert that those who disagree are wrong, so they don't assert that those who disagree are wrong, even though they go on believing as they do. So neither of their beliefs are "faith" in the sense that I mean.
Meanwhile in an alternate universe, Alice and Bob believe the same things about who will win tomorrow's game, but both insist that the other is wrong. Alice still doesn't have any reason to give Bob for why he needs to change his mind, she has the same (lack of) reasons for belief as the Alice in the first universe did, but her attitude toward those (lack of) reasons is different. She just knows it, in her gut, and also the Stars coach swore confidently on TV that his team was sure to win the game tomorrow, and besides the Stars are more popular than the Stripes anyway and that many fans can't all be wrong. That is faith in the sense that I mean. Bob meanwhile explains to Alice his reasons for thinking that the Stripes have better odds than the Stars, and will therefore win over them, pointing to their win/loss ratios and player characteristics and so on. Alice doesn't care; Bob is wrong, as far as she's concerned, because she just knows he is, even though she's got nothing to counter his argument with. That is faith in the sense that I mean.
Faith isn't incompletely justified belief. All belief is incompletely justified.
Faith is uncritical, unquestionable belief. Not all belief is uncritical.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
"Ultimate reality" is a topic that non-religious studies like physics and (irreligious) philosophy also investigate.
It sounds like what you really want that category to be is "supernatural things", which would actually work for me, but only because I hold that all belief in the supernatural is necessarily held on faith, since by definition opinions about supernatural things cannot be supported by evidence, for if there was evidence, the supernatural would have an observable effect on the natural world, and would therefore be natural.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Well technically, disbelieving P and believing not-P are not equivalent; if we write it in functional notation that becomes clear, the opposite of believe(P) is not-believe(P), which is not necessarily equivalent to believe(not-P), although the latter would certainly entail the former, but only in that direction. But that's a minor aside to the main point.
When we start out, with no knowledge, all possibilities are live, any possible world might be the actual world so far as we know. We cannot pick out one of those infinite possibilities and conclusively show that that is definitely the actual world. All we can do is show that whichever possibility is actual, it mustn't contradict this or that bit of evidence, ruling out swathes of possible worlds, leaving a narrower selection of those that might be actual. But there's always still a selection, always still multiple live possibilities. The more evidence we accumulate, the more we can narrow in, but we're always just whittling away possibilities, never positively supporting any particular one of them.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I was saying that the Thomists think that. That wasn't my opinion, that was my report of their opinions.
In the millennial wake of religious wars, pogroms, inquisitions, martyrdoms, marital rapes, misogyny, homophobia, chattel slavery, self-abasing vicarious guilt, bigotry & scapegoating, the above sounds to me very much like an apt definition of Faith. As a learned wit once said "... For good people to do evil things, that takes religion." :victory:
What I understood you to be saying is that there's always a "countervailing," a "disproportion" between issues of faith or mysticism and those of reason. What I meant to convey in my response to what you wrote is that institutionalized religion, in my sweepingly generalized view, does everything in its power to make people not question their existence. This is the boulder of ideology that oppresses so many minds so easily. This kind of ideology relieves the individual of any requirement to think and question; the goal is obedience.
To confront the impasse, as I meant it, is to acknowledge the aporia: the problem of existence does not have an answer = the disproportion between explanation and action.
This is the problem with such exclusive definitions. It is quite possible, and probable, that acts which fulfill the requirements for "religious acts" were being carried out before animals evolved so as to fulfil the requirements of being human.
This tactic of exclusion is common with philosophers who argue to prove a position rather than to learn the truth. We find it in definitions of things like "language", "meaning", and "intention". It is argued that these things are exclusive to human beings ("created BY humans") when evidence from the science of biology clearly demonstrates otherwise. Evidently it is profoundly wrong to assert that these things were "created By humans".
But I do not think it is correct to say that they were "created FOR humans" either. That appears to be some form of inverted anthropomorphism, or a misinterpretation of the purpose, or final cause which is apprehended as being the reason for existence of these things. To say that some prior creatures, or even God, did such and such acts "FOR" the sake of human beings, rather than for the sake of something else, with a lack of understanding of the intention behind those acts, therefore without sufficient proof, is to make an unjustified conclusion.
Thank you for the clarification. The aporia is what I was focused upon.
I will need to mull over the role or momentum of institutions as an agent opposing the observation of the impasse. It seems that both sides are preserved in the traditions and language of the established religions.
I agree with all of this, but why wouldn't this include secular politics? Like some of the stuff that happened under Stalin? This isn't a defense of theism by any means. It's more an extension of atheism. Gods and angels are the superstitions of less critical, less conceptual times. Our superstitions are 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality' ,' rationality', 'science.' I don't mean that these concepts are bogus, but I do mean that these high words get tangled up in low deeds. In other words, magical thinking is just as happy with secular abstractions.
Oh and (at others, not you jellyfish) I get the impression that this thread isn't supposed to be for arguing for or against faith, religion, god, or theology, but just for trying to come up with definitions of all of those things that satisfy all parties. It seems like some people are trying to argue for or (mostly) against some of them here. I'm definitely against all of them, but I'm not trying to argue against them here, just to give my understanding of what they are. Refined a bit from the conversation since I last stated it, that understanding its:
Faith is uncritical belief.
(I think that's a bad thing).
Religion is a system of belief appealing to faith.
(Belief about anything, not necessarily about God).
God a perfect person, the best that is possible in all the ways a person should be.
(I don't think that exists).
Theology is the study of God.
(Any kind of study, not necessarily religious).
Thanks for the link. This part caught me.
[quote=link]
The archetypical examples of such appeals to faith are essentially appeals to authority. Some trusted religious figure or holy book says that something is true, and that assertion is taken as not needing any support: the assertion itself is taken as self-sufficient.
[/quote]
http://geekofalltrades.org/codex/fideism.php
Quoting Pfhorrest
Fair enough. I guess I've just tried to emphasize that intellectual types tend to focus on articulated beliefs when it comes to religion, as if religion was a competing philosophy. I see philosophy instead as a competing religion. I'm oversimplifying, but philosophy is roughly humanism. Questioning is sacred.
So I'm against fideism too, because I'm invested in some image of the sacred, autonomous mind.
[quote=Emerson]
Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.
[/quote]
On the other hand, this to me is some kind of faith. How do I know that I'm not crazy?
[quote=link]
By rejecting appeals to authority, just like with appeals to popularity, and raw appeals to your own faith, I am only saying to hold all such opinions merely tentatively, remaining open to question and doubt.
[/quote]
I'm down with this principle....but, in the spirit of this principle, why are we attached to detachment? In what are we invested that urges us not to be fools? I agree that expecting others to believe on authority is bad. Bad how? I think free minds want a symmetric relationship with other free minds. They want to see their own freedom/infinity reflected and recognized.
[quote=jellyfish]I agree with all of this, but why wouldn't this include secular politics? Like some of the stuff that happened under Stalin?[/quote]
Of course not. 'One-party state' politics, such as Stalinism (Maoism Nazism Fascism, etc), are the very manifestations of sectarianism which is antithetical to secular politics, or secularism (i.e. democratic plurality ... e.g. vide Dewey, Arendt).
[quote=jellyfish]Our superstitions are 'freedom', 'justice', 'equality' ,' rationality', 'science.' I don't mean that these concepts are bogus, but I do mean that these high words get tangled up in low deeds. In other words, magical thinking is just as happy with secular abstractions.[/quote]
This muddle amounts to a false equivalences - religious vs secular "superstitions" - the usual superstitions of a facile ahistorism. Yeah, "high words get tangled up in low deeds", but that in no way demonstrates the latter is caused by the former. Nearly a century of misreading - misappropriating - Nietzsche's coinages imagery & tropes by e.g. salon existentialists, nazis / crypto-fascists, luddite/hippie heideggerians, poseur punkers/anarchists, p0m0 anti-oedipal lacanian feminists/queer theorists, et al reminds us (me) that great ideas aren't responsible for the lunatics & criminals who often misuse them (i.e. great books aren't responsible for what their willful misreaders do to/with them). One could, likewise, also defend church dogmas & biblical preachments this way against the atrocities of "true believers"; but it's the everyday micro-atrocities of "common faith" for which there are no apologia (except, maybe, some ad hoc theodicy) to redeem the "concepts ... high words" of credo, canon & liturgy. That said --
When reading the following keep in mind the current Stalinist regime in North Korea where, according to their "constitution", a "holy trinity" (of Great Leader (d. 1994), Dear Leader (d. 2011) & Supreme Leader) rules:
"A totalitarian state is in effect a theocracy, and its ruling caste, in order to keep its position, has to be thought of as infallible. But since, in practice, no one is infallible, it is frequently necessary to rearrange past events in order to show that this or that mistake was not made, or that this or that imaginary triumph actually happened." ~George Orwell
Furthermore, the myth of atheist totalitarianism (in the 20th century) has also had its taste Hitchslapped from many, if not by now most, snouts: Gott mit uns (video) ... and other officially self-proclaimed and church-sanctioned sigils of "destiny" (e.g. "The End of History", "das Tausendjähriges Reich", etc)
Lovely. The quintessence of Bakhtin's dialogism: interlocutors understand their own ideas from different perspectives by listening to how the other uses their own words/concepts. This should lead to expansion, clarification and deeper understanding of said ideas. Free minds never try to repress or distort an other's ideas.
This reminds me of the very beginning of the Cuban revolution. There was a burst of cultural creativity and expression that was quite avant garde and included homosexual art. This was very quickly shut down by the Soviet Union's pressure on Castro, who then came up with the very Orwellian phrase, "Within the revolution: everything; outside of the revolution: nothing." And complete censorship clamped down on any but the most socialist realist artistic expression. Ultra-orthodox.
Thanks. I like your take on it too.
Quoting uncanni
Ah, I didn't know about that. But the Orwellian paint-job is familiar and believable. Domination usually has a flowery excuse. I'm quite fascinated by ins and outs of such justifications.
I think we are (all too often) bound ourselves by our desire to bind others.
Now that is a profound statement, with multiple resonances or over-determinations:
* to force others into some kind of rigid structure;
* to reduce all meaning to a supreme Monologic meaning (one correct interpretation);
* sadism
It's when we realize that the dialogue is open and infinite--that that is the nature of the philosophical dialogue--that we can settle in and let our ideas develop and our understanding deepen. In striving to have a rational understanding of our interlocutor, I think that we deepen our experience with the world at large. Even us cyber-dialogists.
Let me just take one thing back: We never settle in: I believe above all that "Learning not increased, is learning decreased."---Hillel
I like your breakdown. The sadism/cruelty is what Nietzsche understood so well. To me sophistication is related to turning this sadism inward, against the self. My sense is that it can't just be abolished but only steered. Any life structuring narrative seems to impose at least an implicit hierarchy. Every crystallized notion of virtue casts a shadow.
'Monologic meaning' is a good description, I think. Our temptation is to find and impose this meaning. Spengler called it 'ethical socialism.' It's what we Faustians take for granted: one true path and the duty of homogenizing the world in the name of this path. I like Feuerbach for demonstrating the birth of humanism from Christianity. Monologic has monotheistic roots, it seems. I can't be against it in a simple way, since my own pursuit of truth is the pursuit of single truth. To me the living option is irony of some sort.
Quoting uncanni
I totally agree. I think this realization can be painful. It's the death of the usual spiritual comforts. One has to set sail on a dark ocean of personality and even embrace a permanent identity crisis. One becomes everyone and no one. For me the journey has been strange. It's lonely and yet the opposite of lonely, humble but proud.
Somehow cyber-dialogue fits all of this. I don't want to be publicly tied to the wild thoughts we're exploring here. I don't want to force freaky-difficult-'infinite' consciousness on others. We strangers meet here to be wildly honest about the wonder and terrors of life. We create a wall of digital graffiti.
I don't think I was ever so honest in a paper written for school.
Not so fast...
There are beliefs which it is unreasonable to doubt. That this is a sentence of English, for example. Such beliefs are foundational. Consider Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs.
Now if god were real, wouldn't one expect belief in him to be of this sort? If there were such a creature, woudln't it be unreasonable not to believe in him?
:up: :cool: Reminds me of the good old PF days - praise be goober!
Yep.
I'm thinking of the faith found in the trial of god. There is questioning, even rejection, and yet there is still faith. In that play the arguments against god are considered, and god found wanting. And yet the play ends in prayer.
How does this make any sense to you? It's like saying 'if what I tell you is true, then it is unreasonable for you not to believe me'. But of course your reasons for believing or not believing me are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether or not what I say is true. Likewise, our reasons for believing or not believing in god are mostly, if not completely unrelated to whether there is or is not a god.
Omnipresence. IF there were a god, wouldn't His presence be utterly overwhelming? This seems to be what many of the devout describe.
This in contrast to Quoting PfhorrestThere are things that stand outside the tournament of justification, because they are needed in order for that tournament to take place. Isn't god just the sort of thing that would justify everything else?
But I suspect that will be anathema to you, old friend.
Quoting Pfhorrest
Considering what must be the case, in order for one to doubt in this way. There must, for instance, be beliefs, however tentative. And I suppose there must be some sort of language in which this doubting may take place. Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts.
SO there must be stuff that is beyond doubt.
It's painful and liberating, as you suggest. I am quite isolated where I live--there are absolutely no old leftie hippie intellectuals around these parts; I'm surrounded by devout, hypocritical christians. So I have indeed found in this forum a respite, a breather.
I really like your phrase, "permanent identity crisis": but this doesn't have to be a painful or uncomfortable constant: it can be seen simply as the evolution of oneself, one's philosophy.
What the heck is "presence"? By the time I say "now" it's in the past. I'm afraid the presence of anything is not overwhelming. It's actually very difficult to affirm what it means to be present.
Quoting Banno
I believe this is contradictory. Such a thing would be unjustifiable. And an unjustifiable thing cannot itself justify anything. Placing god in this contradictory category only makes the reality of god impossible. It would be an atheist definition. If we want to understand how a theist sees, apprehends, understands, or defines "God" an atheist definition is not helpful because clearly these two apprehend the meaning of that term in completely different ways.
Quoting Banno
I didn't think you were an idealist Banno, but that is the affirmation of an ideal. The only thing beyond doubt would be something perfectly well known, and such perfection is proper only to an ideal.
Quoting Banno
This may be the case, but I know you well enough to know that you will deny that the "stuff that is beyond doubt" is 'ideal'. You will claim that this "stuff" is some sort of foundational belief such as "this is a sentence of English", which is not an 'ideal' at all because it actually can be doubted. I can for instance doubt that it is a "sentence" because the "t" in "this" is not capitalized. and if that is not supposed to be the sentence referred to, what does "this" refer to? In fact, your example is a complete misrepresentation of what an ideal is supposed to be.
Try looking at mathematics, where each symbol is supposed to directly represent an object (mathematical object) instead of meaning something. When the symbol directly represents an object instead of having meaning, (such as the numeral "3" represents the number 3), there can be no doubt as to what the symbol means. Therefore we have ideal representation. Ideal representation is what is required to put an expression beyond the reach of doubt. The problem though, is that the whole system may be cast into doubt, by doubting the existence of such ideal objects.
Quoting jellyfish
Apparently, I have given you the wrong impression of Enformationism. It is not an attempt "to bring God down to this world". And it is not a Christology in any sense. It is instead an attempt to understand the traditional disputed dichotomies of Science, Philosophy, and Religion. As expressed in the heading of my BothAnd Blog : "Philosophical musings on Quanta & Qualia; Materialism & Spiritualism; Science & Religion; Pragmatism & Idealism, etc."
However, in view of my thesis, it might seem that the only reasonable religion for humans would be some form of man-made Humanism. Yet, I can't imagine that it would ever appeal to enough people (non-philosophers) to have any effect on the masses. So, I compromise on Deism as my religious philosophy : although I have no direct experience or knowledge of G*D, I have concluded that the evolving world seems to be organized by a Mind, instead of by random collisions of atoms, or by an infinite regression of materialistic Multiverses. And, since modern science has discovered that both Energy and Matter are forms of metaphysical Information, it follows that everything in the world is a piece of that Cosmic Mind. By that, I don't mean Panpsychism, but PanEnDeism. :cool:
Quoting jellyfish
Yes. I was impressed, although at times mystified, by Hofstadter's books. I have quoted him in some of my essays on The Self. But I wouldn't mention that abstruse Strange Loop argument to non-scientists or non-philosophers, because it's so technical and abstract. :nerd:
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Me too. And I know what you mean by hypocritical Christians. The leftist hippies are the true Christians, as I see it, as they continued with the implicit humanistic core of the Christian tradition.
Quoting uncanni
I totally agree. I have found my ecstasy in this crisis. I live largely for this crisis. I suppose I chose those words to emphasize that it's the way of death and despair, too. Philosophy has opened up for me both new highs and new lows.
Thanks. I am now seeing it as a metaphysical system that wants to resolve traditional confusions and overcome apparent dichotomies. This too is in Hegel, along with a religion element that you aren't concerned with.
I'm more with philosophers like Wittgenstein and Heidegger on this theme. To me the situation is far more organic and subconscious and ultimately 'uncurable' by an explicit system. We can't dominate the metalanguage, which is ordinary language. All explicit systems are little boats on the dark ocean of being-in-the-world, being-with-others, being-in-language. Explicit systems can be good for organizing explicit knowledge, but I think most of our knowledge is tacit.
Quoting Gnomon
His books are indeed complex. I do think I am a Strange Loop is beautifully unpretentious given its depth and complexity. It's hard to imagine how he could have written it better.
I agree that it's hard to discuss with those not into that kind of complexity. Philosophy can be a lonely path, especially in this junk-food social-media age, where everything is bite-sized click-bait. Even the people I'm close to don't have the same appetite for the conceptual journey. And it's only that appetite that leads to enough reading to make Hofstadter digestible rather than mystifying.
I'm with you on confronting the aporia. But I also think this is a terrifying path ('condemned to be free') and that religion is also an opiate in demand: people want a master, a system. You nailed it with 'relieves the individual.' Of what? Of the permanent identity crisis that might otherwise drive them to despair and self-destruction.
As in Brave New World, the people are protected from their own depth and potential for madness. Heretics can be cast as enemies of the people, who would thrust them into a permanent revolution in the means of seduction (of self and others via flattering-comforting grand narratives.)
That said, since god as I have defined possesses all abilities that exist (or more), and since persons exist, then god must possess the ability of persons too. But as the perfect being, it is not limited to possessing the abilities of persons only.
There's no way around crisis, death or despair for humans. The way I see it, we had best find the "healthiest" ways we can manage for dealing with them. I think a lot of people give up before they finish growing up, and I believe it takes a lifetime for humans to grow up. If we stop working on it, we're screwed; we've settled into mind-numbing stasis. Stasis and ecstasy derive from the same Greek word stasis--standing or stoppage. We will find the bits of ecstasy in moving forward.
Pearls before swine. :clap: :cool:
It leaves me doubtful. Some people here at TPF claim it's impossible for me to doubt some of the things that I doubt, therefore my doubt of my doubt is warranted. Perhaps I'm misusing the word "doubt". This possibility warrants the doubt of doubt as well.
Do you think there's something wrong with claiming to doubt doubt? I think it's better than claiming to know that I know. There's an infinite regress implied here, and infinite regress is conducive of doubt. So there is nothing wrong with claiming to doubt doubt, while there is something wrong with claiming to know that I know.
Are you saying that I'm casting pearls before swine?
I'll hazard to speak for more of us than just my lonesome, uncanni, when I say "Oink oink ..." Keep droppin' them pearls in our pen. :wink:
I agree. But, when god is labeled as "a perfect being", it's an Oxymoron. In our experience, no created or mortal beings are perfect. Because, given Life & Time, they have the potential for further development. That's why I try to avoid the confusion by labeling G*D as "BEING" : defined as the eternal-infinite power to exist. Since that includes all possibilities, it means that G*D has the potential for Personality. But only in the world of imperfect created beings is that opportunity actualized into reality. "Person" is a relative term, while "BEING" is an absolute concept.
I must see it that way too, because I try to be kind.
Now I do think 'healthy' pretty much has to be ambiguous here. If we avoid 'ideological' stasis, then (seems to me) we haven't settled exactly on what the good life is, on exactly how to be grown up and virtuous. Another uncomfortable issue in my mind is the connection of 'sin' or irrationality or immaturity with great art. Even moral progress seems to require that the 'sinner' (moral revolutionary) violate today's norms in order to install tomorrow's. In other words, domination these days is likely to be justified in terms of public health, public safety. There's also the problem of whether violence is ever justified. Is antifa dealing with things in a healthy way, even if it gets them or others killed? Or perhaps we'll take a 'do no harm' approach. Even this passivity can be accused.
I'm not trying to be buzzkill but only articulate the complexity of not-stasis as I see it. I guess I find an ecstasy in this complexity -- at the cost of having anything like a solution for existence.
With that said, faith, the beliefs supported by the probable or the reasonable, is quite necessary. Very few beliefs are supported by absolute proofs.
We are all pigs in the same pen, then; I certainly don't consider myself grown up yet. Maybe the 70s will usher in more maturity...
I agree: I'm not seeking an easy resting place for my mind or my beliefs. Sometimes I think things would be a lot easier if I just knew that I was saved by Jesus, but then other times I think that everyone who has gotten "the good news" really knows, deep down inside, that it's bollocks. The restlessness of the negative dialectic keeps calling me...
:point: :fire:
Nice. Here's a passage that I think maybe you'll appreciate. To me it's about the glory of the negative what it tends toward.
[quote=Hegel]
The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity.[1]
[/quote]
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm
This to me describes the 'infinity' of the godless/divine wanderer.
I understand. But I persist to say that your definition of religion is therefore too broad, because sportball would be a religion for Alice and Bob in the second alternate universe; but this is not how people commonly use the term "religion", is it?
Quoting Pfhorrest
Actually the study of reality is metaphysics, not physics; and indeed it is not strictly religious. But that is why another essential component to "religion" is the act. The mere study of topics even about gods would be called theology, for which the theologian who does not act in accordance to the findings from the theology is technically not religious.
Quoting Pfhorrest
We need to make the distinction between the terms "disbelief" and "non-belief". A rock is in a state of non-belief, for it can neither believe nor disbelieve in anything. On the other hand, the proposition "disbelief in p" is the opposite to "belief in p". As opposites, they are also mutually exclusive.
Quoting Pfhorrest
I understand that you discuss the Thomists' view, which is not necessarily your own view. But my point was that Thomists, who are somewhat competent at logic, would not make the simple error to believe that reason supports faith when, under the definition of faith you have given, reason destroys faith.
Anyways, to close this part of discussion about what Thomists believe, here is an extract about Aquinas: "The theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas did not hold that faith is mere opinion: on the contrary, he held that it represents a mean (understood in the Platonic sense) between excessive reliance on science (i.e. demonstration) and excessive reliance on opinion." - Source.
I wasn't attracted to Hegel and read very little of him. I believe that for various German writers, it's a travesty to translate them to English; Martin Buber's work is practically unreadable in English.
What does he mean, "absolute inwardness"? Why does he keep using the word absolute over (4 times)? It makes me suspicious."A pure and infinite self-identity": does "infinite" acknowledge the différance of that self-identity? "Absolute independence"? "Free unity with itself"? I don't get it.
I'm uncomfortable. I don't think I understand or know his discourse at all, like the way I do Bakhtin, Freud, Lyotard and a few others that I read repeatedly to understand really well. I'm outside of Hegel, and I know I'd have to study him intensely to get him.
What strikes me about the passage is that it seems to contradict what you've written about our need for the monologician in our midst so that we remember not to transform our own dialogic notions into any kind of self-righteous, authoritarian or repressive take on other views. The float like a butterfly sting like a bee struggle against or dance around stasis (or hypostasis as Adorno called it), and certainly against the concept of a stable self-identity. Just as my philosophy continues transforming, so do myselves. Freud's ego has been dehisced like a seed pod into infinite selves of which we may or may not be conscious. Of course, some of these selves are completely unconscious, and it would take serious psychoanalysis to abreact them. Myselves are kind of infinite like the cosmos...
I prefer aspects of Modernism to Romanticism.
Why not?
I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase.
Yep. That's were I was headed. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, well, so much for your accusation. I am not an idealist.
I like using this kind of example to illustrate the argument for critical rationalism.
When it comes to why to do (or intend) something, it's pretty much accepted that everyone is free to do what they want just because they want to do it, unless there is some good reason not to do it. Nobody insists that everybody stop doing anything at all until they can justify from the ground up why they should do something, because it's clearly impossible: maybe you want to buy a car so you can get to work so you can earn money so you can buy vanilla ice cream so that you can eat vanilla ice cream so that you can enjoy the taste of it, but at some point you get to something like that where your only justification is that it sounds good to you, you just want it, and "so you have no good reason to do it then" doesn't count as a reason not to do it, at least not to any reasonable person.
But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it.
But the autocorrect here is becoming a real pain.
The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.
And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus.
And unless you're a moral nihilist (in which case it's not worth arguing, just stop reading here), it's possible for the things you want to be "in error" too (for you to want the wrong things, things you shouldn't want), so good reasons can also be given to not want those things. But "you don't have a good reason to want that" is not, in itself, good reason not to want it.
They're perfectly analogous.
Quoting Banno
It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.
Notice that explaining something requires no judgement of success or failure, while justifying something requires success. You say something, you believe that what you have said explains something, and that is your explanation, regardless of whether anyone understands it, let alone believing or agreeing to it. To justify on the other hand requires agreement, that's where "the correctness of" comes into play.
Quoting Pfhorrest
That's right, providing the reason for an act does not justify the act. One must provide a "good reason" for the act This is evident from the fact that providing a bad reason (unsound argument) cannot justify an act. That's why it's very difficult to justify acts, as well as beliefs, through reference to "feelings". This is contrary to the common belief that we justify by referring to sensations ("I saw it" for example), which just provides us with appearances and no real principles.
Quoting Banno
Right, error is common place, and that's why this notion of "fit" is not a good principle to base such judgements on. One person's method of judging a "fit" is completely different from another person's method. What method does your auto-correct use? You might notice here at TPF that some people have very odd ways of choosing words. I find it very odd that you would be judging whether the world fits to the words rather than judging whether the words fit to the world. When making a "fit" something must conform to the shape of the other. We conform the words to fit to the world, not vise versa.
You clearly use a completely different method for judging the "fit of wold-to-word" from me. You judge that "justified" is a word which fits your vanilla purchase, when all you've said in your attempt to justify, that you buy vanilla because you like it. I see that you are trying to conform the word "justify" to fit your perception of 'the world', but I reject your proposed conformation as a misunderstanding of the world.
Even if one accepts this, "I like vanilla" is sufficient to justify my purchase.
And you seem to have misunderstood direction of fit.
If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.
Quoting Banno
it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world.
The problem, as I explained, is that justification requires success. And you've failed. Sorry.
Sure. That just doesn't negate my point. Flavours and numbers are different.
Seems to me you haven't read Anscomb, nor Austin.
A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible. Hence, bible scholars.
I met a bible scholar who said, when reading the line from his version of the bible, "there will be no women", that it does not mean there will be no women. He said his interpretation was derived from reading other parts of the bible.
How can you trust a narrative if it is misleading or irreconcilable with itself? By declaring that some parts of it did not mean what it actually said. Instead of admitting to a mistake, you make up an intricate set of reinterpretations, which necessitates the alteration of the normative meaning of the text. The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises. Which they do, hence the sectarianism in Evangelist Christianity. The alternative, that is, to not take this approach, is impossible for a Christian, since normative understanding of the text leads to discrepancies, which the bible critics with the persuasion of secular atheism thrive on.
To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three. Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit.
A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world.
You don't need to read Anscomb, Aristotle, Astute, or Augustine, (or Austin for short) to see that. (In alphabetical order of appearance.)
There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.)
I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
1. Buying vanilla instead of Rocky Road is not a sin, or an unethical act.
2. It is the taste that is unexplained-- and hence, unjustified. To buy something to satisfy one's taste preference I see as justified, because it prevents the person's suffering. Minor suffering, such as one that would present, should the person buy chocolate flavoured ice cream instead of vanilla, when both are equally available with no moral restriction. So the avoidance of minor suffering is a cause that renders the selection justified.
But justification is justification, and "because I like it" doesn't justify anything.
Quoting god must be atheist
What purpose does "has" serve here? I really do not know what you mean here. Are you saying that the person shapes the world to fit to the bible? I do not believe this, I believe the religious person shapes the words of the bible to fit to the world.
Quoting god must be atheist
This is a matter of interpreting the words differently. And that is shaping the words, just like Banno wants to shape the word "justify" to suit some personal goal. Interpretation is not an act of making the world fit to the words, it's an act of making the words fit to the world.
Quoting god must be atheist
You are totally neglecting the role of words here. This 'fitting' is done through the use of words. The "bible's teaching" is not "a world" to the reader, it is a bunch of words. So there is not "three worlds" here. Furthermore, I do not believe you can distinguish between "perceived reality" and "inner model of the world" as you claim. One's "perceived reality is one's "inner model of the world", the two are the very same thing. So now I have reduced your "three worlds" to just one world.
Quoting god must be atheist
Now you introduce a fourth world, the "existing world". But you've given no ontological principles to justify the claim of an existing world, so the "existing world" is still nothing more that one's "perceived reality', of 'inner model" of the world. This claim of an existing world is no more justified than Banno's claim that buying vanilla is justified by "I like it". Justification requires demonstrating the correctness of the act, or assertion.
Quoting god must be atheist
Again, you are leaving out the role of words. A person has an inner model of the world, a perceived reality. The person will try to fit words to this world. There is no such thing as trying to "fit the world" to this mental model, because until the person apprehends that other people have their own inner models, (perceived realities) this is the only world that there is. So, what the person does is try to fit words to this mental world. There are two distinct types of this activity, one is putting words together to speak or write, and the other is interpreting spoken or written words. Each is a different type of shaping words to fit one's "world".
If you want to talk about shaping "the world" we would have to consider how one's inner model, one's perceived reality, comes to exist, and changes over time, because this is the only instance of "world" which has been justified.
Quoting god must be atheist
Right, I agree that there are many situations in which justification is not asked for. Justification is only really needed when it is asked for, and we often accept things without asking for justification. This is the case for instance when we trust the authority of the person speaking.
What Banno was arguing, is that there are things which are unjustifiable, personal taste for example, and that these unjustifiable things form the basis, the foundation, of all justifications.
I think that this is a misunderstanding. What forms the foundation of all justifications is things which we do not ask for justification of. These are things which for some reason or another (perhaps we trust the authority of the person speaking), we do request justification for. This is very distinct from Banno's claim that these things are unjustifiable.
The things which we do not ask for justification of, which Banno calls "unjustifiable", are in fact justifiable, and all we have to do is doubt them, and ask for justification, to get someone motivated to move on justifying them. Banno wants to claim that they are somehow beyond doubt, because it would be ridiculous to ask for justification of them. But this is an incorrect approach, because it is by doubting these foundational things, asking for justification, that we expand our knowledge beyond the limits set up by those people, who at one time, were the authorities whom we would not ask for justification.
So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it.
The demand is for justification, and this by definition is to demonstrate the correctness of the thing being justified. If Banno claims "I like vanilla", I can request proof that this claim is true, i.e. justification. Bannno has used the claim to justify buying vanilla, and implied that the claim is unjustifiable. It is not. The preference for vanilla may be demonstrated.
I don't know if you're right, @Metaphysician Undercover. One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA.
Beyond that, I would be really hard pressed to state if Banno ate the ice cream because he wanted to perform a just, moral, ethical and correct act. He ate it because he likes it, is my opinion, and I think justification of it may be available (by DNA analysis) but it certainly is a modern development in the history of justification theory.
A justification shows why something was done. "I prefer vanilla" is sufficient justification for my choice of vanilla.
That's it.
Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way.
Yeah, I strongly doubt you will find agreement on that of God there from theists, and I personally disagree with that definition of religion.
That definition of theology seems pretty uncontroversial though.
So you agree then, it is possible to account for taste.
Quoting Banno
This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one.
Quoting Janus
Right, I'll agree to that. One form of justifiable things is propositions, they may be true or false, so we might ask for justification of the proposition, demonstration of its truth.. However, justification goes further than this, because like in the example of Banno's purchasing vanilla milkshakes, we also ask for justification of actions.
This leaves things which are neither correct nor incorrect, as unjustifiable. Banno's proposition "I like vanilla", as a proposition, may be either true or false, therefore it is justifiable. Now the question is whether something which is unjustifiable (neither correct nor incorrect) could be used to justify something else. Notice that a proposition cannot fall into this category (unjustifiable) because a proposition must be either true or false, and true is a instance of being correct.
Quoting tim wood
This would be an atheist's definition. A theist believes that God has real independent existence. It does not make sense to use an atheist's definition, because if you want to define a term, you must refer to those who actually use that term, to determine the definition. You wouldn't turn to someone without an education in physics, to get a definition of "quantum entanglement", you'd turn to a physicist. Likewise, you wouldn't turn to someone without an education in theology to get a definition of God, you'd turn to a theologian.
Not so much. My dictionary says you are wrong; but what would it know?
Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?"
But then, you like obtuse.
As do I, when there is something to be revealed by it.
SO is there a point to your being obtuse? I've missed it, if so. Can you try again?
No, I would not concur with that. The issue with reducing 'God' to an idea or a projection, construction, or social consensus, is that it deflates it to an artefact of the mind, individual or collective. This is the common attitude, practically the default. But I think the question is understood this way because modern culture doesn't have any scale along which to understand what 'transcendent' means, which is an inevitable consequence of the process of secularisation. So the secular response is: by transcendent, you mean deity, and that is not something objectively ascertainable, so it must be subjective or social. There's simply no other place to envisage it or put it.
But the point is, whether or not there is God or supreme being, this principle or person does not exist in the sense that material phenomena exist. Everything that exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and end in time. As 'the sacred' is not composed of parts and is a-temporal, ergo, not something that exists. This is the subject of the essay - by a Bishop - God does not exist.
There is an old maxim, 'God is never what you think'. The principle is that thought itself is inherently incapable of comprehension of the sacred. That is why spiritual philosophies rely on silence, meditation, 'un-knowing', and the like; although this understanding is not so much characteristic of modern religion, it's associated more with contemplative spirituality (although you now find it in alternative spirituality, like Eckhardt Tolle.)
They might ask you: what would you be prepared to do, to find out?
Yes, quite a few it appears. You seem to have a selective form of "consensus".
Quoting tim wood
Are you serious? I think it is quite clear in Christian religions that human beings are dependent on God as creator, and God is not dependent on human beings for His existence. Therefore God has real independent existence for Christian based thinkers.
Quoting tim wood
God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that.
Quoting Banno
Your claim was that there are unjustifiable things which could be used to justify other things.. These unjustifiable things are beyond doubt, because they are foundational, and to doubt them would undermine one's own capacity to doubt. You suggested that god might be like this.
The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. There are no such things. If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. That's why we can doubt god (for example). If they cannot be doubted, they are neither correct nor incorrect, as janus pointed out. But they are not foundational.
Regardless of whether "I like vanilla" justifies your purchase, it is not itself unjustifiable, and not beyond doubt. So the example does not suffice and is a digression.
It really isn't. It's a fundamental idea in philosophical theology. The trouble is, whenever I try to explain it, you first become exasperated, and then hostile, because of your 'mind-map' or the heuristic by which you categorise all these ideas. Which is something like: It's perfectly OK to believe in God, because by so doing, all you're doing is professing faith, saying something about yourself. But if you wish to show there is such a being, then you obviously can't, because it's not objectively verifiable.
Is that close?
What I'm arguing is that what is 'objectively verifiable' is not all there is to be known. Or, put another way, there are other modes of knowing, or cognitive models, within which 'ideas of the sacred' are quite demonstrable, if not necessarily objective.
I acknowledge it's a deep subject and topic, and not everyone will want to go there, but if you start a thread on 'towards a philosophy of religion' then you might at least be willing to think outside your particular square about it instead of continually blowing up about it. :wink:
Quoting tim wood
'God is...' will do just fine, thanks.
Quoting tim wood
OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. (Although there's always Andrew Newberg....)
Theologically speaking, the role of the creator as being imminent or transcendent has been mostly dealt with as differences of opinion to how closely such an agent may be involved with the concerns and affairs of a single person. So, in one sense, it has always been a problem of accepting an idea because thinking one way or another changes the decisions a person makes.
But making decisions of that kind is not the same thing as deciding what is valid to accept as evidence for one state of affairs or another in a discussion of our creation as a shared reality and wondering what made it the way it is. Nobody starts their journey as an ethical being by making sure it can be defended through philosophy.
Kant, particularly in the Critique of Judgement, makes a distinction between the two approaches. In that tome, he complains that Spinoza was too dark in his view of the person and what they could hope for.
So I propose it is difficult to move forward with these considerations because we, as people trying to sort things out, cannot simply point to this or that articulation of the problem as a shared point of departure.
Well, yes they do. I gave you an example of one. There are plenty of others.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's muddled. If they are foundational then they are true. Are you claiming that all propositions can be either true or false? but that's wrong, too.
But this is the same stuff we have been over many times before.
A system of beliefs grounded in faith, which in turn is uncritical belief, belief not to be questioned.
Quoting tim wood
To believe something is to think that it is true. Christians generally think that God exists, in an objective way, independent of humans thinking that he exists; that he existed before there were any humans to think that he existed. They may not claim to know with certainty or be able to demonstrate that to other people, but they still think that God exists independent of human opinion, and would disagree vehemently (see this thread) that he's "just an idea".
More on the topic of the OP, I thought what you were looking for was consensus on what the idea of God is of, regardless of whether or not that exists. Like, we can probably come to a consensus agreement on what "unicorn" means, and then debate whether or not there are any such things. I thought that's what you were looking for.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nope, even if we're talking about my paragraph above, just agreeing on what it is we're to debate the existence of. The creator of what, and does absolutely anything count as that, whatever it should turn out to have created whatever you mean? E.g. if the creator of the Earth, then does the Sun's protoplanetary disc count as "God"? Or maybe whatever old dead star whose remains that protoplanetary disc (and the Sun itself) coalesced out of? If the creator of the universe, would "quantum fluctuations in eternally expanding space-time" count as God? If "whatever created..." something is all you mean by God, then you're going to end up concluding that there necessarily is a God, because nothing comes from nothing, and even atheists won't disagree that that thing (that whatever came from) exists, they'll just disagree that it deserved the label "God".
This seems to be a confused use of the word "believes". I believe that the sun exists, and that its existence is independent of anything anyone thinks about it. My understanding of most Christians, and most theists generally, is that they have the same opinion about God as I (and probably they too) have about the sun, in that respect.
There might be a difference in their opinion between God and the sun in the respect that they can easily demonstrate the existence of the sun to other people and demonstrating the existence of God might not be that easy. But there are plenty of other mundane things that it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of (faraway celestial objects, tiny subatomic particles) that nevertheless can be shown to exist with indirect evidence and reasoning from that evidence, and plenty of theists seem to think that the existence of God can be indirectly demonstrated in the same way (just look at all the many arguments for why God must exist).
As an atheist I of course think all of those attempts to demonstrate the existence of God fail, but theists obviously disagree.
Quoting tim wood
I already raised problems with that in my previous post.
That God is transcendent and beyond material form is not an idea of my devising.
Even without any explicit faith commitment, who or what the name ‘God’ refers to is necessarily a very slippery matter. But I will quote some passages from Comparative Religion scholar Karen Armstrong, from an essay of hers on the question Should we believe in belief? which I think it highly germane to the topic.
She leads with:
Actually, I can’t help but think this mirrors exactly what Tim Wood makes of it. So, what is the matter with that approach?
Well, she says:
Some comments inserted by me.
Picture the world you think atheists believe exists.
Now picture the world you think theists believe exists.
Now describe the difference between those two pictures.
That difference is what you think "God" means.
For me, I think that difference is generally the existence of a person of some sort -- some being with a mind and will -- that excels to perfection at all the things that are virtues of a person, having complete knowledge of everything in the universe (omniscience), perfect function of mind and will within itself (including omnibenevolence), and complete power over everything in the universe (omnipotence).
And I don't think such a thing exists.
Other nominal theists seem to think that "God" means either something that atheists wouldn't dispute the existence of, just the labeling of (so there is no difference in the two pictures above), or something poetic, literary, or metaphorical, like "love" or other theologically noncognitivist referents. But for theists who do posit a difference in the world they think exists and the world that atheists think exists, it seems to be something like the above.
Your example, "I like vanilla" is not beyond doubt. Perhaps it's beyond doubt to you, but it's not beyond doubt to me. So when you use that in your attempt to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes, it may be questioned by me, doubted. Therefore you have not provided an acceptable example.
Quoting tim wood
This is the way you look at Christian theological thinking, as presuppositions, but it is not the way that the founders of Christianity looked at God. If you read some of the material you'll see that it's mostly all questions, with some proposed answers. St. Augustine for instance questions everything from the earth to the heavens, and especially the presupposition that God is omniscient, in relation to Augustine's own experience of "free will". Take a look at the table of contents of St Thomas' Summa Theologica for example, the entire book is a series of questions, discussion of the questions, objections, and replies. Your claim that these thinkers presupposed God, and never questioned the presuppositions, is the exact opposite of the truth. That is exactly what they did, question the presuppositions. And that is why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's ontological proof as unsound.
Quoting Wayfarer
This is the key point which tim wood doesn't get. Certain individuals will make a serious quest toward whether there really is a God. These individuals will question (doubt) all the fundamental presuppositions, which Banno is claiming are beyond doubt, in regard to the reliability and truth of such presuppositions, which others insist are beyond doubt. Some of these thinkers, like St Thomas for example, became the most profound theologians for that very reason, that they got beyond the prior presuppositions, to establish new principles of a deeper an higher understanding.
Tim wood portrays the theologian as believing in God only because God is a presupposition. It is implied that if one doubts or questions God that person looses the presupposition and will necessarily become atheist by the very fact that the presupposition of God is cast aside. So tim does not accept the profound reality which you and I have experienced first hand, that if one makes a serious quest, the reality of God becomes evident. And, it does not require the presupposition that God is real, as tim believes, it just requires a human being with an inquisitive (doubtful) nature. Some of these human beings who seriously doubt the existence of God end up as the most profound theologians.
Quoting tim wood
You seem to have missed my post, way back earlier in the thread. I said that to think that there is such a thing as "the definition" would be a mistaken thought. So you will not get my consent on any proposed definition. And, it is evident in this thread that my position is correct, because there has been no consensus.
Quoting tim wood
I've read a considerable amount of Christian theology and never have I seen it stated "the fundamental tenet is belief". You really are just making this stuff up. Faith is very important, but faith, as that which supports or propagates belief, is not the same thing as belief. And faith itself is propagated, cultured, not indoctrinated, so faith is not even the type of thing which could be a tenet. That's a category mistake. This category mistake is very similar to the reason why Aquinas rejected Anselm's ontological argument. We cannot make God real simply by believing or having faith that God is real, we must actually understand that God is real. So Aquinas points to the human disposition which is required in order for a human being to understand that God is real.
Aquinas succinctly states that the existence of God, and other things which can be known about God by natural reason, are not articles of faith. However, to those who cannot understand the reasoning by which the existence of God is known, this can be accepted by faith.
Quoting Wayfarer
As stated above, Aquinas assures us that the existence of God, as well as some things about God, can be known by natural reason. He explains this by describing how we can know a cause through its effect by reason. We can observe the effect, create principles based on that observance, and deduce that there was a cause, and some things about the cause.
What appears to be missing for your quoted passages is the Aristotelian distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge, made in his Nichomachean Ethics. In modern epistemology it is know-how and know-that. In post-Socratic times, the distinction between logos and mythos was mostly supplanted by the Aristotelian system.
It appears like this came about because Socrates was highly critical of ambiguity in the use of "techne". Through rhetoric and sophistry logos and mythos got all mixed together, conflated such that the combined two became techne or episteme, and there were no hard principles to separate knowldege which was based in theory from knowledge which was based in practise. And theory is not necessarily supported by sound premises. A significant portion of Aristotle's work is actually aimed toward sorting this out, starting with his fundamental logical Categories, and the designation of "substance" as what grounds logic (theory).
Nature minus mystery. :chin: :clap:
[quote=Pfhorrest]Now picture the world you think theists believe exists.[/quote]
Nature plus mystery. :scream: :pray:
[quote=Pfhorrest]Now describe the difference between those two pictures.[/quote]
• plus Mystery. Begs all questions, answers none (e.g. "Mystery did it ..." "Mystery said it ..." "It's the Mystery's Will ...") Mystery-of-the-gaps. A(nother) just-so story. Magical thinking.
• minus Mystery. Explicable answers at least in principle - criterion for filtering out pseudo-questions (e.g. "What happens to me after I die?"). Complexity (perplexity) exorcises mystery (anxiety). Defeasible thinking.
[quote=Pfhorrest]That difference is what you think "God" means.[/quote]
Ersatz, ad hockery, stop-gap, placeholder (+0), fetish, anti-anxiety placebo ... :sparkle: :monkey:
You forgot the second mystery.
Stupid joke. The difference between Nature + mystery and Nature - mystery is 2 mystery.
No - and this is the crux of the issue for philosophy of religion. Western culture has lost the ability to understand or envisage different modes of being. There's a very interesting article on IEP about 17th Century Theories of Substance. It notes that:
I'm arguing that the possibility of 'degrees of reality' (and the corresponding sense of 'ontological proximity' to the absolute) has generally been lost in the transition to modern thought - and that, therefore, we believe that the term 'existence' is univocal - something either exists or it doesn't. Birds, bats, and the number 7 exist; unicorns, phlogiston and the square root of 7 do not. And that I believe is what we have in mind when we ask whether 'god' is 'materially existent'. Then the answer is 'no'. And that's the only answer available, in the flattened-out worldview that we nowadays inhabit, because we've lost a dimension or a mode of cognition.
So, in answer to your question as to whether I accept that simply 'anything and everything exists' - the answer is no, but empiricism is not the appropriate method to deal with the question. I do accept there are levels of being that are outside the purview of the scientific worldview, and that they are real. But this is the question of metaphysics, par excellence, and empiricism reduces any consideration of what is real, to what can be seen, felt, and touched, or theories arrived at by way of mathematical inference based on what is measurable, and it conditions our entire outlook and way of being in the world on that basis. So it tends to foreclose the possibility of there being a metaphysics (although I should add, I think that metaphysics is only ever provisional in nature, that it's a "pointing out device", not a final truth.)
Commentary on Heidegger.
Let's work with that. I say I prefer vanilla, You ask if I am sure - it was chocolate yesterday, Banana (yuck!) the day before...
Or you notice that there is only one serve of chocolate remains, and you know that I know you prefer chocolate, and hence suspect that I am putting up with the vanilla so that you can have the chocolate.
IS this what you have in mind?
Why are you stuck on material existence? No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. But this does not mean that Christians believe that God's existence depends on the human mind, like other immaterial things seem to. On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
Quoting tim wood
Sure, I'll accept those definitions of "faith". Now did you read what I said Aquinas stated very succinctly, that the existence of God, and some things about God are not articles of faith, because they are known by natural reason. But they may be accepted on faith by those who do not understand the reasoning.
Quoting tim wood
The founding premise is that each and every material object has a cause of its existence. Notice that there is no presupposition of "God" here. But when we notice that the first material object must necessarily have a cause which is immaterial, we give that immaterial cause a name, "God".
Of course, if you do not understand the argument, you might accept "God" on faith, as Aquinas said, but I see no reason to reject the argument. And I've seen many who have attempted to give reason to reject the argument, but all those attempts have proven to be unreasonable. So in reality it appears to be unreasonable not to accept the founding argument for the existence of God.
Quoting Banno
Yes, you might be lying. You purchased vanilla. You claimed to be able to justify your purchase with "I like vanilla". This assertion does not justify your purchase because I am not convinced that you actually do like vanilla, and I think you were buying the vanilla milkshakes for someone else. Either justify your claim or I'll continue to believe that you were buying the milkshakes for someone else.
The point being that any claim which is purported to be "beyond doubt", must be substantiated, in order to actually be beyond doubt. And to substantiate a claim is to justify it. So your claim "I like vanilla" can only act to justify your purchase of vanilla milkshakes if it has itself been substantiated, or justified.
The regress in justification does not end in the way that you think it does. It ends not with something which is beyond doubt, but with something which we see no need to doubt. So if I trusted you for example, when you said "I like vanilla", that might put an end to the need for justification. In general, we commonly appeal to authority to put an end to the regress in justification, citing a scientific principle, or some such thing, which will not be doubted by people who trust science.
I don't see this as different from what I have suggested.
I may be misunderstanding here, but here's my reaction to a possible distinction between the two. There is a difference between what I need to have no reason to doubt and what is beyond doubt. If I have experiences X, this could lead to a rational belief A that I have which I cannot demonstrate to others, but which I have no reason to doubt. This could be mundane - I see a pumas of different sizes and ages - in a state where they are not supposed to exist, I see them engaged eating a recent killing stalking prey raising young. And over a period of the last decade. I decide pumas are in this state. (like New Hampshire, say). Others have good grounds to not accept my belief. They don't know me, how good my observational skills are, if I have an agenda, what I saw, if I can tell the difference between a lynx (or bobcat, whichever one it is that's in that region) and a puma, if I am nuts, was high and so on. So they have very good grounds to go with whatever the official state and scientist position is on the demographics of pumas and ignore my belief. I on the other hand have no reason to doubt my own belief - unless I was high, or had an agenda, or am subject to visual hallucinations and so on. But I can have good grounds for ruling these out.
I think often in discussions it is as if two rational people with different experiences must reach the same conclusions. I don't think this is the case.
Now I realize this mundane example is still dealing with something scientists, in general, would say has some, extremely tiny chance of being possible. They don't dispute the existence of pumas, in fact they believe they exist, just not there - though often in practice they will speak in terms of impossibilitiy and rule out rather than remaining agnostic - the history of rogue waves is a good example of this where people were told their estimates of the waves were wrong and that such things were impossible and so on. Only later did technology shift and it was found out the scientists were ruling out something that was real and correctly interpreted and described by the people on ships at sea.
There does come a point where the side that rules out is not really accepting the problem of other minds. Their assertions come very close to: if I experienced whatever you did, I would not believe it and interpret it as you do.
So I'll explain to you the difference.
You say that these are things are "beyond doubt", in the sense that it would be unreasonable or irrational to doubt them. This implies that there is some sort of certainty inherent within these things. And so you conclude that there are fundamental certainties which are necessary as foundational, even to support the existence of doubt itself. "Doubting such things would mean never getting started on this tournament of doubts."
On the other hand, I say that these are things which we simply choose not to doubt. This does not assign to them any sort of certainty or indubitableness, nor does it categorize them as somehow outside the theatre of justification, or inherently beyond doubt. In fact, the majority of these things which we choose not to doubt, have actually been doubted, and justified many years ago. Then they appear to us as "common knowledge" past down from generation to generation by parents, teachers, and other authority figures. As common knowledge they might appear to be beyond doubt when they really are not.
The point being that I believe it is a mistake to categorize these things as "beyond doubt". When human knowledge (as a whole) grows and evolves, the principles which were once used to justify these things which we accept from the authorities, without doubting them, may become outdated and inconsistent with modern principles. This means that within human knowledge s a whole, there are inconsistencies. Over time, as the inconsistencies within our knowledge continue to glare at us with an increasingly blinding light, it becomes more and more irrational not to doubt these things which might appear to be "beyond doubt". The irrationality is compounded by philosophers who insist that such things actually are beyond doubt.
So we can place "God" in this category of foundational things, as you suggest, and I agree with you on that point. But I believe it is a mistake to portray these foundational things as beyond doubt. We must categorize them in the exact opposite way, as extremely dubious because they are ancient conclusions. We must therefore doubt them all, revisit the principles whereby they were originally justified, and establish consistency with the principles believed today. To have a human "body of knowledge" which contains inconsistencies is incoherent and contradictory. Such inconsistencies exist as a result of us choosing not to doubt fundamental principles.
You'll see that I prefer to categorize these things which Banno says are "beyond doubt" as things which we choose not to doubt. This places "doubting" as the natural human condition. We do not choose to doubt, it comes naturally when the conditions which produce certainty are not created, and we choose not to doubt with a judgement of certainty. We must choose not to doubt, suppress the urge to doubt, in order to accept and believe things without first doubting them.
This is consistent with Socrates' portrayal of the root of philosophy being "wonder". The philosopher has a desire to know, and this presents itself in its primitive form as wonder. Doubt is a type of wonder. It is only by doubting things, seeking justification for things, that we produce higher levels of certainty. Therefore I would replace Aristotle's classification, 'man is a rational being' with 'human beings are philosophical beings'. This emphasizes the role of wonder, doubt, and uncertainty, in relation to the desire, want, and lack of certainty.
So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. Most likely you have already doubted, which would be your natural inclination, so you researched material to verify what you actually saw. Now your judgement is beyond doubt to you. Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt.
To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. A debate is based in doubt, it is not based on the two opposing sides both being certain. So abstaining from, and ignoring the debate, is contrary to the natural desire for certainty, which manifests as doubt.
And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation.
I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put.
So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less.
And that's Wittgenstein's antidote to Socrates' senseless wondering.
One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se.
So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess.
How could we have a coherent omnipotent, omnipresent omniscient being? Wouldn't such a being be so overwhelmingly present as to be beyond doubt?
And I suspect that there are theists who think like this; they suppose atheism to be incomprehensible.
It should be beyond doubt, the contention is God is found everywhere. Metaphorically (since such a God, being everywhere, cannot have a specfic empircal manifestation to watch), would see such a God wherever we looked.
But if we understand that, there is no question of faith. We know God is present for sure. We no longer have an uncertainty or nihilism for belief to make safe.
Yep. Doubt would be unconscionable.
Yet, plainly, there is doubt...
from the p-o-v of the mystics, God is indeed the only reality. Us hoi polloi are completely bamboozled by appearances and are clinging to the unreal.
Well said.
This is where the majority of our difference lies. I think there is no certainty in language use. Look at the way you use "justify" compared to me. Look at this thread, and the different ideas of what
"God" means to different people.
You might claim that there is certainty "in the use to which the language is being put", meaning that you are certain of what you are saying, and certain of the effect you desire to get from that use of words, but this does not mean that you are certain that you will get the desired effect when you use words. If you are, then this is a false sense of certitude, because there is always the possibility that the other person will misunderstand and you will not get the desired effect. That is why we must choose our words carefully. This is the case with all things that we do, as human beings, there is always the possibility of failure in any endeavour. So we cannot take success for granted and we must proceed with care and caution, always aware of that possibility of failure, lest it be actualized due to carelessness. That false sense of certitude actually causes carelessness and therefore failure.
Quoting Banno
Oh no, this is completely false. The bishop doesn't do a thing. The player moves the bishop, and does so by choice. If a player decides to make a move which the other player thinks is contrary to the rules, they might consult the rules to decide who is right. The rules are there to resolve such doubt. It is not the case that moving the bishop in a row is beyond doubt, because one who has never played the game, and does not know the rules, will have doubt as to how to move the bishop. However, it is the case that doubt as to how to move the bishop is quelled by wanting to play the game, and understanding the rules. Then the player chooses to move the bishop in the correct way.
You must see that it's pure nonsense to say of the bishop moving diagonally, "that's what it does; no more, no less", when in reality this is what the player chooses to do with the bishop. What about the end of the game, when the bishop moves back into the box, isn't this a little more? And when a player gets frustrated and throws the board, the bishop will fly threw the air, and "that's what it does", but it can do a lot more and it can also do a lot less.
Quoting Banno
Sure, but in the case of language use there is no rule which says that we must play this language game, and not some other language game. So you might be playing chess, while I'm playing checkers and tim wood is playing backgammon while wayfarer is playing Ouija, etc.. There's a lot more than four games to play with language so how do you propose to determine what game it is that another person is playing?
Quoting Banno
If this is your mental exercise, then don't you see that the theist is not playing chess at all? You are saying that you'd have to change the rules of your game (chess) to produce a coherent theism, without recognizing that the theist is actually playing a completely different game. Are you ready to play another game, or is chess all you are interested in?
Quoting tim wood
The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial.
Quoting tim wood
You've just gone off on a tangent without paying attention to a word I've said. First, instead of addressing the logical argument which proves why God is necessarily real, you replace the conclusion with "I don't know". Then, in your ignorance of that argument which demonstrates why God is real, (ignorance professed by "I don't know"), you go off to say that the thinkers "felt" that they had to make the idea of God real. Can't you see that it's not a case of having "felt" this or that sensation, or whatever type of feeling, it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real?
What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?
No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. I wouldn't say it is beyond doubt for a number of reasons: 1) that is contextless. I could certainly understand why others might doubt it. I wouldn't tell Banno that 'it is beyond doubt there are pumas in New Hampshire.' I have no reason to doubt it, myself. And I would likely make bold statements about it to those I know. Oh, actually, pumas are here...I might say. I might witness even in public contexts. But I would not presume others should just go along with what I say. 2) I could doubt it. Perhaps at some point I would. Maybe I end up seeing a lynx that is enormous and I might think, wow, I didn't realize they could be puma-sized. And further I could doubt in a philosophical sense. Perhaps I am in a simulation.
But in all practical terms, I would likely spend time doubting other things and not that.Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverI think this is often the case. Not just because humans have a tendency to doubt, but because if the experiences are different, then the conclusions will tend to be. Add in paradigmatic biases or model based biases and what is required as evidence can become enormous.
I think there is tremendous resistence to the idea that rational people can rationally reach different conclusions if they have different experiences.
But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible.Quoting Metaphysician Undercoveragnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case.
Here's an example: I have seen many doctors tell people they are not sick. IOW the doctor cannot find an illness he or she recognizes and cannot find a physical basis for the symptoms the person claims to have. I have experienced and know countless others have experienced doctors say with great certaintly that 'you' or 'your child' does not have an illness. Often there is a referral to a psychiatrist or psychologist.
Any doctor should of course know that new illnesses arise or ones previously known arise with idiosyncratic symptoms. A more honest and epistemologically grounded response would be: I can find nothing wrong with you. As far as I can tell there is no disease or illness causing your symptoms. It is possible that it is somethign we have not encountered, but I would like you consider that it might be stress related or psychological in origin.
IOW the doctor cannot know there is no underlying physical pathology and agnosticism is both grounded and honest. Even a look at the last 30 years in the history of medicines will innumerable cases where people have been told they are not ill and then it is found out later that they are. Not just individual cases, but even large groups.Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverYou seem to be seeing agnosticism as a permanent state. I don't take it that way. All I am suggesting is that people realize that there are, now, and here and for them personally, epistemological obstacles. These may or may not change.
I am nto suggesting we should just throw up our hands.
We should not assume that we can know all truths now. We should not assume that if something goes against current models (or seems to) it must be false. We should not assume that if the other person is rational and correct they can demonstrate it. We should not assume that individual experiences are irrelevent. We should not assume that two rational people with different experiences should nevertheless draw the same conclusions.
I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.
I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all.
This is where we disagree. As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. This cannot be a human idea because the existence of human ideas is limited to after the existence of human beings.
So it is very clear that your definitions which assert that only material things are real, and that immaterial things are dependent on the human mind are unsound, incoherent in relation to other known principles, and need to be replaced with definitions which are closer to the truth.
Quoting tim wood
The argument I presented is quite clear, expressed in very simple terms, and easily understood. "I don't buy this argument" does not demonstrate any weaknesses of the argument. However, the argument demonstrates weakness in your definitions. Therefore, without further ado, your definitions are rejected.
Quoting Coben
But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? Did you not look in books, or online to confirm that what you thought were pumas, actually were? I assume you were not a specialist on the physical characteristics of pumas prior to seeing them. It's only this activity of confirmation, which is inspired by doubt, which leads you to the position of having "no good reason to doubt". So the situation is not "at some point I would" doubt it, it's 'at some point I did'.
When the judgement is made, doubt is removed, and then a reason is required to revisit the issue with fresh doubt. These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before.
Quoting Coben
At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt".
Quoting Coben
Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved.
Quoting Coben
OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved.
That doesn’t address the point, however, which is kind of reality that such principles as the Pythagorean theorem possess. They’re ‘intelligible objects’ i.e. objects of reason only, but which are real in that they’re the same for anyone who can grasp them.
Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess.
Nor does it mater that there is more than one game, except that its not a bad idea to keep an eye on what game you are playing, and what others are playing. The alternative would be quite confusing. As would mixing the rules of chess, checkers and backgammon. Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting.
For a moment there I thought you had a point, but in this last post you seem to have lost it. If I many...
There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading.
But I still feel as though you’re missing the vital point here. In Greek philosophy, such principles are said to be real independently of any particular act of perception, but nevertheless only perceptible to the ‘eye of reason’. So - not constructs of mind, but rational percepts. That then goes back to the ‘is mathematics invented or discovered’ conundrum but my view is that the natural numbers and fundamental geometrical principles are discovered - they’re the same for all who can think, but they are more than simply acts of thought. They’re real but incorporeal.
This is why man qua ‘rational animal’ is able to ascertain the reason for things - the logos, which is root of knowledge. But again, this is not to say that these principles are a product of the human mind - rather that the human mind has evolved to the point of being able to perceive them through reason.
How is this relevant to philosophy of religion? Because it indicates the nature of ‘ideal reality’, which is not the product of the human mind, but is only perceptible through reason. In the broader Platonic tradition this was a fundamental principle and also an analogy to the nature of higher truths.
I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency.
The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time.
I don't think that Kant lent his arguments to the notion of an 'intelligent designer', and I'm pretty sure he wouldn't have agreed with today's ID arguments, although I could be wrong. (quick google....)
(SEP entry on Kant)
Which is quite an interesting perspective!
Quoting Valentinus
Very perceptive, and I agree with you.
I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. They tend to believe that there are physiological conditions which correlate to the psychological problem, but the correlated physiological are not necessarily identifiable. This may be a type of compromise, but it's most likely just a justification for treating the psychological problem with medication. If it's a real physiological, medical problem, then the use of medication to treat it is justified.
Quoting Coben
I think what I meant is that the closed minded agnostic believes that we can never know whether there is or isn't God, so we ought not even talk about this, or try to determine the answer to this question. In other words, if we cannot know whether there is a God, what's the point in saying anything about God? This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism.
Quoting tim wood
Adding fancy words like "existential truth" to your claim that the argument does not "cut it", does not refute the argument. You need to show how the argument is existentially false. That you happen to be of the opinion that non-material things are not real doesn't cut it as a criticism, because the premises do not refer to any non-material things. The real existence of a non-material thing is necessitated as a conclusion.
Quoting tim wood
In other words, it's extremely obvious that the argument is very sound, so there's no point wasting time trying to refute it.
Quoting tim wood
Quite clearly, that's because the logic is beyond reproach.
Quoting tim wood
Actually, the fact that "endless possibility" is truly impossible, is the key premise to Aristotle's cosmological argument. This is the principle which the Neo-Platonists use to prove that God is necessary. Endless possibility, if it were reality, would exclude any actuality. Therefore if this were something real, there would be nothing actually existing.
Quoting tim wood
You've yet to address the argument. Which premise lacks existential truth, relative to your presuppositions? Is it that material things are contingent? Or is it that there's a first material thing?
Quoting Banno
Right, we were not talking about chess. You said there is certainty in language, and you tried to justify this by referring to the game of chess. Stay on topic. When we use language we are rarely playing chess, so this is irrelevant.
Quoting Banno
Excellent, I can almost agree with you here. However, there are many instances where you can be intelligible and interesting without being clear about what it is you are doing. Ever read mysteries, for example? Interest is created by the suspense cause by not being clear about what is going on. Then there is poetry, where intentional ambiguity seems to rule the day. The poetry is still intelligible, and interesting, without being clear.
Furthermore, there's a very curious aspect of ambiguity which allows the author to create a huge audience. If I say something extremely ambiguous, it could be meaningful to you, and meaningful to various other different people, each having different reason for the meaningfulness, seeing different meaning in it. The simple, ambiguous phrase may be meaningful and interesting to all sorts of people from all different walks of life, while the precise expression of a clear thought will only be interesting to a few.
Quoting Banno
The theologian doesn't play by the rules, you ought to have picked up on this by now. Rules are man made, and the theologian turns to God, who lets us know that we have free will. I think that was Moses' downfall, he wrote rules and pretended that they came from God. Jesus tried to rectify this by rebelling against the supposed rules of God.
IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion.
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverAgreed.
This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.
Please reconsider my point now. If we are to define "God" we must refer to those who have real use for the term. It's wrong to say, "this use makes no sense to me so let's make a different definition". That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. Therefore, if theologians see a real need to conclude that there's an immaterial cause which they call "God", it's wrong to say that an immaterial thing with real causal existence makes no sense to me, so I'm going to steal there term "God" and make it refer to something else. That is not philosophy of religion.
In Banno's terms, if the theologians are playing "chess", then we can either learn the rules which they've laid down, and join in, or else we stay out of their game. But it's wrong to say I don't like this game called "chess" that they're playing, and I have no inclination to abide by the rules and play that game; but I'm going to make another kind of similar game, one which better suits my inclinations, and I'm going to call this game "chess", just to spite the others.
Strawman (1).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded.[/quote]
Strawman (2). Special pleading (1).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.[/quote]
Special Pleading (2).
Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do.[/quote]
Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. And evidently, theologians talk about 'things' which are, no matter how subjectively or discursively 'meaningful', indistinguishable from fairytales or hallucinations.
Of course, we could be mistaken; but ... to wit:
"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish." ~David Hume
"The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness." ~Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace
[i]"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence."[i] ~Carl Sagan
"If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims."
~Tenzin Gyatso, The 14th Dalai Lama
Or any of a wide range of phenomena. Just as medicine does somatic conditions. It's natural, we work with our models. But if you are going to put yourself in the position of claiming to be on the rational/sane team with the right to judge others irrational/insane, then having a basic knowledge of the history of your own discipline and what this implies about current knowledge seems a must to me.
As a somewhat related example: advocates of evolution - and please note, I believe in current evolutionary theory: so many times I have found people arguing that evolution means survival of the fittest and this entails stronger organisms - rather than organisms well adapted to the environments they live in. Smaller physically weaker organisms my be better adapted. Or that any trait an animal has must be beneficial - when in fact it may be neutral, it just didn't lead to that species being selected out of existence. Or they engage in teleological explanations for traits.
Just because people tend to be fans of science - which atheists do tend to be, but need not to be atheists - does not mean they even understand basic things about science. I have often found myself in disagreement with people who are identifying as 'on the science team' who are confused about all sorts of scientific facts and theory, let alone what scientific epistemology entails. And I have encountered the implicit assumption that science is complete in a wide range of topics. If X were true, they would know.
Quoting 180 Proof
We could start with the cosmological argument, but if you're really interested, you'll have to pick up some books and read the material yourself.
Quoting 180 Proof
Actually, this claim is false, because the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God. Clearly "God" has an effect on us, so we cannot remove that concept from the category of efficacious, just like we cannot remove "quantum entanglement" from that category.
Quoting 180 Proof
I was talking actually talking about some atheist who profess scientism. I wasn't referring to "most scientifically literate positions". Your claim of strawman is unfounded, because clearly there are many people who fit my description of the type of atheist I dislike. Please don't ask me to name names because I won't. But you, being offended by my claim without having been named, and seeing the need to defend those persons described, says something about you.
Quoting tim wood
Where have you been tim? I presented the argument at least twice in the last few days, you first ignored it, and when I referred to it, you said you don't "buy it", and "it doesn't cut it for existential truth", without ever addressing the premises.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's a simple deductive argument, with two premises, the first an inductive conclusion drawn from observation (material things have a cause of existence), the second a logical statement concerning the nature of temporal order (there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing).
Quoting tim wood
I agree that Aquinas' five ways are logical arguments.
Quoting tim wood
The thing I'd object to here, is 2). The cause of "a thing" is not necessarily an efficient cause, because an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. This is why the human will is understood as "free", it is free from efficient causation. So in human acts of intention, we have an immaterial cause, (free will), working with immaterial objects (ideas), which causes things. This is how we can understand the reality of immaterial cause through the examples of intentional human acts.
Contrary to what you claim, the idea of an immaterial cause is highly intelligible. The problem is that the scourge of determinism has set into the minds of the many, punishing these minds by banishing them from associating with the free, immaterial world of the soul, to the point that only purge can rectify.
Quoting tim wood
As I said earlier, Aquinas clearly states that the existence of God and some things about him can be known by natural reason. it's in your quoted "Reply to Objection 1".
Quoting tim wood
See, "faith presupposes natural knowledge". So we first know the existence of God through natural reason, and by having this natural knowledge of God, we are then predisposed toward accepting on faith, other things, which other say about God. And so we have as "Reply to Objection 3", that from His effects, the existence of God can be clearly demonstrated, and known, though we cannot perfectly know God "as He is in His essence.
Quoting tim wood
I think there is a problem with classifying Aquinas as an apologetic, depending on how you understand "apologetics". Prior to him, Aristotelian principles were generally not accepted into Christian theology. Aquinas adapted Christian principles to accept his interpretation of Aristotelian principles, so he was more of a shaper, or creator of Christian principles than a defender of Christian principles.
Theology is always "an exercise in what we want to belief". It is accepted that we have free will, and can believe what we want. The question is whether we are ready to accept the truth. Many, as yourself it seems, are not ready to believe the truth, so you find excuses not to accept the very simple and straight forward arguments demonstrating the existence of God, casting them aside because they are not consistent with what you want to believe.
Quoting tim wood
There's no point to evaluating the argument in "modern scientific terms", because it's not written in modern scientific terms. That would be like trying to play chess using the rules of checkers, it's fool's play. The terms are metaphysical, used in a metaphysical context, to be understood by metaphysicians. Either you have a desire to understand these terms, and understand the truth in these matters, or you do not. If you do not have such a desire, you can leave it well enough alone, and perhaps accept on faith the existence, or non-existence of God. But you are in no position to argue the non-existence of God without understanding the terms.
Quoting tim wood
I can't understand what is meant by this passage at all. it seems very confused. Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. Are you suggesting that medieval writings are not meaningful? The "original scope" of these referred writings is religion, and the existence of God, exactly the scope of this thread. Why would you think that referring to these articles, in a discussion about God is an attempt to take them beyond their original scope? In reality, God is beyond the scope of science, so it is you who has the desire to take something beyond its scope. You want to use science to judge metaphysics, when metaphysics is not a subject of science, and therefore cannot be subjected to science. I agree with you, that this is harmful.
Well, if there is such a world, then these are precisely its denizens.
I read once, as a throwaway line, in a polemic by (I think) Rowan Williams, with an allusion to Heidegger, that ‘there’s no such thing as a thing’. And indeed this or that chair is simply a ‘collocation of parts’ that serves a purpose. What, really, is a chair? It can be a log, or a rock, or an objet’d’art. (found the Williams reference.)
I have a very good understanding of the concept of matter. It is an Aristotelian concept. If you think that the argument fails due to a misunderstanding of "matter", then you need to present an interpretation of that concept which demonstrates that the argument fails.
Quoting tim wood
"What a thing is" refers to a thing's form, and the form of a thing is distinct from its matter. So thinking about "what a chair is" doesn't give me any understanding of matter. The same matter which composes the chair could potentially, exist in many different ways. That's why matter is understood by the concept of "potential".
Quoting tim wood
I told you, it's a temporal order. "First" means earliest in time. You do understand that "cause" is a temporal concept, or do you not?
Quoting tim wood
As a cause, final cause or what we call intention, in Aristotle's principles, is real, just like "the good" is real in Plato's principles. This is very clear in Aristotle's principles. To make intention into something unreal, as you are doing, and accuse me of reification, is a distorted interpretation which leaves the existence of artificial things as unintelligible. The world is full of such things, and if we trace a chain of efficient causes to account for the existence of any such thing, the chain stops at the intent of the creator. The concept of free will disallows that the actions of the creator can be accounted for by efficient causation. So to say that the intent of the creator is not a real cause, is to say that the artificial object just happened, by chance, to get the form which it has, instead of recognizing the reality, of final cause. Then you deny the fact that the form of the object was given to the object by the mind of the creator.
Quoting tim wood
I believe the Pythagorean theorem to be a mental construct. But this does not mean that this mental construct (or model of reality) is not intended to represent something real and independent of human minds. The concept's usefulness is dependent on the accuracy of its representation.
Aristotle presents two premises by which Pythagorean idealism (and the idealism of some Platonists he says) is refuted. The first is that these ideas exist only potentially, prior to being actualized by the human mind. Despite the fact that the potential for an idea like the Pythagorean theorem exists prior to it being "discovered" (which Aristotle calls actualized) by the human mind, it is the human mind which gives the idea actual existence. The second premise is Aristotle's cosmological argument. This argument proves that it is impossible for potential to be eternal. Therefore it is impossible that ideas have eternal existence prior to being "discovered" by the human mind, as Pythagorean idealism, and Platonic realism claim.
It is this argument which separates modern Platonic realists from Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians. The Neo-Platonist and Christian theologians respected Aristotle's cosmological argument, and went on to posit separate "Forms". The "Forms" are distinct from human ideas, having actual existence independent from human minds; "form" being actual under Aristotle's principles. It is necessary to respect this separation between ideas and Forms, in order to understand human fallibility. Human ideas have problems because of imperfections in the human mind. Therefore the human ideas do not perfectly map reality as intended. Pythagoras himself was extremely bothered by the "irrational" ratio which relates two perpendicular sides of a square. The square root of two does not resolve and this indicates a fundamental deficiency in the Pythagorean theorem's representation of reality. There is a basic incommensurability between one dimension of space and another (also evident in the irrational nature of pi), which indicates that this way of conceiving "space" is somewhat faulty.
Quoting tim wood
Before you can say what a "material thing" is, you need to apprehend the concept of "matter". "Matter", as derived from Aristotle's Physics, is completely theoretical, it is not a practical concept at all. What we observe is that things change as time passes. Logically, if something changes it is no longer the thing which it was; it requires a new description, having a distinct form. In pre-Socratic times, sophists could perform all sorts of magical tricks with this fact. Fundamentally, at every moment of passing time, the existing object ceases to exist, and is replaced with a new distinct object. What we observe however, is a temporal continuity of things staying the same, with only certain aspects changing.
So Aristotle posited the existence of "matter" to account for the continuity of existence, the things which stay the same as time passes. Now, the form of the object might be changing as time passes, but we can still say that it is "the same" object, based on the assumption that the object's matter is not changing. Aristotle has a division of reality into matter and form in order to account for the two aspects, what stays the same as time passes, and what changes as time passes. Form is what is active, actual, and changing, whereas "matter" is a theoretical principle, posited to account for the observed reality that some things do not change as time passes. In Newton's laws, "matter' is replaced by inertia, what he posits as a fundamental property of matter.
Quoting tim wood
Clearly it is you who has not said anything intelligible about what "material" refers to.
Quoting tim wood
What Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates (and this is fundamental to his Metaphysics) is that it is impossible for matter to exist without any form. This means that for any material existence, there is always, necessarily, a "what it is". To think otherwise is to think the unintelligible, and to allow yourself to be consumed by contradiction. However, he also explains in his Metaphysics, that the first question of being (ontology), is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, and not something else. And, it is also a case of thinking the unintelligible if we propose that there is no reason (as in cause) for an object being what it is instead of something else. These two principles together indicate that the form of an object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that object. This is why post-Aristotelian metaphysicians posited independent Forms. The Neo-Platonists have a procession, or emanation of Forms from the One, whereas the Christians have a hierarchy of angels from God.
:up: :cool:
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]"Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?"
— 180 Proof
We could start with the cosmological argument ...[/quote]
(a) At best the argument is unsound. (b) Otherwise, it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction from the experience of the cosmos to [wait for it, wait for it] a-cosmos. (c) Also, there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise. (d) Lastly, one of the argument's hidden assumptions - nullifying soundness - is that the cosmos, consisting of cause and effect relations, is itself the effect of a cause (i.e. "First Cause") - compositional fallacy, no? (e) And, nailing this apologia's coffin shut for good, this purported "First Cause" is not even uniquely, or identifiably, (JCI) theistic, but just as arbitrarily can be attributed to deistic or pandeistic or ... QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic "creation"-concepts. Caveat: And some, or most, of these same objections also defeat the rest of that toothless old quaint Quinque viæ (due, in no small part, to Aristotlean 'teleological' pseudo-physics). :yawn:
So no, MU, like e.g. Spinoza Hume or Kant, I do not find (any version of) the "cosmological argument" to be "compelling evidence" of any thing other than poor reasoning (i.e. ad hockery).
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]... the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God.[/quote]
Any religions? ergo any g/Gs? That's as vapid as saying "the very existence of 'Star Wars conventions, websites, merchandise, books, films & fan clubs' is public evidence for the efficacy of ... 'The Force'". C'mon, MU, you can do better than that.
[quote=Metaphysician Undercover]But you, being offended by my claim ...[/quote]
Stop projecting. Criticism of your fallacious arguments and incoherent statements is not a sign of "being offended" by them. Get over yourself; I'm not offended by your idle woo, MU, sometimes it even amuses me.
What's your reasoning for this? Why can't reality be such that human concepts are immaterial things which do not exist independently of the human mind, yet there are other immaterial things which do exist independently of the human mind?
Here's an example. I know there are immaterial things within my mind because I have contact with them, and apprehend them with my mind. I do not however, have direct contact with immaterial things independent from my mind. But I apprehend all sorts of things in my environment, words, writing, and other artificial things, which indicate to me that there are immaterial things which are independent from my own mind, in the minds of others. Even a human being itself, I observe as a material object, but I conclude from this object's activities, and my own experience of immaterial objects, that there is an immaterial cause of these activities. And that immaterial cause is independent of my mind.
Therefore, based on my own experience of immaterial things, and the material evidence of other immaterial things active In the world, the conclusion that there are immaterial things independent of my human mind is very sound. Aquinas' arguments state that based on the evidence of existing material things, we can conclude that there are immaterial things independent of all human minds. This is done in the very same way that I conclude that there are immaterial things independent of my own mind. We see in our environment, the effects of immaterial things, and based on our own experience with immaterial things within our own minds, we conclude that there are immaterial things independent of our minds. On what principles would you base an argument to deny this?
Quoting 180 Proof
If this is your opinion, let me state to you, a simplified version of Aristotle's cosmological argument, and see if you can tell me why it is unsound. Remember, it is the argument which Aristotle used to refute Pythagorean idealism, what we now call Platonic realism. But it also demonstrates that "prime matter" is an impossibility, as unintelligible.
Through observation we see that the potential for the existence of an object precedes in time, the actual existence of that object. And, the actual existence of an object requires a prior actuality (this you might interpret as a cause). If the potential for existence of objects preceded the actual existence of objects, and there was nothing actual, then there would always be the potential for existence of objects, and nothing actual. We observe that there is actual existence, therefore there is something actual which is prior to the potential for existence of objects.
Please, point to the fallacies which you claim are inherent within the argument, so that I can rectify my thinking. I will grant you, that the premises can be demonstrated as unsound through a process ontology, which denies the reality of "objects". But process philosophy ends up with the related problem of temporal continuity, the temporal extension of an event or process. So process philosophers end up turning to God to account for the observed continuity (consistency in the observed world) from one moment to the next.
Quoting 180 Proof
Well of course it is. "Efficacy" means to have an effect on. Clearly the existence of these things, conventions, websites, etc., demonstrate that these concepts... "The Force", etc, have efficacy. the concepts have an effect on the way people behave. C'mon 180 Proof, think about what you are saying for a minute before you blurt it out.
There seems to be a modern determinist/materialist movement to deny the idea that concepts have efficacy. This is pure nonsense, because all we need to do is to look around at all the marvels of the engineered world around us, which couldn't have been accomplished without concepts, to see first hand the efficacy of concepts. That movement is simply determined to isolate concepts and ideas in some Platonic realm of eternal existence, banishing them from our world, such that it is impossible for them to have an effect on our world. This is exactly the type of nonsense which Aristotle's cosmological argument was intended to combat. The cosmological argument brings immaterial objects, human concepts and ideas, right into our world, as natural objects in our world, existing as the property of human beings. This allows for the overwhelming evidence, that these ideas and concepts have causal efficacy in our world. That is the reality at the basis of "ideology".
Quoting 180 Proof
I invite criticism, that's how we learn. Please, be my guest and criticize the argument. But simply throwing every term for every form of fallacy which you can muster, stating "the argument is unsound", "it's an invalid, or incoherent, induction", "there's a further incoherence of trying to make an a posterior argument justify an a priori premise", "compositional fallacy", etc., is just random nonsense.
If you have something constructive to say about the argument, please point to the fallacious parts. I assure you that I can address all of your seemingly random criticisms. Here's an example:
a) The argument appears unsound to you because you misunderstand the premises.
b) The idea that the potential for an object precedes its actual existence is not an incoherent induction. If it were false, there'd either be eternal objects, or objects which come from nothing. Since none of these have been found, and these ideas are unreal, the induction is coherent, and the premise is very sound.
c) I see no attempt to make "a posterior argument justify an a priori premise". That's just a random claim, probably derived from a misunderstanding of the argument.
d) No, there is no composition fallacy. If the argument is applied to "the universe", (which I didn't do in the first place, I referred to a "first object"), then "the universe" refers to an object. The composition fallacy would be associated to a straw man, produced by those who make "the first object" into "the universe", and claim that "the universe" is not a natural whole.
e) The fact that others might refer to God by another name is irrelevant. Aquinas for example concludes that this is what "we call God". There is however, a problem with referring to the conclusion of the cosmological argument as consistent with "QFT tunneling symmetry-breaking theoretic". In fact, this is exactly the type of Platonism (giving reality to a statistical model) which the cosmological argument attacks. Symmetry-breaking theoretical systems do not account for "the act" which breaks symmetry, and that is why they are inconsistent with the cosmological argument.
You agreed that there are immaterial things in human minds, called ideas. If you want to take that back, because of the rickety bridge it leads to, then go ahead. But you are in denial.
Quoting tim wood
You clearly did not understand what I wrote. Please go back and reread. Or if you prefer, pay attention and I'll state it very simply for you. There are immaterial things in my mind, mental constructs, ideas. From the existence of artificial material things, and the actions of other human beings, which I sense, I deduce that there are immaterial things independent of my mind, i.e. in the minds of others. I have no reason to believe that there are not immaterial things independent of all human minds. According to theologians, the existence of natural material things is evidence of immaterial things independent of all human minds.
Why do you see a problem with this? It is very clear that we do not have direct mental access to immaterial things which are independent of our own minds, yet it is very true that there are such things. We logically deduce that there are immaterial things independent of our own minds, through observing the existence of material objects. It is this logical process which leads us to the existence of God.
Quoting tim wood
It appears to me like you haven't read any Aristotle. I've read all his work except some which is debatably not properly attributed to him. And, the majority of his work I've read multiple times. If you think that I attribute to him a kind of thinking which is 20th century thinking, this is simply because his principles are still relevant today.
You seem to have a bias against ancient principles. "If it's ancient then it cannot be of any value." Actually the opposite is true. A principle which was written thousands of years ago, and is still accessible today, has stood the test of time. Principles which have little or no value are dropped and disappear.
Quoting tim wood
We aren't talking about faith, we are talking about reason. This is the hole which you have dug for yourself, and seem to be incapable of escaping from. Religion is based in reason, not faith. Faith only exists where it's supported by reason. In your deluded state of denial, you refuse to accept this fact.
Quoting tim wood
Yes, it's quite clear from this passage that you have not read Aristotle. Precisely what Aristotle did was "put nature to the question". For example, read his Physics, De Anima, Nichomachean Ethics, and Metaphysics. These books very explicitly "put nature to the question". His logical principles are put forward to prepare the student by developing a critical mind. Remember, Aristotle partook in the tradition of Socrates and Plato, criticizing the knowledge of the day. His logic is aimed at the demise of sophism, and this same goal was later maintained by the Skeptics.
OK, I see this as an acceptable starting point. You have described two distinct categories of "things".
Quoting tim wood
Yes I do invert the order, and there is very good reason for this, clearly explained in Plato's Republic. Do you recognize that the idea of "the chair" exists in the mind of the carpenter before the carpenter builds the material chair? Therefore the material existence of the chair is dependent on the immaterial "chair" in the carpenter's mind.
Quoting tim wood
I agree with this. Now, do you agree that there are material things which are the product of thinking, just like there are immaterial things which are the product of thinking? We see these engineered, artificial things all over the earth.
Since both types of things, according to your categorization, immaterial and material, may be the product of thinking, the question we need to address is if it is possible that there are any things which are not the product of thinking.
You've defined the immaterial category of "things" in such a way that this type of thing requires a mind. Consequent to this definition (your definition) of "immaterial thing", all immaterial things are the product of thinking.
Now here's the problem. Aristotle demonstrates in his Metaphysics, (and this seems to be where your point of denial lies), how it is necessary to conclude that the "form" of each and every material object is prior in time to the material existence of that object. From this argument, we can conclude that every material thing is dependent for its existence, on an immaterial thing, just like the chair is dependent on the carpenter's idea, in the example above. Incidentally, this fact (where your point of denial lies) is empirically demonstrated by particle physics.
I see two possible solutions to this problem. Either we adjust your definition, allowing that there are immaterial things such as "Forms", which are not the product of a mind, or we propose a "divine mind" to account for the existence of these immaterial things. Choose your poison.
Quoting tim wood
I don't understand how you can make this assertion. Check these reasons:
1) I can only make conclusions concerning the existence of immaterial things based on logic, because I cannot sense immaterial things.
2) There is very strong evidence of immaterial things independent of my mind.
3) There is evidence, not quite so strong, that there are immaterial things in the minds of other animals.
4) Plato, Aristotle, and even modern physicists, have demonstrated the need to assume immaterial things as prior to all material things.
5) You have given me absolutely no reason why we ought to restrict our definition of "immaterial thing" in such a way that immaterial things are necessarily dependent on a human mind.
Therefore, I have no reason to restrict "immaterial thing" in the way you suggest. In fact, I have very strong reason against this. So I just can't understand your assertion that I "have every reason" to do this.
Quoting tim wood
This is false, just like your claim above, that I have "every reason to". I provided the logical argument in a number of different formats. You and 180 have both asserted that it is fallacious, but neither one of you has "put your money where your mouth is".
Quoting tim wood
You're so fucking full of shit that it frustrates me Woody. I produced the argument at least twice. Each time, you said something like "that argument doesn't cut it", and "I don't buy it". After this, you said "please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to". So I re-presented the argument again, and you said "thank you for re-presenting". Now you're right back to "Exhibit these demonstrations for us". Sometime I feel like I'm "Tied to the whippin' post, tied to the whippin' post."
But this is wrong. With will power we move our bodies and this produces material things. So thinking clearly has a material effect. Thinking produces material things. The evidence for this is all around us in the form of artifacts and engineered things.
Quoting tim wood
Chairs are produced by human beings, and the idea, of what will exist, precedes the material existence of the chair. Do you agree with me?
Quoting tim wood
This is a misrepresentation. All my ideas are mentally constructed in my own mind, I agree with you on that. However, there are immaterial things independent of my mind, such as the ideas in your mind. How can you not agree with me on this?
The "by itself" is irrelevant. You're just trying to create a distraction here. No cause works "by itself", it works on what is existing at the time. The cause of free will works from within an existing human being.
Quoting tim wood
What is the point? It's you who is deny the point. The point is that the world is full of things created by thinking. Why do you deny this fact?
Quoting tim wood
I added the qualification to get agreement, a starting point. Now let's see if we can proceed slowly and cautiously from this agreed starting point. You agree that there are immaterial things independent of your mind. Do you also agree that you do not have direct access to these other immaterial things (ideas of others)? You conclude that there are other immaterial things, independent of your mind, through judging the material things which you sense. Now, is it not the effects of those other immaterial things, on the material world, things like words, artifacts, and human actions, which justify the conclusion that there are other immaterial things independent of your own mind?
Quoting tim wood
OK, that's a start, you agree that the idea pre-exists the chair. Do you also agree that the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the chair? The immaterial thing, the idea, is necessary for the existence of the chair, and is necessarily prior to (pre-exists) the chair. The material chair could not exist if the immaterial idea to make it, was not there first. Doesn't this necessity justify the claim of "cause"?
Right, I have made the conclusion that there are immaterial things which are not mental constructs of human beings. I have produced the argument which necessitates that conclusion. You have rejected the argument and asked me to "exhibit these demonstrations for us". My obligation is to take it very slow and easy to facilitate understanding by even the most simple minded human being. First step, do you agree that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) independent of your own mind?
Quoting tim wood
Of course we were talking about causes, where have you been? That's the crux of the argument, as Aquinas said, we can know the existence of God through His effects. Am I talking to a board? Second step, you logically conclude that there are immaterial things (mental constructs) which are independent of your own mind, from sense observations of the effects that the immaterial things have on material things.
Quoting tim wood
I already answered this for you, it's very simple. Thinking moves the human body, producing material change, effect in the material world, creating material things. This is the essence of free will. If you are deterministic, and insist that these actions may be explained by material causes, rather than the immaterial cause of intention or free will, then this explains your stance toward immaterial things.
If that's the case, then I can only tell you that I see inconsistency in your principles. You allow that mental constructs exist as immaterial things, but you deny the efficacy of these immaterial things. How could the material chair come into existence if the immaterial idea does not play a causal role?
So I'll repeat myself. The idea of the chair which the carpenter builds, is necessarily temporally prior to the material chair, and, the idea is a necessary condition for the existence of the material chair. This necessity indicates that the idea is a cause of existence of the chair.
To demonstrate causality does not require a demonstration of "how", it just requires a demonstration of necessity. We do not need to demonstrate how cold temperatures freeze water to show that cold temperatures are a cause of water freezing. The immaterial idea is necessary for the existence of the chair, therefore it is a cause of existence of the chair, regardless of whether we can demonstrate how it acts.
And then you follow it up with this:
Quoting tim wood
It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one that follows:
1. If there is something that can be used in a discussion to allow it to not fall apart, then that something should be used in every discussion
2. Definitions, when used as starting points, allow a discussion to not fall apart.
3. Therefore, any discussion should require definitions to be used as starting points.
This argument runs a modus ponens to argue that "definitions" are what are needed for a discussion to not fall apart, which seems to be what you are (generally) arguing for. While I agree that definitions, in the way describe them as "Religion is" or "Theology is," can help add some structure to discussions and help discussions from falling apart, I do not think that means that every discussion should use them as starting points or that there could not be discussions that use them and do not still fall apart in the end.
I think an objection arises against premise two of my above argument. Certainly, it is easier to have a discussion that begins with a claim or foundational principle, but does that mean that it will not fall apart? I do not think so, for many people could not understand the definition to begin with, or if they do, then they could eventually stray off topic from what was initially being discussed. I think both of these things, if not addressed and corrected, could cause a discussion to ultimately collapse, though a definition is acting as an established starting point for the discussion.
Because of this objection, I think the argument fails. Maybe a reply to this could be that the argument is not charitable enough, and that this is not in fact what the argument is. I would disagree with this reply, especially in light of the section that we should start all of our discussions with definitions of what "God is," what "Religion is," or what "Theology is." So, ultimately, I think the argument fails.