Did I know it was a picture of him?

That it looked like him would be my justification.

Reply to Hanover And so you do not see that as circular?

@Hanover's account...

Justification: it looked like him
Truth: it is indeed a picture of him
Belief: Hanover believes it to be a picture of him.

Is that what you are claiming?

To know something is to have a rule for interpretting some sensory data. To know it is him is to have some prior experience which was interpretted in a way that was useful and is recalled when a similar image appears in the mind.

When we see others who resemble people we already know, from our perspective they look like the person we know, not the other way around. Our interpretaions are based on finding patterns from prior experiences that are useful.

Hmmm...

Good thread topic my friend. Could be a bit of fun.

In order for a belief to be sensibly called "justified"...fill in the blank. Does being justified require being argued for, or does it require being well-grounded by/within personal experience regardless of whether or not the thinking/believing creature is capable of offering subsequent explanation?

The fire example...

Quoting Harry Hindu

To know something is to have a rule for interpreting some sensory data.

It is? How do you know?

I would like @Sam26's opinion.

Reply to creativesoul One wants to use material implication, but that's too much.

I’ not inclined to refer to ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’.

Quoting Banno

And so you do not see that as circular?

No, it's not circular. A computer can identify a picture of you as Banno. It must be matching various criteria against something in its database. That's what I'm doing at some level.

Is it circular to say I know that's not a cup because it looks like a cat?

Quoting I like sushi

I’ not inclined to refer to ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’

Then you're not addressing the hypothetical:

Quoting Banno

If to know is to hold a justified true belief...

Quoting creativesoul

Does being justified require being argued for, or does it require being well-grounded by/within personal experience regardless of whether or not the thinking/believing creature is capable of offering subsequent explanation?

There is no distinction here. We argue by referencing our empirically gained knowledge. I know the butler did it because I either saw him do it or I saw other evidence implicating him.

Quoting Hanover

Does being justified require being argued for, or does it require being well-grounded by/within personal experience regardless of whether or not the thinking/believing creature is capable of offering subsequent explanation?
— creativesoul

There is no distinction here. We argue by referencing our empirically gained knowledge. I know the butler did it because I either saw him do it or I saw other evidence implicating him.

Non-linguistic creatures can know that touching fire causes pain. There is no stronger justificatory ground than getting burned. Are we to say that they do not know touching fire causes pain simply because they cannot tell us about it?

Reply to I like sushi Few would say it was without reservation. Hence this thread.

I think he knows it is N's face, but it seems to me the knowing and justification are here the very same thing - recognising the picture as being of N.

DO others see this circularity?

Quoting Hanover

A computer can identify a picture of you as Banno. It must be matching various criteria against something in its database. That's what I'm doing at some level.

This claim carries all the paraphernalia around the guess that mind involves unconscious algorithmic processing.

I'm not buying that, and hence I am not buying your point here.

Quoting Hanover

Then you're not addressing the hypothetical:

That's right; but one approach will be to treat the hypothetical as part of a reductio. If it is the case that we agree he knows the picture is of N., and yet that this knowledge is unjustified, then so much for justified true belief.

Reply to Banno I don’t quite know what you’re getting at tbh. At a guess it sounds something like the difference between looking at a mirror and looking into a mirror - we can switch between our regard for the mirror as mirror and what we see through the mirror (and the obvious confusion and disorientation that can happen if we fail to distinguish between the two).

Quoting Banno

That's right; but one approach will be to treat the hypothetical as part of a reductio. If it is the case that we agree he knows the picture is of N., and yet that this knowledge is unjustified, then so much for justified true belief.

The reductio is to ask not how I know Mr. N is Mr. N, but it's how you recognize anything, including the words on this page. How do you know what I mean by "Mr. N" if not those letters look a certain way?

Quoting Banno

This claim carries all the paraphernalia around the guess that mind involves unconscious algorithmic processing.

I'm not buying that, and hence I am not buying your point here.

Sometimes it's conscious processing, so it's not a guess.

No it's his body double. No it's a look-a-like. Yes, it's him. The former is more probable.

Reply to Hanover It’s banal. I am justified due to experiential knowledge of what the person looks like and the difference between the person and a picture of the person.

So what?

Reply to I like sushi I agree, but why did you question the JTB definition if you now adopt it?

Reply to Hanover Quarter past three, obviously!

Reply to Banno A picture of N is worth a thousand words. But what if the picture is lying? Pictures lie? Sure--well, they can be manipulated. Using various techniques, a person can be made to be present in a photo who was actually not there. Or, someone who was actually present in the photo can be made to look like someone else, or to not be in the picture at all.

Have not people been mistaken in identifying pictures? Our perceptions and memories can be quite wrong. ("Eye witnesses" are quite often as good as blind.)

The trouble is, we are not ALWAYS right and we are not ALWAYS wrong. A perception may be 100% accurate: What you said you saw is true. But we are wrong often enough that we can not say, "I saw the picture. It was him, all right. There can be no doubt about it" as if it were incontrovertibly true.

It's too clumsy to condition every assertion we make. No one wants to always hear, or always say, "I am somewhat confident that what I said I saw is actually what I saw, and that my memory of seeing it has perhaps not been corrupted... and blah blah blah. Most of the time, if the stakes are low, we can tolerate, "he said he saw it; most likely he did. That's good enough." But if the stakes are higher, well then "I said I saw it" just isn't good enough.

But our assertions of fact have to be verified, preferably by more than one source and verification method. I can claim to have seen my old friends Abraham, Martin, and John, but if there is nothing but my report... well, proceed with caution.

Reply to I like sushi Nice. Yes.

Quoting Hanover

Sometimes it's conscious processing, so it's not a guess.

Sometimes.

Knowing that this is a picture of N. is different to knowing that water freezes at zero degrees.

Quoting Bitter Crank

It's too clumsy to condition every assertion we make.

Sure. That's not what I want.

Let's say I showed you two pictures, one of your friend Jim, one of your friend Sally. I asked you which one was Jim and which one was Sally and why.

Then let's say you were looking through your album later, and you saw the picture of Jim and later the one of Sally.

In the first case, a question is present, so is the request for a justification. In the second case, no question is present, so there is no need for a justified answer.

Is the state of apprehension of each picture the same in both cases? Probably in all relevant respects, it is the same picture. In the first case, one can summarise one's perception and compare it to facts about Jim or Sally to provide a justification - what can be seen and is relevant for justification can be said.

Does this mean the scenario with the question and the scenario without it have the same structure? No. The first allows an answer to be given, in the second no answer would be. One scenario requires modification to turn into the other, and there is no guarantee that what can be presumed about the relationship between all involved parties and objects stays the same over transposing scenario.

Quoting fdrake

I asked you which one was Jim and which one was Sally and why.

What did its being of him consist in, then? Perhaps what I later said or did.

So knowing it is N. lies in my capacity, among other things, to show you the difference between Jim and N.

I rather like your reply, and think it captures the flavour of Wittgenstein's speculation better than, say, @Hanover's response or @Bitter Crank's quiet relevant poke at excessive pedantry. One's knowing that it is N. consists in all the details of the way N. fits in to one's world.

That's so much more than a justified true belief.

Knowing how to add two numbers is shown in the act of adding numbers. Knowing how to ride a bike is shown in getting on the bike and taking off up a hill. The same is true of knowing that it is N. in the picture.

Quoting Banno

So knowing it is N. lies in my capacity, among other things, to show you the difference between Jim and N.

This makes the ability to identify someone or something, or diagnose the presence of some phenomena, an inter-relation between an agent and a social store of knowledge. This allows the continual vouchsafing of reference without collapsing all such behaviour into historical precedent or a dispositional state. Proper names can thus be rigid, but their connection to their referent is socially mediated through knowledge banks and, above all, (possibly deferred) interpretive competence towards the referent.

Reply to fdrake Seems so.

Reply to Banno

Though it isn't so surprising that we learn how to look for things. :)

Quoting Banno

To know something is to have a rule for interpreting some sensory data.
— Harry Hindu

It is? How do you know?

I provided the answer, but you simply asked the same question again. Your question, not my answer, is circular.

Are you capable of observing your own mental processes of recognition and familiarity, or are you a p-zombie as your response would seem to indicate? Would it be possible to say that a p-zombie knows anything? It seems to me that "recognition" and "familiarity" are the same as "knowing".

Are you capable of knowing anything that you haven't experience before - of having some rule of thumb for interpreting present sensory data (and that rule of thumb is prior experiences)? To say that you know something - what are you doing mentally (other than just making sounds or scribbles) if not some kind of recognition of some present experience based on prior experiences?

You match the prints to the culprit, Bananno. :ok:

Quoting Banno

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him...

And if there is no justification, then do we not know that it is a picture of him?

Banno, the answer to your question is similar to the answer given in On Certainty to Moore's propositions. So, I might ask the same question of Moore's proposition, namely, "How do I know this is a hand?" As Wittgenstein pointed out, in Moore's context the use of the word know is senseless. The context in which Moore makes the assertion is before an audience (he holds up his hand and says, "This is one hand.) as a rebuttal against the skeptics about whether there exists an external world. He claims to know this is his hand, or a hand. Wittgenstein immediately points out how unclear the statement is by considering its negation, namely, "I don't know this is a hand." This tells us something about the use of the word know in reference to a doubt, and the logic behind the correct use of these words. It's very similar to following a rule and making a mistake, they are logically linked.

Wittgenstein also points out that there are situations where one could doubt that that is my hand or a hand. For example, waking from an operation with bandages around my hand and not knowing if my hand was amputated or not. So, in one context it may be correct to use know, and in another incorrect. One might ask, "Does it make sense to doubt in a given context?"

So, do I know it's a hand because I know it's a hand, just like the question you asked about the picture. No, it's not a matter of knowing, it's simply the way we act. In another situation we may be presented with two pictures that closely resemble each other, in this situation it makes sense to doubt whether they are one and the same person. In such a context it makes sense to ask what is your justification (the doubt makes sense)? In one context the proposition is hinge or bedrock, in another it is not. The example you gave is an example of a hinge-proposition.

Keep in mind there are many statements/beliefs that fall into this category, namely, they are hinge-propositions, or as I call them bedrock beliefs that fall outside the epistemological language-game.

"Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

"Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

"Doubt comes after belief (OC 160)."

"I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing (OC 162)."

All of these quotes fit the kind of question your asking. Again, it gets back to certain propositions/beliefs that are so basic that they are outside epistemological questions.

Quoting Banno

Knowing how to add two numbers is shown in the act of adding numbers. Knowing how to ride a bike is shown in getting on the bike and taking off up a hill. The same is true of knowing that it is N. in the picture.

Face recognition software analyzes a picture and compares it to a standard. The computer could ask someone to verify the accuracy of the standard, but that would just be a quality check. One shouldn't think of external checks like that as the basis of all facial recognition.

Humans have the ability to store reliable standard images as well. Maybe consciousness works like the computer in some ways.

Also, armchair, a priori speculation about how the computer works isn't the best approach. How could it be the best approach to understanding humans?

Quoting Banno

Knowing that this is a picture of N. is different to knowing that water freezes at zero degrees.

I suspect that we could differentiate the various ways one acquires knowledge, but as a general matter it all arises from some sort of sensory input. There are legalistic distinctions that follow basic epistemological standards. Perhaps you know the picture is of N because you were told that and perhaps you know that water freezes at zero degrees because you were told it. In both cases, it would be based upon what you heard said (hearsay). Or, both could be based upon direct knowledge, where you actually witnessed N in person and then by picture or you witnessed the mercury fall to zero and then the water freeze.

What is your justification in each? In the hearsay examples, it's your belief in the veracity of the statements. In the direct knowledge examples, it's your belief in the veracity of what you saw.

I've now spent enough years sorting through these types of threads you post that I believe I've earned the right to the great reveal as to what's at stake in these discussions. If you accept my position that the justification for N is as I've stated it is and that it is not circular, what wheel falls off of Wittgenstein's little red wagon?

The justification would typically be something like one's visual memory of what the person looks like.

If you ask for a justification of the visual memory--for example, say that we change it to "I visualized him. Did I know it was a visualization of him?" Then typically the justification would be something like the inductive reliability of one's memory in general.

Those aren't circular, because the justification isn't the same thing that one is asserting.

Justifications do not need to be infallible, of course. (If they did, almost nothing would be justified--certainly not any empirical claims or empiricism-based claims.)

Quoting Hanover

Perhaps you know the picture is of N because you were told that and perhaps you know that water freezes at zero degrees because you were told it. In both cases, it would be based upon what you heard said (hearsay). Or, both could be based upon direct knowledge, where you actually witnessed N in person and then by picture or you witnessed the mercury fall to zero and then the water freeze.

Yes, and one can know "2 + 2 = 4", and that would all entail knowing how to say and write these things but not what the scribbles and sounds actually mean. Knowing how to imitate language use is not the same as knowing what the words mean, or what the words refer to that aren't words themselves. That would require an experience of using the words at the same moment of experiencing the sensory data that they refer to, such as hearing the word, "red" and seeing the color red at the same moment. In that instance, you would know what the word, "red" meant, not just how to form the word with your mouth.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Yes, and one can know "2 + 2 = 4", and that would all entail knowing how to say and write these things but not what the scribbles and sounds actually mean. Knowing how to imitate language use is not the same as knowing what the words mean, or what the words refer to that aren't words themselves. That would require an experience of using the words at the same moment of experiencing the sensory data that they refer to, such as hearing the word, "red" and seeing the color red at the same moment. In that instance, you would know what the word, "red" meant, not just how to form the word with your mouth.

And there's nothing controversial about any of this, but I'm still left with so what? I understand that we logically arrive at conclusions and that logic forms a part of our justification for our knowledge.

I understand that I justify my conclusion that 2+2=4 based upon how I've designated my logical operators to work and that I justify that N is the guy in the picture based upon my past recollections of N.

Are we now just pointing out the difference between rationalism and empiricism and asking if there is truly a priori knowledge or whether all knowledge has its roots in experience? Is that what the OP is about? If so, I didn't realize it was that basic.

"Suddenly I had to think of him." Say a picture of him suddenly floated before me. Did I know it was a picture of him, N.? I did not tell myself it was. What did its being of him consist in, then? Perhaps what I later said or did.

The underlying question, as the context makes clear, is about meaning. One answer is that meaning is a mental activity, that in this case consists in having a mental picture of N.

16. "Your meaning the piano-playing consisted in your thinking of the piano-playing."
"That you meant that man by the word 'you' in that letter consisted in this, that you were writing to him."
The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in.

[Emphasis on 'consist', 'consists', and 'consisted' in the quotes added.]

As to the question of whether I know that the picture that forms in my mind of N. is a picture of N. - on the one hand, there is no mistaking that it is my picture of N., but on the other, I might have mistaken M. for N. Seeing N. and M. or photographs of them I will realize my mistake and might say: "Oh, I meant M." And here we see why my meaning N. or M. does not consist in having a mental picture.

Quoting Fooloso4

The underlying question, as the context makes clear, is about meaning. One answer is that meaning is a mental activity, that in this case consists in having a mental picture of N.

What follows in your post is an examination of intention, not reference. Or do you see the two as inextricable?

Reply to frank

I am not familiar with the literature on intention and reference so this may not address you question. I do not think it is an examination of either intention or reference as those terms are used in a non-technical sense. If I mean N. it is not my intention to mean N., although it may be the case that the person I have in mind or am talking about (referring to) is not N. but M.. It may also be that I have the names right but there are things that M. said or did that I mistakenly attribute to N.

But what I take to be at issue in the paragraph under discussion is whether there is anything that meaning something consists in.

Quoting Fooloso4

But what I take to be at issue in the paragraph under discussion is whether there is anything that meaning something consists in.

If we look back at the quote:

Quoting Banno

"Suddenly I had to think of him." Say a picture of him suddenly floated before me. Did I know it was a picture of him, N.? I did not tell myself it was. What did its being of him consist in, then? Perhaps what I later said or did.

(Zettel, 14)

Is this quote supposed to imply that thinking of N reduces to something later said or done? Or what exactly?

Wittgenstein asks: what did its being him consist of? Its being him is shown by what he does and what he says, that is, how he responds to the picture that floated before him.

Wittgenstein is not providing an explanation of cognition. If it were a picture of someone else he would not respond as he does.

Reply to Banno

I think this could easily be tweaked to be a Gettier problem, which is, imho, much more interesting.

So, usually, yes, knowing what someone looks like, seeing a picture of that person, and recognizing them as that person constitute a justified, true belief, thus a valid knowledge claim.

But let's say I have a friend X, someone (possibly X himself?) hands me a picture and says X is in it and indeed I see a person in it who looks just like X, thus I believe that my friend X is in this picture. Later I find out that the person I thought was X in the picture was actually his identical twin Y (whom I didn't know about, perhaps), but that X is still in the picture, just a ways off in the distance, possibly with his back turned to the camera.

I was justified in believing X was in the picture, since that was what I was told, and I recognized a person who looked just like him.
Also, it was true that he was in the picture.

Justified and true, and yet I did not know he was in the picture.

Quoting Fooloso4

Wittgenstein asks: what did its being him consist of? Its being him is shown by what he does and what he says, that is, how he responds to the picture that floated before him.

Wittgenstein is not providing an explanation of cognition. If it were a picture of someone else he would not respond as he does.

It's either true or false that he recalled the correct image of N.

Case A. His memory is accurate
Case B. His memory is inaccurate.

It's possible that he might act in exactly the same way in regard to both A and B, for instance if he suffered from delusions. So, I'm sorry, I'm just not following you at all. Where am I dropping bits?

Reply to Sam26 You are quite right to compare the note to the first part of On Certainty. I agree with you. And thanks for your reply



I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...)

The justification, it seems, is knowing the names of things. This is called "a hand". This is a picture of a person called "N".

Witt wouldn't agree though, would he? For him, we can only know things that can be doubted, right?

Wasn't that his argument against Moore?

That we could not doubt Moore's proposition, so it makes no sense to say that we know it?

Quoting frank

It's possible that he might act in exactly the same way in regard to both A and B, for instance if he suffered from delusions. So, I'm sorry, I'm just not following you at all. Where am I dropping bits?

Yes, if he were mistaken or delusional he might act in the same way. What is at issue, however, is not the veracity of the image. Suppose a picture of someone you know appears in your mind. Do you ask who it is or doubt who it is? Or do you immediately know who it is in the same way you know who it is if you see him in person? Do you tell yourself that is N.? Do you need to tell yourself this? Of course there may some situation in which you do question who it is or ask yourself "Is this N.?", but consider how odd it would be if every time you think of someone and an image comes to mind of that person you doubt that the image of the person is the image of that person. It may even be that the person does not really look like that. Someone who falls in love may picture the beloved as far more beautiful than that person actually is, but nevertheless, he is not mistaken that the image is his image of that person.

Edit: To be clear, this is not an epistemological problem and has nothing to do with verified true belief.

Reply to Banno The justification for saying that I know a picture of someone is a picture of that person is my well-tested faith in being able to remember what that person looks like.

Quoting Banno

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

This isn't philosophy, but just incorrect empirical generalization. I can in fact see a picture of N and be completely at a loss that it's N, but maybe figure it out that it's N from his hat or his polka dotted tie.

It's like you're trying to convince yourself that you know it's N in an instantaneous unprocessed way, like the mind just knows without thought. Granted the mind arrives at conclusions quickly, but that's not because it's not processing justifications, it's just because it moves quickly.

Quoting Banno

I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...)

I'm not sure what else to say. I guess you could say that one is perceived directly "the hand," and one indirectly by looking at a picture, but generally both are hinge or bedrock beliefs. I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia, which is a book that G. J. Warnock's constructs from J. L. Austin's notes.

Where your statements aren't hinges, i.e., where it makes sense to doubt them, then, they can be justified in various ways. One way of justifying them is through linguistic training. In other words, when teaching a child the correct names of things or persons, or when teaching someone a new language. There is no significant difference between showing a child a picture of "N," and pointing them out in a crowd, we learn how to name things using both methods.

When teaching a child to use the word hand there is no issue of doubt. Learning to doubt is a language-game that comes much later. We seem to swallow down certain basic beliefs as part of the reality we live in. Something has to stand fast for us in order to learn anything.

Both of these propositions need a context in order for them mean anything. There is no intrinsic meaning to these sentences apart from some context (not that you suggested otherwise).

The logic behind the use of these sentences seems very similar.

There is knowing as a skill, i.e., learning to ride a bike, or learning to count is a skill. Knowing that bikes have wheels is a belief, and knowing that 1+1=2 is also a belief. As philosophers we are mainly interested in beliefs.

I'm not sure if any of this is what you're looking for, so take it for what its worth.

Quoting Fooloso4

but consider how odd it would be if every time you think of someone and an image comes to mind of that person you doubt that the image of the person is the image of that person.

Right. I could question it, but I usually don't.

Therefore we know that thinking of N is not a matter of passively recognising a mental image. Is that it?

When the picture comes to mind I might think: "Oh, I am supposed to meet N. for lunch", or I might smile and wonder how he is doing, or various other responses that have nothing to do with asking myself if the picture is a picture of N.

I think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. To mean N. does not mean to have a picture of N. in my mind. Having a picture of N. in my mind is not to mean N. The picture may come unbidden. I do not have to mean N. to have that picture. It may come "suddenly".

Quoting Fooloso4

When the picture comes to mind I might think: "Oh, I am supposed to meet N. for lunch", or I might smile and wonder how he is doing, or various other responses that have nothing to do with asking myself if the picture is a picture of N.

True. Likewise, if I see a stop sign, I don't ask myself if that's a stop sign. I just know it is. Under some circumstances, I might stop my car when I see it.

Quoting Fooloso4

I think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture.

I've never thought that meaning consisted of holding a mental picture. Did you ever think that?

Quoting Sam26

I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia

A favourite of mine.

Thanks for your input.

Do you, @Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing?

So,
Quoting Hanover

That it looked like him would be my justification.

Quoting I like sushi

I am justified due to experiential knowledge of what the person looks like and the difference between the person and a picture of the person.

Quoting Terrapin Station

...typically the justification would be something like the inductive reliability of one's memory in general.

Quoting Janus

The justification for saying that I know a picture of someone is a picture of that person is my well-tested faith in being able to remember what that person looks like.

The seed of the note, and of On Certainty, with regard to knowledge, seem not to have found fertile ground here.

For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on.

And all this towards @Bitter Crank's admonition for us not to over specify th rules.

Quoting Banno

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him...

I don't think recognising the person in a picture is necessary for me to know that this is a picture of N (for example, N is the author of a book, I don't know what he looks like, but I see what I recognise as an "author photo"), nor do I think that me recognising N in a picture necessarily means that I know it's a picture of N (for example, if I know that the picture is a picture of an event X and I know that N was no longer alive at the time of event X, I have sufficient reason to doubt my recognition, and yet the recognition could be compelling enough to spook me). So, no, I don't think recognising N makes that justification circular.

It does point out the source of a possible error, though, and if you specify "How do you know this is a picture of N?" as "How do you know you're not mistaking the person in the picture?" then that would indeed be circular. Basically, every justification for a knolwedge claim involves itself knowledge that you can question, and I don't think "I know this is a picture of N" and "I recognise N in this picture," are on the same level of abstraction. The latter is more concrete.

The wording in the quote, though, is interesting: "suddenly I had to think of him", "suddenly, a picture of him floated before me..." The language leaves open (and even suggests to me) the possibility of an illusion. In that case, since there's no objective picture, isn't the act of recognition consitutitive? Is it even recognition?

Reply to Banno Yes, I also understand all cases of knowing anything as being examples of familiarity. You know your wife your dog, your friends simply insofar as you are familiar with them. This is like knowing in the Biblical sense: " A man shall know his wife.." although obviously carnal knowledge is a special case of the general 'being familiar with'.

Knowing-how is also a sub-category of knowing by familiarity; by practicing we become more and more familiar with a task; for example riding a bike, or playing a musical instrument, until it becomes "second nature". "Knowing-that" consists in being familiar with conventionally accepted facts or ways of thinking about the world. For example knowing that it is raining depends on experience of (familiarity with) the present conditions either directly or by report, and knowing how to conceptualize that experience in conventional terms.

Applying this idea of familiarity to a famous Gettier example which is supposed to be an issue for JBT: say I see what i believe is a sheep in a field and form a consequent extended belief "there is a sheep in that field". But the sheep turns out to be a cardboard cutout, so my belief is mistaken; there is no sheep in that field. According to JBT then my belief does not count as knowledge because it is not a true belief.

But then say there is another hidden sheep in the field; does my belief that there is a sheep in that field then count as knowledge? It is justified by seeing the cardboard cutout, and it is true because there is a sheep in the field, so perhaps I do know there is a sheep in that field.

No, I do not know there is a sheep in that field. I think the answer to such puzzles is pretty simple and obvious; I am only justified in believing that the cutout is a sheep on account of perceiving what I understandably (if it is a very convincing cutout) take to be a sheep. Regardless of whether this is mistaken seeing the cutout cannot serve as a justification for believing there are any other unseen sheep in the field, it can only serve as justification for mistakenly believing that the cutout is a sheep.

Quoting Fooloso4

I might have mistaken M. for N. Seeing N. and M. or photographs of them I will realize my mistake and might say: "Oh, I meant M." And here we see why my meaning N. or M. does not consist in having a mental picture.

Yes. Nor need it be comparing images algorithmically in a database. Connectionism provides a much better model for brain activity than does unconscious Bayesian statistics.

Quoting NKBJ

I think this could easily be tweaked to be a Gettier problem, which is, imho, much more interesting.

I'm not so keen...

It strikes me as odd that Gettier has such a claim to acclaim, since his famous examples serve only to debunk a theory of knowledge that has been seen as fraught since its birth in the Theaetetus.

@Janus

Quoting Janus

I also understand all cases of knowing anything as being examples of familiarity.

Will familiarity do? It seems - and I dread using the word - too subjective.

What is it to say something is familiar? To have a suitable mental image? But see Reply to Fooloso4. How do I tell that you are familiar with N.? Only by what you say and do.

So skip familiarity and move on to that one does; to knowing how.

Deleted repeated post.

Reply to Banno I understand your concern, but I don't see familiarity as being subjective. I would say I am familiar with something or someone when I interact or deal with it or them, and more so to the extent that I become used to interacting with it or them. I can then be said to know who or what I am dealing with, even if I do not yet know how to interact in contextually specific expert (highly practiced) ways.

In the context of sexuality, for example, I am familiar with others in that particular sense if I interact with them sexually, by being attracted, gazing at them with desire, flirting, making eye contact in certain suggestive ways and so on, and none of that need necessarily be learned, it might come instinctively, in which case nothing could be more familiar. I might not yet know how to make love, that will come with practice, but I must first be familiar with the context in which sexual desire begins to make sense and making love can come to be a spontaneous expression of desire.

So, to return to your "image" example I know an image shows a particular person if I can recognize them there and if the image is indeed of the person in question. It is always possible I could be mistaken, though (although not in the case of a mental image provided I have met the person and am familiar enough with them to be able to remember what she looks like).

I read the post(s?) you cited written by @Fooloso4 and was unable to see the relevance; perhaps you could explain how you think that bears on what I have been saying.

Quoting Fooloso4

think what Wittgenstein is breaking the connection we may have formed of meaning as consisting of a mental picture. To mean N. does not mean to have a picture of N. in my mind. Having a picture of N. in my mind is not to mean N. The picture may come unbidden. I do not have to mean N. to have that picture. It may come "suddenly".

So what is it to mean N?

We use the term 'know' in a variety of different ways.

An old song comes on the radio. I say I know that song, but if someone asks me what the words are or how the melody goes I might say I don't know it that well. Later I might remember snatches of the words or a part of the melody that I had forgotten. Do I know it now and not before when I said I knew it? Or do I not know it at all since I still do not know all the words or the bridge?

One person may say she knows what gefilte fish is. She ate it whenever she visited grandma. She might think that it is a species of fish like trout or bass. Does she then not know what gefilte fish is? Another might know how gefilte fish is made but has never tasted it and cannot identify it by taste. Does he know what it is even though he could not tell you what he had just eaten if it was served to him?

I am introduced to someone. I say "Yes, I know Bob we are old friends". Does my knowing Bob mean I know how? I can identify him but doesn't my knowing him have something to do with all the time we spent together, the shared experiences, the talks we had?

Quoting frank

So what is it to mean N?

It might be the person I am talking about who says things on a philosophy forum that others cannot make sense of, or the person I am pointing to rather than the person right next to him or he who shall not be named.

Quoting Fooloso4

So what is it to mean N?
— frank

It might be the person I am talking about who says things on a philosophy forum that others cannot make sense of, or the person I am pointing to rather than the person right next to him or he who shall not be named.

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?

Quoting frank

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?

Not necessarily. Pointing to N. does not mean to hold some fact about him in mind. I might mention some fact about N. in order to help identify the person I mean, but that fact might only come to mind at that point to help identify him.

Quoting Banno

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on.

That seems like one of those things that amounts to someone saying, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge how-to rather than propositional knowledge or knowledge-by-acquaintance."

And then someone else could say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to propositional knowledge rather than how-to knowledge or knowledge-by acquaintance."

And then of course a third person would say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge-by-acquaintance rather than how-to-knowledge or propositional knowledge."

And in my experience, we shouldn't doubt that any of those people can do that--interpret things, to their satisfaction, at least, so that everything is x, and nothing will convince them that they can't interpret everything the way they say they can, and nothing will convince them that it isn't a good idea.

But it's basically just an example of their resolve to jump through whatever hoops they'd need to jump through to come up with an interpretation, as promised, that they'd consider good enough to keep the trick going to their personal satisfaction.

Quoting Banno

For my part, I think we are wrong to think of a distinction between knowing that and knowing how. It seems to me that all examples of knowing that reduce to examples of knowing how.

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on.

Knowing how to do something is more like applied knowledge. One might know the steps but never performed the steps and gets better with experience. In this case, knowledge comes in the form of degrees of behavioral effeciency. One can know how to add larger numbers faster, or tie their shoes more efficiently, because of experience.

Most people keep using terms like "recognition" and "familiarity" when defining "knowing". Could it be that they are the same thing and that philosophers have insisted on using this word, "knowledge" as if it were something more which has led to the confusion.

Thinking about knowledge as a set of rules for interpreting sensory data allows for knowledge to become obsolete and replaced when new experiences show it is necessary.

Quoting Fooloso4

So to mean N is to hold some fact about N in mind?
— frank

Not necessarily. Pointing to N. does not mean to hold some fact about him in mind. I might mention some fact about N. in order to help identify the person I mean, but that fact might only come to mind at that point to help identify him.

Yep. As you mentioned, knowledge isn't the issue here. It's more about reference.

Quoting Banno

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing?

It does seem curious doesn't it? However, I'm finding that beliefs have more to do with psychology than good arguments. The psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument, and this is true no matter what educational level you're dealing with. One can see this especially when we consider religion and politics. People like to follow their particular group, be it a large group or small group, it's comforting to think that others think like you. What we need are more independent thinkers, those who can think outside the box, those who are non-conformists. The other problem is that sometimes you can get to far outside the box. Why people believe what they do is very complicated.

Quoting Banno

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing?

Although this is not addressed to me I would like to respond.

I think it is the result of bad arguments, something that is only problematic for some who are "doing philosophy". The assumption that justification is needed is a pseudo-problem. The question of whether or how I know that the picture I have in my mind of N. is a picture of N. would strike anyone not suffering from a particular kind of philosophical dis-ease as absurd, and rightly so.

Reply to Terrapin Station I agree it is also a matter of perspective, but nonetheless I maintain that knowing as familiarity is basic and comes first, and that knowing-how and knowing-that are secondary and derivative. The other point is that thinking about knowing in different ways, in all the ways we can imagine, may open up new insights into our knowing practices and what it means to know.

Reply to Fooloso4 Indeed. Yet here it is.

Quoting Banno

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here?

I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.

The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises.

Quoting Fooloso4

I don't think it has anything to do with justified true belief.

The question of whether I know that the picture I have of him is a picture of him is odd. When the picture of N suddenly floated before him there was no question that it is a picture of N. It is only subsequently, after the fact, that the question arises.

This gets to the notions I had here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/842365

Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical. It's simply a way of stopping inquiry. Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds?

Quoting schopenhauer1

Hinge propositions are anti-philosophical.

Hinges are not anti-philosophical.

Quoting schopenhauer1

It's simply a way of stopping inquiry.

It is not a way of stopping inquiry but what inquiry turns on.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Why does the limit have to be how we use language ...

Wittgenstein does not claim it does.

Quoting schopenhauer1

... and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/840026

Reply to Fooloso4
I actually see that confirming what I said:
Quoting schopenhauer1

So if you drank from the coffee cup and said, "I am doing a game", someone might look at you funny. But you tried to justify yourself by saying, "Yes, every time I pick up the coffee cup and put it to my mouth, I call that "game"", someone would just say you are crazy. They would tell, you, "Just say "sip" or "drink"!. In other words, you should be using a different set of family resemblances (to drink, sip, imbibe, ingest, partake in, guzzle, gulp, etc.) than the set we usually employ when we say "game". These have historical precedents in the language community and thus these are the proper words to use. If before you sipped from the coffee mug you looked around suspiciously, then stated, "I am getting myself a drink", then winked at me, I might infer "drink" to mean you spiked your coffee. It is all kind of related in a web of notions because of the community's use. So community "grounds" words (i.e. Form of Life), and as far as I see, context grounds how the words are employed (language games). And by "ground" I don't mean metaphysical, but one can say as a some sort of "error checker" for permitted or non-traditional use of words.

But all this being said, my particular critique is that Witt insufficiently posits his theory because it is very common sensical. Communities form language games and their use in context grounds the meaning. But I believe, any anthropologist could have told you that even by his time, so what else is he saying? And that's where I fail to see anything of interest. There are a ton of questions that can arise from this view (common sensical as is it is). For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism? There are beliefs that prima facie are not facts of the world, but interpretations we have. So what is a "community" outside a set of individual points of view interpreting information? So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism. How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon? And if you say we can't, we shouldn't, or we shan't try, okay, then it's not that interesting to me as it is essentially just more explicitly coming up with ways we use language that don't correspond to a direct "truth correspondence theory of logical positivism, which is just tedious to me as someone who never cared for logical positivism to begin with.

Quoting schopenhauer1

For example, how does Wittgenstein explain how it is that social facts exist outside of some sort of linguistic solipsism?

In OC Wittgenstein quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

Language emerges out of pre-linguistic practices. Social facts include things done not just things said. That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain.

Quoting schopenhauer1

So you see, there has to be a greater theory for how something like "community" obtains outside of individual perceptions if one doesn't want to maintain solipsism.

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life.

Quoting schopenhauer1

How does this get beyond the Cartesian Demon?

The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Why does the limit have to be how we use language and not how it is grounded in the world or our minds?

What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people?

Reply to Banno

According to Locke, pictures are also ideas. Ideas are thoughts and memories.

Justification or judgment must be either from intuition or A priori reasoning ability comparing the idea of the perceived picture with the idea of the corresponding past memories.

Quoting Banno

A computer can identify a picture of you as Banno. It must be matching various criteria against something in its database. That's what I'm doing at some level.
— Hanover

This claim carries all the paraphernalia around the guess that mind involves unconscious algorithmic processing.

I'm not buying that, and hence I am not buying your point here.

Is this still your view?

If so, suppose "algorithmic" was replaced with "physical" or "biological". Would that make a difference in your plausibility assessment?

Quoting Fooloso4

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life.

But what exactly does this "shared" mean?

Is it an active and deliberate sharing, like when you offer someone an apple if you have two?

Or is it a kind of sharing we're simply born into, which is imposed on us, without having any say in it?

Quoting Fooloso4

That we do things is not something that Wittgenstein, or for that matter, as far as I know, anyone else attempt to explain.

Really? So psychology, sociology, and anthropology don’t contribute theories for this?

Quoting Fooloso4

A community is not made up of individual perceptions but of shared beliefs, practices, and language. A common form of life.

How do you get out of circularity of what community is? Whence this? How is it “out there”? You have to justify a theory of emergence, not just posit it.

Quoting Fooloso4

The role of the hypothetical demon is to establish that there is something that cannot be doubted, something we can be certain of even if we are deceived about everything else. Wittgenstein has an interesting response: in order to doubt there must be things that are not doubted.

I can doubt community exists outside my perception. Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further. And it’s a legit move to do that.

Quoting baker

What else do we have to express ourselves but language? And who else can we communicate with if not other people?

Other people is a reification of an idea.

Quoting baker

But what exactly does this "shared" mean?

Good question but I’m asking it on the strictest metaphysical sense not just what it’s meaning is.

Reply to schopenhauer1
Of course. We need to navigate between the extremes of solipsism and non-individualism.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Other people is a reification of an idea.

That's solipsistic.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further.

No. Hinge propositions are axioms, that's the point.

Quoting baker

No. Hinge propositions are axioms, that's the point.

To me it seems arbitrary one builds their axioms there. Go further.. Dig. If you say that there is a limit, that is one position out of many.. Believe it if you want, but don't expect me to believe it.

Reply to schopenhauer1 You, too operate with axioms just not necessarily the same ones as other people's.

Quoting baker

You, too operate with axioms just not necessarily the same ones as other people's.

Hehe. Well that itself is a different axiom than the axiom of hinge propositions... Everyone puts down their flag somewhere I guess.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Everyone puts down their flag somewhere I guess.

And it helps to acknowledge that, otherwise we're stuck on a wild goose chase.

Quoting baker

That's solipsistic.

Right. I'm saying how do you justify social entities like community outside of individual perceptions of what the community is, means, etc. There is a "shared" space. What is this "shared" space. Be careful how you define it though without falling into the trap.

Quoting baker

And it helps to acknowledge that, otherwise we're stuck on a wild goose chase.

Much of modern philosophy is trying to wrangle in previous philosophy from "going too far". Putting limits, whether that be language or the mind or experimental verification.

Quoting schopenhauer1

I'm saying how do you justify social entities like community outside of individual perceptions of what the community is, means, etc.

You don't justify them, you take them for granted, axiomatically.

Quoting baker

You don't justify them, you take them for granted, axiomatically.

Philosophy doesn't have to be about what one can prove empirically. It should be thought of as "avenues of looking", synthesis of ideas, or one's "insights".

Quoting baker

But what exactly does this "shared" mean?

Suppose you went to sleep and when you woke up it was 1923 or 1823. Would you realize that this is not the same world it was when you sent to sleep? Or suppose when you woke up you were in some remote fishing village or with in tripe in the Amazon. Would it be apparent that this is not this is not the same place you fell asleep in?

Quoting baker

Is it an active and deliberate sharing, like when you offer someone an apple if you have two?

Or is it a kind of sharing we're simply born into, which is imposed on us, without having any say in it?

A bit of both.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Really? So psychology, sociology, and anthropology don’t contribute theories for this?

I am not talking about doing specific things but that we do anything at all. What explanation do you have that we do things rather than doing nothing?

Quoting schopenhauer1

How do you get out of circularity of what community is?

Well, if you think a group of people living and working together with shared interests and values is circular then I see no reason why it would be necessary to get out of it.

Quoting schopenhauer1

How is it “out there”?

A community is not something "out there". It is something within which we live.

Quoting schopenhauer1

You have to justify a theory of emergence, not just posit it.

Do I? Do you think there has always been human language? Do you think there has always been human beings?

Quoting schopenhauer1

I can doubt community exists outside my perception.

Yes, you can, but when you express that doubt on a public forum you do so outside of your perception. Or do you think the forum and its participants do not exist outside your perception? Do you think the language you express your doubts in only exist within your perception?

Quoting schopenhauer1

Hinge propositions can’t just stop theorizing as that hinge needs to be grounded further.

When you are theorizing are there things that you accept? Things that are not called into doubt when you theorize? Do you realize that your assumptions about grounds functions as a hinge? Something you accept without the grounding having a ground?

Quoting schopenhauer1

Philosophy doesn't have to be about what one can prove empirically.

Indeed, but in order to philosophize, one needs axioms. Otherwise one is just manifesting mental-verbal diarrhoea.

Quoting Fooloso4

Suppose you went to sleep and when you woke up it was 1923 or 1823. Would you realize that this is not the same world it was when you sent to sleep? Or suppose when you woke up you were in some remote fishing village or with in tripe in the Amazon.

Would it be apparent that this is not this is not the same place you fell asleep in?

Why wouldn't it?

Quoting baker

Why wouldn't it?

It wouldn't if our way of life was not a shared way of life.

Reply to Fooloso4 It's not clear where you're going with this. Obviously, I can't recognize something as the Amazon without having heard other people talk about it.

From some point on, though, what I have learned from other people is enough for me to develop a sense of self-sufficieny and independence. (This is easy and tempting to confuse for terminal self-sufficieny and independence.)

Quoting baker

Obviously, I can't recognize something as the Amazon without having heard other people talk about it.

Perhaps not, but you would know it is not part of the shared community you live in.

Reply to Fooloso4 Here, we could bring up the difference between an introvert and an extrovert. Not everyone feels equally bound to other people

For an extrovert, the experience of waking up in a foreign place or time could be more disorienting than for an introvert.