Kant's first formulation of the CI forbids LITERALLY everything
Kantian deontology has been criticized on many grounds. I would like to advance what is, to the best of my knowledge, a novel criticism: that Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative forbids – literally – everything.
“Kant’s first formulation of the CI states that you are to ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (G 4:421)”
SEP https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/
In a Kantian sense, “The form of a maxim is “I will A in C in order to realize or produce E” where “A” is some act type, “C” is some type of circumstance, and “E” is some type of end to be realized or achieved by A in C.” (ibid).
However, when it comes to ethical maxims, Kant takes that whole universality thing very seriously – and very literally. All that stuff about context and motive gets gutted out, and we are left with the raw act itself. Which is why, famously, Kant believes that it is always wrong to lie, no matter what your context or motive might be. You wouldn’t want everyone to lie all of the time, so lying is wrong. So you can’t even lie to save a life. To borrow a term from grammatical theory, Kantian deontology is “context insensitive.”
It’s also important to observe that it’s not enough for a behavior to be describable in terms of some maxim that you would be happy for everyone to follow all the time. If the behavior can be described by any maxim that you would not will to be universal, the behavior becomes unethical. Again, lying is wrong, so lying is always wrong, and it doesn’t matter what else the lie may happen to be: a beautiful sonnet, a sublime haiku, or an order for steamed hams. It’s a lie, so it’s wrong: end of discussion.
There are many problems with this. But the one I want to raise here is that with a little creativity, literally every behavior can be described in such a way that it fits some “maxim” (as Kant uses the term) that you would not be happy for everyone to act in accordance with all of the time. This becomes especially clear as one begins to describe behavior in ever more minute detail.
For example, most of the time I’m okay with people squeezing their fingers. But if a particular finger happens to be wrapped around the trigger of a gun, and that gun is pointed at my head, then absolutely no, squeezing that finger is right out! And unless you happen to feel differently about guns pointed at your own sweet noggins, then no more finger squeezing for you, my dear Kantians!
Or take that most presidential of activities: inhaling. Most of the time I’m quite okay with people inhaling. It’s close to being a universal maxim. But if that person is me, and somehow I’ve found myself in the presence of Sarin nerve gas, then... no, no, absolutely not!!!
And so on.
As I said, Kantian deontology can be attacked on many grounds. This is merely one argument I have come up with. Beyond the usual invitation to comment implied by any posting, I would be especially interested in hearing from anyone who knows if this argument has been made before, or who thinks they can find a flaw in my argument.
“Kant’s first formulation of the CI states that you are to ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (G 4:421)”
SEP https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/
In a Kantian sense, “The form of a maxim is “I will A in C in order to realize or produce E” where “A” is some act type, “C” is some type of circumstance, and “E” is some type of end to be realized or achieved by A in C.” (ibid).
However, when it comes to ethical maxims, Kant takes that whole universality thing very seriously – and very literally. All that stuff about context and motive gets gutted out, and we are left with the raw act itself. Which is why, famously, Kant believes that it is always wrong to lie, no matter what your context or motive might be. You wouldn’t want everyone to lie all of the time, so lying is wrong. So you can’t even lie to save a life. To borrow a term from grammatical theory, Kantian deontology is “context insensitive.”
It’s also important to observe that it’s not enough for a behavior to be describable in terms of some maxim that you would be happy for everyone to follow all the time. If the behavior can be described by any maxim that you would not will to be universal, the behavior becomes unethical. Again, lying is wrong, so lying is always wrong, and it doesn’t matter what else the lie may happen to be: a beautiful sonnet, a sublime haiku, or an order for steamed hams. It’s a lie, so it’s wrong: end of discussion.
There are many problems with this. But the one I want to raise here is that with a little creativity, literally every behavior can be described in such a way that it fits some “maxim” (as Kant uses the term) that you would not be happy for everyone to act in accordance with all of the time. This becomes especially clear as one begins to describe behavior in ever more minute detail.
For example, most of the time I’m okay with people squeezing their fingers. But if a particular finger happens to be wrapped around the trigger of a gun, and that gun is pointed at my head, then absolutely no, squeezing that finger is right out! And unless you happen to feel differently about guns pointed at your own sweet noggins, then no more finger squeezing for you, my dear Kantians!
Or take that most presidential of activities: inhaling. Most of the time I’m quite okay with people inhaling. It’s close to being a universal maxim. But if that person is me, and somehow I’ve found myself in the presence of Sarin nerve gas, then... no, no, absolutely not!!!
And so on.
As I said, Kantian deontology can be attacked on many grounds. This is merely one argument I have come up with. Beyond the usual invitation to comment implied by any posting, I would be especially interested in hearing from anyone who knows if this argument has been made before, or who thinks they can find a flaw in my argument.
Comments (124)
You are right in a sort of reduction ad absurdium sense I guess.
But also, a fault in his maxim that I see is that people often do different things. For example some people want lots of children, others none. According to the maxim either choice is disastrous for humanity!
You are right of course that my argument crucially hangs on the segment of my post that you have quoted.
I have not read Kant first hand, and make room for the possibility that I am simply wrong about this. Kant's works have a reputation as very lengthy tomes in which every single paragraph is a dense uphill slog. The truth is I'm not quite sure I have sufficient interest for that. Sometimes it's just easier to go out on a limb and see if someone else can kindly come along and saw that limb off for me. :wink:
But...
Even if you're completely correct and Metaphysics of Morals says what you say it says, I'm not sure that isn't just a further argument against Kant's first formulation of the CI.
Doesn't Kant's whole distinction between a hypothetical imperative as a conditional command, as opposed to a categorical imperative being an unconditional command, absolutely forbid exceptions to any categorical imperative? Once you have an exception it becomes a conditional command, and therefore a hypothetical imperative.
Or, to say much the same thing in language more consistent with my OP, an imperative can't be contingently universally willed.
Meaning that, by definition, you can't ever have one CI overrule another. Once it's been overruled, even once, it's not a CI anymore.
In fact, if Kant says what you say he says, if anything this seems to be an even more fatal flaw in his ethical system than the one that I suggested in my OP. To allow one CI to overrule another is to remove the logical basis of the entire system.
Or so it seems to me.
I am only a humble student. As I said, I am quite ready for this limb to be sawn off!
:smile:
No universal law may ever follow from a hypothetical imperative*;
Categorical imperatives do not “compete” with each other, nor does any one displace any other, for the excruciatingly simple reason....there is only one**;
Deontological moral philosophy is “contextually insensitive” because it is grounded in pure practical reason, having merely a logically consistent idea as its fundamental principle, that idea itself being “contextually insensitive”;
* “...hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual...”
** “....There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law....”
The flaw isn’t in Kantian deontology, it’s in the frailties of human nature.
I’m using the Gutenberg online tenth Thomas Kingsmill Abbott edition, 1895, IPad reference pagination is 535 of 1265. Translations may differ, but the gist should be consistent.
If you just do a search of critique of pure reason pdf, you'll get a lot of options.
EG http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf
Gutenberg has the Meiklejohn translation, downloadable to Kindle for IPad or PC, with click-able chapters and sections. Lots easier if one has an idea what he’s specifically looking for.
Still not as satisfying as a book, though, methinks.
Lets consider the statement " do not lie "
Consider that you are a german living in nazi Germany and you are hiding a jew in your house.
An officer of nazi police knocks at your door and inquires whether there are jews residing in your house.Will you tell the truth or lie.
kantian ethics does not take care of delicate situations like these where a universal law fails to appear moral.But kant would argue it is the act which matters and the will.
Correct. The maxim tells what to do. The imperative is just the form what to do either should (hypothetically) or must (categorically) take.
Hang on.........
Wrong book. Mine is from Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sometimes called Groundwork, yes. Kant, and Abbott, call it F. P. M. M., 1785.
Lying through all those examples, is dirtying those examples.
Which is to say, if in lying you happen to gift someone a gold ingot, you'd be gifting it with dirty hands.
Yes, you're giving something precious and beneficial - but you're giving it away dirtied.
So you're always detracting?
As to the topic title, there's a bit of an issue.
Let's run the ferris wheel again; I say it cannot forbid literally everything, without forbidding 'forbidding literally everything'. It nulls itself out, and allots for not everything - but anything.
If it forbids literally anything, it would grant all choices, rather than null them out; and would make the statement much more practical, in the sense that you could maintain a stance of absolute good.
Whereas you can't, if it forbids everything.
I just read a little on presumed right to lie.
Most arguments in favour of lying say one of these things.
1.Lying manipulates the situation and makes you the cause of whatever result/end that may come out of a scenario.It also means you are treating the matter as means to something else, but you do not know the end, hence telling the truth should be treated as an act in of itself.
2.The murderer is responsible for the act of killing and it is not your act, hence you are allowed to lie.
3.You may not answer the question or explain the matter in truthful terms.
4.The moral framework of kantian ethics does not apply to this situation as the nazi Gov is unjust in its nature.
Can you point out some objections to these arguments.Btw, l am not well versed in kant and once l have free time, l would consider reading kant extensively.
OK...found it, read it. It appears we’re mingling your conflict of duties with my singular C.I. Yours comes from The Metaphysics of Morals, mine comes from The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. We can discuss each concept, duty and/or imperative, but I don’t think we can discuss how they relate to each other, for the formulation of the imperative is a conscious practical act of reason and is always antecedent to our abiding by it, whereas duty is a necessary human attribute which makes such abiding possible.
Kant’s moral philosophy is every bit as confusing as his theoretical epistemology. There’s a lot of reference material from which to pick one’s personal axioms, to be sure.
Yes, you may now proceed to gloat, but only because you are right in what you say, not because I am wrong in what I say. Half a gloat? Partial gloat. Something less than a full-blown gloat.
I can't fault your logic there! And truthfully, that hadn't occurred to me.
Kant says only to act in ways that you would allow everyone to act, all the time.
My response to that is that if you apply some creativity, you can describe any action in such a way that your description (or "maxim") also fits some behavior that you would never want to become universal.
Take, for example, what I am doing right now: typing a string of characters into a keyboard. Now, most of the time I'm completely fine with allowing everyone to do that. But if that string of characters happens to be a launch code that kicks off thermonuclear Armageddon, then I am absolutely not! So according to Kant, I must now and forevermore judge typing to be a deeply immoral activity!
To drop the word "forbidden" and express the point in more Kantian language, I would not want everyone to follow a maxim that says "execute everyone who engages in philosophy!" Therefore I would not want the practice of acting on maxims to become universal. Therefore acting on maxims is itself immoral!
But...
Don't forget: this is an ethical debate, not an ontological one. Kant's CI goes to what is ethical, not to what exists. So if acting on maxims itself is immoral, that does not mean that maxims cease to exist. It could just be taken to mean that we're steeped in sin no matter what! So rather being cancelled out in a double negative, I would suggest that my fundamental point is now doubly true!
Or, in the immortal words of Saint Bartholomew, who himself was quoting from Homer, "You're damned if you do and you're damned if you don't!"
On a completely different note, If you haven't already done so, I encourage you to read the other posts in this thread, especially tim woods'. I admit to only knowing Kant at second hand, and so must make room for the possibility that he is right when he says things like Quoting tim wood
But tim, if you're reading this too, I respond that there are a LOT of books I really need to read. For now, while I would be a fool not to at least make room for the possibility that I have misunderstood (or perhaps I can honestly say "been misinformed about" Kant), you have not convinced me that that is the case.
If you could quote specific sections of the text that support your view of what Kant is really saying, I would be more convinced! :wink:
And that works well, if you take in to account that Kant was being specific - of 'the box', as it were.
If you go outside the box, then it might get a little washed out, but not to deny its specific application, as we'd simply end up in another 'box'. I'll hereby honourably name this the Matryoshkant.
Quoting Theologian
Perspectively, you're on point.
An easy example would be if two people who stood face to face held the maxim of 'always go right'.
Though they go right, to each other they go left.
If you blur the lines a bit, Kant's idea is fully valid in use with absolutes - but will get you dizzy if you try to apply it from a point of view/reference.
Quoting Theologian
No, no, no, my dear.
I would say, that even though typing a string of characters leads to a thermonuclear Armageddon, the string itself is harmless. So you should not be judging the writing, but the intent behind it - which I would think is the whole reasoning behind Kant's proposition.
In somewhat short: Typing is a neutral tool, like a stone. You may use it to build walls and temples or kill others.
You should not be judging the stone, and thus applying your maxim to the stone - but to its intentions, building or killing. So 'tis not writing to be found deeply immoral, but the intent to harm - regardless of the activity.
Quoting Theologian
That's a good one.
But, the trick therein lies with 'You're damned'. You're damned a priori, so that's all that matters and the rest is filler. It would be the same if you weren't damned.
You're six feet tall if you do eat an apple and you're six feet tall if you do not eat an apple.
But will you be six feet tall if you do eat an apple or don't? This I do not know.
Finally,
Quoting Theologian
I would be inclined to say this applies to vernacular maxims and their connotations, but not to absolutes who pertain but to themselves.
However, I would like to add a little historical perspective that I think is useful in understanding why Kant just doesn't come out and say "well, obviously lie if the alternative is to give the true code for a nuclear bomb to a person intent on blowing up the city or entire world".
Kant did not know about nuclear weapons.
Likewise, the Mafia wasn't a big problem at the time that obviously needs infiltrating. Governments had not yet decided it was a good idea to make illegal popular products people would buy anyways leading to global scale criminal networks that threaten the honest functioning of governments.
Most of the obvious counter examples to Kant's "lying is bad" are fairly modern. Kant did not live in a world with weapons of mass destruction where nearly everyone believes we need spies to try to protect state-owned weapons of mass destruction and prevent non-state actors from developing their own.
In Kant's day it was a matter of debate whether spies were required for warfare or whether it was "un-gentlemanly" for aristocrats to spy on each other and read each-others mail. Germany was not a democracy. But Kant was not a radical non-violent person, even though he wanted peace. Kant viewed favourably the French revolution (or at least in a nuanced way that did not outright condemn it) ... just not that a similar movement is required in Germany.
These are not difficult positions to take in Kantianism if it is a universal principle to "overthrow intolerable tyranny when necessary ... or very likely necessary", which he can then claim "it's not so intolerable in Germany, nothing to see here".
From a Historical perspective now (of WWI and WWII clearly being far more violent events than a German democratic revolution prior to WWI), it seems obvious Kant was wrong, but Kant didn't have this convenient perspective; and history has also proven Kant right, that violent revolution is not always necessary to go from tyranny to democracy.
So we can certainly strive to find hypocrisy in Kant's political views, but even if we take his stance that "no one should ever lie" at face value, Kant lived in a time where this was far more plausible than now and he couldn't start his argument with examples like "well, obviously we wouldn't give a mad man the codes to arm the nuclear device", and so we don't see Kant dealing with these examples.
A better reading of Kant is to try to imagine examples that would be obvious from Kants perspective and whether it's plausible they can be dealt with without lying (Gandhi and MLK achieved political objectives without the need to lie, whether we think they are liars or not), and then of course consider if Kant leaves "a way to a more important categorical imperative" if the need to lie does arise (just as Gandhi and MLK didn't rail against under-cover police and spies protecting nuclear weapons).
No, I think you are mistaken here. Kant's moral philosophy is not at all context insensitive. I think you're misunderstanding how a maxim works in general. A maxim is a principle of acting, it's not the "raw act" itself. The context is embedded in the principle. Almost no CI will be as simple as "do not kill". It will almost always be a conditional statement: "Do not kill for your own convenience". This is also, obviously, where the motive for the act is relevant.
Quoting Theologian
You're using a very popular example but missing the very specific reason why lying, in particular, is "always" wrong (I think it's debatable whether or not that's actually a reasonable conclusion to draw). Kant argued against "benevolent" lying on the basis that when you tell a lie, you become responsible for the (unpredictable) long term consequences of the lie. It's a bad example to choose because Kant's logic here is specific to lying.
Quoting Theologian
Yeah but that's backwards. The maxim guides the action, or else it's not a maxim. An action can be categorised under any number of maxims, but that is wholly irrelevant to Kant's system. Kant is concerned with the formation of the will, the "motive".
Quoting Theologian
Where is the maxim here? "I will never squeeze my fingers" is obviously not a universal maxim.
Quoting Wittgenstein
In the case of lying, Kant was concerned that by lying to change the trajectory of someone's actions, you'd become inextricably linked to that altered trajectory. So that, for example, if your neighbor also sheltered even more Jews, and not having made an arrest in your house, the Nazis would then discover them instead, it'd be partially your fault for lying. Whereas if you tell the truth, it's the Nazis free decision what to do with that information. You can't be blamed for the truth.
An interesting argument, but somewhat removed from the general merits of Kant's moral philosophy. Unfortunately, it has come to dominate all discourse on it.
Nope, I'm afraid I don't.
I recognize I may be wrong about the implication of the first formulation if the CI. And I realize it is not your responsibility to correct all my misapprehensions. But "you're wrong - now go read a 700 page book to see why" is not a particularly convincing argument that I am wrong.
And whatever else you may say of me, I am capable of making my points without resorting to personal insults.
Feel free to place me on ignore.
On reading/studying: Gotta wonder, doncha??
———————-
My reference can be found here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682-h/5682-h.htm#link2H_4_0005. Scroll to SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, then scroll some more to the 7th indented footnote on what a maxim is. Next, in its own paragraph, is the statement, by The Good Professor himself.
I've had similar criticisms of the CI. What counts as a maxim to be universalized? I think that his first formulation was trying to be too rigorous for its own good.
From this thread 2 years ago: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/40563
[quote=schopenhauer1]Traditionally, the CI has been applied to larger ethical themes like murder and stealing. How about more granular, everyday situations? Can deontology be applied to more nuanced scenarios?
At what point does the CI not apply? Can it work with any contradiction that arises, no matter how trivial or is this not meant to be applied to more daily situations of living? If not, why? That is the realm of most human activity. It's how we treat each other in everyday life, the small decisions, the hustle and bustle of living.[/quote]
Incidentally, this week's comic fits right into your thread here :lol: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/293
Thank you, schopenhauer1; on both counts!
And you know, that comic really did make me laugh out loud! :lol:
No problem! :grin:
But you know, if Kant really is as context insensitive as I've been saying...
Is hitting people with rules something I - or he - would will to be universal?
That's the problem, anything can be universalized and in a way justified or not justified. "If every student who lied should be hit with rulers" is there a contradiction if universalized? Another problem is what kind of maxims are appropriate to universalize. Surely, we would all disagree. There are a number of problems here.
The second formulation seems general enough to actually apply meaningfully. To not use other people as merely an ends is an interesting point, and is a large basis for my antinatalism.
For example, foisting challenges on another individual is always wrong, even if that individual eventually identifies with the challenges. Foisting challenges on an individual, along with exposing them to a world that has non-trivial (and unavoidable structural) suffering, due to some other X reason (i.e. parent's reasoning for having the child), is always wrong. A person who did not exist already, did not need to experience the X (parent's) reason in the first place. The child would be exposed to suffering and sets of challenges. This would be using the child for a means to some end (some X reason), and discounting the challenges and suffering of the actual child that did not need to be foisted upon them in the first place.
This is of course a variation of the CI second formulation.
Well the "Groundwork" is not that long, and I found it enjoyable to read (in german at least).
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't think it really matters so long as you are actually concerned with maxims governing actions and not just making a rule for every single actions. It's not supposed to be some fixed catalog at a high level of abstraction like the ten commandments. If the principle that guides your action is embedded in some more abstract principle, you can go up an check if the principles that guide your actions are consistent with themselves and the CI.
Fair enough, but I guess there is a reason he calls it "practical reason".. But is it practical? If he gives you a standard, but the standard is incompatible in its many uses, what does it matter then as a useful thing? I would like to universalize the fact that everyone should smile when I walk into their establishment and be as friendly as possible. If we universalized that, there is no contradiction here, should this be a general maxim?
Let me edit what I said above.. If let's say, there WAS a contradiction..something like "If everyone were mean, civility itself would not exist".. would that be a general maxim? Everyone MUST be friendly to me when I walk into the establishment? You may disagree with how granular I'm getting.. see what I'm getting at?
A maxim of benevolence / friendlyness can be universalized, I think. Of course, this is different from a maxim that includes forcing people to be friendly, which, while not necessarily self-contradictory, isn't something one would want to be on the receiving end of.
Quoting schopenhauer1
If a maxim fails the CI, it does not follow that the reverse becomes a duty. if a general maxim of "mean-ness" (non-benevolence) fails the CI and is therefore prohibited, it does not follow that "friendlyness" (benevolence) becomes an absolute duty. You shouldn't be mean to your customers on principle, but that doesn't mean you can never be mean if the situation requires it.
Dunno what to tell ya, bud. I figured the text would come across the screen consistently no matter the device, but maybe not. I’m on an iPad so my description follows that appearance.
Not the seventh or eighth paragraph; the 7th indented paragraph, of the second section, with the asterisk that denotes it as a footnote in an actual book, before any sub-sections of the second section.
I already quoted it directly, but I’ll add some to it, from the Gutenberg link:
“....When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims * shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.
* A maxim is a subjective principle of action, and must be
distinguished from the objective principle, namely,
practical law. The former contains the practical rule set by
reason according to the conditions of the subject (often its
ignorance or its inclinations), so that it is the principle
on which the subject acts; but the law is the objective
principle valid for every rational being, and is the
principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative.
There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law....”
—————-
I see how you arrived at your three versions of the C. I. and how it relates to proving my one version wrong.
To get some perspective on all this, I often think of a brief exchange I had some years ago with a fine arts student. This particular student had no truck with abstract definitions or theories as to what constitutes a work of art. No, he wasn’t going to have any of that.
“Art,” he stolidly pronounced, “is the creation of objects.” And that, it seemed, was that.
The reason I remember that prosy proclamation so vividly is because at the time he made it, we were both visiting the house of some mutual friends where we had both often been guests in the past. And in this house, as in virtually all houses, they had a toilet. I thought of that toilet, and without speaking the words aloud, silently asked the question:
“Did you ever make any objects in there?”
[There’s a complete tangent I’m tempted to go off on here, but... that’s for another thread, and anyone at all familiar with conceptual art will know what I’m talking about anyway. Suffice it to say, that at the very least, not all shit is art.]
My actual point here being, framing good definitions, or good laws, or good rules of any kind, is hard. Our rules often wind up including things we didn’t intend, or exclude things we did. As I’ve made abundantly clear, I don’t claim to be any kind of Kant expert. Nor do I claim for one moment that forbidding literally everything was what Kant intended to do. I only claim to have put some thought into the logical implications of what Kant actually said – in his first formulation of the categorical imperative. And to have reached the conclusion that forbidding literally everything was what Kant actually said actually does.
So let’s get to that.
“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”
https://www.britannica.com/topic/categorical-imperative
Only according. Only.
That, word “only” is crucial here. It means that if there is even one maxim that an act violates, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative has been contravened. Yes, weighing up competing maxims does seem to me, as well as to others here, to be the reasonable thing to do. Maybe Kant himself even said as much elsewhere. Until someone produces the reference for that I’m frankly skeptical, but I don’t know for a fact that he didn’t. And even if he did, so what? “Weigh up competing maxims” is most definitely not what this rule says, and we all know it.
“Act only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law.” That’s it. If you act according to even one maxim which you cannot at the same will to be a universal law, you won't have acted only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law. You will have broken this rule. End of discussion. So if an act can be described by any maxim that you would not will to be universal, and you perform that act, you have broken this rule. Again, end of discussion.
And if anyone here can think of even one act that is not in accordance with at least one maxim that no basically normal person could ever want to be universally applied... I challenge them to tell us what it is!
Even though shopenhauer1 has told us that foisting challenges on another individual is always wrong...
Oh well. I like shopenhauer1, but honestly, I’m a meta-ethical subjectivist anyway. So I don’t think that anything is wrong.
:grin:
I struggle to see the point of discussing a philosophy on the basis of wilful ignorance of the details of said philosophy.
Quoting Theologian
That doesn't matter though, since a maxim can have as many conditions added to it as you like. Whether you treat the exceptions as a competing maxim or a part of the first maxim is logically equivalent.
Quoting Theologian
Again, this is not how it works. You don't "describe" acts with maxims. It's right there in the CI: you act according to a maxim, and that maxim is the one that matters.
Quoting Theologian
The CI does not ask whether an act violates "at least one maxim". The CI only applies to the maxims themselves. If we're talking about the CI as written, you could at most ask us to come up with a maxim that doesn't violate the CI. Such as "safe lives where you can do so without significant danger to yourself".
Quoting Echarmion
Oh, Lord! :roll:
Let's just agree that someone is completely missing the point. Willfully or otherwise.
Perhaps you'd be interested in actually engaging with the substance of my post? You did say this:
Quoting Theologian
I would be glad to. Perhaps in the next day or two though, as I am a little tired right now.
And perhaps you could also refrain from ad hominem attacks in the form of accusing me of wilful ignorance.
This is correct. The whole point being, of course.......don’t act on that maxim.
The maxim could very well be agent A’s subjective principle formulating his volition, which he himself willed as if it were to be a universal law, but if such principle is in conflict with agent B’s, yet B acts consistent with the judgement required in conforming to A’s will......B’s imperative is violated and he has lost his claim to moral worthiness. On the other hand, historical precedent shows B may merely change his mind, that is to say, think an alternate rendition of pure practical reason based on a witnessed objective validity, altered his personal imperative by means of his willful choice of volition, and he then tacitly subscribes to the idea of a possible universal law even if not originally of his own will.
It is impossible for a thinking subject to be absolutely controlled by rational law, in the same way he is controlled by natural law. Any moral philosophy grounded in rational law is merely a guide to private conduct, with the understanding explicit in its formulation that there is no fundamental causal accounting for diverse cultural and psychological subjectivity. Even allowing the universality of the faculty of human reason in general doesn’t account for the influence of experience on its members.
Scribble 10 E=MC2 on yonder blackboard, go forth amongst the vulgar masses* and philosophize as you see fit.
In your defense, I must say it is odd, and somewhat disturbing, that Kant would use exactly the same phraseology for an imperative standing as a law, as a principle standing for nothing more than a subjective interest. From that it is easy to see, as you have hinted already, that passing familiarity with Kantian metaphysics will never suffice for meaningful dialectic about it.
* Hume, 1740. He apparently never had to worry about being culturally correct. (Grin)
On the other note, you are probably well aware that Kant never married, never had a serious lasting relationship with the other gender, never traveled, hardly socialized at all, seemingly never did much of anything but think. I guess if you spent 70-odd years at thinking, you pretty much cover everything that has any relevance to you. Boring as hell if you had to live with him, I bet, but looking back on his catalogue of writings.....a thoroughly fascinating intellect to be sure.
Good summary there. My problem with the CI is not about certain, easy-to-see contradictions. Rather, it is when it gets to more everyday interactions and situations. That's why I used the example above about being friendly to everyone who goes into a store. So, let's say I go into a store, and the cashier person working ignores me when I ask a question and just couldn't give me the time of day or something. It's really no big deal, though I'd rather have more helpful interaction as a customer. So should that be a universal maxim? "If all store employees were rude to their customers then the concept itself of customer service would no longer be a real thing". This kind of granularity seems to be more controversial. You might say that customer service isn't what is violated, but civility in general. Another person would say that those aren't even contradictions like the lying-property one is, and that they wouldn't count as something violated. There is just no epistemological way to tell what kind of action should be universalized nor what the actual contradiction is that might be violated.
It's hard to tell who is wise, other than it makes sense to you perhaps. But if you say because they were right about consequences, that would negate Kant's deontology anyways.
Again, the point is we do not know what maxim is correct, hierarchically. So let's say that the clerk is rude because his wife died a couple weeks earlier and that puts him in a bad mood. So then in that case the maxim might be, "A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out?
Even Kant was pretty bad at applying his own philosophy. He would answer that it would never be good to lie, even if a killer came to your door asking where your friend was, and you knew they were trying to kill him. Clearly, he is violating some maxim about protecting life. "If everyone acted in a way where if someone's life were in danger they could not violate another maxim, even if that person died as a result" were universalized, the very concept of preserving life itself would be violated. If everyone gave in to aggressors like that, life itself would be short, nasty, and brutish. I am sure violating the principle of life would come before principle of property or trustworthiness.
I wondered out loud if I was the first to make the argument I did. It turns out I'm not.
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/10/28/gregory-salmieri/kant-vs-white-conflicts-duty#_ftn1
"Any action can be described at different levels of abstraction, such that it will be willable as a universal law under some descriptions and not under others."
Oh well. Always disappointing. But it happens a LOT in philosophy.
It also deals with Kant's ability/inability to deal with competing ethical claims.
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf
Good stuff. Thanks.
This is key, because Kantian deontological moral philosophy has to do with what IS morally significant, and not with the haphazard machinations of common life. This also releases Kant from the critical “arcane and obscure fluff” exemplified when “...he fails to investigate the possibility of conflicting moral claims....”**
While it is quite obvious Kant recognized the reality of conflicting moral claims; his was not the purpose to investigate them, but to provide knowledge of the supreme ground of good and right, in order for us to resolve them on our own:
“....Innocence is indeed a glorious thing; only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced. On this account even wisdom-which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge-yet has need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence. Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth-a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good....”
——————
On competing maxims:
The reason for reducing moral philosophy to the idea of law, is to describe an absolute necessity. To will an action as if it were a universal law, therefore, carries that very absolute necessity as intrinsic to it. From here, one can see there is no competition within absolute necessity whatsoever. But that, in and of itself, isn’t sufficient for good moral conduct, for one must still feel the need to acquiesce to it, hence the principle of duty, from which the “act ONLY....” arises.
**Timmermann, 2013, “Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory”
We should not use metaphors when explaining something that is already difficult and dense.
If the foundation fails, whatever the problem the walls tend to solve wont be solved.Can you describe a good foundation without refering to what it is supposed to support.I certainly can do that but the analogy fails when you try to compare CI to foundation and walls to purpose/duty.Can a categorical imperative be seperated from the action/duty, l dont think so.They depend on each other.
"The point is that the CI corresponds to the foundation. The wall itself, the building of it, what it's for, those can all be apportioned to purpose/function, maxim, duty. When it comes to walls, there are all kinds for all purposes, even just of brick walls never mind other kinds. But the idea of a good foundation is a one, one idea.
What is the reason for a good foundation? To hold up, preserve, protect what is built on it, and its purpose. And this is the reason underlying the whole project."
I can try to build a structure that is made for collapsing when the enemies attack, but that requires a weak structure.In ethics, we cannot do that because nature does not discriminate and reason will not allow us to build a weak foundation, atleast not for ourselves.
Well l don't think the analogy applies here, the act will be relevant to CI, if there is one but if there isn't any, the act can exist on its own.
I would like to respond to more arguments but the matter is not clear.
There is no logic involved here, you should try to use that term in its true sense.A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms.We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory.
I think Kant talks of perfect duties and imperfect duties, one is a must and the other is optional.
This is a big mess, simply beacuse we often get rhetoric,enotions mixed with convincing arguments, and trust me there is no way we will agree on what was Kant was saying if we regard him as right.
If we think Kant's position is weak, we can certainly share some common criticism of his theory.
Rules can be explained without applying to any problem, for example addition is opposite to subtraction.We can describe general concepts.
It is not a matter of taste but clarity of thought.
If you want to treat ethics like a science ( i think so ), you have to abandon using metaphors.
In Science we use mathematical formulas to clarify doubts when physical phenomena confuse us.Ethics is confusing in philosophy and using metaphor is a tradition, perhaps that explains why things have gone messy in philosophy.
HIS ? l don't think anyone can claim that he is speaking for Kant after he is dead.All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts.This may seem a trivial or a stupid point but it is practical and realistic.
Can you explain what you think are the merits of his ideas and the cons.I can either acknowledge or refute them
Could you elaborate on that?
Quoting Wittgenstein
How so? There are maxims which can also be described by a more general, abstract maxim, but in less detail.
If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.
Quoting schopenhauer1
There wouldn't be emotional exception to a maxim, since that defeats the point. The idea behind the CI is to have reason guide your actions, not emotion. Kant would uphold the duty of civility (assuming it applies for the moment) even if an emotional reaction would be understandable.
I don't see why there couldn't be something that shakes out in some universal violation.. "If everyone didn't allow for exceptions for emotional grieving, out of reasons of civility, that would itself endanger civility".. I don't know.. I'm sure I can think of a better one, but you get my gist.
I kind of find it funny that he is pitting "reason" with "emotion". That's kind of a false dichotomy. Property, life, civility, trustworthiness would be things we would have to value in the first place. Presumably value has some sort of emotional preference attached to it. Actual, now that I think about it, another criticism is that these contradictions might reduce down to preference theory or a hypothetical imperative.. because it presumes that we must value property, getting along, etc.
A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals.
Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man.
I agree with this idea that all maxims should be on the same ethical plane in a sense like parallel lines, they should never conflict with each other.
We can avoid the hierarchy of maxims by clearly defining what we should consider as maxims.
What do you consider as maxims ?
In my opinion, and l can be wrong , the false maxims are those which are circumstantial like
1. Do A in 1 if a
2. Do B in 1 if b
3. Do ( ?) in 1 if a,b
The third one causes confusion, so we should rather say
1. Do A in 1.
2.Do B in 1.
A must be same as B.
3 does not even rise.
So a couple of points:
First, this isn't a contradiction in terms, just a contradiction.
Secondly, not all maxims "pass" the CI. "I will lie when it suits my purposes" is a maxim, and it's clearly conditional. It just fails the CI "test".
Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.
Quoting Wittgenstein
Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.
Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance.
I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved.
We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form.In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases.
Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder.There is also a dispute about what qualifies as property.
If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim.
Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable.
Not everything that seems impractical is a contradiction in terms of the CI. It's not like being rude to customers, for example, is the only way to process grief. What Kant means by self-contradicting behavior is not maxims that "endanger" a positive value, but maxims that, if universalized, would defeat their own purpose. The thief aims to enrich himself, but if stealing were universalized, all the thief's wealth would be itself subject to stealing, and hence mostly worthless.
Quoting schopenhauer1
That Kant unnecessarily pits reason against emotion is a common criticism, and one that later followers of his ideas have tried to rectify. But the CI does not rely on an emotional value attached to property, getting along etc. In fact that's the major reason why it has been so influential. Kant bases the CI purely on the form of a general law. It has no content. All content comes from examining maxims in a social setting and seeing which maxims, if universalized lead to outcomes that are both non-contradictory and can be willed regardless of your position in that society.
Quoting Wittgenstein
Why would this result in a hierarchy of maxims? If the maxims are conditional, they don't conflict in the first place. Kant considers the CI to be like your own personal law-giver. You should follow the law unconditionally, but the laws themselves, just like external laws, can have conditions.
Quoting Wittgenstein
But I just pointed out that "Do not kill" cannot be universalized, since there are circumstances where one would will to be killed, such as in defense of innocents. That what "self defense" entails precisely requires further examination is not grounds for claiming that it cannot be universalized. Even simple maxims like "respect the porperty of others" require further details on what exactly constitutes property.
Quoting Wittgenstein
But you just specified the particulars. Are you claiming that by reformulating the abstract maxim into a couple of more specific maxims, the specific maxims now somehow violate the CI?
Quoting Wittgenstein
Yeah no. Self defense is one of the simpler legal concepts.
Quoting Wittgenstein
Because when you are outside the property, it's not exactly defense, is it?
Quoting Wittgenstein
But the basis of Kant's system is that everyone has access to the same rationality. So, if everyone rationaly thinks through what should and should not consider self-defense, they would not come up with different behaviors. If what you were saying here was true, then the CI itself could not work, since it presumes that every actor applies the CI internally and comes up with the same maxims.
Quoting Wittgenstein
Well you're going to have to supply an argument why you think self defense is incompatible with the CI. Kant himself did not think so.
Right, so the theory itself rests on the value/emotional weight put on property itself. There is something beyond the contradiction that is added. The thief has to actually value property in the first place. Thus, it does turn hypothetical: "If you value property, then you would not steal, as property itself would be useless for you". Hence why I claimed that the supposed "categorical" imperative becomes "hypothetical".
Well but the thief does value "property", in the sense that he values having secure access to material goods, or else what would the point of stealing be? It's important to look at the act from the perspective of the maxim. A thief's maxim might involve profiting from selling the stolen goods. In that case, it's obvious that the thief relies on the notion of property to benefit from the act (as without the notion, noone would buy). There are maxims where this kind of contradiction doesn't exist. For example, one might simply steal because one has no other way to acquire food, or simply to deprive the owner of the item in order to spite them. In those cases, no self-contradiction occurs, and it's then a matter of asking whether or not one can will the maxim to be universal.This second step is similar to the well known "golden rule", or perhaps in a more modern form Rawl's veil of ignorance.
There's several problems here. First, again is that it reduces to a hypothetical: "If you want to live in a world where property is honored for daily living, then you would not steal". There is an element of common interest there. We can choose to not value property and be okay living in a society that property doesn't matter. Perhaps it is a treacherous "all man for yourself" society that we desire. Then stealing would be fine. Sure, this is probably not something most people would value or desire, but in some possible world, person can indeed value this type of society. Thus, the contradiction itself like "property being useless as a concept", or some such, is really based on social norms, emotional feelings about the value that may or may not be contradicted, and more generally things that are more qualitative, probabilistic (being socially constructed and contingent), and not universal in application.
On a matter of - dare I say - practical reason, there are posts I can write in pretty much the time it takes to type them, and there are posts that require actual research. I probably can't afford too many of the latter because there are actually other things I need to get done besides participate in this forum!
Nevertheless, you should hear more from me shortly...
Yes, yes. I know...
There's a lot to unpack here. The "categorical" in the CI refers to the way you form your maxims, not to their content. You're supposed to be "motivated" by duty alone, and reason determines what that duty is. This ties back into Kant's conception of freedom.
The reason you apply though, is practical reason. As such, it does not operate in "some possible world" but always in the context of human society. And humans, by and large, have common interests. Sociopaths and mental illnesses exist, but those are exceptions. Kant assumes that humans have a common ability to reason, and I think it's difficult to disagree with that.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think this is taking things a bit too far. There are no "emotional feelings" involved in determining whether or not a maxim is self-contradictory. You just look at what concepts the maxim presupposes. Those concepts may be themselves the result of social processes, but that doesn't turn the operation into a "qualitative, probabilistic" process. The process is subjective, yes, because morality isn't written down as some object somewhere. The universal application only ever happens in a mind.
Maybe, just maybe, using a bit of sophistry, or other techniques, the categorical imperative can be salvaged. But in any case, what difference does it make, what does it matter, if people suffer and die as a result? I mean, philosophically speaking, Kant could be right, and his CI alive and kicking, like they say, but the people dead and buried, what is it that we really want here?
Quoting Echarmion
I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there.
Anyone who’s ever tried to “do” philosophy, to examine, take apart, or, dare I suggest, contribute to philosophical arguments, inevitably notices that the exact formulation of a position matters. It matters a lot. A subtle re-wording of a premise can open up or rule out entire lines of reasoning. A minor tweak to a conclusion can make the difference between a valid and an invalid argument. Anyone who attempts to do philosophy, even for just five minutes, quickly notices this.
To give an example from relatively philosophical recent history, logical positivism holds that all metaphysical statements are meaningless. But, it has been countered, “metaphysical statements are meaningless” is itself a metaphysical statement.
Whatever you may think of that argument, the logical positivists do not get to say “Oh, but you know perfectly well that we didn’t intend to imply that, so you’re just being willfully ignorant of the details of our philosophy.” That’s not how implication works. It’s not how philosophy works either. If the position of logical positivism, as formulated and advanced by logical positivists, turns out to have self-contradictory implications, that is a problem – for the logical positivists. It is not evidence that the person who points out this self-contradiction is just being willfully ignorant because they failed to focus exclusively on what the logical positivists intended to imply.
My own argument form, as @Kippo correctly identified right from the outset, was reductio ad absurdum. It is a valid argument form. And it pretty well always works by identifying some implication that everyone knows perfectly well your opponent never intended to imply.
So. Does, as I suggested, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative imply that literally everything is forbidden?
To me, it all comes down to whether or not we take Kant at his word when he says “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” I think “only” is the crucial word here, because if there is even one maxim you are acting in accordance with that you cannot at the same time will that it become a universal law, you are no longer “acting only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”
QED.
Furthermore, a great deal that Kant says only makes sense if we interpret the first formulation of the categorical imperative in this way. In every instance I have found where Kant argues that some specific act is wrong, all he does (or even tries to do) is show that it forms an instance of acting in accordance with a maxim we could not at the same time will to be universal.
For example, following the reference Mww gave
Quoting Mww
and scrolling down a bit lower, we find:
***
1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.
***
Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. Of course, he doesn’t need to consider this possibility if we take his use of the word “only” in the first formulation of the categorical imperative seriously. He has shown that an act is in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same time will to be universal. Therefore, by his own standards, he has made his case and he can stop there.
By contrast, if we don’t take him at his word, and assume that somehow he is not serious when he uses the word “only,” literally all the arguments that he advances above now have a hole in them that you could drive a truck through. Or perhaps an infinite series of trucks, since one can always dream up new maxims to test.
Everything I said applies equally well to Kant's argument that stealing is wrong. If we all stole all the time, private property could no longer exist, so there could be no such thing as stealing. Therefore we cannot steal and at the same time will that stealing be universal. Therefore stealing is wrong. And that, once again, is that.
Are you noticing a pattern here?
If you read the secondary literature on Kant, it seems generally accepted among ethicists that one of the great weaknesses in Kantian ethics is that Kant rarely provides much in the way of guidance for choosing between competing moral imperatives. I refer interested parties to a reference I gave before in a previous post:
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf
The only well known example of Kant considering any kind of moral quandary [and the only example at all that I'm aware of in which can actually provides the solution to the quandary] is the famous “killer at the door” example that has already been discussed. But even that seems to exist only to demonstrate that all other rational beings are independent moral agents, and so that you are not responsible for the maxims that they act on. If you lie, you yourself are acting in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same will to be universal. Therefore it's wrong, and all discussion ends.
Again, are you noticing that same pattern in his argument form? One broken maxim, QED.
Other than that... if you follow the link I gave immediately above (and scroll down to the first paragraph beginning on page 3), you'll see that Kant's theoretical response to the possibility of moral quandaries was that it was conceptually impossible for them to even exist, but that there could, perhaps, be conflicts between "the so-called 'grounds' of the obligations," and that in such cases the strongest grounds prevail. For myself I am far from convinced that this is even coherent, and that even if it is, that it does not wind up flatly contradict the first formulation of the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, I believe that this is the only even possible ground for refuting the claim I made in my OP, so I present it to you. It's possible that only someone completely committed to a really excruciating exegesis of Kant would be able to nut all this out. Or perhaps even that gives Kant too much credit. Maybe he's just fudging it at this point. He realizes he's in trouble, and so has resorted to such vague wording that no strong conclusions either way are possible. Or maybe I'm being too harsh. Maybe he, like the rest of us, just gets stuck and unsure sometimes.
"What if Kant were one of us?"
He is, you know. I think we forget that sometimes. And now I'll have that playing in my head all day...
Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. But for the purposes of my own underlying thesis, even if you can, so what? The only real issue here is whether I'm right about the "only" part. If I am, then expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially apply only has to effect of expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially forbid the action.
The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand.
This, apparently, is what I do for fun...
I gotta get a better forum-life balance! :gasp:
What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict?
Whatever you do then, you'll have broken a maxim!
Kant, of course, takes the coward's way out, claiming (as I previously observed) that such a conflict is inconceivable.
Of course, even if he's wrong, it's only a problem if we assume all situations have a moral way out. Perhaps the universe, by its very nature, just compels us to be sinful? I'm back to the teachings of Saint Bartholomew: "You're damned if we do and you're damned if you don't." There's nothing incoherent about that. It's just a nasty universe.
But the idea of an inherently moral universe does bring me to what I've long thought of as the real fundamental problem with Kantian ethics.
All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. And his basis for that claim is that if you act according to a maxim that you could not at the same time will to be universal, you are being irrational. Kant’s claim is that if you don’t want to live in a world where everyone welshes on their debits all the time; or you can see that a world where everyone welshes on their debts all the time is simply not logically possible, because no-one would ever lend in the first place, then it is irrational for you to welsh on your debts. You are, in effect, saying that you disapprove of this action, while at the same time engaging in it yourself. Which is, so he claims, irrational, and we can know this a priori.
My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was.
Kant’s claim – that it is irrational to act according to a maxim that you would not will to be universal – only makes sense if you introduce an additional assumption: that there are in fact maxims that prescribe moral and immoral actions. Either that, or that there are moral and immoral actions, and that these can be prescribed by maxims.
So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A.
Impressive, ain’t it?
Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal.
There could certainly be no police, no judiciary, no penal system. Civilized society would collapse overnight.
Okay, that's enough from me for now. Over to the rest of you.
This really is very murky.. "human society".. "common ability to reason".. Not everyone has, does, or will come up with a same common reasoning about society and its interests. All I have to prove is that there is an ethics above and beyond the categorical imperative and being bound by duty for which morality lies, otherwise the categorical imperative is just a clever line of reasoning that explains little of morality. There is already an assumption of what is good behind the "practical reasoning" for which the categorical imperative is supposed to focus on. Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. Rather, it reduces to a list of goods that people think are worth living for. But this already means that the CI itself is just a heuristic and not morality itself- there is something beyond it whether that be a good, a value, or an emotional weight or moral sense of something, depending on your theory.
Kinda makes me want to merge this with the socialism thread. Kant is so bourgeois.
That would be a contradiction in terms, but it's not what I said. Maxims aren't rules (though their structure is very similar) and they aren't universal (or else there'd be nothing to universalise).
Quoting Theologian
Of course he doesn't. Because, if you read the examples, you notice that they all just deal with the one maxim that actually describes the persons actual intentions. Other hypothetical maxims are not relevant.
Quoting Theologian
If you look at the portion of Kant's writings you quoted, the maxims listed all have conditions. They have "when X is the case" segments.
Quoting Theologian
The problem is that you still misunderstand how the CI applies. I have pointed this out twice already. The CI evaluates a particular maxim. One which you either actually want to adopt or merely want to consider for the future. The maxim comes first, the act second. Of you take an act and then "dream up" arbitrary maxims it might fit you're simply doing it wrong. That exercise is entirely unrelated to Kant's system.
Quoting Theologian
Maxims are neither "thou shalt" nor "thou shalt not". They're always "I will". The CI is not a canon of rules like the ten commandments. It's a self-test to run on your own behaviour. Expressing the results of a CI test as a law is a second step that you can use to determine behaviour in advance.
Quoting Theologian
Yes, but "rational" is not the same as "objective".
Quoting Theologian
It's a good thing, then, that Kant does not insists that this is the case. When you apply the CI, you imagine your maxim as if it were a universal law. It stays a maxim in your head, however.
Quoting Theologian
Now this is turning into pure nonsense. Kant doesn't claim his morals are based on an object somewhere, he claims they are based on reason. The CI doesn't come out of thin air. There is an actual derivation you can read.
Quoting Theologian
That's not a maxim though.
Murky? What's murky about it? Is it unclear what I mean by "common ability to reason" or "human society"?
But sure, not everyone agrees on the details. But how much of that is due to personal interests or pre-existing beliefs? I don't think anyone can truly say.
Quoting schopenhauer1
What is assumed about good and bad by starting from the fact that we are human beings that live together in a society?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Kant doesn't say this when he talks about the CI, though he did write about property and I don't think he ever questioned the idea of property. Whether or not Kant was correct in assuming that individual property is moral is a different question from the question of whether the CI is the correct standard to assess morality.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So, what is behind it? How does it get in?
Quoting Echarmion
Hmm... Okay.
Allow me to speak with equal candor. Deep in your own nonsense (I shan't speculate on whether it's willful or not), you do actually have me on one point. Kant's maxims are indeed expressed - or at least can be expressed - in the form of "if X then Y." You got me.
But...
1. This is very different from Quoting Theologian which is what I was actually arguing against; and
2. At times Kant's "X" value is so general that it's virtually absent. For example, take two maxims that Kant does consider (for the purposes of rejecting):
"to increase my wealth by any safe means" (Critique of Practical Reason, Mary Gregor trans.)
"When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." (from the same link Mww gave that I referenced before).
The first is not expressed in the form "if X then Y," but I acknowledge it can be. "By any safe means" may be transformed to the X value as "if it is safe to do so." But this seems such a general condition as to be a virtually absent "X" to me.
Similarly so an X value that is "being in want of money," when the Y value is to go get some money.
So if you want to pull me up on Quoting Theologian
...not being a maxim because it is not of the form "if X then Y," then fine.
IF it is safe to do so, THEN I will absolve myself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings.
There you go. Now it's a maxim. :smile:
You are right about this, I acknowledge the fact, but I don't think this has any real effect on anything I actually said.
Otherwise... I think we may perhaps have reached the point where we may each agree that the other's posts speak for themselves, and require no further comment.
It's more about good or bad about what a society should do and the relations of people in that society. That is an assumption inherent in the ideas of property, trustworthiness, etc.
Quoting Echarmion
No that's the point, he doesn't say that, but it is implicit in the ideas of property in the case of stealing.
Quoting Echarmion
Views about what society should feel is important- like property.
How is it "very different"? Could you provide a clear rule as to what conditions are and are not allowed?
Quoting Theologian
Perhaps Kant simply did not want to choose overtly complex examples. What makes you think there is a restriction to the kind of conditions that a maxim can have?
Quoting Theologian
The reason it's not a maxim is not because you did not put it in the proper form. The reason is that it can not determine a will. You cannot will yourself to be absolved of responsibility. You can perhaps wish it to be so, or argue that it is so, but it's not something you can act on.
Quoting Theologian
So, you spend considerable effort to write these posts, yet you do not want to engage with my main criticism? I have repeated it in three different posts now, you have neither acknowledged it, nor even claimed I am wrong. What gives?
Quoting schopenhauer1
But these are assumptions that the acting people have. They are not inbuilt into the CI. The thief assumes something about property, the oathbreaker something about oaths. People have assumptions, and so their maxims will include them.
So the thief who revels in a society of treachery, and the oathbreaker who wants a world of untrustworthiness...
Yay! Chaotic Evil! :grin:
Interesting.
“A” for effort.
Quoting Mww
You know, a former lecturer of mine, who was himself a former student of Noam Chomsky's, once told me that Chomsky "Played academic hardball, in which it was more important to be interesting than right."
I may yet have a great career ahead of me! :wink:
Yes, as I have already mentioned above there are maxims that concern anti- social behaviour yet do not lead to a self-contradiction. The most famous one is actually killing for personal gain.
These maxims result in societies no sane person would want to live in though, hence they still fail the CI. Of course there are persons who'd genuinely want such circumstances, but they would not be accessible to morality, no matter how convincing.
Perhaps. Far be it from me to deny the possibility. Nevertheless, Herr Kant seems to have his own misgivings:
“.....Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to support it in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute director of its own laws, not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else condemning the man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence. Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality, but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals, for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds, which alone experience can furnish. We cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Juno, it embraces a cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to see in it, only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form....”
———————-
Quoting Theologian
Quoting Theologian
I would ask you a similar question: when scrolling a bit lower, do you find a commonality in the four given examples? There is one, and its importance is significant.
——————-
What do you think the “it” stands for in the primary rendition of the categorical imperative?
Okay, I'm about to nod off, so this will be my last post for a bit.
And somehow, I feel I'm playing Euthyphro to your Socrates, and my answer to this question is going to set me up for something! But hey, I'll play on...
Beyond the commonality I previously noted for the purposes of the argument I was making at the time, I think the one of which you speak is that all four:
1. Point to what we might call some "natural" inclination towards immediate personal satisfaction (relieving pain or want, avarice, or self indulgent idleness);
2. Asks the question "what if acting in said way became a universal law?" (This of course being the connection to the first formulation of the categorical imperative);
3. Then comes to the conclusion that a world in which everyone gave in to this inclination became a universal law is simply not possible.
I could leave it there, but the quote with which you lead in makes me wonder if you aren't also looking for a "1(b)" where one could also see the commonality that empirical observation (or at least, short term observation, or observation only within the scope of our individual lives) might lead us to the conclusion that acting on what I previously called "some 'natural' inclination" would actually make the world, or at least our own lives better.
Now, your second question:
By "it" I take it you mean the "it" in "will that it become a universal law."
I take that "it" to refer to the maxim on which you would be acting.
(I was tempted to say "would hypothetically be acting," but in this context that could be construed as confusing!)
I'm wondering if where you're headed with this is a view of maxims as referring to, or at least more concerned with motives (those "'natural' inclinations" I spoke of earlier).
Given that all revolve around reducing pain or want; or increasing pleasure and prosperity, one could also see in these examples Kant setting up ethical problems where he can show (or attempt to show) that a utilitarian response ultimately breaks down.
Anyway, bedtime for me. Over to you, Socrates!
Okay, so this is my point. Morality is then not really to do with the CI but something else beyond it, or prior to it. You seem to be positing either some sort of moral sense, or socially-constructed agreement, or list of values that we all share and THIS becomes the source of the moral framework, not the CI itself. In fact, the CI presupposes that we already have a sense that hypocrisy is wrong. The CI does not therefore provide any of the actual morality, it's the values that we already have when we are applying the CI. This is where then we should focus it would seem to me. He can then admit that really it is more of a hypothetical imperative- "If we want to maintain a certain type of society, and we do not want to be hypocrites about maintaining that society, then the standard of CI would apply". But again, the type of society, and not being hypocritical would have to be addressed and examined first as to why that counts as moral in the first place.
Well the CI is based on reason, so reason is prior to it.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I can kinda see where you are coming from here. Yes the CI is not like a moral code, e.g. the ten commandments. It's purely a method to arrive at such rules. The "source" of the moral rules is human reasoning about the (hypothetical or actual) situation under consideration. This is not a flaw in my opinion though. Rather, this is what sets the CI apart from codes of rules which always have trouble finding solid ground to stand on.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But the CI, being a fully general method, does not rely on us first establishing a certain type of society. It works on any possible society. So long as the members of that society have shared interests, it will end up providing a framework to further those interests. That's the idea, anyways. All that you need to do is the ability to put your self in other people's shoes, as the saying goes. If everyone does that, and everyone's minds work roughly the same way, the result is that everyone ends up with roughly the same rules.
Yes, in that case the CI really has little to do with the actual morality itself, and certainly cannot be said to be a grounding for it. If anything, it is a clever heuristic. Even duty itself is not much of a ground in itself, because the question becomes, "duty to what?". I think we would be getting closer if we mentioned the actual things that people value- relationships, physical pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, etc. The heuristic to see if one is violating a principle by which people obtain these things can be useful, but only if we understand what it is that people value, if that can even be ascertained. But then it is really a theory of value that comes first before talk of how a value may be contradicted.
We’ll never know whether Euthyphro‘s arguably inconclusive definitions of piety actually left ol’ Socrates defenseless, or whether Socrates was doomed from the beginning regardless of whatever defense he may have mounted. While it may seem your Euthyphro is being surrepitously investigated, I just want to make some effort in understanding where you’re coming from.
———————
Yes, it is the maxim, as sustained by numerous references.
——————-
The commonality is the impossibility of conformity as a universal law of nature. If the myriad of hypothetical imperatives are dismissed as not abiding as universal laws of nature, but the categorical imperative demands accordance “as if” a universal law is actually possible....what kind of law is it? It may indeed be the case, that the categorical imperative only has any meaning for those rational agents that think themselves in possession of a transcendental causality.
Tough mentally, no doubt. Between pissing off the clergy (busted on his Master’s thesis by Piest academia) and being somewhat contrary to Newton (the reigning God of Science), what ducks he had he must have kept well-lined.
Quoting Mww
I can't deny that we have the kind of experience we do because, at least in part, our minds are constructed a certain way. But I also don't think that accepting this much leads to a literal acceptance of transcendental causality as understood by Kant. One may, perhaps, see Kant as paving the way for something like modern "cognitive" science; which itself seems to offer a more recursive rather than strictly "top down" way of understanding the relationship between mind and experience.
You can't "do science" without taking positions that are inherently philosophical, and which certainly don't seem to be subject to immediate empirical verification. That realization was what got me interested in philosophy to start with. But at the same time, having taken the necessary positions and "done some science," I also can't deny that that seems to lead to a far more sophisticated and and better justified understanding of the mind than we could ever have arrived at a priori. As I said, a recursive relationship.
And while I'm not going to attempt to prove it in this post, I am far from convinced that where this understanding ultimately leads includes a distinction between transcendental and natural causes.
Though not completely dismissive of the idea either...
Oh, PS:
Here are a couple of questions you might like to consider:
Does what starts off as epistemologically fundamental necessarily have to wind up as ontologically fundamental?
Does it necessarily have to wind up in your final ontology at all?
But then, dear schopenhauer1, you're plunging directly into the unseemly waters of... utilitarianism!
:gasp: :gasp: :gasp:
...or at least paddling at their edges!!!
Post one hundred a haiku.
The chance lost, I weep.
Yes, or a general axiology/value theory. It would revolve around the values themselves. I refer back to the Nussbaum thread, for example. Even though I was critiquing it there, it makes much more sense to acknowledge what most humans value first. It may be justified through social construction, or simply a rough idea that we can get through reflecting on our own moral sensibilities. Similar to how "rights" are agreed upon, ethics can then proceed to what would would be in violation of its own principles, something like the CI. But, of course, being a pessimist and antinatalist, these values themselves would not take precedent over suffering which in the context of procreation, can be prevented for future individuals without any actual consequence to a particular individual- a case I was making with @Banno in the Nussbaum thread. But again, I still think the Nussbaum approach or other like-approaches of mining for what we value would be where to start over the CI which seems more about heuristics of how to judge if the values that were listed as important were violated.
Let me add.. even having a common framework of values, would still be debated on a granular level, still giving the CI problems in everyday situations.
Sorry, I'm not quite sure what you mean by "the Nussbaum thread."
EDIT: Oh, found it.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6046/nussbaum
I don’t think about ontology that much; whatever I want to know about empirically presupposes the existence or possible existence of it, whatever its nature. When drilling down into the metaphysics of human knowledge, on the other hand, one may have to assume existences without their proofs, or even propose them outright including their proofs, in order to justify a particular theory, but that’s ok as long as he maintains logical consistency.
Besides......wouldn’t it be better to understand how knowledge is possible before professing the ability to know something? But then, of course, we stand in danger of being immersed in an inevitable circularity; as you say.....it’s the way our minds work. Or brain, as the materialists would insist.
I might as well come clean as to the limits of my own understanding. While I did a couple of philosophy units in my undergraduate degree way back when, I've only been seriously studying philosophy for a bit over a year. I said what I said in the OP because it seemed to me, rightly or wrongly, that the implication I drew was fairly self evident in the first formulation of the CI itself. But the deeper we go into the details of Kant (or any other philosopher) the more likely I am to say something that is purely and simply wrong.
But hey, I can live with that if everyone else can! :wink:
At this stage in my philosophical development, I think I would call myself a monist. But I am far from convinced that distinguishing between idealism and materialism actually gets us anywhere, or even has any meaning.
As I think you grasp, what I was getting at with the questions I put to you was that every human activity, inquiry included (scientific, philosophical, or otherwise) presupposes something. And you gotta start somewhere! Call that practical reasoning, if you will. But to treat what is presupposed by your starting point as a fundamental part of what is may be like committing to stay in kindergarten your whole life. I fear treating Kant's distinction between transcendental and natural causes as absolutely hard and fast may be falling into this trap. I prefer a more recursive approach in which which our presuppositions are continually open to reexamination in the light of our most recent round of discoveries.
I have often been struck by the thought that the activity of writing letters to Santa Clause presupposes the existence of Santa Clause...
I can live with it. These are, after all, just philosophical musings, with no life or death or similarly catastrophic implications. Not to mention.......what other choice is there but to go with the flow, so to speak, if the interest be of a continuous dialectic.
The human cognitive system is complementary: up/down, left/right, yes/no, ad infinitum. That is to say, relational; knowledge only has any standing when it avails itself to comparison. This relates to the idealist/materialist dichotomy, insofar as one need not chose one over the other, but he is nonetheless well advised to comprehend their inherent distinctions and what each distinction actually does for us. Thus far in our human intellectual evolution, it is quite apparent, in keeping with the complementary system with which we’re saddled, we require both parts of that modality relation in order to understand our world and our place in it. If for no other reason than each half of the complementary pair is in itself insufficient to explain the totality of the human condition. That being said, I find it hard to accept a strictly unqualified monist paradigm.
I would agree without hesitation we must have a fundamental assumption, no matter what we’re investigating. I personally go with perception, in its common understanding, being passive and therefore not the cause of whatever difficulties we have with reason in general and knowledge in particular. I will admit to not knowing what other fundamental assumptions would serve the same purpose, mostly because I guess I never thought much about it.
The distinction between natural and transcendental causality is necessary. Simply put, natural causality is phenomenal, transcendental causality is merely thought, the former subject to sense and thereby intuition, the latter subject to understanding and thereby mere conception. If the objects of sense have a cause, it is logical to suppose objects of pure reason must also have a cause. One we may measure and justifies experience, the other we will not but nevertheless justifies logical possibilities. The human complementary cognitive system writ large.
It’s fine to think writing letters to Santa presupposes Santa’s existence. Right up until one knows with apodeictic certainty he doesn’t. Then it’s still fine as long as one acknowledges he doesn’t and writes to him anyway, perhaps to laugh at himself, or even to hold a faint hope. A problem, in the form of a logical inconsistency, may arise when you write to him, knowing he doesn’t exist and intuit/cognize him as if he does. Otherwise known as .........wait for it........
............the transcendental illusion!!!!!!
I have a totally different and yet binding description of ethics. It is not popular, or it has not been popularized. I based my description / definition of an ethical act on what has been called ethical. The very type of behaviour.
The entire human race talks about ethics without a definition of what it is. The closest description I encountered that comes close to a definition, is "you know, ethics, morals, you know, you have a feeling when something is right and when something else is wrong." This is the mean opinion on ethics, and yet it is definable, precisely and with a good fit.
OK, fine. I’m busted: it isn’t a transcendental illusion, exactly. Well....actually, it is, but only because I took the scenario further than my original co-respondent intended. In other words, I made it into one by suggesting an possibility not given as evidence. Nevertheless, the T. I. is taking a subjective conceptual necessity (Santa is generally responsible for my happiness under some certain conditions) for an objective empirical necessity (so I must write to him as a means to inform him how to go about doing that). Within the context of the dialogue, the writer is justified in presupposing the real existence of the object of his writing, otherwise, in accordance with the writer’s understanding, the purpose of the writing would never be met.
Who are “all those people”? Writers to Santa? Isn’t the normative criterion for writing to Santa under-developed rationality? If this indeed be the case, Santa exists much more than mere idea, but rather as means in concreto for a very specific ends. Santa stands as an idea when his existence is abstracted from experience and then used as a contrivance for well-being (ho, ho, ho, jolly ol’ St. Nick) or a weapon for enforced behavior (better watch out, better not cry; be nice or get coal in your stocking).
No wonder the human race is so farging confused.
And what, exactly, do you base this statement on?
On the CI and Kant's teaching.
I'd like to help you, Frotunes, but I'm afraid I only do thread necromancy.
At least, most of the time!
:naughty: