A Refutation of Nominalism:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Quoting Terrapin Station
Of course, one can doubt that unchange exists and presuppose that all is changing all the time, but then the phrases ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ become subjected to their own presuppositions.
The statements ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ either change over time or they do not change over time, and there is no middle ground. If the phrases ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ are remain unchanging from one moment to the next in time so long as they exist, a contradiction in terms ensues; and if they change from moment to moment in time, well what do those phrases then become? If you cannot say what exactly they become or can potentially become, then how can you say that are changing? What can the set of words and concepts (i.e. phrases) ‘nothing is unchanging’ or ‘all is changing’ possibly become from one moment to the next in time without their meanings being changed and therefore lost in time?
There exist only three possibilities here:
1. Either the phrases themselves remain unchanged and the abstract meanings to which those phrases point remains unchanged, in which case, a contradiction ensues.
2. The phrases change and the meaning to which those phrases point changes, in which case, the phases have lost their original meaning altogether and language is altogether senseless and therefore without value.
3. Or the phrases change and the meaning to which those phrases point remains unchanged, in which case a contradiction ensues.
To be a nominalist it seems that one must either contradict oneself and be OK with it, or they must concede that number 2 is true, and the language in which they use to support their own position is without meaning and therefore without value, in which case, another contradiction ensues, because in speaking on behalf of their position, they assign meaning and value to the words in which they are speaking while at the same time asserting that those words are meaningless.
I'm a nominalist, by the way
Quoting Terrapin Station
nothing is identical through time.
Of course, one can doubt that unchange exists and presuppose that all is changing all the time, but then the phrases ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ become subjected to their own presuppositions.
The statements ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ either change over time or they do not change over time, and there is no middle ground. If the phrases ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ are remain unchanging from one moment to the next in time so long as they exist, a contradiction in terms ensues; and if they change from moment to moment in time, well what do those phrases then become? If you cannot say what exactly they become or can potentially become, then how can you say that are changing? What can the set of words and concepts (i.e. phrases) ‘nothing is unchanging’ or ‘all is changing’ possibly become from one moment to the next in time without their meanings being changed and therefore lost in time?
There exist only three possibilities here:
1. Either the phrases themselves remain unchanged and the abstract meanings to which those phrases point remains unchanged, in which case, a contradiction ensues.
2. The phrases change and the meaning to which those phrases point changes, in which case, the phases have lost their original meaning altogether and language is altogether senseless and therefore without value.
3. Or the phrases change and the meaning to which those phrases point remains unchanged, in which case a contradiction ensues.
To be a nominalist it seems that one must either contradict oneself and be OK with it, or they must concede that number 2 is true, and the language in which they use to support their own position is without meaning and therefore without value, in which case, another contradiction ensues, because in speaking on behalf of their position, they assign meaning and value to the words in which they are speaking while at the same time asserting that those words are meaningless.
Comments (236)
Before you post something, read it out loud. Does that sentence make sense to you when you read it out loud?
unchange = not not change....nothing is unchanging = all is changing
"Predisposed to that their own presuppositions"?
Yes, for example, the phrase 'nothing is unchanging' presupposes that nothing is unchanging without providing a logical proof that this is true. the phrase 'nothing is unchanging' exists as an abstract object of memory and imagination, it does not, 'not exist' in the absolute sense of the word; so the phrase 'nothing is unchanging' is subject to, or "predisposed" to, its own claim.
Is English your first language?
there's nothing wrong with the sentence. are you going to nitpick about the first sentence or refute my refutation. If you cannot support your own position, you should stop believing it to be true. I suggest that you don't, as others do, root your philosophy in the false presupposition that all is a subset of nothingness, and then pick and choose which sub-categories of philosophy fall under that presupposition.
It makes no sense in conventional English. "
good thing logic isn't bound by the English language.
Could you give a reference for anything like "
There, its fixed, can we move on now, look how much time you've wasted unnecessarily, clearly, the word "that" wasn't supposed to be there.
Okay, so moving on, we already answered this. They are non-identical instances of the phrases.
Maybe it's not clear what you're asking, though. What sorts of answers would you accept to other "what do they become" questions?
see hypotheticals 1, 2, and 3.
Re this, let's clarify how you're using "senseless" there. Is it basically just a value statement?
senseless and meaningless are synonyms. it means that the words and concepts associated with the phrases do not point to an unchanging meaning, but a changing meaning, meaning that the words themselves are meaningless.
How would we arrive at the idea that in order for meaning to be meaning, it can't change. It it's changing meaning, it's not meaning at all?
Note that what nominalists are saying is that this:
A
and this:
A
are not actually identical.
What they're not saying, and I think you're thinking that they are saying this, is that we get something like this:
A
changing to something like this:
B
They're not saying that.
They're saying it's:
A
and
A
But that those aren't actually identical.
you can change the words around and substitute japanese for english, for example, by if the original state is to retain its truth value, the meaning in which those words point must be identical in both cases.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I'm saying that A in itself doesn't point to anything, it is a variable which points to some tangible thing or some abstract concept, and that if you are to introduce another variable A, it must point to the same thing or concept that the original A points to, otherwise you must use a different variable such as A2, or B, etc... A is identical to A if A points to the same thing or concept in both cases, but A is not identical to A2 or to B if they point to different things or concepts which are not themselves identical with each other. A can change, and B, or C can be used to point to the same original thing or concept that A originally pointed to and there is no problem, but when you change the one A and not the other which still points to the original thing or concept, then they are no longer identical.
"But if the original statement" maybe? Again, could you read this stuff out loud and fix typos prior to posting it?
Truth value is a judgment that an individual makes on each instance, by the way. They do that in conjunction with their meaning assignments on that instance.
yet still, the truthiness of the statement is true whether or not the individual makes the judgment of its truthiness or not, so the truthiness of the statement precedes man's discernment of it, in terms of real world truths, this is what we're talking about in the post. You keep trying to turn the conversation down some twisted road that leads to nowhere, for what? to see who has a better grasp on the philosophy of language? We cannot get anywhere because you keep reverting back to your own conception of things, a conception which I've shown to be contradictory.
am I the chimp or the pig?
Since you asked, go ahead and pick one. I'd go with the pig. Oink oink. :_)
considering the fact that the argument was over with the OP, and everything that happened after that was unnecessary and primitive, I'll go with neither.
You missed option 4:
There is an underlying catergory error taking that a change in the world involves a change in meanings or abstracted ideas.
In this instance, the nominalist has a position which obtains: all events of time are change (moments of existence), while every meaning is its own and the same regardless of point in time ( which is, in turn, how change is coherently defined, since being a change, every moment must stand as it own unique meanging ).
I don't see a need for an option 4, and its very difficult for me to understand what you saying here; it's not exactly worded coherently. the position of the nominalist is that "nothing remains unchanged," correct? Or is this statement not representative of the nominalists view on things? Are you saying that because we can assign a new t-value for each moment of being that, since meaning is in time, presumably, meaning (t1) must be different from meaning (t2); how do you know that meaning is in time, that is, time as it is relative to the senses?
Ask the nominalist to account for shared meaning. Shared meaning is required for language use, particularly for picking out an individual/entity to the exclusion of all others.
But we do.
Some change is allowed without changing the identity of the thing in question.
No, it isn't. Truth is a judgment that an individual makes about the relation of a proposition to other things.
No, it isn't.
You can talk about P at T1, and I can talk about P at T1, and P at T1 is identical to P at T1--so what we're talking about can be identical. You're confusing that with our thinking, our utterances, etc. at T2, T3, etc. As always, what we're pointing to isn't the same thing as our pointing.
I was wondering, Terrapig, since it took time for you to speak those words inside your mind, and a duration of time to speak each individual word, how is it that you were able to use a single word that pointed to a single meaning even though that meaning had already changed before you finished thinking about it? It seems odd that you were still able to use a single word with a single unchanging meaning and then combine a multiplicity of them to make a coherent sentence with meaning even though the meanings of each word and also the meaning of the paragraph as a whole ha e already changed. In doing so, aren’t you disapproving the validity of your own theory, in real time? that is, contradicting yourself while you speak the words?
Meaning isn't something different than thinking, so what you're asking here makes no sense. You're talking about meaning as if it's something independent of thinking.
no, I’m not saying that meaning and thinking are mutually exclusive, only that thinking, that is, a particular set of words with a particular set of sounds, is not equal to the meaning, or that meaning is a subset of those words and sounds, but that those words and sounds are subsets of meaning, meaning, that their meaning precedes their existence in time.
I think that you should just give up, because you’re in over your head here and you just keep digging yourself deeper into the ground. Your inability to rationally address the whole of a statement, and nitpick a single part only, is keeping the conversation from progressing. It was over with the first post, a post which you still haven’t addressed thoroughly. Which of the numbers in the OP does your conception of nominalistic fall under, 1,2, or 3?
I wasn't saying "mutually exclusive" either. Meaning is a mental event. It's a type of thought.
The "ism" is just a name representing the views in question. It's easier to say "Jaws" than it is to explain all of the characters, the whole plot, etc. every time.
Which makes it possible for someone to refer to a topic in general terms without either knowing or understanding specifics.
either meaning and thought are mutually exclusive, which is impossible, meaning is a subset of thought, in which case, the existence of the thought precedes the existence of the meaning of the thought in time. For example, the meaning of the word “horse” preceded the existence of the word “horse,” in time. Now, I could make up a word or sentence in real time like “Terrapin is a duncerou” and the meaning of the word would come after the word, but if it is true that you’re a duncerou, it was true that you were a duncerou before I made up the word to point at it; meaning that meaning is contained within the words and the words not contained within meaning only when the words are made up and don’t stand for a verifiable truth but an imaginary falsehood, in which case those words have no valuable meaning and for all intents and purposes words are conceptually contained in their meaning, and meanings precede words.
Sure, that's possible, but I don't know how we'd avoid that wholesale, as every word we use represents something someone might be unfamiliar with or something they might not understand very well. Maybe we can get the folks who use words anyway to just stop talking. ;-)
Meaning is a subset of thought. In other words, not all thoughts are meaning, but some are. The existence of the thought in question (the thought that is meaning) doesn't precede the existence of the thought in question in time. (And that should be pretty obvious. Your comment shows, however, that you're having a problem understanding the idea that meaning is (identical to) a mental event, a specific (type of) thought.)
Meaning isn't an object external to us. Meaning is the act (or event) of making mental associations.
If I'm saying that meaning is identical to a mental event, you wouldn't respond with "so the meaning of the word 'horse' which means, 'that' animal existing in the world" unless you either don't understand or you're ignoring the view that I had just expressed.
Incoherence anyone?
Ah. You're learning... almost. Thinking/believing is the act. Meaning is the result.
We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1.
Quoting creativesoul
It's the same view I've had for decades. If it seems like I'm "learning" your view must be evolving.
Quoting creativesoul
:lol: :lol: :lol:
"We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1"
As I explained above, "what we're pointing to isn't the same thing as our pointing."
We can both point at A (or P) at time T1. That's what we're pointing to. A at T1 is identical to A at T1, right? It's the same thing, at the same time.
That's not the same thing as our pointing. My comment (made at T2, say) about A at T1 isn't identical to your comment (whether made at T2 or some other time) about A at T1.
Here's a very simple way to look at it:
You and I are both standing in a room. At the same time, we both point to a chair in the corner of the room. We're both pointing at the same chair. The chair I'm pointing to at that moment is identical to the chair you're pointing to at that same moment. That is, the chair at the moment is identical to that chair at that moment. "It is itself."
But my hand isn't identical to your hand, is it? Otherwise you'd better be worried when I go to wipe my ass.
What we're pointing to--the chair (at time T1) isn't the same thing as our pointing (our extended arms and fingers).
Less literally, we could both refer, propositionally, say, to the chair at T1. We're linguistically "pointing at" that chair at time T1. The chair at time T1 is still identical to the chair at time T1.
But our pointing--the prositions we're uttering, aren't identical. Just like my arm isn't the same as your arm.
I don't believe that all essences are eternal, so I'm not an essentialist, or a platonist in the truest sense of the word. However, I do believe that the Law of Identity and the Law of Non-Contradiction are eternal, and I've assigned both of these logical identities, ontological values that are eternal as well, which is something that no one else has done. I call this aspect of Existence, "Absolute Objectivity." All essences besides these are not eternal, going back into the past, but are eternal going forwards into the future because of the nature of Existence, all essences are preserved indefinitely after coming into existence.
Ever heard of time dilation?
Exactly. Glad someone else was also paying attention.
Also, more generally, the absurd notion that there is no shared meaning, if accepted, would render all discourse futile, because interlocutors could never be doing anything other than talking past one another. A lamentably useless position to hold!
I would concur. Good point on the matter of dilation as well.
It's not that I find it attractive, or a useful perspective or anything.
It's what the world happens to be like. My like or dislike of that is irrelevant. It's factually what the world is like, even if I wish it weren't like that, even if I think it would be better or more useful, etc. for it to be some other way.
Re the variety of positions under nominalism and what I think is the case with respect to them:
* There are no real (that is, extramental) abstracts
* Types/universals are concepts (that is, ways of thinking about particulars) (this is basically the conceptualist version of nominalism)
* Things are not identical through time (we think of them that way as an abstraction)
* Properties are real but they're unique particulars
* My view has some similarities to resemblance and trope nominalism, as I think that things are objectively more or less similar to each other while never being identical to each other as long as they're numerically distinct.
You should probably learn the details of my view first.
At any rate, say that T1 is a span rather than a point. (If you would been honest enough to think that one should know another's view prior to critiquing it--know it at least well enough that you could paraphrase it successfully in the opinion of the person in question--you would have known that I don't buy any real points, period.)
The span in question would be identical to the span in question, no?
We're can't refer to something in its own frame of reference? Again, you seem to not be able to grok the difference between our pointing and what we're pointing to. Time dilation would be relevant to our pointing, no?
Oh no, I dread to think what that would be like... If only there were some kind of Internet forum where that happened literally all the time... It could act as a warning to avoid such a horror at all costs!
It's lucky the idea of the impossibility of shared meaning is not universally accepted, but you might be able to find some local deviations if you search hard enough. You wouldn't be able to go in there and tell the participants they were talking past one another though, because no one really believes there is no shared meaning, and even if they did they wouldn't allow themselves to understand what you were saying. :yikes:
One could argue from a freeze-frame sort of line of thought. A picture in time. However, one cannot argue from that and arrive at no thing is identical through time for the argument itself requires significant passage of time and the speaker will not be able to remain coherent and successfully identify a thing/entity s/he is picking out to the exclusion of all others unless s/he calls the ever-changing thing by the same name despite the fact that everything is in flux.
A at t1 is A. A at t2 is A.
The alternative is untenable.
What would that have to do with what I was explaining re reference and whether two people/two instances can refer to literally the same thing?
Nothing you said there had any coherence. By the time I read it, the meaning had completely shifted.
Shit! It just happened again with what I'm writing here. What in hell's Creation do I mean? I mean what I don't mean to mean. :scream:
Stop being mean! :naughty:
No, it doesn't. It simply depends on the fact that there is change.
At any rate, you were supposedly taking issue with a post about reference. At least that's what you quoted and seemed to be critiquing.
If there is something that changes then there must also be something that remains the same. You are reifying the abstract stipulation that if something changes to any degree whatsoever, it can no longer count as being the same entity; and that way lies incoherence.
Because?
It sounds nice as a bumper sticker, but what's the reason that one would believe that?
Say that only a single electron exists. It ceases to exist and only a single proton exists. That's a change. What remained the same?
I.E The past is the past in relation to the present, but remains as the present in relation to itself.
I read that a few times, but I can't make any sense of it.
The past is changes that happened. I don't understand "but remains" or "as the present in relation to itself"??
Too bad.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Think of a man walking. He changes, because his position changes; but his position is not determined in relation to himself, as he is always centered on himself.
So it changes in relation to the environment, and it's the change of the environment that partly changes the man. But he remains the same to himself.
There's nothing abstract about particles like electrons and protons.
The idea that there has to be some nonchanging thing that changes, rather than there just being change, is either unanalyzed or it's due to sloppy analysis of possibilities.
Someone walking changes for many reasons, including both relations of bodily position--legs change distance relative to each other, knees bend, etc., and relative to things around the person. There's a lot more going on than that, but understandably, we need to grossly simplify this and leave a bunch of stuff out.
"Centered on himself" doesn't seem to make any sense. Neither does "the same to himself."
It's one reason: relation.
The amount of objects in relation is irrelevant.
In other words, many different relations.
I didn't say anything like that, and no, that's not my view. It would only make sense to figure that something like that is my view if one were to think that the only thing that makes anything distinct from anything else is that things can be identical through time. But I can't imagine anyone thinking that.
Quoting Janus
That part I'd agree with. But not because of this:
Quoting Janus
It's not that there's nothing but change. It's just that nothing is identical as changes occur.
Quoting Terrapin Station
To say that there is nothing but change just is to say that nothing is identical as changes occur. And there's a sense in which I would agree with this; but identicality is not coterminous with identity. I can be me, which is logically to say the same me (otherwise it is meaningless), across time without having to remain absolutely the same across time.
I'm not sure what you're referring to there re something I typed, but "you" across time, as a persistent entity, is an abstraction we perform. That abstraction is itself non-identical over time.
Quoting Janus
That's just another way of talking about the abstraction contra the fact that things aren't literally identical through time.
No they aren't.
First off, abstractions are mental acts that individuals perform.
You remember that I'm a nominalist, right? We're antirealists on abstract objects. Abstractions only exist as something we do mentally. Maybe you could try to formulate some sort of support for your alternate views, rather than just saying things like "rubbish"? How about telling me anything you take to be evidence of real (extramental) abstracts?
Abstracts/concepts are actually particular mental events. If you'd bother to learn something about nominalism, you'd see that conceptualism is one of the common nominalist stances.
yes, but all changes are mental events, so you’re really not saying much here, let alone refuting my claim.
Why would you believe that?
There's no requirement for objects to be identical through time.
When it doesn't change in the contextual frame in question.
because all changes bridge first and final causes.
First, let's be clear that ontological facts in no way hinge on how we determine anything. Only ontological facts of our determining actions as such would hinge on that.
Aristotelian nonsense? Seriously?
because there exists at least one final cause, first causes must exist, and if first causes exist, the universe has a first and final cause. it’s quite simple. how do you not understand this stuff, this is like philosophy 101
Isn't that simply saying that just in case someone does something in a goal-directed or purpose-oriented way, the goal-directed or purpose-oriented action must occur, and that requires an initial state followed by a consequent state?
What that has to do with a claim that change is necessarily mental is something that likely only you have any inkling of, if indeed it makes any sense to you (which I doubt).
Relevance to?
At any rate, I didn't say whether we can determine anything or not. I said let's be clear that ontological facts do not hinge on how we determine anything.
from what I’ve already said, the steps of logic which lead to the verification of my claim are very easy figure out; it seems that you’re too invested in your opinion to do the steps necessary do disprove it, that is, your own opinion.
"Change is only mental" isn't an empirical claim?
it’s a lost cause with you, you’re opinion won’t change if I prove it to you, and it won’t change if I don’t. Not even sure why anyone bothers to argue with you.
Would your opinion change if I "prove" mine to you?
:lol: you don’t know the first thing about logic. you still haven’t figured out that you lost the argument before you even started. the OP put nominalism in the coffin. and then I repeatedly kick it while it was down some-more, yet still you persist in trying to revive it. for this reason, I don’t think you’re actually capable of proving anything, because the context in which those proofs are being formulated, is faulty beyond repair.
So was that a yes or no?
So, what relevance do they have? Can we determine them or not?
Quoting TheGreatArcanum
That is something I have wondered myself many times; and even more I wonder why I continue to argue with him.
Aristotle all day! :strong:
Well, they'd be relevant to the way things are/to facts, including relational facts, to people who are interested in facts, etc.
We can determine this by looking at something in a particular reference frame and abstracting out the observational interaction, for example.
You just like the extra teeth.
We're you aware that Jesus, our lord and savior, was revived, [I]RESURRECTED[/I], in a mere span of 36 hours. Hallelujah!!!
Beating a dead horse can sometimes be amusing. :grin:
I'm also a sucker for the long in the tooth.
Actually, I just looked it up. That's hilarious :rofl: .
But as a nominalist, you know that nothing is absolute, so why would we begin to think such about Aristotle?
Quoting Terrapin Station
And how do we do that without relying on the notion of identity obtaining, and entities persisting, across time?
Speaking to a nominalist is like speaking to one under the oath of silence, you can always answer their questions for them, and with no resistance.
I wouldn't say that we observe things, examine things, etc. without performing both type/universal and genidentity (persistence through time) abstractions. Could we forego those abstractions? It would probably be possible for some people, but it would take a lot of practice to get used to it, and most would feel there's little benefit to it. We naturally think in terms of those abstractions.
This, however, does not imply that the abstractions obtain in the extramental world.
You always get my jokes. So, look into the humor and you will get the meaning. :grin:
"Think such about Aristotle"--think something "absolute" about him?
Yes
I don't know. What "absolute" thing was on the table?
That Aristotle was of absolute value. And we have univocally confirmed that he is not. Thank you.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I haven't said that it would or would not imply that. I don't even know what it could mean or what an "extramental" world could be.
Ah--got it now. Most of Aristotle I see as an example of "mistakes to avoid," so the notion of him being of "absolute value" was pretty far from my mind.
Oy vey. :brow:
Got it! The instruction mean, not the humour....yet. :lol: Actually I think I do almost get it now, but I won't attempt to explain, it because that would be likely to ruin it.
Its nominalism for God's sake. Fuckin Christmas!!! :joke:
As a nominalist, I said:
Quoting Merkwurdichliebe
By absolute value I mean "nothing". By univocally I mean "you". And, by we I mean "me". WHat the fUck does that even mean???
Fuck, I ruined it. :grin:
That is, actually what I meant.
Yeah, that's a convincing argument!
Just in case you were not aware, I am not in any way arguing for platonism. I am arguing that our notions of identity and difference are indispensable to discourse, and that we have no good reason, since all our knowledge relies on them, to doubt their veracity. We don't possess the conceptual tools to coherently doubt their veracity.
So, while we may be inclined to think we can be fairly confident that a "real" world exists beyond our necessarily concept-laden perceptual experience, we really have no idea what such a purportedly extra-mental world could be like.
The reason to doubt indentity through time is pretty simple. If there's a change in what we're calling "x," then "x" isn't identical at each of those "points."
But we can be relatively confident in the assertion that there is some universality in the mechanism which begets the concept-laden perceptual experience of the human organism. Call it the neo cortex. Hence we can unify our individual concepts through language.
That identification of an entity just is what indicates its identity, and it does not rely on all the parts remaining exactly the same through time. If you look at a cup on in front of you you cannot discern any microphysical changes that might be thought to have occurred to it from one moment to the next. We assume that such changes do occur, but if that assumption is correct it is specialized derivative knowledge which is based upon our identification of the entity in the first place, and it is not the case that our identification is dependent on those purported changes.
I addressed that already. The latter is simply a mental abstraction that we make.
Why would you doubt that? Why would it only be something that would evolve once we get to human brains and not in brains prior to human brains?
To "establish identity" is to formulate the abstraction in question. Again, why would you doubt that brains would be able to do this evolutionarily prior to human brains?
Not at all, it is merely to recognize entities. That animals do this is evidenced by observing their responses. It really just comes down to pattern recognition; being able to recognize recurring patterns. That ability does not rely on the ability to abstract; it is not an abstraction. The abstraction comes with the general notion of identity.
We could say that one is recognizing something that has a particular set of causal connections to a prior existent.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Wow...
I can’t believe that someone who fancies themselves to be a philosopher just wrote this. This might be the most ignorant thing that I’ve ever read in my entire life. Absolutes are truths that are true for all things, and also, eternally true, so what in the f are you talking about?
Great reading comprehension.
OK, insofar as I think I understand what you are saying here, I don't disagree; but I can't see the relevance. The animal presumably has no notion of recognizing anything like that, and humans don't necessarily or even usually have anything of that kind in mind when they recognize someone. It's simpler to think that the animal and the human just recognize repeating patterns. The way you look today would presumably allow anyone with a half-decent eye to recognize you in a photograph from thirty years ago of a group of say twenty people you were part of.
No need to posit "particular sets of causal connections to a prior existent".
At any rate, the gist of nominalism is that there's nothing extramental in all of this that's actually identical with numerically distinct or discernible things.
Right, so you'd be saying that some pattern A on occasion 1 isn't just similar to pattern B on occasion 2, but it's literally the same pattern, as in there's just one, and it's somehow instantiated in A and B at both occasions. How would that work ontologically? The pattern isn't just the one particular in that case, but somehow transcends the particular and is then instantiated in it. How would that work? Where would the pattern be located, for one?
If it changes how is it identical?
Nominalism is saying something about identicality. So if you're not, you're not presenting something contra nominalism. That's why I clarified this a few posts ago: "At any rate, the gist of nominalism is that there's nothing extramental in all of this that's actually identical with numerically distinct or discernible things."
Quoting Janus
Here, you're using the word "identical." So the question remains. If there is change, how is it identical at two different points? Or are you saying something about identity there and not identicality, in which case you shouldn't use the word "identical"?
Nominalists agree that we say things like "that's cat x at time T1 and cat x at time T2," but we say that the identity in question ("cat x") is a mental abstraction, which is itself not identical through time.
Each reference to a particular entity or identity is a different instance of reference, and so each act of reference is not identical to other acts of reference. But the referent is always the same referent. The referent being the same referent each time it is referred to does not logically depend upon the referent being physically unchanging from one moment to the next. To say that it does would be to commit a category error. You seem to be confusing yourself by getting your categories mixed up.
It's not "literally the same" if it's different, is it?
So the way that I'm using "literally" or "logically the same," which is a conventional way to use both terms, is that there's nothing different in either case. Regardless of the words we use, what nominalists are denying is that something is the same in this sense in two instances. They're not denying something other than that. So it's turning out that you might actually agree with nominalists, but you just have an issue with the terminology.
Okay, but do you understand that nominalists are only denying something absolutely unchanged on numerically distinct instances?
If x at time T1 and x at time T2 have an absolutely unchanged identity in your view, isn't (aren't?) the identity of x at T1 and x at T2 identical? If not why not?
With respect to the aspect that you'd say is identical, how would you say that time passes, since time is change or motion?
That holds better of properly quantified.
Some things recognized are mental activities.
Not disagreeing, but rather sharpening the terms of agreement.
Agreed.
Nominalism is untenable. A thing is not equivalent to it's name. A thing changes. It's name does not. If nominalism is held by a coherent advocate thereof, then s/he must admit that we cannot step into the same river once... We cannot step into that river!
Strict adherence renders language useless, at best...
It's a philosophical position that amounts to nothing more than willfully ignorant mental masturbation.
The confusion and misapplication of terms seems to me to be the main purpose of the nominalistic approach to discussion.
If you don’t hold to the above then could you please outline what you mean via the use and definition of terms like ‘object,’ ‘entity,’ ‘real,’ ‘concrete,’ and ‘abstract’.
Thanks
We need to go back a step then. I asked you this:
"If x at time T1 and x at time T2 have an absolutely unchanged identity in your view, isn't (aren't?) the identity of x at T1 and x at T2 identical?"
You responded with "That's right."
Again, "identical" refers to being exactly/literally the same, zero differences, or "absolutely unchanged" as you say, in two instances, including at two different times.
OK. When did the River Thames (for example) become 'that' river? It will have been a trickle at one point in the past. It would certainly have been in a different location before the southern uplift created the North Downs. So at what point in its history did it become 'that' river?
And while you're at it, you can explain at exactly what point 'that' river ends. How far out to sea, or how saline must the water be before it is no longer 'that' river? Where does 'that' river begin for that matter? Underground? The moment it breaches the surface? As soon as other tributaries join it?
I'm regularly dumbfounded by the number of people who seem to do philosophy on the basis of the whatever seems obvious to them must therefore be a fact of the world. It's unbelievably lazy thinking.
On my view, all abstracts, all abstraction is only a (particular, physical) mental event. It's a way that we think about things, about relations, etc. So this includes numbers.
Quoting I like sushi
It's primarily a position on universals. The idea is that there's not a "chair" universal (or a "round" universal, or a "red" universal, or anything like that), which isn't identical to any particular chair (or roundness or redness), that's then somehow instantiated in various particular chairs (or round or red things). Most nominalists don't buy realism (extramentalism or objectivity) for abstracts in general--whatever you want to call them, abstract objects, abstract entities, etc.
Quoting I like sushi
The gist of it isn't that it's an "approach to discussion." It's ontology. It's a stance about what sorts of things there are in the world.
Re "object" and "entity" I'm not using them in some technical manner. I use them as synonyms for a
Re "real," it's traditionally used in these discussions to refer to something existing (or subsisting, or again any word you want to use like that) "outside of" mentality. So if you think that x is real, or if you're a realist on x, that implies that you believe that x occurs apart from the mental.
"Concrete" is used for particulars--single things that are some specific way ("thing" is not being used technically there). "Concrete" usually has the additional connotations of being physical, in spacetime, etc.
"Abstract" is in contradistinction to "concrete." Abstracts are usually thought to have no physical referent, no referent in spacetime, and/or they are not particular things (again, "thing" there is just a nontechnical "
From what I can tell we probably only differ in our use of terminology so our views are likely different only due to semantics.
I don’t adhere to psychologism. I can sympathise with that perspective though.
The way I've used "real," and especially in its connection to any discussion of nominalism, should be pretty clear from context to anyone who has studied or who reads a lot of philosophy. What I described is a very common way to use the term, especially historically, and especially in the context of the issue of nominalism. But I don't mind clarifying it when folks ask, as you did.
As for the use of “real” it is far from apparent exactly what you mean. Not to mention I asked about what kind of “nominalism” previously and you appeared not to understand the question. Maybe if you look here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/#VarNom
Note: there isn’t an instance where “real” is mentioned in that passage. Nominalism is generally in the category of metaphysics whenever I’ve seen it discussed and the term used is generally “object” - referencing the semantic difference between the “abstract” and “concrete”.
I’m just someone who hasn’t read “a lot” (how much is “a lot”?) of philosophy though, but that’s what I’ve come across.
I mentioned conceptualism, trope nominalism, etc. in my answer. You never commented on my response to your query (not that I saw, at least).
Quoting I like sushi
"Realist/realism" etc. occur on that page 26 times by my count, including in the subsection about the varieties of nominalism. The traditional debate with respect to nominalism, by the way, is known as the "nominalism vs realism" debate.
My mistake about your reply! I got my wires crossed there. I still don’t really understand what kind of nominalism you adhere to though - too many subtleties to it. You fall short of Conceptualism though? Yet I do see that concept nominalism is sometimes regarded as synonymous to Conceptualism.
I don’t see personally see how ‘numbers’ are not real - even though they are abstract. I don’t see how someone can claim to have an ‘opinion’ about basic arithmetic, but I am quite willing to accept that numbers don’t reflect physical reality because two apples are not the same apples, yet the ‘two’ we talk of is never some different ‘two’.
What makes someone a realist? What is the view of someone who is a realist on x that makes them a realist on x? Realists think what?
(I'll get to the other stuff after we think about the above)
If someone was to say to me they were a realist it wouldn’t give me anything near an understanding of there overall view. I would assume that they were probably scientific in their approach though, but dogmatic in their dismissal of any other possible perspective.
I find it rather amusing when one argues in such way...
Those are not consequences or troubles arising from my position. They are consequences of a strict adherence to nominalism. I've no burden to defend those.
The irony of it all given the charge of "lazy thinking"...
:kiss:
Things are in a constant state of flux. The identity of a thing need not be. In fact, change could not even be taken account of if we demanded such.
Those are consequences or troubles arising from your position. They are not consequences of a strict adherence to nominalism. You have a burden to defend those.
The irony of it all given the charge of "lazy thinking"...
Well, this is fun isn't it? Do you want to present an actual argument yet or shall we just clarify that we disagree for a bit longer?
An argument for what? Need I present an argument to show you that nothing you've said bears upon my position? We isolate and subsequently identify a thing by virtue of naming practices. Some of those things change and/or evolve. It is the same thing nonetheless.
The river named Danube changes. The Danube's changes cannot be properly accounted for unless it's identification remains the same. "The Danube" picks out that river along with it's changes to the exclusion of all others and their changes.
It's the same river.
Your turn.
Yes. That's the bloody point of a discussion forum. It's not your personal blog.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, I'm aware that you think that, now try to reason that conclusion. Why do you think that it remains the same thing despite some of it changing?
Quoting creativesoul
Again. Why do you think this? Give, perhaps, an example of how such improper accounting might come about. What would be the consequences? Why might we want to avoid them?
Quoting creativesoul
Indeed it does, which is a discussion about language. Nomilaism is an ontological position. It's about what exists extra-mentally, not about how language works.
Quoting creativesoul
Why?
Good luck trying to pin “creativesoul” on this point. Granted the semantics of the discussion matter, but I fear the aforementioned person is perhaps more interested in weaving back and forth between various semantic values than sticking to one in particular (after a page or two of what is about to proceed you may come to the same conclusion).
@Terrapin Station If there is weight to our exchange it may be better served in a separate thread. Split off where you see appropriate :)
Yeah, I've had a few discussions with CS before.. It's just a matter of presenting what I can until the argument gets dismissed with some one-line quip about red-herrings.
Quoting I like sushi
It depends on the context. Often we'll say that we're realists or antirealists on x, or the conversation will be solely about the ontology of x. That simply means that one is respectively asserting or denying objective existence/independence of human thought with respect to x.
If the context isn't clear aside from it being a philosophical context, realism is usually being contrasted with idealism, in the broadest sense, where one is a realist just in case one believes that there is (a la ontological realism) and/or we can access (a la epistemological realism) some objective/human-independent things, without one specifying just what things.
As I was pointing out to Janus, what nominalists are denying is that two numerically distinct instances can be exactly the same, so that it's literally one thing and not numerically distinct in the relevant respect, with respect to some x. So either some A and some B that are numerically distinct via being spatially separated, or A at time T1 versus A at time T2, which is numerically distinct via temporal separation.
In this sense - and as seems apparent to this thread - “real” can be written and have different meanings. Given that the author of the OP has been talking along the lines of ‘universals’ it would perhaps have served a purpose to outline the possible connotations and make as explicit as possible what is meant by “real” for the purpose of the thread.
Some perspectives, of certain adherences to nominalism, have a certain stink of ‘psychologism’ to them; I am not convinced by arguments from psychologism, but I’m not massively familiar with them and I’d like to learn more about them.
In what way does that distinguish it from any other philosophical position? Or your own statement for that matter, which is based on the semantics of "based upon"?
The problem with parsing it that way is that one can be an antirealist on universals and essences while not denying universals and essences. That's the conceptualist brand of nominalism in a nutshell.
Yes, it seems to be "much ado about nothing". We all know that entities are constantly changing, although obviously more or less than other entities and kinds of entities. Common usages of the word 'same' do not always, or even mostly, imply "exactly in every detail the same'. All humans are the same, insofar as they are human. All rivers are the same, insofar as they are rivers.
But no two humans or two rivers are the same, insofar as they are different instances of human or river. And no human or river is exactly the same from one moment to the next. And yet a river or a human is the same river or human (as distinct from all the other rivers or humans) throughout its entire existence as river or human. The logic here is really not that hard!
It doesn't. It makes it the same.
:rofl:
If one holds to nominalism and remains coherent, they end up saying things like you cannot step into the same river once.
The problem, of course, is that we do talk about the same river. We can because we allow some arbitrary amount of change prior to changing how we talk about that which has changed.
The point is that we identify with names. The names often remain the same even if the referent has undergone significant change. The other point is that a strict nominalist cannot account for a thing changing.
Yup.
There are much better ways to deny that much. Some which do not lead to reductio. Others are not inherently incapable of accounting for change... which is rather ironic... all things considered.
The point is not for nominalism to deny the use of universal terms, it's to describe them accurately as being a mental construction within individual minds. Universals as existant objects would be objective, one would be right or wrong about them, yet if they are, in reality, mental constructions, simply agreed upon by a majority, then we are claiming universal rightness and wrongness on the basis of mob agreement. If neither of you can see a moral, or even political, problem with that philosophy, then I pity the fight against authoritarianism in your respective countries.
Yes, and in addition there must be continuity and sufficient commonality of attribute (sameness and uniqueness) across time within that which is being named to ensure that the name can continue to be coherently used to refer to it.
If that's all that nominalists are doing, why isn't it as good as any other way, and how would it lead to a reductio?
There are people, including philosophers, who posit that multiple instances of things, whether temporal or spatial or both, can somehow be (not just conceptually, not just in name, etc.) identical in some regard--that is "exactly the same," numerically identical in some regard. Nominalists are taking issue with that (at least as one prominent branch of nominalism). If you don't agree with the notion that multiple instances of things can be (not just conceptually etc.) identical in some regard, then you're actually on the nominalist side of the debate.
You've said that a couple times. Could you maybe explain it?
"Numerically identical": if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious.
"Not just conceptually, not just in name": would something being conceptually numerically identical be exactly the same as something being numerically identical just in name?
There are many waves in the surf, and each wave is generated, rolls in and then breaks on the shore. Do you think each wave, considered as an entire process or event from generation to breaking on the shore to be numerically identical and hence numerically distinct from all other waves?
The problem I see with your notion of things being numerically identical only at T1, T2, T3....etc. is that, if those instants are not dimensionless, i.e. if they are temporally extended, then each of them has its own process of change occurring within it, which would mean that any entity would never be numerically distinct at all, and could not ever be said to exist as an entity. That is, in other words, if you take numerical identicality to be equivalent to numerical identity then there is no instant except for an absolutely temporally unextended instant (which obviously cannot exist) in which an entity can be itself. And that of course would mean that an entity cannot exist or be itself at all.
If we accept that entities are themselves only conceptually, does that mean that there is absolutely nothing in the world or about the world that leads us to conceive of entities as possessing stable identities? Would this not amount to saying that they are not entities at all? If you do want to say that, which most of what you say indicates, then the problem I see for your position would be that it leads to an absolute dualism of mind and world with an unbridgeable gulf between. That's why I say your position is inherently incoherent.
The irony here... there are two ways to say much the same thing. You could look at the second paragraph from the bottom in the above post, or think about the following question while paying particularly close attention to the inevitable logical consequence that your answer will produce
How much time can pass before a river is no longer the same river?
Arguing that items existent are NON-CHANGING based in the hoodwinked premise that CHANGE is understood is ridiculous. Equally so, arguing that items existent are CHANGING based in the hoodwinked premise that NON-CHANGING is understood is ridiculous.
The nonsense of this thread seems to be in a two-way denial of the initial statement above (1st para.). The only serious opposition possible is being voiced in selective circumstances - and can be for either bizarre polar-view espoused. The “selective circumstances” are SETS. Within a SET a prerequisite LAW is set out - there is no exception when we talk of ALL abstraction; and it is through such abstractions that we navigate a landscape that is consistent enough to be referred to in areas as changing or non-changing, as similar or different WITH these articulated ideas being applicable in multiple ways with multiple reaches of usefulness. Our task is to explore where best to apply constants and where best to question previously established constants. I don’t think purposefully talking past each other or using vague thoughts cast out as ‘knowledge’ - by aphorism or metaphor - helps unless they are explicitly put out as growing ideas and/or taken with a degree of generosity.
Noe of the above means we should accommodate everyone. I won’t accommodate creativesoul until I see consistency in argumentation and a genuine attempt to communicate by answering direct questions directly (at least in part) - this critique is from another thread where I tried repeatedly only to be met with continual evasion (on no less then a half-dozen instances).
As for critiques:
@creativesoul You’re too vague because you try to be too precise. Your attempts to communicate ideas are often consist of avoiding points and merely asking questions as if to appear to be some wise sage. Plainer words and direct answers and questions would be more welcome - I expect more drivel from you though as it appears that is your habit (that is the honest truth).
@Terrapin Station You’re too unwilling to state the obvious. Many discussions I’ve observed you partaking in go off the rails because you assume too much of the reader and don’t make clear enough what is explicit to yourself. This is a VERY tough problem fro all of us and I can relate to omitting what I consider ‘trivial’ details! Try practicing a more ‘generous’ approach to people replies; if they seem nonsensical it is likely due to some disjoint rather than just being plain stupidity.
@Janus You agree above with creativesoul yet you fall into the trap of assuming there is such a thing as a “strict nominalist” with little appreciation of wha that means.
The OP is a strawman attack. There is the assumption of some Nominalist Ideal, which is ironically like stating nominalism is a constant yet it doesn’t exist. The argumentation taken up during most of this thread has been mostly poor and emotionally reactionary. Accusation have flown around and very little attempt has been made to understand the perspective of the other - or in some cases (here’s looking at you creativesoul) any attempt at reconciling to someone else’s view has been met with obstinance, avoidance and outright sophistry.
I haven't said anything about a 'strict nominalist".
Note you said this “in addition” to this by creativesoul:
As usual this is nonsense/strawmanning. If I am to view things from a nominalist perspective I can certainly account for change. I highlighted already in my previous post the duplicity behind this. Just because things that are very similar - and often within a limited set of experience - appear as being as good as the SAME it doesn’t mean they are NON-CHANGING. If two bananas are rotting at the same rate then relative to each other they are NON-CHANGING, so to suggest that anyone saying so isn’t accounting for ‘a thing changing’ is simply deceptive.
On a neurological level we have two conflicting appreciations. One is our priming bias and the other is the bias to address unique phenomenon. We necessarily have to exist in a state of flux between different degrees of conformity and exploration. Our ignorance allows understanding and our knowledge allows its own destruction in part not totally. A child seeing a horse for the first time will say “big dog” because that is the closest approximation the child possesses in its lexicon - the child is correct, yet they call it “big dog” to check against what its social circle calls said “big dog” and adjusts its speech to fit.
The point being is that there are ‘aspects’ from any given understanding that cannot be subtracted without altering the basic grounding. It would be a very strange child that was to point to a cup and say “small dog” as a cup is missing several aspects associated with “dog”. In this sense the nominalist is saying “dog” is not real but that “a dog” is real. One is abstract and the other is concrete. The nominalist perspective does struggle to reconcile when such real objects are atomized and this is because the experience of objects disappears - meaning only having a concept of “leg” without “body” is utterly pointless as you’d be saying “leg” but meaning “body” (that may be a little hard to grasp because I cannot think of a better way to word it right now.)
Do you mean explain things like I'm teaching a 101 level course? I avoid doing that here because everyone wants to act like they're the expert, like they're the teacher. So I acquiesce to the positioning that they're familiar with all of this stuff already.
Again, there actually are people who assert that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. So in their view, this isn't "defining away" the possibility of indenticality in two instances.
Nominalists disagree with the view that two different instances of something can be a numerically identical instantiation of some single thing. Realists (on universals, genidentity, etc.(the latter you'd probably prefer to call "genidenticality," given what's being claimed)) are who we're disagreeing with.
What exactly have I said which you consider "nonsense/ strawmanning'? I corrected you for apparently claiming that I had referred to "strict nominalists", and you responded by quoting a passage form me that doesn't contain that term, and one from @creativesoul which does. What's the relevance of the latter having used the term? I am not creativesoul. We are not the same entity. :wink:
As to the above passage of yours; you need to read more carefully. Where have I said that change cannot be accounted for from a nominalist perspective. My criticism was that if the nominalist wants to say that an entity is only the same or identical to itself at a given time T, that this is false, or at least facile, because there is no actual time T during which there is absolutely no change. I have said that there is no absolute sameness and an entity may be across time the same entity with out the nonsensical requirement that it be absolutely unchanging.
Your first passage above seems to be speaking not about nominalism but about those who disagree with it; so what is the relevance of that to my statement that if you define, as I believe nominalists generally do, identity across time as recurring "numerically identical instantiations of some single thing" you are "defining away" identity altogether?
So, your second passage above says that nominalists do disagree with that view, which I was already well aware of. I am also well aware that nominalists are anti-realists in regard to universals, essences, and genidentity and so on, so what was the purpose of pointing that out if not just to try to make yourself look smart?
My argument has been that identity consist in continuity (not absolute lack of change) across time, and that this continuity is not merely conceptual, or if it is then the world, considered independently of minds is always already "conceptually shaped", as per something like John McDowell's or Robert Brandom's ideas, such that it can be intelligible to minds. In fact if identity wasn't grounded in something more than merely mentally occurring concepts, then there would be nothing at all in the world to correspond with our concepts.
And yet you say you don't need 101 material. You're not understanding simple things I'm writing.
Such as understanding what the different sides of what the nominalism versus realism debate are even claiming.
For one, not understanding that people don't universally deny identicality multiply instantiated.
I acknowledge that there are those who claim that there are real essences, or souls or what-have-you. I have not been concerned with those kinds of claims at all, and you would know that if you had read with care. The irony is that I have understood what you have written; it is rather that you have not understood and responded to what I have written, because as always you process everything and distort it through the muddied lens of your own presuppositions.
"if you define that as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life"
Via saying that a simple description of identicality being multiply instantiated "defines it away" so that no one would hold the view.
As I always seem to end up saying to you: if you don't present something cogent and relevant to what I have actually been saying, then I won't respond further.
You're calling me a fuckwit and you still can't even get straight if we're talking about identicality or identity per the distinction you introduced earlier.
What do you think "that' refers to in the passage below, which you quoted from me (and lifted out of context) if not identity? (In future quote the whole relevant passage and/or use the 'quote' function instead of copying and pasting so that I can easily refer back to the context of the passage being quoted).
Quoting Terrapin Station
"Numerically identical." You preceded "if you define that . . ." with "Numerically identical," followed by a colon, because that's what I had just explained.
Yes, but this is in response to your passage quoted above where you say that people claim that a thing's identity is dependent on it being numerically identical in the way you have defined it. We were discussing identity. So, if identity is dependent on numerical identicality and you define the latter "as meaning that an entity is absolutely unchanging from one moment to the next then you have defined away the possibility that any entity could be the same entity throughout its life, and that is pretty much trivially obvious." It should have been obvious to you that "any entity could be the same entity throughout its life" is a reference to identity.
The passage you quoted there does not use the word "identity," it's not saying anything about identity (per the distinction between identity and identicality as we've been employing it), and I'd not say that identity (again, per the distinction as we've been using it) hinges on something being numerically identical. I was pointing out that nominalism is about identicality per the distinction we're using, not identity.
Who knows why you're arguing with me? :wink:
I was simply explaining that nominalism is about indenticality, and there are people who claim identicality over multiple instantiations. If you do not, then you're actually on the nominalist side of things, at least for this issue.
And again I would point out that even those who are realists about universals, essences, souls or whatever are not claiming total and absolute identicality of entities over multiple instantiations; to claim such a thing would be patently absurd. In any case I haven't been concerned about those kinds of metaphysical issues, but I have been saying that identity is about recognizable continuity over time as a real phenomenon, so I am most certainly not "on the nominalist side of things".
Quoting Terrapin Station
Well, I can't help you there because I have no idea; it seems to offer no satisfaction and to be a complete waste of time. In fact I don't believe I have been arguing with you,(since I haven't been able to discern a cogent position on your side to actually argue against) so much as correcting your repeated misinterpretations of what I have said.
Perhaps it will be better if we ignore one another in the future.
I didn’t confuse you with what creativesoul wrote. Don’t play that game.
I cannot honestly agree or disagree with what people are saying here because no one seems to be able, or willing to try, to articulate what they mean concisely - creativesoul being an active participant in doing the exact opposite with obscurantism.
Terrapin seems to think nominalism is a doctrine that doesn’t possess any nuanced views (and that they are not “views” merely evident obviousnesses) and you seem to be floundering between two poles trying to understand them, but no one is playing.
I’ve stated my position as clearly as possible and don’t feel the need to call it ‘nominalism,’ ‘realism’ or ‘relativism’. I think it is easy enough to sum up by saying “a dog” is real, but “dog” is not real - in the nominalist sense. There are problems embedded within I would’ve liked to have discussed but there seems an unwillingness (not on your part) to look at this. I’ve also posed the question to Terrapin about psychologism given that conceptual nominalism is often called psychologism (something I am highly dubious about and that few people hold to).
No, that's not correct given the distinction as it's been made.